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There is a growing body of literature on digital inequalities with an interest in 
mending inequalities in a world that increasingly relies on the digital by identifying 
and isolating the factors that predict digital opportunities. However, there is little 
which addresses differences in Internet access where infrastructural access in terms 
of availability and affordability is not an issue. In addition, artificially limiting 
Internet access is becoming normalised, with limitations used liberally as means for 
control, neglecting the potential implications of such measures. 
The inspiration for this research came from the small body of knowledge 
available on the effect of artificial Internet limitations on digital inequalities and the 
consequences of Internet controls on how people make use of the Internet. This 
research highlights these potential consequences, whether deliberate or not, and link 
them to outcomes of Internet use, while shedding light on the effectiveness of such 
limitations. The research was motivated by a belief in the potential the Internet allows 
as an open platform for a universe with equal access and opportunities for the people. 
The first part of the research studied artificial Internet limitations in three 
communities, Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore, as a factor in determining digital 
inequalities through two studies aimed at assessing change in opportunities, measured 
as differences in tangible outcomes of Internet use, as a function of artificial Internet 
limitations. The findings showed that artificial Internet limitations do indeed affect 
digital opportunities, producing lower satisfaction, with achievement opportunities 
attained when the individual is able to circumvent the controls. 
The second part of the research is a practical implementation of the model 
developed in the first part to predict digital opportunities in one of the projects to 
reach new Internet users, commonly referred to as Next Billion(s). Facebook’s Free 
Basics platform was chosen as an example. The platform provides access to a set of 
services without incurring data charges in a form of zero-rating. The innate limitations 
of the platform were proven to limit the potential for individual to access any content 
not within the walled garden of the platform with near-zero circumvention potential, 
leaving opportunities provided by the platform to wither in front of the limitations set. 
People with access only to that platform remain passive consumers and part of 
disconnected and excluded communities, as the platform limits the potential for 
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1.1 Study Motivation 
Is all Internet access equal? The question that inspired this research towards 
a quest to look at potentially neglected differences in Internet access and trying to 
measure the effect they have on how people make use of the Internet. The difference 
in Internet access as a determinant for digital inequalities is not fully covered in the 
current body of literature discussing digital inequalities. Allowing the opportunity for 
this research to offer a much-needed contribution to knowledge in the form of a fresh 
look on nuances in differentiation in access among the connected resulting from 
avoidable limitations. The other field this research touches on is Internet censorship 
studies, which the research contributes to by connecting it with the field of digital 
inequality studies, to provide a wider perspective of the implications of censorship 
and other artificial Internet limitations on tangible outcomes of Internet use. 
The normalisation of artificial Internet limitations, sometimes as a 
misconception of how networking works, leads to resorting to measures and controls 
that produce these limitations as means of control, neglecting the potential negative 
consequences of such measures. This research tries to highlight these potential 
consequences, whether deliberate or not, and link them to outcomes of Internet use, 
while shedding a light on the effectiveness of such limitations, motivated by a belief 
in the potential the Internet allows as an open platform for a universe with equal 
access and opportunities for the people. 
1.2 Scope 
The scope of this research is to identify artificial Internet limitations and 
tangible outcomes of Internet use in Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore, and then the 
research covers Facebook’s Free Basics as an Internet platform for the Next 
Billion(s), by studying the main innate artificial limitations and predicting outcomes 
of use correlated with these limitations. The artificial Internet limitations in this 
research are defined as the limitations imposed artificially over the network and can 
be changed with no significant change in technology. The limitations studied are 
imposed at network and community levels, and thus affects a whole network or 
portions of it rather than an individual user. The artificial Internet limitations are 
grouped as direct and indirect, with direct limitations presented by technical controls, 
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such as blocking of websites and services, and the indirect limitations comprised of 
activities that deter unwanted usage or aim at changing behaviour, such as 
intimidation from unapproved usage. 
The notion of tangible outcomes of Internet use is defined as the influence of 
online activity on offline activities grouped as fields of economic (property, income, 
education or employment), cultural (identity, belonging), social (with personal, 
formal, and political or public networks), and personal (health, self-actualisation, and 
leisure) use, as achievement, and satisfaction with related Internet affordances 
compared to offline-only use. The tangible outcomes are used in this research as 
specific indicators for digital inequalities, as they offers an overview of the difference 
in opportunities among individuals obtained through online activity and applied in the 
offline world. This indicator is assumed more reliable than indicators such as time 
spent online, and speed of access, as it reflects developments in personal life 
opportunities, and their satisfaction with the affordances offered online.  
Facebook’s Free Basics, the platform that allows access to a predefined set of 
online services with no charge for data transferred, as used in this research refers to 
the platform offered through both the mobile application and web access. The innate 
limitations studied refer to the general limitations imposed by the platform as 
indicated in the technical specifications and guidelines available for the general 
platform, and do not cover any special arrangements that may be taking place within 
a specific community. The testing of the network took place within the Zain mobile 
network in Jordan, but the findings comply with general technical specifications and 
guidelines and thus can be generalised to the expected innate limitations in other 
networks where this platform is offered. 
The research scope is, however, limited to the users of the Internet within the 
countries selected as it focuses on differentiated outcomes of Internet use, and thus 
targets Internet users. This limits the remit of this research by excluding individuals 
that are totally excluded from network society through artificial Internet limitations, 
such as with Internet shutdowns, or deliberate efforts to keep connectivity away from 
specific regions, or individuals that chose not to connect as a result of coercion. 
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1.3 Research Questions, Aims, and Objectives 
This research aims to identify the role artificial Internet limitations have in 
determining digital inequalities, in order to transform communities through better 
opportunities by highlighting the correlation and applying the predicted impact on 
networks with innate limitations. The research questions as formulated below serve 
to ascertain the relationship and enable application of the findings, with each research 
question followed by the set of objectives that contributes to answering it. 
1. What are the relationships between Artificial Internet Limitations and Digital 
Inequalities manifested as tangible outcomes of Internet use as measured among 
samples from Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore? 
Objectives set to answer this question: 
a. To evaluate the status of the Internet studied through identifying artificial 
Internet limitations imposed, whether direct or indirect. 
b. Investigate tangible outcomes of Internet use as reported by individuals in 
the countries of research, in terms of achievement and satisfaction. 
c. Explore the correlations between predictors related to artificial Internet 
limitations and the tangible outcomes of Internet use, at community and 
individual levels. 
2. How do the relationships developed predict inequalities in communities with 
Internet access that is artificially limited, in particular, Facebook’s Free Basics as 
an example of Internet for the Next Billion projects? 
Objectives set to answer this question: 
a. To evaluate the status of Facebook’s Free Basics in terms of artificial 
Internet limitations innate to the platform. 
b. Project findings of the correlation between artificial Internet limitations 
and tangible outcomes of Internet use on the platform using predictors 
found on the network level. 
The methods used reflected the research questions and objectives set above, 
influenced by the transformative-emancipatory perspective to mixed-methods 
research as described by Martens (2003), which serves the main aim of the research, 
supporting transformation through information on the effects of limitations, and 
creating a set of policy recommendations. 
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1.4 Impact and Contribution to Knowledge 
The impact of the research stems from multiple dimensions, including the 
main transformative aim of the research, the data and knowledge captured, the 
findings reached, and several contributions to the practice. The dissertation situates 
itself in the contemporary discussion on digital inequalities beyond basic access, 
skills, and outcomes divides, by offering a different and original look on nuances in 
differentiation in access among the connected as resultant from avoidable limitations. 
This research also contributes to the field of censorship studies by providing a view 
based on a global network connecting people from the West, the Middle East, and 
Asia, as opposed to the Global North and American-centric view dominating in the 
field as described in the literature review. 
This fresh look opens opportunities to expand the research either horizontally 
by applying the research methods and design to more communities, or vertically by 
discussing power relations and differentiation in access as advised by infrastructures, 
international relation and hegemony aspects, as well as closer to the individual, with 
limitations set by the technologies used. The data, analysis, and recommendations 
reached in this research also provide a good account that can be used in Internet 
censorship studies to compare actual implications of censorship beyond theoretical 
rhetoric on who controls what, while shedding light on understudied communities. 
By the time of submission, the concepts discussed in this research were 
utilised to advise the following contributions: 
• Research project on the weaponisation of access, or the use of artificial 
Internet limitations to produce and maintain digital inequalities as an 
instrument to support hegemony. The project included a book chapter, 
guest lecture, and a conference paper. 
• A co-authored peer-reviewed journal article on digital divides, titled “The  
Three  Levels  of  Digital  Divide  in  East  EU Countries” 
• A co-authored book chapter on digital inequalities, titled “Digital 
Inequalities in European Post-Soviet States” 
• A book chapters on the relation of Internet affordances and tangible 
outcomes of Internet use, titled “Defying Borders in the Levant: 
Contemporary Dance and the Internet”. 
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• A book chapter on digital inclusion and practices with unexpected events, 
titled “Digital Inclusion in Jordan: Opportunities and Hurdles”. 
  
Data collected on the communities studied in this research also offer a window 
for impact, especially given that the communities selected are among the less-studied 
communities. The data collected allowed for the following contributions so far: 
• Presentation of initial findings to a multidisciplinary audience, including 
non-academic Internet governance actors in the GIG-ARTS2018 
conference held in Cardiff. The paper titled "Meaningful access and 
tangible outcomes of Internet use, Bahrain case study", was presented 
based on preliminary data collected for this research from Bahrain. 
• Discussion on anomalies found in data collected from Estonia, advising 
the less documented and researched practice of escaping localities using 
circumvention tools. The discussion was presented at the European 
Communication Research and Education Association 2018 conference, 
Lugano, with a  poster titled  “Bypassing localities:   shifting   Internet 
access to join intercultural communication”. 
Further contributions come from practical aspects related to the research, from 
promoting the concept of artificial Internet limitations to development and sharing of 
research instruments, as well as data contributed to open repositories. Some of the 
impact already achieved in this category includes: 
• Developing the survey used in three additional languages to the one 
available as part of the framework, making a version in Arabic, Estonian, 
and Mandarin available for sharing with the academic community. The 
Arabic version was already shared with the framework developers in LSE 
to be used in a project on Kuwait. 
• Supporting the Open Observatory for Network Interference in advising on 
the mobile probe that was launched in February 2017 and was instrumental 
in expanding the data collection of the project, and getting measurements 
from areas with no measurements previously collected, including Bahrain. 
• The concept of artificial limitations developed in this research made its 
way to the definition of Meaningful Connectivity as developed by the 
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Association for Affordable Internet (A4AI) as a new standard to measure 
Internet access. 
The potential for impact continues to be possible, with more research and 
dissemination conducted, whether to augment the findings, build on concepts 
developed, or to use the policy advice the research concludes by suggesting ways to 
to transform individuals’ access to increase the opportunities individuals have, and 
potentially address digital inequalities. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
The dissertation takes a simple structured approach to achieve its goals and 
thesis, the structure is described in figure 1-1, with details on each chapter following. 
The approach taken allowed for gradual knowledge building from the current body of 
research and for designing methods to answer the research questions in a rigorous 
manner, followed by data collection and analysis of the two studies as pillars of the 
research to apply the knowledge developed on a real-life case with yet another 
understudied community. Finally, the research concludes with a summary of the 
process and building for future research and further contributions to knowledge. 
Figure 1-1 





















The research begins with paving the grounds for analysis based on theories of 
technology adoption and inequalities in the digital world, including the concepts of 
stratification and normalisation as forces behind changes in opportunities. The 
research then gets into the details of the studies conducted, from Study 1, which 
provides the foundations for comparison among communities studied in terms of 
artificial Internet limitations, to Study 2, which builds a body of knowledge on 
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tangible outcomes of Internet use in those communities and the correlations different 
predictors at the individual level have with these outcomes. The research then goes to 
discuss the findings of the effect of artificial Internet limitations on tangible outcomes 
of Internet use and later on provides an additional study that is considered an 
application to the final findings, hence the unorthodox structure of having a study 
following the discussion chapter. The last chapter provides advents for additional 
impact on supporting knowledge on newly established networks that are inherently 
limited, and the prospects they offer to the communities they are serving in terms of 
digital inequalities. 
Chapter 2 provides attempts to review the current body of knowledge related 
to the link between artificially limited Internet access and digital inequalities and 
development resultant from access to information, thus it necessarily draws upon 
theories and approaches settled in a variety of disciplines, including media and 
communication studies, social studies, and technological aspects of Internet access 
and availability. The review goes briefly through foundations of wide-scale media of 
communications, from electrical to digital, highlighting the expectations of 
communication technologies to change the world and necessarily eradicating 
inequalities in access to knowledge. The review looks in-depth at theories and models 
aiming at explaining adoption and diffusion of technology, to understand what factors 
suspected as determinants to access and usage, and then move towards social study’s 
theories on the digital divide, to see what these theories base research on in terms of 
factors and predictors. The discussion in chapter 2 allows for an understanding on 
views from different disciplines on what affects access and use, enabling for a 
conclusion on what variables needed for the measurement of digital opportunities and 
outcomes of access, and as a result, digital inequalities. 
Following the literature review, the Methodology chapter, Chapter 3, looks at 
the research questions detailing the design of research methods to answer these 
questions while highlighting the rationale behind each decision taken in relation, 
including community and sample selection, and listing potential limitations with 
suggested ways to mitigate their effects on the quality of the research. The chapter 
builds on the conclusion of the gaps in understanding and explaining the effect of 
artificial Internet limitations on digital inequalities described in the previous chapter, 
with a design for the research covering two-tier approach for studying limitations and 
digital inequalities, followed by a third study as an application for findings. Each of 
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the two first studies is designed as a mixed-method study, with quantitative and 
qualitative instruments. The chapter also covers ethical considerations, validity and 
reliability, and limitations of the research. 
The first of the two core studies of the research follows in Chapter 4, covering 
the first leg of the correlation sought after in studying artificial Internet limitations 
and digital inequalities, the limitations part. Through studying the three countries 
covered in this part of the research, Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore, as three 
communities of Internet users, fulfilling the requirements of the transformative-
emancipatory perspective to mixed methods. The chapter is structured to cover each 
country in a separate section, starting with a brief context on the country. Then to 
provide a look at digital inequalities and inclusion efforts that affect digital 
opportunities, followed by an examination of network measurements collected from 
networks, then a review of reported Internet limitations to advice change in policies 
and perceived limitations, to conclude each section with key findings. The chapter 
ends with a comparison of critical findings as a conclusion, which is incorporated and 
further studied in the discussion chapter. 
The second leg of the correlation, the digital inequalities, is studied in Chapter 
5 by researching the inequalities in the tangible outcomes of Internet use as the 
measurement adopted for inequalities in opportunities for Internet users. The chapter 
structure differs from the previous chapter in that it categorises findings and 
discussion by the instrument as the main grouping, rather by country, to allow for 
studying of the whole sample as one network society, with communities that differ by 
level of artificial Internet limitations exposed, as well as by the individual level. The 
chapter begins with reviewing the data collected as part of the survey and its 
characteristics, then the measured tangible outcomes of Internet use in terms of 
achievement and satisfaction, followed by analysis on the role of predictors studied 
on these outcomes. The interview instrument is also reviewed, with main findings by 
country included and discussed. 
Chapter 6 follows the data reviewed in the two previous chapters, to connect 
the dots and answer the research inquiry on artificial Internet limitations and their 
connection to tangible outcomes of Internet use. The chapter builds on the grounds of 
analysis based on the literature reviewed and the theory developed through Chapter 
2. The chapter then goes on to review the limitations found through Study 1 dealing 
9 
with the countries as communities within the larger network society differentiated by 
the model and level of limitations applied to its Internet access. Finally, the chapter 
fulfils its goal, and the overall goal of the research, by connecting the limitations in 
means of predictors and function for tangible outcomes of Internet use as a 
manifestation of digital inequalities. 
With the findings collected throughout the chapters dedicated to Study 1, 
Study 2, and the discussion, Chapter 7 plays the role of applying these findings on a 
real-life example of networks with innate artificial Internet limitations to provide an 
example for further studies on infrastructure, their artificial Internet limitations, and 
digital inequalities. The network chosen for the study is Facebook’s Free Basics, one 
of the platforms that aim to connect people with no or limited affordability for Internet 
access in what is known as Internet for the Next Billion(s). The history and main 
changes of the platform are discussed, followed by a discussion on the type and level 
of artificial limitations set on the access level and the prospect for circumvention, with 
an example of the platform as offered in Jordan. The discussion then naturally moves 
to estimate digital inequalities through the predictions developed between limitations 
and tangible outcomes of Internet use. 
The conclusion of the research comes in Chapter 8, with the reiteration of the 
research key findings, expected contribution to knowledge and the potential 
implications of the research on policy-making and further studies on access 
differentiations through artificial Internet limitations and its correlation with digital 
inequalities. Finally, the limitations faced and planned activities to build on the 
research to support the transformative vision that motivated the research are reviewed 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Researching the link between artificially limited Internet access and digital 
inequalities and development resultant from access to information draws upon 
theories and approaches settled in a variety of disciplines, including media and 
communication studies, social studies, and studying technological aspects of Internet 
access and availability. Thus, this literature review is necessarily broad, and covers 
multiple aspects of research, moving between subjects to explore theories and models 
relevant to the research. 
The review goes briefly through foundations of wide-scale media of 
communications, from electrical to digital, highlighting the expectations of 
technology, particularly communication technology, to create a new world, enabling 
world knowledge sharing and development of civilisation, and necessarily eradicating 
inequalities in access to knowledge. Then the review looks in-depth at theories and 
models aiming at explaining adoption and diffusion of technology, to understand what 
factors suspected as determinants to access and usage, and then move towards social 
study’s theories on the digital divide, to see what these theories base research on in 
terms of factors. The field of Internet censorship studies is briefly covered in the 
literature review as well to widen the prospects and impact potential of the research. 
This discussion will allow for an understanding on views from different disciplines 
on what affects access and use, enabling the conclusion on what variables needed to 
be included in the measurement of digital opportunities and outcomes of access, and 
as a result, digital inequalities. 
As this research also looks at artificial limitations and information controls 
that define access, the literature on the constructs of the Internet, and what constitutes 
unrestricted and unfettered Internet access is covered in this chapter. Then it is 
contrasted with what restrictions can be applied on access, and how to measure them 
in a way that would enable projection on digital inequalities in terms of opportunities 
for achievement and satisfaction with tangible outcomes of Internet use, to conclude 
this research. Studying Internet access also includes a look at different models of 
networks constituting Internet access, from conventional networks provided as part 
of the business offering to networks managed and operated by communities, to recent 
models of access to expand Internet penetration and availability for the next billion 
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users. This discussion reach to parties involved in access at each model, and the role 
of each in enabling and potentially fetter with access, and the models in which the 
Internet is governed on multiple levels. 
2.2 Background on expectations of technology 
From the first days of electrical communication, people foresaw the potential 
of communication technology to connect people together, creating “one intellectual 
neighbourhood” with all inhabitants of Earth, as described in 1846 proposal to 
connect European and American cities via telegraph (Hynes, 1988). And in 1960s 
when McLuhan and Fiore (1967)  said that “thanks to electric circuitry, we are living 
in a Global Village, where ‘Time’ has ceased, and ‘space’ has vanished, reconstituting 
dialogue on a global scale”. This concept of breaking spaces by creating a universal 
medium connecting all people is an idea shared among new media invented, including 
the Internet. 
This concept of a connected world motivated researchers to look at technology 
as an enabler for world knowledge sharing and catalyst for the development of 
civilisation by enlarging one’s immediate environment and providing an opportunity 
for world development. The great inventor Nikola Tesla remarked in an article 
published in 1904, that he has “no doubt that it [World Telegraphy] will prove very 
efficient in enlightening the masses, particularly in still uncivilized countries and less 
accessible regions, and that it will add material to general safety, comfort and 
convenience, and maintenance of peaceful relations” (Tesla, 1904). 
The introduction of digital communication and later packet switching, first 
described in a 1964 study by RAND Corporation (Baran, 1964), paved the road for 
the transfer of different types of information, routed to and from multiple recipients, 
without having to have a dedicated connection or circuit between every two ends. 
Digital communications allowed multiple ends to share the same set of connections, 
thus lowering the cost of connectivity and communication, and requirements for new 
ends to join the group of ends, or in other words, the network. Also helping by adding 
resilience to the overall network, where a connection between any two ends can be 
established through multiple paths so that in the case of a path is damaged, a new path 
can be established quickly with no need for infrastructure changes. 
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The mid-20th century saw the advent of several packet-switched networks 
connecting computer and devices, including the network created by Donald Davies at 
the United Kingdom's National Physical Laboratory (NPL) following research in 
1965. As well as General Electric Information Services (GEIS) network in U.S.A in 
1965, Merit network of Chicago public universities demonstrated in 1971, SITA 
network of airlines (SITA HLN network) in 1969, CYCLADES in France in 1973, 
and ARPANET, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network that was the first 
to implement the TCP/IP protocol suite in 1969. 
These networks, and others, operated individually until the ARPANET and 
NPL networks were connected in 1973, forming the first network comprising of other 
networks, called internetwork, or internet for short, vanishing the space of the Atlantic 
Ocean and connecting two continents (Kirstein, 2017). Over time, and with inter-
connection protocols like TCP/IP becoming standards (Maathuis and Smit, 2003), 
more and more networks were connected, creating what is currently known as the 
Internet, with the capitalised ‘I’ to distinguish it from the generic concept of internet. 
The Internet provided a link among scientific elites for two decades, before the 
invention of World Wide Web in 1989, and later graphical browsers in the early 1990s 
popularised the technology (Norris, 2001, p. 3). 
From then and over two decades, most of communication and expression 
moved to digital forms, through emerging media platforms that use computer 
networks for communication, overtaking conventional media. This move posed new 
opportunities and challenges to communities from different social and economic 
abilities, in terms of access to information, reach, and ability to express freely, 
highlighting gaps in technology adoption and skills, and social inequalities. 
The digital and connected world has substantially affected all of our activities, 
including receiving and sharing knowledge and information, adding vast sources of 
information that are usually not bound to geographical limitations, and at the same 
time, may not follow governmental restrictions, sources that are not otherwise 
possible in scale, scope, and ease of access. At the same time, it provided an 
opportunity to reach out to the world to communicate and express ideas and thoughts 
in a manner that have the potential to be free, and have a multiplying effect on the 
spread of any thought or news (Dutton et al., 2010), creating communities of shared 
interests that could cover the globe in reach. On the other hand, the connected world 
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posed a new aspect of social inequalities, as being able to have access to connected 
devices was never accessible to people from different economic stands, and access 
was not readily available in remote and hard to reach areas. This has changed over 
time with the introduction of cheaper devices, and broader coverage networks with a 
lower cost of entry. 
Advancements in computer networks accelerated this move to digital forms 
(Shane, 2004), particularly the Internet, on technical and spread aspects, as seen with 
networks expanding in size and geographical reach. Computer networks cover every 
corner of the earth, with an increase of accessibility to 40% of the world population 
in 2015, from less than 1% in 1995 (World Bank, 2016). The expansion meant more 
networks are being built around the world, and these networks are being connected.  
Internet infrastructure has evolved to accommodate the increase in demand. 
In the beginning, when the network was still a research project, the design decisions 
were solely based on technical requirements set by researchers. Later on, when 
corporates realised the commercial potential of the Internet, design was driven by 
requirements set by business demand (DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2001), but when 
reliance on the Internet increased as the primary source of news and information for 
the majority of the people, States, and community organisations became interested in 
deciding how the network operates. The effect this left on Internet infrastructure 
decision-making cannot be neglected, especially with opportunities for technology 
use being structured by the infrastructure providers and regulators, who in many 
authoritarian cases are the repressive states themselves. 
Internet adoption proved to be a more complex state of affairs, with its 
dependency on availability of electricity, devices, and connectivity, and the specific 
set of skills required to be able to access and use the Internet, as well as other set of 
circumstances that affect inequalities in what outcomes and benefit people get from 
the Internet. In the next sections, the discussion covers theories developed to 
understand the diffusion and adoption of the Internet and differentiation in access and 
use was looked at and researched. 
2.3 Technology adoption to digital divide 
How people are introduced to and make use of new technologies, including 
equality in opportunities provided, were well studied in recent years, through multiple 
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disciplines from science and technology-focused disciplines, to humanities and 
socially focused disciplines. Differentiation in access and use of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) took the lions to share in research, particularly 
opportunities provided by the Internet to people and societies. The digital divide was 
the term mostly used to describe stratification and use of the Internet (Ragnedda and 
Muschert, 2013), this covers differentiated access, the gap between who has and who 
does not have access to communication technology and the Internet, and 
differentiated use, or the gap between different usage behaviours. 
The reasons behind the difference in access and use have been extensively 
studied, mostly through methodological individualism relating differential access to 
ICT to individuals and their characteristics(van Dijk, 2012). In a book that sat as a 
stable reference for much-related research to date, Pippa Norris (2001) argued that it 
might be possible to overcome the global divide if the main drivers behind the 
diffusion of the Internet were established. In addition, it will be possible to understand 
and predict the probable patterns of diffusion and consequences of the Internet, if the 
main drivers proved to be similar to drivers behind diffusion and adoption of older 
forms of information technology. Several theories tried to explain and predict 
diffusion and use of information and communication technology and the divide 
resultant from differentiated access and use, as covered later.  
One of the theories that placed foundations for the study of technology and 
adoption is Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers, 1962), looking at diffusion as the 
process by which an innovation is communicated over time among participants of a 
social system. Categorising users of technology into five groups based on when they 
adopt and use new technologies, the groups are innovators, early adopters, early 
majority, late majority, and laggards. The elements affecting diffusion according to 
this theory, are the characteristics of the innovation itself, the channels over which 
information about the innovation is communicated, time, and the social system, which 
the potential user is part of, and can influence their decision. 
This was also the focus of models with rather simplistic variables, like the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1985), which includes two factors 
affecting user acceptance and adoption of technology, perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease of use, these two factors would define user’s behaviour intention, and 
thus decide whether that user accepts and uses a specific technology or not. This view 
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focused on factors related to the technology itself, neglecting any spatial or positional 
variables, and similarly to Diffusion of Innovation theory, neglected factors that 
limited or allowed user ability to access and use the technology, including societal 
and economic factors, in explaining differentiated access and use. 
Other models tried to build on the aforementioned theories expanding the 
factors and determinants affecting technology diffusion and adoption. One of the 
principal efforts in this regard is the Unified Technology Acceptance and Usage 
Theory (UTAUT), which, in addition to factors related to the technology itself of ease 
of use and performance expectancy, added positional factors of social influence and 
facilitating conditions as its core constructs (Venkatesh et al., 2003). The model also 
used gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use as moderating variables for the 
four constructs’ influence on behavioural intention and use behaviour. This theory 
continued the tradition of previous theories in looking at constructs as the user 
perceives them, even with facilitating conditions, which, according to UTAUT, 
mobilises behavioural intention to use behaviour, and defined as “The degree to which 
an individual believes that an organisational and technical infrastructure exists to 
support use of the system” (Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
To further extend these models, Spatially Aware Technology Utilisation 
Model (SATUM) built on them towards understanding technology diffusion, by 
associating ICT adoption and diffusion with demographic, economic, societal and 
infrastructure variables, to recognise geographic pattern in digital divide, thus making 
the model useful for studying differentiated utilisation of information and 
communication technologies among different geographical regions. However, unlike 
previous models, this model skips individual-level behavioural intention and 
motivation, focusing on groups of people in geographic areas, and their general 
utilisation of technology. 
Stocker and Whalley, in a more recent study, looked at the user experience of 
Internet customers in the United Kingdom to conclude that there multiple complex 
interactions that shape the experience (Stocker and Whalley, 2018). These 
interactions concluded that the quality of experience is composed of the user, with 
their preferences, digital literacy, and context of demographic and socioeconomic 
factors, and the system, with the network performance, content and media, and 
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terminal equipment. The research also suggested what factors the Internet Service 
Provider could influence. 
A notable theory that utilised positional, personal, and technology factors, as 
well as factors affecting the ability to gain access, and resources available, is Jan 
A.G.M van Dijk theory on the digital divide, portrayed in his 2005 book The 
Deepening Divide (van Dijk, 2005a). Their resources and appropriation theory of the 
diffusion, acceptance and adoption of new technologies is based on four core concepts 
that interact among each other to define the individual’s potential of access and use 
of technology. The first two concepts, personal and positional categorical inequalities 
and the distribution of resources in relation to digital inequalities, define the resources 
available to a person and thus define the third core concept, access, which is the 
number of types of access to ICT available, sequencing from motivational, material, 
skills, and usage access.  
Figure 2-1  
The conceptual model for van Dijk theory 
 
Notes: From the Deepening Divide 2005 
These types of access are also affected by characteristics of the technology 
itself, and itself affects the fourth concept, participation in society, whether economic, 
social, spatial, cultural, political, or institutional. This model is iterative in that the 
fields of participation in society affect categorical positional inequalities, the first core 
18 
concept of the theory. This theory covers a wide variety of determinants of access and 
uses with many variables, thus the amount of data required to operationalise the model 
is hard to collect, particularly with large groups, but it seems to be a widely adopted 
theory concerning factors affecting digital divide and technology adoption. 
The relationship between types of access relevant to effective use of ICT was 
also studied by de Haan and Iedeman, who discussed three types of access, 
motivation, possession (as access at home, or work/school), and digital skills (De 
Haan and Iedeman, 2006), these types correspond with van Dijk’s types of access of 
motivation, material, and skills. de Haan and Iedeman analysed two alternative 
models for the relationship between the types of access, the first is hierarchical, which 
is sequential in essence, and each type is a precondition for the following type, from 
motivation to possession to skills. While the second model is a crosscutting circle 
model, treating each type of access as equally important, and as relatively independent 
from the others. After studying large scale sample in the Netherlands, they concluded 
that the hierarchical model is a better than the cross-cutting circle model in terms of 
representation of reality, a similar conclusion to the definitively-sequential model of 
van Dijk. 
van Dijk listed what they saw as shortcomings in research on the digital 
divide. These included lack of conceptual elaboration and definition, lack of theory, 
lack of interdisciplinary research, lack of qualitative research, research being static 
and not dynamic enough to include fundamental changes in technology, and the 
insufficient attention to the observation of consequences of the digital divide (van 
Dijk, 2006). These conclusions were a result of an inventory of leading digital divide 
research published between 2000 and 2005, showing how some of the issues were 
tackled as research in digital divide moved from focusing on access and availability 
to skills, and later to outcomes of Internet use, as will be seen next. 
In the same article, van Dijk tried to answer questions on what inequalities 
does the concept of digital divide refer to and concluded that research on the subject 
looked at a set of inequalities grouped into four main categories of inequalities. 
Immaterial inequalities like life chances and freedom, Material inequalities like 
capital and resources, Social inequalities including position, power, and participation, 
and Educational inequalities such as capabilities and skills. These inequalities moved 
along different digital divide research levels, from looking at access (material) as the 
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primary determinant to looking at what benefits people make out of Internet use, 
which included very much similar categorisation. 
The digital divide research focusing at the level of availability of access and 
use assumed mainly the notion that by having access, people will utilise technology 
to better themselves and enhance their opportunities within their society. This 
technology determinism approach perpetuated the idea that having access to 
technology that would definitely enable world knowledge sharing and development 
of civilisation, from the early days of electronic communications. Later in this 
chapter, how individual relationships in network society may cause the opposite of 
that is covered, and how reports show that in reality, digital expansion and 
development may be skewed towards who is in a better position within societies. 
At this stage of research, two conflicting concepts related to the progress of 
the digital divide were defined by Norris (2001), normalisation and stratification. 
These concepts govern the relationship between the digital divide and digital 
inequalities, as they provide a long-term overview of the effect new technologies have 
on societies. The concept of normalisation states that during the initial phase of 
Internet development and spread, it is expected that differences among social strata 
increase, however, with time, and as the technology becomes widely spread, these 
differences gradually disappear and different groups of the society reach saturation 
level of the technology. 
On the other end, the concept of stratification states that the difference in 
Internet adoption starting point of different social groups dictates difference at 
endpoints, meaning that social strata lagging in technology adoption, will always be 
behind, and may never reach the same saturation point as social strata of early 
adopters. Effectively propagating inequalities among different strata, stating 
continues intersection between digital divide and social inequalities. In a form similar 
to the cumulative advantage described under St. Matthew Effect, where those who 
have more, gain more, something that, according to Ragnedda (2017) applies to terms 
of socioeconomic position and cultural acquisition, as well as technological skills. 
The intersection between society and technical access availability was largely 
discussed by Warschauer (2002). This view could have confined understanding of 
digital opportunities to classical social inequalities, where people with higher income 
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and social position, would with no doubt, have access to the latest technology, and 
thus digital inequalities will be nothing but propagation for social inequalities. 
In terms of geography, the digital divide has been studied on multiple levels, 
from people living within the same society to country and national levels, and 
between groups of countries, like the studies looking at digital divide between the 
global south and the rest of the world, or between developing and developed countries 
(Norris, 2001; Ogunsola and Okusaga, 2006). These studies used different attributions 
to describe the variables affecting access to ICT and knowledge, including economy, 
demographics, and geography. Norris (2001) described differentiation by studying 
the digital divide through three dimensions, social, global, and democratic. Through 
the first dimension, they described the social divide as the gap between the 
information-rich and information-poor nations. The second dimension of the global 
divide, in turn, looks at the gap between countries categorised as industrialised and 
developing countries. The third dimension, democratic divide, looks at the use of the 
Internet for civic participation and the gap between those utilising the Internet to 
participate in civic discussions and change, and those who use the Internet as passive 
consumers. 
This book, coming in the early days of Internet dominance on our daily lives, 
outlined questions that were at the core of digital divide studies for years. These 
questions were related to inequalities between and among societies, resulting in 
differentiated access and use of the Internet, looking beyond the dichotomy of haves 
and have-nots, to digital inequalities. Digital divide studies asked whether digital 
inequalities would gradually fade away over time as access becomes more widespread 
than before, or will these inequalities cause an enduring pattern and thus maintain a 
divide between info-haves and have-nots. These questions resonated in most of the 
research following and helped in framing the digital divide as a social matter, for what 
connection between digital and social inequalities and patterns it states. Disparities 
reinforced by the emerging Internet age were also described by Norris to include 
disparities between post-industrial economies at the core of the network and 
developing societies at the periphery. 
Rok Park et al. (2015) researched the digital divide at country level through 
studying the level of digitisation convergence in 108 countries, concluding that 
countries can be classified into three groups. This grouping suggests that although 
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countries diverge as a whole, convergence is happening within subgroups of 
countries, classified as clubs with the first showing high level of digitisation and 
lowest speed of convergence, the third showed the lowest convergence in digitisation 
level, with the fastest level of convergence, while the second is somewhere in 
between. This research contribution included identifying factors that drive a country's 
digitalisation convergence level, which included GDP, the share of service trade in 
GDP, tertiary education entrance rate, and the ratio of the urban population. With 
GDP per capita, tertiary education entrance rate. The first three factors have a direct 
relationship to the convergence level, while the last factor has an inverse relationship.  
Later on, as access itself was becoming more available worldwide, new 
stratifications among Internet users started to be notable, and researchers found that 
little is known about gaps in societies where internet access is very widely diffused 
(van Deursen et al., 2016). Researchers like Attewell called attention to the disparities 
in skills that affect technology and Internet use, which they labelled as the second 
digital divide (Attewell, 2001). These disparities, Attewell argued while focusing on 
education of schoolchildren, are missing in policies addressing the digital divide as a 
mere technological dimension of social exclusion. Moreover, Attewell noted that 
even if everyone gets access, children with better social and cultural resources will 
excel in the new arena of technology and the Internet. Attewell also placed the digital 
divide as one of the keys to get social and political leaders to work on ameliorating 
inequality and social exclusion in general, calling technology a “Trojan Horse” in this 
regard. 
Similarly, DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001) argued that a shift of emphasis in 
digital divide is needed, from research on digital divide as a dichotomy of having or 
not having access, to research on digital inequalities, the differentiation among people 
with access to the Internet. DiMaggio and Hargittai suggested going beyond 
documenting inequality, to developing a testable model connecting individual 
characteristics, dimensions of inequality, and positive outcomes of technology use, 
which would be of more value to both scholars and policymakers, than basic research 
on access. 
Researchers carried on Attewell, DiMaggio, and Hargittai ideas to discuss 
determining factors related to opportunity enhancement through the Internet other 
than access determining factors. This view defined the second level digital divide as 
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the divide resulting from how people use the Internet and from the online or digital 
skills they possess, or lack of thereof (van Dijk, 2006; Parent and Cruickshank, 2009; 
Ragnedda and Muschert, 2013). This view introduced new factors that have the 
potential to crosscut classical social stratifications reflection on digital inequalities. 
These factors played a role in the understanding that people may have equal 
opportunities to the Internet, despite being somewhat deprived economically and 
socially, if they could obtain skills needed, and could use the Internet to their benefit. 
Ragnedda and Muschert however, did not suggest total detachment between digital 
and social worlds in terms of inequalities but instead discussed the entanglement 
between inequalities existing in the digital sphere, and inequalities present in the 
social sphere (Ragnedda and Muschert, 2013). 
The term democratic divide was used by Seong-Jae Min (2010) to describe 
one example of the second level digital divide, as the differences between those who 
actively use the web for politics and those who do not. The relation with second level 
divide is proven in the results of their study, which showed that access by itself is not 
enough to encourage meaningful use of technology for politics, skills and 
motivational factors were equally important for that. 
Skills needed to use the Internet were defined by van Dijk and van Deursen 
(van Deursen and van Dijk, 2010; van Dijk, 2012), and categorised into two main 
sets, medium related, and content-related skills. The medium related skills are skills 
needed to be technically able to access and navigate the Internet, including operational 
Internet skills, that is the skills needed to ‘operate’ browsers, search engines, and 
forms. Moreover, formal Internet skills, that is skills needed to navigate between 
pages, and maintaining a sense of location while navigating the Internet. 
Content-related skills were defined as informational, communication, content 
creation, and strategic skills. These sets of skills are concerned about the ability to 
search and evaluate results and information offered over the Internet. Skills enabling 
the creation of online identities and communication through mail and other media to 
exchange opinions, skills needed to contribute to the Internet, and finally skills that 
allow the achievement of personal or professional goals via the digital medium. 
These sets of skills pushed forward research on digital inequalities to study 
the tangible outcomes of Internet use, in what is known as the third level digital divide 
(van Deursen and Helsper, 2015; Ragnedda, 2017), as having access alone was clearly 
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found insufficient to reap outcomes of the Internet, and better oneself and the society. 
This view studied the change in one’s life taking place as a product of using the 
Internet, through the aspects of social participation, cultural use, economical and 
personal opportunities (Helsper, 2012). This also allowed for the introduction of new 
approaches relating social and digital inequalities, moving from what seemed as 
simplistic views on digital inequalities, similar to Marx theory on stratification, to 
Weberian approach, where ideas and values causation are studied as part of 
determinants to digital inequalities (Ragnedda, 2017). This new dimension of digital 
sociology looked at social stratification in the digital age, and how they are 
reproduced by status and group affiliation, in addition to economic aspects of class 
dynamics. 
Another view on the digital divide and digital inequalities theories were 
suggested by Servaes and Oyedemi (2016), where the approaches to ICT gaps were 
viewed as structuralist, culturalist, and post-modernist. The structuralist approach 
uses class structures and has a bipolar lens, between who have and who have not, 
roughly mapping to studies on the first level of the digital divide. The culturalist, in 
turn, approach widens the lens to include economy, social, cultural discourse, as well 
as studying patterns of use and policy, corresponding roughly to studies of second and 
third levels of the digital divide. The post-modernist approach offers a 
multidimensional perspective of inequalities, confronting digital divide from a broad 
principle encapsulating the multidimensionality of inequalities.  
However, research into the effects of inequalities of access is, as van Dijk 
states (2013, p. 45), very scarce, which is something they found strange. Especially 
that analysis through this lens for national Internet use surveys showed them that 
access really matters and that people without access are clearly disadvantaged, and 
people with access to traditional information sources solely lag behind. This 
dissertation sits in this area of studying effects of inequality of access but focusing on 
inequalities resulting from artificial Internet limitations. 
2.4 Network society powers and digital labour 
Physical or material access aspect is intuitively the base for digital divide and 
digital inequality research, having access defined the studies of the first level of the 
digital divide, and it is the requirement for studying the second and third levels of the 
digital divide and digital inequality. However, types and levels of access were not 
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well covered and studied. This includes changes in technology, networks, devices, 
and services, affecting access, and the nature of relationships within the networks and 
network society, which define the visibility of content and services, and access 
abilities. 
Jan van Dijk attributed research lack of ability to adapt to changes in 
technology as one of the shortcomings in research on digital divide (2006). They saw 
that digital divide research is not dynamic enough to accommodate changes in how 
people access and use the Internet; this includes changes in device ownership and use 
patterns. For instance, personal computer ownership is regarded as the primary device 
for access, and one of the conditions for access ability, however, the change in 
technology made mobile devices the base device for access for many people, and 
personal computer ownership became irrelevant to the ability to access and use of the 
Internet. A similar argument can be projected on access technology, prior to home 
Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL), connection technology determined access speed, but 
with advancements in infrastructure and connectivity technology, access speed 
became artificially controlled. For large parts of the connected world, this relates to 
what package the user chose, which in many markets is a combination of access speed 
limitations and download volume quota. 
For the issue of who controls what is visible and accessible, Hargittai touched 
on the concept of gatekeepers, the bodies controlling what information is visible to 
Internet users (2000), and their role in the allocation of user attention to online 
content. Hargittai called the attention to the relationship between Internet users and 
content providers, at the time when they were distinctively separate, and highlighted 
the role of search engines and portals as gatekeepers having deciding power in what 
information reaches users, based on commercial reasons or the value of the content 
as perceived by the gatekeeper. At the time when users are becoming content 
providers, this power relationship persists, with Social Network Sites (SNS) playing 
a significant role as gatekeepers. 
Castells and van Dijk looked in-depth at power relationships in networks and 
network society, Castells (2011), defined power in networks as “the relational 
capacity that enables a social actor to influence the decisions of other social actor(s) 
asymmetrically in ways that favour the empowered actor’s will, interest and values” 
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(2011, p. 10). Castells distinguished among four forms of power in this regard, 
Networking Power, Network Power, Networked Power, and Network making Power. 
Networking power, as described by Castells, is the capacity and control over 
what medium or message is included in a network, through gatekeeping activities 
depending on decisions and instructions of whom they called ‘Programmers’. 
Although Castells seems to have borrowed the language of the technological 
networks, their work does actually apply to digitally enabled networks in the same 
way as on other types of networks, like financial market networks, and in this regard, 
the concept of gatekeeping corresponds with the power of Hargittai’s gatekeepers 
described above, with the programmers setting policies and guidelines. The 
persistence of networking power in the hands of gatekeepers can be seen, as per 
Castells, in government control over the Internet, and corporate attempts to enclose 
communication within their walled gardens. 
The second power is Network Power, the set of rules and protocols of the 
network, controlling how it works and how it is managed. Whereas Networked Power 
is concerned about the relationship between nodes, with specific nodes exercise 
power over other nodes in a network, through setting policies and guidelines, as in 
editorial decision-making on content, for example. The last power, network making, 
is the most determining form in networks and allows decisions to set up and program 
a network, deciding the content and format of communication of the network. 
Network-making power includes another power relationship, the Switching power, 
the power of deciding what networks are connected to other networks, and how they 
interact with each other. A key concept to take from Castells views on power 
relationships is that it does not have to be always represented by applied enforcement, 
as the practices of coercion and intimidation are also an essential mechanism for those 
in control in the power relationships, and can even be more stable and effective if the 
concept of intimidation is in people’s minds (Castells, 2011, p. 5). 
In addition to powers in the hands of corporates as mentioned above, 
DiMaggio and Hargittai mentioned the aspect of corporate control on altering 
individual-level incentives and constraints resulting in inequalities in technology and 
access, from decisions on devices to decisions on network infrastructure (2001). This 
includes decisions by technology and computer companies on capabilities of devices 
and standards supported and decision on core speed of networks and coverage. One 
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example of this is how a decision by the late Steve Jobs to not support Adobe Flash 
in Apple’s mobile devices, partially because he hated it, caused the death of the 
mobile version of this technology (Hern, 2015).  
In their take on the Network Society, van Dijk (2005a) shows how the 
development of new information and communication technologies may put our 
societies’ most fundamental values, including social equality, at risk. With a possible 
result of complexity and cost of technology is intensifying alienation and social 
inequalities (p. 3). Results from the real world can confirm this, the World Bank’s 
World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (2016) concluded, “the benefits 
of rapid digital expansion have been skewed towards the wealthy, skilled, and 
influential who are better positioned to take advantage of the new technologies, while 
the world’s most vulnerable falls behind”. 
In a similar fashion to our view of the Internet as a network of systems or 
smaller networks of nodes, van Dijk defines networks as the collection of links 
between nodes that among themselves constitute units or systems. van Dijk (2005b) 
sees the infrastructure of network society as the result of relationships between social, 
technical, and media networks. In western societies at least, the individual linked by 
networks is the basic unit or node of the network society. Relationships can be 
organised at four levels, individual relations, group and organisational relations, 
societal relations, and global relations, these levels offer various level of permanency, 
strength, and scale. 
Relationships within networks define how they work, and who can do what, 
for example, van Dijk attributes code relations, or how relations between and within 
ICT networks are programmed and configured, to be an instrument of power, 
affecting personal opportunities of autonomy and privacy. None of the code relations 
is technically neutral and thus selective in how the network works, and how it relates 
to other networks, tending to increase inequalities in society and organisations 
(2005b, p. 40). Not only is network communication biased by code nature, but also it 
is vulnerable, depending on technology as well as trust, commitment, and richness of 
information exchanged. Break down of network communication can be a result of the 
lack of these dependencies.  
As networks expand in scale and scope of integration with our lives, 
particularly at the organisational level, control and authority remain unchanged 
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between members of the organisation, but communication distance is reduced, and 
more information is shared and collected as part of computer networks. This may lead 
to a severe threat of privacy if not dealt with according to van Dijk, who suggest the 
need for protective measures governing computer networks, mainly through 
legislation, self-regulation, and technological solution (2005b, p. 117). 
The vow towards legalisation as an effective mean of governmental control 
may seem in contrast to what van Dijk argues at the same book on the trend of 
communication sector to set loose of governmental control. When they said, “The 
final result will be a replacement of government-controlled public monopoly without 
competition by a small number of private oligopolies with the limited competition but 
no democratic supervision” (2005b, p. 84). Nonetheless, this is understandable when 
looking at legislation-control of privacy suggested as a needed measure, in the scope 
of governance of relations between people within the network, rather than at a 
multinational corporation scope. 
The digital divide within the network society, according to van Dijk, can be 
amplified by structural inequalities among three groups of the network society, 
pictured as a tripartite with Information Elite at the centre, then the Participating 
Majority, and the Disconnected and Excluded at the periphery, defining participation 
in the network society. Information elites have most of the powers; they make all 
critical decisions in society. This structure was used by van Dijk to refer to multiple 
scales of organisation, from people to countries. For countries, poor countries, as they 
described it, sit on the periphery of the global network society. Where despite 
employment and labour diffusion enabled by technology was thought to be able to 
bring social equality to the world, van Dijk (2005b, p. 174) observes that the 
employment structure created sets high-quality jobs at the centre, while relatively low 
skilled jobs at the poor countries at the periphery of the system. This difference in the 
type of employment is seen as more critical to social inequalities than the extent of 
employment. 
Other prominent scholars, Fuchs and Sandoval (2014) focused at types of 
employment in the digital economy, which they use to describe an economy with high 
reliance on digital means, defining digital labour and the different forms it can take 
in the production, circulation, and use of digital media. Fuchs and Sandoval discuss 
the international division of labour taking a Marxist stand stressing class 
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contradictions in the analysis of globalisation, putting class relationships s forms of 
organisation of the relations of production. This includes a dominant class controlling 
modes of ownership, distribution, and coercion for exploiting another, subordinated 
class. This can be understood in line with van Dijk’s argument on the quality of jobs 
and global employment diffusion above. It is worth mentioning here that the labour 
discussed here includes all work needed concerning digital media, from mining 
material needed for digital devices to knowledge and cultural products. 
Fuchs and Sandoval conclude that “the world of digital media is shaped by a 
complex global articulation of various modes of production that together constitute 
the capitalist mode of creating and using digital media. The digital tools that people 
use for writing, reading, communicating, uploading, browsing, collaborating, 
chatting, befriending, or liking are embedded into a world of exploitation.” (2014, p. 
515), this describes one relation between corporate and people, extending the concept 
of digital labour from formal employees and workers, to users and consumers. 
Fuchs used the typology and definition of digital labour to expand further on 
digital valorisation, in their book Digital Labour and Karl Marx (Fuchs, 2014), which 
is the first of two analysis of digital labour, in an effort towards demonstrating the 
relevance of Marxism to the world of multidimensional global inequalities we are 
living in now. The types of digital labour Fuchs focuses on in this book, is the 
contemporary unpaid work of consumption on the Internet, where consumer provide 
the commodity of being the audience, giving attention to what is offered to them, 
conventionally through various modes of advertising. Moreover, the labour of unpaid 
content and data generation, in what they later called prosumers (producer/consumer), 
as Fuchs rightfully argues is not that only consumers are providing audience 
commodity ubiquitously by being connected all the time, effectively placing a 
‘factory’ wherever people are, from living location to work, and all in between spaces 
(2014, p. 111). However, that there is a monetary value that operators obtain from 
their clients in the form of personal and usage behaviour data (2014, p. 103), defining 
internet prosumer commodification, which is the form of digital labour I will be 
focusing on mostly throughout this research. 
The second book in this series, Culture and Economy in the Age of Social 
Media (Fuchs, 2015), takes on the same approach on digital labour, focusing on social 
media, and the culture and economics related to them. From what ideologies they 
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create, to how consumers are almost always prosumers, creating value for corporates 
from providing attention to generating usage data and profiles merely through being 
within the network and navigating around, exposing their interests and behaviour. 
Another in-depth look of how the digital world perpetuates stratification and 
the difference between capitalists’ super-rich and under-employed people, can be 
found in Nick Dyer-Witheford book on cyber-proletariat (2015). The book argues that 
growth of cybernetics, which can be understood as a component of digital media in 
Fuchs and Sandoval analysis, including networks, computers, and digital 
technologies, extended the notion of social class. With power imbalances between 
capital and proletariat, in what seems a reflection of classic Marxist theory on digital 
media, however, Dyer-Witheford focused on formal labour or work, including 
immaterial labour, more new forms of labour that are unique to the digital world. 
Mark Andrejevic covered the relationship between corporate and users 
through a series of writings on exploitation and digital labour (2009, 2012, 2013), 
where they discussed how online services make money from its users. Creating a new 
form of digital labour, where users' attention is the value companies sell to make 
money, connecting this attention-economy to early scholars on television and media 
and the idea of audience labour, by Smythe (1981), Schiller (1971), and Mattelart 
(1996), who established the way in relation to audience influence and capacity, and 
audience commodity. 
Andrejevic also connects digital labour with exploitation, arguing that 
components of exploitation of capturing of unpaid surplus labour, coercion, and 
alienation, exist and operate in the digital world, through forms of commercial 
surveillance facilitated by technology (Andrejevic, 2012). This commercial 
surveillance, as Andrejevic argues, would not likely be the choice of individuals, but 
because of privatization of Internet infrastructure and services online as production 
resources, provide owners of these resources the power to control over terms of 
access, including what data to be collected, and how it is dealt with and possibly 
commoditised. 
In addition to the relationship between corporate and users as producers of 
usage data and attention corporate sell for advertisement, there is another relation, 
that is not less exploitative, the relationship between corporate and users as producers 
of content users themselves consume over the corporate-owned networks. This is 
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particularly noted in Social Media Sites and Web 2.0 services. Web 2.0 is a term 
defined by Tom O’Reilly in 2005 as “the network as platform, spanning all connected 
devices; Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages 
of that platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better 
the more people use it. Consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, 
including individual users, while providing their own data and services in a form that 
allows remixing by others, creating network effects through an ‘architecture of 
participation,’ and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user 
experiences” (O’Reilly, 2005). This definition compacts multiple features of this kind 
of networks that will be expanded throughout the research. 
Fuchs puts the relation that governs Web 2.0 in clear terms in Critique of the 
Political Economy of Web 2.0 Surveillance (Fuchs, 2012),  when they said that “the 
exploitation of surplus value in cases such as Google, YouTube, MySpace, or 
Facebook is not merely accomplished by those who are employed by these 
corporations for programming, updating, and maintaining the soft- and hardware, 
performing marketing activities, and so on, but by them, the users, and the prosumers 
that engage in the production of user-generated content” (2012, p. 54). However, they 
acknowledged that not all of Web 2.0 is based on such exploitive relationship, citing 
Wikipedia as an example of a non-profit and advertisement-free, preventing Web 2.0 
from being commodified completely. This relation, according to Fuchs, is a result of 
the asymmetrical ownership structure of web 2.0 corporations, which is owned by a 
few legal persons and not by the users, while user data, including user-generated 
content, profiles, interactions and usage data, are dispossessed by the corporations to 
generate profit. 
The realisation of the high value and commercial interest users bring to 
companies, as seen earlier through noting this rise of Internet economies that rely on 
attention and user-generated content as products, brought the realisation of 
valorisation potential more connected people do provide. This was one of the reasons 
behind the push towards reaching to non-users of the Internet, including the 
unconnected 55% of the world population (World Bank, 2016), and trying to connect 
them. 
The power corporate and governments exert on networks to limit them 
artificially, and what effects it have, is the central theme of this research where it is 
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defined as artificial limitations of the Internet. It is the tools Hargittai’s gatekeepers 
use, a rendering of Castells networking power, one of the results of van Dijk’s code 
relations, and one of the tools corporate is using to exert powers towards valorisation 
of users. These can be understood in the context of any network, but for the sake of 
this research, it will be looked at from the context of the broadest used network at our 
time, the Internet. Later literature concerning history and types of these artificial 
limitations is looked at. 
2.5 Internet access, censorship, and artificial limitations 
Some studies discussed inequalities in access, focusing on the inequality of 
access speed equity (Longley, 2003; Riddlesden and Singleton, 2014), while other 
studies focused on the effect of artificial limitation in schools or libraries on access to 
knowledge, or political participation in countries, as discussed by Wagner & Gainous 
(2013) and Yang et al. (2013). Nevertheless, the issue of fettered or artificially limited 
access and its effect on digital inequalities is still largely understudied. One of the 
possible reasons for that is that artificial limitations have usually been limited in scope 
and scattered across populations and environments, as at home or school or work 
censorship, or targeting specific sites under the flag of protecting social norms and 
culture (Lawrence and Fry, 2016). However, with the increase in number of projects 
aiming at connecting new people to the Internet (Reed, Haroon and Ryan, 2014), and 
the rising interest by corporations and state to control Internet users, it becomes 
necessary to highlight resulting inequalities and suggest what effects it has on 
outcomes of Internet use, which is the heart of this research. 
Neil Selwyn suggested that what is meant by access in the definition of the 
digital divide should be reconsidered, to include factors of time, cost, quality of the 
technology, and the environment in which it is used (Selwyn, 2002). As part of their 
work, the term effective access comes up to describe what users can get from their 
access, as opposed to what is available for them in theory. This distinction in 
theoretical and actual access is also part of Internet Governance Forum definition of 
meaningful access in its policy options for connecting and enabling the Next 
Billion(s), a definition the author helped in shaping through discussions at regional 
levels, and addresses the issues of “quality and speed of access itself to the availability 
of relevant content, the ability to use content, the extent to which human rights are 
promoted and respected online, and whether women and marginalised groups are able 
to benefit from” (IGF, 2016). 
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This shows the existence of inequalities in types of access, and a need to 
distinguish among different types of access from the view of limitations they have, 
particularly in the light of changes in power relations within the network society 
discussed earlier. 
At the early days of computer networks, limitations on what to access and at 
what speeds were determined entirely by the capabilities of the connection and 
network the individual is connected to, however, over time, this changed, and many 
limitations where introduced. One of the earliest accounts documented on limitations 
related to content started with a joke, when a service/address blocking of a usergroup 
in University of Waterloo and a temporary ban of that usergroup in Stanford 
University (McCarthy, 1996), because of an inappropriate joke being communicated 
on that usergroup. Faculty at Stanford University issued a statement that would still 
be appropriate today, although was issued in 1989, even before the days of the World 
Wide Web, stating that “Computer scientists at Stanford fear the university has 
entered a never-ending role as a moral regulator of computer bulletin boards by 
recently blocking access to a list of jokes deemed to serve no ‘university educational 
purpose’” (Philp, 1989). 
From there, surveillance and censorship became part of how we view the 
Internet, the first case of Internet wiretap was in 1995 when governments started 
seeing the need for them to practice authority in the cyberspace. Then attorney general 
of the United States Janet Reno stated, “If we are not vigilant, cybercrime will turn 
the internet into the Wild West of the 21st Century”. In 1996, a law to control the 
content on the Internet was introduced in the United States under the name 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) (Nesson and Marglin, 1996; Ciolli, 2008), 
which set the pace for online content censorship.  
Researchers documented the move and transition in how the Internet is viewed 
and controlled. Of the most prominent works in this regard is Goldsmith and Wu’s 
book Who Controls Internet? (2006), which provided detailed account and analysis 
for Internet controls and limitations as well as a documentation of the dynamics of 
Internet controls among the community, governments, and commercial entities. This 
work, which became a cornerstone in the field of Internet censorship, argued that the 
Internet will only move towards more governmental and commercial control assuring 
territorial governance, as the Internet, like previous technologies of communication, 
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will not replace the central role of territorial governance (2006, p. 180). These 
limitations as Goldsmith and Wu argue provide the Internet with stability and 
robustness, while not denying the opposite side of governmental regulation and 
control used as a tool to monitor and control population. Other researchers analysed 
the world of Internet regulations as the United States leading, with the rest of world 
working in a different field, this view could not be put in terms clearer than Bauml 
when they justified Google’s acceptance of China’s condition of assisting in 
censorship in order to allowed to work in the country by saying that “We cannot 
expect every country to be the United States”. The accompanying footnote further 
explains the West-centricity that reads “Even countries such as France and Austria 
have differing policies on what is acceptable speech, yet they are still considered 
advanced, rather than backward, countries” (Bauml, 2010). 
The views presented in this book are compatible with Goldsmith’s long standing 
argument on the importance of territorial governments as controllers of the Internet, as 
expressed in their work from as far as 1998, when they argued that territorial regulations 
of the Internet are as feasible and legitimate as non-Internet regulations (Goldsmith, 
1998). Twenty years later, Goldsmith further confirmed their believe in the importance 
of governmental control, and extended it to assert that the United States, of all other 
governments in the world, rightfully controls and manages Internet and promotes Internet 
freedom agenda that involves commercial non-regulation and anti-censorship agenda, 
while other countries efforts revolve around clamping down on unwelcome speech 
(Goldsmith, 2018). 
Responses to Goldsmith views quickly emerged, with Pozen (2018) arguing that 
aside from government, there is a global movement of Internet freedom defenders that is 
less deferential to market logic and more concerned with people’s capacity to control 
their own data and privacy away from state interference. The United States here was 
viewed as a false friend rather than a fellow defender of Internet freedoms. The 
dominating body of knowledge in the Internet censorship studies revolves around the 
comparison between the advanced Global North and the backward Global South. While 
this research invokes the concept of a one global Internet that is subject to artificial 
limitations setting the conditions for difference in outcomes of use among end-users, thus, 
it can be hardly said that this research is based on that field, despite having a potential for 
direct contribution to it by connecting the concept of digital inequalities. 
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Regardless of academic analysis in the field of censorship studies, states around 
the world carries on with their individual Internet control agenda. This fact pushed this 
research away from analysing censorship and its reasons, to analysing the facts on the 
ground through measuring what the end-user faces of artificial Internet limitations no 
matter whether they were set by governments or as a result of commercial interests. 
Countries practiced their direct powers to introduce their own restrictions since the mid-
1990s, including what was listed at Human Rights Watch 1996 report (Sorensen, 1996), 
listing China, for requiring ISPs and users to register with the police. Germany, for 
blocking access to several newsgroups served over CompuServe pre-WWW service. 
Saudi Arabia was included for confining Internet access to universities and hospitals, 
Singapore for requiring political and religious content providers to register with the state, 
New Zealand for classifying computer disks as "publications" that can be censored and 
seized. 
Limitations have developed over the years to cover new methods and reach 
larger coverage. Limitations set by governments and commercial entities extending 
its territorial control to cover access at countrywide scale, as happened when 
Afghanistan's Taliban banned Internet access countrywide, including from 
Government offices, in an attempt to control content in 2001. Other limitations 
included Egypt Internet shutdowns in 2011 (Malas, Hafidh and Millman, 2011), and 
Syria going offline for two days in 2012, and later for 8 hours a day during general 
school exams period of 2016 (Al-Saqaf, 2016), as part of an anti-cheating policy. 
Reports also came on Internet shutdown every night at certain neighbourhoods in 
Bahrain and specific areas in Cameroon. 
These limitations were not only related to government policies but also 
included corporations, as when two feuding providers (Cogent, Level 3) severed their 
peering connection in October 2005, resulting in many customers from one provider 
not being able to access resources on the other's network. Limitations on access speed 
were introduced not so far along when Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) connections 
became widespread in the United States in 1996 several Internet Service Providers 
suffered extended outages, unable to cope up with the growing number of users, and 
the solution was to introduce bandwidth throttling and bandwidth cap. 
From the examples above, we can get an idea of what type of limitations to 
look for, distinguishing between natural and artificial limitations. With natural 
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limitations defined as the limits set by current technical advancements or laws of 
physics, such as when speed is confined to maximum possible by medium or 
availability of access confined to topography. While artificial limitations are defined 
as the limitations imposed artificially over a network that can be changed with no 
significant change in technology. Based on the compilation of restrictions mentioned 
in historical overview and literature above, we can list artificial limitations on the 
Internet to include any of the following forms: 
• Service Blocking: Limiting the ability to access a particular site or service. 
• Bandwidth Throttling: Limiting connection speed to a defined value. 
• Bandwidth Cap: Limiting the maximum amount of data transferred to a pre-
set volume within a specified period. 
• Peripheral Control: Limiting the ability to introduce other devices to the 
network or connecting another network. 
• Content Censorship/Filtering: Limiting the ability to access and viewing of 
certain content. 
• Algorithmic Limitations (Algorithmic Walled Gardens/Filter Bubbles): 
Controlling and limiting the content shown. 
• Access Limitations (Walled Gardens): Limiting the ability to access content 
and services outside a set of predefined content and services. This differs from 
service blocking, in that instead of blocking a list of sites and services, this 
only allows a list of sites and services. 
Some of these limitations are already part of how we think Internet access is, 
particularly Bandwidth Throttling and Bandwidth Cap, which are part of usual 
Internet service offerings. Other limitations, however, are being contested these days, 
for example, the Net Neutrality debate, which is concerned with power exerted by 
corporate to differentiate the quality of access and traffic for content (more on net 
neutrality). 
Research efforts on limitations included Open Net Initiative, a collaboration 
project aiming to investigate, expose and analyse Internet filtering and surveillance 
practices, through development of measurement tools and methodologies to study 
Internet filtering and surveillance, capacity building of a network of local advocates 
and researchers, and studying the consequences and trends in filtering and 
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surveillance, and their implications (ONI, 2016). The project ended in 2014, after 
almost a decade of research. 
Three leading organisations collaborated on this project Citizen Lab at the 
Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto; the Berkman Centre for 
Internet & Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group (Ottawa). In addition 
to a pool of partners worldwide that assisted in data collection. The project issued a 
series of reports, books, country reports, and regional overviews in addition to the 
publishing of data sets of measurements collected. 
Freedom House has also been studying a set of artificial Internet limitations, 
as part of their annual survey and analysis of Internet and digital media freedom 
around the world. They issued a series of reports and ranking on the Internet and 
digital media freedom since 2011. Their methodology includes three categories, 
obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. 
The limitations discussed here stem from the powers governments and 
corporations have on deciding the network design and offerings to assure networks 
are used to their benefits. Later we will look at projects aiming to connect new users 
to the Internet and studying the artificial limitations innate to them. 
2.6 Predictors of digital inequalities 
As research in the digital divide moved further, the set of predictors studied and 
connected to variation in opportunities available to individuals changed slightly, with the 
simple sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables. For example, the Unified 
Technology Acceptance and Usage Theory (UTAUT) research used gender, age, 
experience, and voluntariness of use as moderating variables (Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
Also, age, and gender as stable set of predictors in Internet diffusion and use including 
Zillien and Hargittai (2009), Meraz (2008), (Losh, 2004), and van Dijk  (2005a, 2013), 
some of these researches also included education level and employment status, as well as 
income. 
The van Deursen and van Dijk study on the shift of digital divide into the 
difference in usage (2014) found that the most prominent predictors for differences in 
Internet usage are education, age and gender, whereas Internet experience, income and 
residency seem to be less relevant. The work of Helsper, van Deursen, and Eynon (2015) 
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(2015) on Tangible Outcomes of Internet Use focused on gender, age, education, and 
employment, as the classical predictors to opportunities for Internet use. 
It is worth mentioning here that for the literature covered in this review, the gender 
predictor was a dichotomous variable of male and female, which limits the sexual 
identities individuals identifying themselves as and thus fail to capture more broad 
differences among people. For the sake of compatibility, the same two options are used 
for this research but will be labelled further on as sex. 
However, these predictors lacked the ability to capture the difference in access 
opportunities, particularly with the variation of Internet limitation, natural or artificial, to 
predict opportunities for use, and making use, of the Internet. Here comes an essential 
contribution to knowledge that this research is offering, the look at variables related to 
Internet limitations as predictors for digital inequalities. The variables as advised cover 
the perception of limitation, as a measure for how people see their network of being open 
or not, and the level of limitations, whether direct or indirect applied. The variables also 
include the self-described efficacy of ability to bypass and overcome these limitations, to 
the operationalisation of these skills through the actual use of tools to allow 
circumvention of blocking and surveillance. 
Although the Internet limitations usually affect groups of people and thus 
constitute difference at community level rather than individual level, there is room to 
study how much each of these limitations affects the individual. This room relies on 
difference in individual’s ability to bypass the limitations either as skills to shape usage 
or through using technological means to circumvent said limitations and deciding on what 
predictors are informed by of the types of artificial Internet limitations as discussed in the 
previous section. Which suggests that it is possible in many cases of limitations for the 
individual to put an effort and be able to limit the influence of the limitation on how they 
use the Internet. 
  
2.7 Internet for the Next Billion(s) 
Although access sits at the base of any digital divide research as seen earlier 
in this literature review, the methods to reach unconnected people and related theories 
were not thoroughly discussed. It was often left to matters of public policies and 
commercial interest. Forcing reliance on policy documents, statistics, and news, 
rather than academic literature for this section. Here the research outlines motives and 
38 
means behind reaching the unconnected, in an effort to understand whether efforts 
towards the bridging of first level digital divide enable digital equalities or establish 
inequality as a result of artificial Internet limitations part of its design. 
Some research tapped on why people do not use the Internet, like Reisdorf and 
Groselj, who studied unconnected people in the highly connected country Great 
Britain and concluded by categorising users into non-users, low users, regular users, 
and broad users (Reisdorf and Groselj, 2015). The results they concluded was that 
low and non-users come from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds and that 
non-users have a negative attitude towards technology, suggesting being unconnected 
as being a choice for some people, despite having networks they can access if they 
had the motivation and could manage resources to connect. 
However, and despite the feeling one might get from the sheer amount of 
research on the digital divide, the fact is that there are more people not connected to 
the Internet than there are people connected, and little have the choice of being 
connected or not. World Bank data shows that as of 2015, only 43.9% of the world 
population is connected to the Internet  (World Bank, 2016). In 2017, Internet World 
Stats put this number at 49.7%  (Internet World Stats, 2017).  
Most of the unconnected people numbers come from countries with the lowest 
income resulting in the global digital divide, with the group of countries defined by 
the World Bank as low income having only 9.5% of its population using the Internet 
(WorldBank, 2018). Figure 2-2 demonstrates the change in Internet users as a 
percentage of the population in different areas of the world.  
The trend lines strongly demonstrate and effect of economies on Internet 
penetration on multiple levels, from local to a country level, with the group of least 
developed countries sitting at the lowest rank of the chart. This essentially 
demonstrates van Dijk (2005b) tripartite at the global level, with developed world as 
Information Elite at the centre, and developing countries towards the periphery as the 
Disconnected and Excluded.  
Figure 2-2 
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Internet users as a percentage of the population 
Based on data from the World Bank 
Most of the research surveyed in previous sections described the 
characteristics of people with differentiated opportunities in terms of access and 
skills, with the hope that policies targeting people fitting these characteristics would 
help in bridging the gap. Nevertheless, Fuchs and Horak set to describe the reason for 
such stratification as the multidimensional class structure of modern society that 
creates structural inequalities (Fuchs and Horak, 2008). So that the global digital 
divide described above is mainly an aspect of the economic divide between countries, 
which, in turn, cause countries on the wrong side of the divide to be deprived of 
political power and cultural skills.  
Fuchs and Horak see these as requirements for active participation in the 
information society, resulting in what they call digital apartheid. Looking at the global 
digital divide between Africa and developed world as “an expression of the unequal 
geography of global capitalism That there is a lack of economic and technological 
resources in Africa is not the fault of corrupt African governments and not an effect 
of bad governance, market protectionism, a lack of investment conditions for Western 
capital, etc., but the effect of hundreds of years of colonial and post-colonial 
exploitation, exclusion, and dependency of the Third World that has caused the very 
conditions that Africans have to face today.” (2008, p. 115). 
States' realisation of the importance of the Internet as a tool for development 
was crystallised in World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 2003 
Declaration of Principles (2003a) and Plan of Action (2003b), aiming to help 
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countries overcome the digital divide, and later in WSIS follow up WSIS+10 and its 
United Nations General Assembly review (UNGA, 2015a). Efforts to connect the 
unconnected majority of the world is often attributed as Connecting and Enabling the 
Next Billion(s) (IGF, 2015). The efforts were translated in many parts of the world 
with the state's efforts to connect more people, particularly in rural and economically 
deprived areas. That was at a time when Internet Service Providers and 
Telecommunication Operators were the drivers behind Internet expansion, based on 
commercial interest, these corporates found it simply non-lucrative to invest in 
connecting remote users, as they relied mainly on income from selling connection and 
products online, something that users in deprived and remote areas cannot provide 
for. 
More recently, on the 25th of September 2015, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted a resolution setting the agenda for Sustainable Development 
Goals to be achieved by 2030 (UNGA, 2015b, sec. 9). In which countries agreed to 
"Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and 
strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in the least developed 
countries by 2020". This is expected to push states to join the race by either investing 
directly in access and skill development projects or collaborating with other 
corporates already in the race to do the job, in a manner that guarantees the interest 
of both parties. One example of how may this look like is the recently proposed EU 
Copyright Directive, which 'requires internet companies to install filtering technology 
to prevent the upload of content that has been “identified by rights holders”' 
(McNamee, 2016). Later on in the research, projects for the Internet for the next 
billion will be discussed, including strategies, agendas, and reports issued at the inter-
governmental level, to evaluate what was in fact moved into robust actions, and how 
successful these initiatives are. 
In addition to people that are choose to be unconnected or as a result of 
economic position, whether as individuals, or as a country, there is a group of people 
that reside in countries where the Internet is available in general, and are not 
considered economically deprived, but live in remote locations that are not easy to 
reach. Corporates do not find the revenue from investment in infrastructure to reach 
these locations good enough. In some of those areas, local initiatives worked towards 
creating common networks, making technology and knowledge on building these 
networks available to the public. Providing access to people in remote areas, or as an 
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open alternative for available networks, some of these initiatives succeeded in 
connecting a significant number of nodes, like Guifi.net in Spain (Guifi.net, 2017) 
and AlterMundi in Argentina (AlterMundi.net, 2017).  
Fuchs and Horak (2008) discussed six possible strategies to reach 
unconnected people and solve the global digital divide, they are: 
1. Wait and see, market and technological development will cheapen access. 
2. By entering into markets and competition, third world countries will be able 
to leapfrog directly into information societies. 
3. Attracting foreign capital will increase wealth for all and access in developing 
countries. 
4. Technologies developed for the Third World. 
5. The Third World does not need technology. 
6. An integrated strategy of combining the global redistribution of wealth, 
educational and health programs, digital literacy programs; public and free 
access to computers and technologies, open-source technologies, and 
computers for the Third World. 
According to the authors, all but the last strategy are one-dimensional, trying 
to reduce the digital divide by targeting one dimension, neglecting the 
interconnectedness between different dimensions of technology, social aspects, 
development, human rights, and global capitalism. 
Despite that, major corporations starting seeing high value and commercial 
interest in ubiquitous Internet (Schmida and Lovegrove, 2016), as a result of the shift 
in Internet economies increased reliance on attention as the commodity of the Internet, 
as well as user-generated content and data, which brought realisation of valorisation 
potential more connected people bring. As seen earlier in reviewing the works of 
Fuchs (2012) (2012) on economies of Web 2.0, Andrejevic (2009, 2012, 2013) on 
exploitation in the digital world, Fuchs and Sandoval (2014), Fuchs (2014,2015) on 
digital labour and exploitation in social media, and Dyer-Witheford (2015) on cyber-
proletariat. 
This drove many corporations that provide services over the Internet and have 
its users’ information and attention as their bread and butter, including Facebook 
(Yim, Gomez and Carter, 2016) and Google (VentureBeat, 2016) to a "connectivity 
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race", in a manner similar to the fourth strategy mentioned above. This is a race to 
connect and reach new users and convert existing ones to free or subsidised access. 
Corporations like SpaceX (Moon, 2016) and OneWeb project backed by Virgin and 
Qualcomm (OneWeb, 2016), joined the race in the hope of being able to re-sell the 
new grounds to Internet corporates. ISPs are trying to join the race as well by 
providing a platform to collect and sell their customers browsing behaviour and 
information (Ogunkoya, 2016). 
All of the companies mentioned as part of the connectivity race are developing 
their own Internet delivery methods; Facebook’s Internet.org is testing Aquila, a 
solar-powered model of drones that ‘beam’ Internet signal to people in remote and 
underserved regions (Facebook, 2017). Not waiting for this project to realise, 
Facebook already provides access to its social network and specific services at no cost 
through partnerships with local mobile operators. Company X, the sister company of 
Google, has Project Loon, which is a network of balloons providing Internet access 
through partnerships with last-mile providers from mobile operators and local 
authorities (Alphabet, 2017), this system was tested in New Zealand. OneWeb is on 
a mission to create an affordable global gateway, “building a new global knowledge 
infrastructure accessible to all”, aiming to “fully bridge the digital divide by 2027” 
(OneWeb, 2016), using a constellation of 648 low orbiting satellites, with terminal 
that connect to the satellite and emit LTE, 3G and Wi-Fi. A similar concept of using 
low orbiting satellites, but with a much more ambitious numbers, is SpaceX 
constellation of 4,425 satellites, planned to be operating in five years from 2017 
(Moon, 2016), this company looks at this project as a pilot for its system to provide 
Internet on planet Mars  (Dickerson, 2015). 
These corporate efforts should be looked at from the view of power relation 
between them and their users, and from digital exploitation theories, where their 
interests are vested. This is another aspect this research is focusing on and 
contributing to the knowledge in. as seen earlier in the works of Castells and van Dijk 
on network society, corporations designing and providing access have Network 
Power, while corporations managing the medium or services available over the 
network have Networking Power. When there is one corporate providing both, this 
corporate can exert almost complete control on the network users, from what they can 
access and see in services from other networks and how they communicate, to content 
censorship and gatekeeping. When this is combined with a business model reliant on 
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digital exploitation of user data, attention, and generated content, we end up with 
networks that have limitless ability to control and motivation towards control, the 
research refers to those as holistic network providers, as this scenario is becoming a 
reality. 
From the details above, we can classify projects to reach the next billion into 
two main groups, infrastructure providers, and holistic network providers. SpaceX 
and OneWeb are evidently building a global infrastructure that they will monetise on 
through selling access to Internet companies, states, and potentially end-users. While 
Facebook and Company X do not share enough details on the monetising model of 
Aquila and Project Loon, they have the potential to become holistic network 
providers. This is particularly possible if we analysed the current service offered by 
Facebook, Free Basics. 
Free Basics’ platform goal is to bring internet access and the benefits of 
connectivity to the portion of the world that does not have them. They do that by 
providing access to country-specific useful services, as they call it, to people regions 
where internet access may be less affordable, through mobile operators (Internet.org, 
2017). The services offered include a set of websites and services on topics from 
weather to sexuality and health. These are handpicked by Facebook, effectively 
creating a walled garden, where Facebook is both the network owner and gatekeeper. 
The platform is marketed as a stepping-stone for users to get on to the Internet. The 
platform is currently available in 61 countries and municipalities as of mid-2017 
(Internet.org, 2017). Gebhart (2016) studied Free Basics and Wikipedia Zero in 
Ghana, and how users understood and experienced these services, to find that most 
users perceived it as telecom operator’s promotions, and most of Gebhart’s 
respondents did not use any of these services, because of technical and educational 
barriers as well as uncertainty about how to access and use them. These services also 
did not affect users’ data-buying strategies, suggesting that most of the users were 
already Internet users that used the offering to minimise the cost of access to these 
specific services. 
Internet Governance Forum, when discussing policy options for connecting 
and enabling the Next Billion(s), expressed concern about the nature of these private 
initiatives. Moreover, they stressed the need to ensure that such initiatives to expand 
access do not come at the cost of net neutrality and the free flow of information, with 
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contributions mentioning a warning of acceleration of walled garden Internet (IGF, 
2016). 
Yim et al. argue that although altogether rejecting attempts like Free Basics to 
provide social good might mean losing an essential opportunity for benefiting 
different stakeholders, and it is important not to embrace it uncritically (Yim, Gomez 
and Carter, 2016). This was said in their discussion on whether Free Basics is for or 
against the community, concluding that although it restricts users’ choices, and the 
implementer (Facebook) possesses virtual political powers with potential privacy 
risks. The use of the platform is determined by users themselves, putting the weight 
on the individual’s skills to make use of the platform, while overcoming its risks. 
However, not much research is available measuring the potential effects of such 
walled gardens on the benefits of Internet use on people’s lives and opportunities. 
This is an area of knowledge this research is trying to contribute to as well, with the 
conclusion aiming to sum up the effects such walled gardens, as offered to the next 








From the literature review, it can be concluded that there is a gap in understanding 
and explaining the effect of artificial Internet limitations on digital inequalities. This 
research aims to fill this gap through studying the correlation between artificial Internet 
limitations and outcomes of Internet use, defined as the Third Level Digital Divide, 
among three countries. The research was influenced by the transformative-emancipatory 
perspective to mixed-methods research as described by Martens (2003), a perspective that 
addresses inequalities through working with groups with different opportunities and 
powers from communities perspective. For this research, the adoption involved looking 
at the Internet users worldwide as one community, with the difference in Internet 
limitations imposed on sub-communities grouped in countries as a source of difference 
in power, comparing the tangible outcomes of Internet use as the divergence in 
opportunities and a rendition of inequalities. 
Countries were selected in an effort to limit the agency of the first and second 
levels of the digital divide. This was achieved through selecting countries from top of the 
list of countries in terms of Internet penetration rate based on World Bank statistics 
(World Bank, 2016) while having highly contrasted levels of artificial Internet limitations 
as reported through the Freedom House Freedom on the Net annual reports (Freedom 
House, 2017). To be able to conduct the correlation, the research utilises two distinct but 
interrelated studies. The first study looks at artificial Internet limitations in selected 
countries, while the second aims to measure Internet use outcomes in these countries. A 
third study is also designed and included to assess artificial limitations part of services 
offered to expand Internet to new users, the case for this is Free Basics, a service provided 
by Internet.org/Facebook to allow people in areas that have no connectivity around the 
world to access a pre-defined set of websites and online services. The variation in 
variables being measured compels the use of multiple data collection methods. 
This chapter looks at research questions detailing the design of research methods 
to answer these questions while highlighting the rationale behind each decision taken in 
relation, and listing potential limitations with suggested ways to mitigate their effects on 
the quality of the research. The following chapters build on the design advised here to 
fulfil the research goals and provide an insight to support answering the research 
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questions, with more details on the studies, including specific correlations between 
variables and analysis described in the following chapters.  
3.2. Research questions, hypothesis, and analyses overview 
The core of this research can be summarised in the following research questions: 
1. What are the relationships between Artificial Internet Limitations and Digital 
Inequalities manifested as tangible outcomes of Internet use as measured among 
samples from Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore? 
2. How do the relationships developed predict inequalities in communities with 
Internet access that is artificially limited, in particular Facebook’s Free Basics as 
an example of Internet for the Next Billion projects? 
The path taken to fulfil the first question goes through two central studies: the first 
looks at artificial Internet limitations in the research countries (Study 1), while the second 
study aims to measure the second leg of the correlation represented by the measurement 
of tangible outcomes of Internet use in these countries (Study 2). Crossing results from 
the studies over the examined population in countries of interest establish what effect do 
different artificial Internet limitations have on outcomes of Internet use, if any. The 
approach for taken for research is illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 3-1 
Studies and Phases of the Research 
 
The literature review showed lack in the body of knowledge in testing the nuances 
of connectivity as forms of digital inequality, with Internet access generally assumed to 
be the same regardless of the artificial Internet limitations imposed on the access, and 
thus, the null hypothesis (H0) would be that artificial Internet limitations do not affect 













differences produced by artificial Internet limitations, with the alternative hypothesis (H1) 
proposed to be that these limitations do affect digital inequalities. The hypotheses based 
on the available literature to fulfil requirements to answer the research questions, and 
allow for the continuation of the research to understand the effect in relation to the 
limitations, and the related predictors. Accepting or rejecting the hypothesis above, and 
the further research into the nuances of the effect measured would allow for an informed 
response to the second research question, on predicting inequalities in communities with 
Internet access based on artificial Internet limitations imposed to it.  
The risk here is that the application, as proposed,  looks at projects of connectivity 
for people with no, or scarce access to the Internet, while the studies 1 and 2 looked at 
areas where Internet access in terms of availability and affordability is not an issue. 
However, this by itself provides an aspect of power for the research, as it looks at access 
in abstraction, neutralising as much as possible factors other than artificial Internet 
limitations, to be able to use these limitations as predictors for digital inequalities among 
Internet users. The power also stems from the fact that Internet for the Next Billion(s) 
projects minimise access hurdles to the network, and as with the countries covered in 
studies 1 and 2, individuals do not have to worry about the cost of access, or its 
affordability, but may need to worry of the openness of the walled garden they are 
entering. 
For the second question, and as the research matures, it looks at an area where the 
Internet for the next billion projects selected for this study, Free Basics, is available for 
new Internet users, and get an understanding of what artificial limitations that exist on 
these connections (Study 3). In the case of rejecting any of the null hypotheses related to 
the first question, and thus accepting the alternative one, the research would be able to 
extend to studying the extent of the limitations related to the hypotheses rejected in the 
networks covered as part of Study 3. With the rejection of any of the null hypotheses, it 
would be suggested that the existence of these limitations might affect the digital 
inequalities in these communities, as represented by tangible outcomes of Internet use. 
The knowledge of the effect of the artificial Internet limitations on Internet use outcomes 
developed by the studies, we can project what effects the limitations have on new Internet 
users, and thus effectively answering the second research question. 
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3.3. Research sample and country selection 
Since the research is looking at the inequalities prescribed as part of the third level 
of digital divide, the population of interest for Study 2 is general people already having 
access to the Internet. Thus is not limited to populations of specific countries or 
geographies, but rather to communities affected by group artificial Internet limitations 
applied at large scale viewed as communities with different access potential. The 
differences studied through the transformative-emancipatory perspective adopted in this 
research allow precisely for that, as it is designed to study differences among sub-
communities with different opportunities. Large scale artificial Internet limitations tend 
to be implemented at country level following censorship and blocking laws and 
regulations, rendering people with access to the Internet within a country treated as a sub-
community of the overall network society, with the difference of access potential 
mediated by controls and limitations set. As a result, it was logical to look at countries as 
level of comparison. 
When comparing media in different countries, the field-setting work of Hallin and 
Mancini (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) cannot be ignored, as it did define a widely accepted 
basis for comparison of media systems across countries with different levels of 
democracy, different types and levels of journalism and media contribution. However, 
this work, and the plethora of works that followed, even with the follow up by the original 
authors published as a ten-plus year review of the original work (Hallin and Mancini, 
2011, 2017; Brüggemann et al., 2014), focused on localised media systems. The concept 
of localised media systems, as opposed to access to worldwide information sources, 
works well with established conventional media, such as newspapers and collective 
action supported by localised new media such as petitions, but does not seem to be 
offering much relevance in the Internet-enabled world of a global media system.  
Furthermore, the notions of community and country as used in this research shall 
be clarified. The research looks at the whole global network society is one community, 
while grouping by country exists solely to facilitate a look at large-scale implementation 
of artificial Internet limitations. This usage does not fit with the definition of locality as 
used in the field of media systems comparison. The research field uses the geo-political 
and territorial affiliation manifested at country level as basis for comparison. Thus, it does 
not seem appropriate to rely on comparing media systems as base for this research or to 
select research sample communities, leaving the need to conduct a separate preliminary 
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research to select regions where it would be easy to isolate artificial Internet limitations’ 
role in determining user potential. 
Following preliminary research to select the communities to be covered by this 
research, the initial selection included Estonia and Bahrain, in addition to the reasons for 
selection included later. Bahrain offered a distinguished opportunity to compare 
limitations among more than one sub-community within the same geographical setting 
that are affected by different forms of artificial Internet limitations, coming from 
knowledge of nightly shutdowns affecting only the Duraz region in Bahrain. It is worth 
noting here that the comparison among communities with different limitations within 
Bahrain was later dropped and replaced by looking at nuances in access availability as 
expressed by research participants, who included people affected by these shutdowns.  
The reason for dropping this potentially important aspect is that it is not possible 
to measure differences in outcomes of Internet use resulting from temporal access 
impediments covering only few hours of the day with clarity, especially that access during 
the rest of day is on par with access available to general population of Bahrain. 
Nonetheless, the aspect of Duraz region and the added limitations it is enduring is still 
covered in Study 1 to offer a well-rounded picture of the situation there. 
To increase reliability of the research, two more countries were added, Singapore 
and New Zealand, however for practical reasons related to resources available for the 
research, New Zealand was dropped, leaving the sample for this research to network 
communities grouped geographically in the countries of Estonia, Bahrain, and Singapore. 
The research countries were carefully selected to fulfil the research requirements of 
having active network society while being exposed to pronounced levels of artificial 
Internet limitations. The geographies were selected for having high Internet penetration 
rates and among the top 30 countries in terms of World Economic Forum Network 
Readiness Index indicating a high level of Internet availability and reliance among 
businesses and the society (WEF, 2017), thus clearly active in the network society, with 
access not being a huge impediment to Internet use.  
The other face of the coin that was critical in selecting these countries making 
them distinct from the many countries that have a similar position in terms of access 
availability, is based on Freedom on the Net annual report (FoN) published by Freedom 
House (Freedom House, 2017). The chosen countries have varying levels of restrictions 
on Internet access and use as per the FoN. These countries are all considered small in 
51 
terms of population and have comparable Internet adoption patterns over the years. Table 
3-1 compares some of the selection criteria among the countries. 
 
Table 3-1 
Comparison between countries of research 
 Bahrain Estonia Singapore 
Population, millions 1 1.378 1.315 5.607 
Internet users as 
percentage of population 
in 2012 1 
88 78.39 72 
Internet users as 
percentage of population 
in 2015 1 
93.4 88.4 82.1 
Internet Openness 2 Not Free, 71 Free, 6 Partly Free, 41 
Types of Restrictions 2 Access/Content/HR None Content/HR 
OONI Measurements 3 2,963 333,95
2 
55,473 
World Economic Forum 
Network Readiness Index 
4 
28 22 1 
Notes, 1: World Bank Data, http://data.worldbank.org 
2:FreedomHouse Freedom on the Net reports, http://freedomhouse.org 
3:OONI Explorer, https://explorer.ooni.torproject.org 
4:World Economic Forum Global Technology Report 2016, 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-information-technology-report-2016 
 
Data in table 3-1 show that the research includes one country with Internet access 
available to residents to be considered free (Estonia), one considered partly free 
(Singapore), and one not free (Bahrain), which further strengthens the reliability of 
research through covering similar countries that differ in aspects related to this research. 
Another source of information for comparison concerning Internet openness was 
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OpenNet Initiative reports1. The initiative did follow rigorous methodologies in their data 
collection and reporting. It is worth mentioning that this effort, as well as the efforts of 
FreedomHouse used in this research, cannot be considered as fully academically valid 
resources as it did not go through a strict peer-review process as expected from rigorous 
academic resources. Nonetheless, these sources provide a very good indicator of the 
situation, and with its multi-year edition, provide a necessary longitudinal perspective to 
understand changes and connect them with other events. These resources are also some 
of the scarce resources available that do extensively cover countries of research. Thus, 
they are used in this research to provide necessary context and guidance with the 
information they provide are tested against primary-collected data whenever possible. 
Initial assessment of reports covering Bahrain and Singapore included results on 
the status of the Internet and details on confirmed that artificial Internet limitations in 
Bahrain cover political, social, and Internet tools, while limitations in Singapore included 
selective filtering on the social context. The latest OpenNet Initiative reports available 
and used for the initial assessment are from 2009 for Bahrain and 2007 for Singapore, 
rendering them outdated, especially when taking into consideration the pace in which the 
Internet and Internet controls are evolving. They are referenced as part of the historical 
context development, and their findings are used in comparison with findings of the 
research studies to understand changes in Internet limitations. 
Internet adoption rate can also play a role in determining the use of the Internet 
(van Dijk and Hacker, 2003), which is another factor used to select countries of research. 
Figure 1 shows Internet adoption rate over the years in countries of study as percentage 
of the population, demonstrating similar trend between Estonia and Singapore, which in 
turn is comparable to that of Bahrain, showing no significant difference in the overall 
Internet adoption that may result in a comparable difference in attitude towards the 
technology and services. This serves to strengthen the rationale of country selection. The 
data for this table is sourced from World Bank indicators database, which in turn sources 
the International Telecommunication Union’s World Telecommunication/ICT 
Development Report and database. 
 
 




Internet penetration rate, 1995-2015, Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore. World 
Bank Data 2017 
 
In each of the countries of the study, the research involved conducting a survey 
among a random sample of Internet users, the sample for the survey are Internet users 
aged 18 and above. The survey itself was conducted online targeting sample for surveys 
per country was aimed at roughly 150 samples per country, which, when calculated using 
tools based on the formula by Krejcie and Morgan (1970), provides 95% confidence level 
with up to 8% confidence interval. The sample was selected through a hybrid sampling 
method of snowball sampling with multiple entry points. The entry point participants 
were reached through online calls for participation, through paid advertisements on 
leading social networks, mailing lists, and through access provided by local organisations 
working in related issues, and later asked to pass the survey to people they know. This 
combination of methods of access provided needed randomness. 
As the research progressed, it was apparent that the recruitment of participants is 
more challenging than anticipated, especially in Bahrain and Singapore, affecting the 
number of responses from these two countries. Different measurements were taken to 
mitigate that, including introducing rewards for survey completion to increase interest in 
the survey, the rewards were four £100 Amazon vouchers, to be drawn among 
respondents who opt-in by leaving their email address at the end of the survey. This 
method helped bring new responses, but not as effective as perceived. 
The second instrument for Study 2 is a set of interviews, increasing the validity 
of the study, as well as confirming and expanding survey results. The interviews are semi-
structured, with subjects carefully selected to extend the representation to varied portions 
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of the population, with people considered experts as users or providers in their respective 
fields. The interviews focused on aspects similar to that to the survey, as well as 
discussing initial results of the survey to get a deeper understanding on responses and 
issues measured, as in the perception of artificial Internet limitations. The interviews also 
provided interviewee's points of view on Internet usage fields. The aim is to conduct at 
least five interviews at each of the study countries with at least one interview for each 
field per country, and this is possible since fields are not mutually exclusive and it is 
probable to find people that fit in more than one targeted sample. 
The sample was discovered and access negotiated through contacts in each 
country, and cold emails and messages on online fora to key people in each of the fields 
above, as well as online advertising on social networks targeting these countries. For the 
interview, a simple token of appreciation was introduced in the form of a £20 Amazon 
voucher sent at the end of each interview. 
Study 1 continues working with the same countries to collect measurements from 
various networks in these countries. The aim is to have at least 2,000 measurements from 
networks operating in each country. A measurement can be a site or service tested or any 
single test covering any of the limitations, one user or testing session can provide multiple 
measurements. The second source of information for this study aims at collecting reports 
available on artificial Internet limitations in the said countries. 
3.4. Methods 
3.4.1. Study 1 
The literature review educated on the existence of two main categories of artificial 
Internet limitations: the first is active Internet limitations, which are limitations set on the 
network level and are not related to the user, such as blocking of websites. While the 
second category can be described as soft limitations, indirectly affecting the network but 
primarily affect Internet use, such as perceived censorship and surveillance. To be able 
to study both categories effectively, Study 1 adopts a mixed-methods approach with both 
quantitative and qualitative instruments and analysis. 
Quantitative methods are used to collect and analyse data on active and hard 
artificial Internet limitations, as it is the most appropriate method when it comes to 
analysing facts that can be measured systematically in forms of numbers and quantifiable 
results. The results in our case are measurements and tests conducted on networks within 
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the selected countries. Moreover, to cover aspects indirectly affecting Internet and 
information access, or soft artificial Internet limitations, a qualitative effort was 
conducted, with information sourced from reports and new as well as from parts of the 
interviews and survey conducted for Study 2. Steps for Study 1 can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Evaluate and adopt methods to measure artificial Internet limitations. 
2. Select countries and regions to be studied. 
3. Collect measurements and tests on networks if no reliable and timely 
measurements already available. 
4. Research reports and news on indirect or soft artificial Internet limitations. 
5. Analyse results. 
At the stage of step 5, and when the results from Study 2 are available, we can 
conduct the correlation between these two studies, and conclude what effects do artificial 
Internet limitations have on outcomes of Internet use in the countries selected for this 
study, giving an idea on similar effects existing wherever certain limitations exist. This 
knowledge allowed for informed look at Study 3, which can be considered an applied 
case towards understanding how these limitations affect new Internet users. 
The mixed-methods approach used in Study 1, as described above, adopts 
quantitative network measurements and qualitative research on reports and news on 
artificial Internet limitations and information controls, as well as information collected 
from interviews in Study 2. The instrument for network measurement looks at hard 
limitations set as part of networks used to access the Internet among the population, the 
fact that we can measure difference in limitations among different networks, open the 
way towards inter-country comparison between users of different networks. From 
research, Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) approach was found to be 
the most suitable, as it covers a wide range of artificial Internet limitations, and is 
collecting measurements through probes available all around the globe, including 
countries of research. OONI also offers a mobile version that can further expand the 
coverage to reach most areas and population of interest. 
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The measurements collected which only gives an idea on limitations based on 
physical and configuration aspects, meaning that user faces these limitations unless a 
technical effort was exhorted to circumvent it. To augment results of the measurements, 
and expand coverage to include indirect and soft artificial Internet limitations, the 
research includes comprehensive investigation of reports and news on measures taken in 
recent years affecting people's use of the Internet in countries of research. This includes 
laws limiting or criminalising open expression and dictating how the people should use 
the Internet, as well as prosecution based on online activities, which may result in a state 
of self-censorship, and chilling effect on the effective use of the Internet. 
3.4.1.1. Network measurements 
Measurement of Internet limitations applied on networks was conducted using 
OONI tools, which constructs a global observation group, of volunteers mainly, to test 
networks around the world to detect censorship and surveillance. OONI measures 
network traffic manipulation using a series of tests covering blocking of websites, 
blocking of some of the most common instant messaging applications, blocking of 
circumvention tools, and detection of systems that could be responsible for censorship 
and surveillance (OONI, 2018). Measurements are collected through series of tests that 
comprise, in essence, of requesting sites and services through a control server and over 
the user network simultaneously and compare results from both to detect blocking and 
possible manipulation. 
One advantage of OONI is that it covers multiple blocking methods, including 
Domain Name Services (DNS) tampering and consistency, Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) transmission reset, and Internet Protocol (IP) address blocking through a 
transparent proxy. In addition, it offers Network Diagnostic Test (NDT), a test developed 
by Measurement Lab (M-Lab), a consortium of research, industry, and public-interest 
partners interested in global network performance. These measurements are essential to 
cover different methods of site censorship extending beyond the official and clear site 
blocking with a page served to inform the user that the site they are trying to access is 
blocked, to practices using different technologies to make it look as if the site is not 
available for technical problems. 
Another advantage of using this measurement approach is that it does not only 
describe accessibility or availability of a site or service but can also be considered 
experimental in that it compares access through different routes, resulting in the ability to 
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identify causality of unavailability. The logic used to identify causality is simple, if a site 
is accessible and identical over both routes, direct, and through Tor network, which 
provides access through secure connection to set of nodes distributed around the world 
hiding the traffic from local networks, and using different locations as exit points, then 
the site is available, and no blocking is detected. If the site is only accessible over the Tor 
network, then blocking is probable, and the type depends on the response received 
through direct route. While if a site is not available on both, then it is probable that there 
is a problem with the site, but blocking is not excluded. 
OONI probe uses a list of potentially blocked websites (URLs) in order to run the 
tests against, there is one global list, and there are country-specific lists with sites 
contributed by the community and maintainers of the OONI project. The lists include 
categorisation of the URL to be tested, date of addition and source, number of addresses 
at each list of interest to the research is listed in table 3-2. To test the blocking at the 
countries of the research effectively, websites that may be blocked were researched and 
contributed to the lists of interest accordingly. One shortcoming of the OONI mobile 
application, when compared to the desktop probe, is that it does not allow natural 
selection of list to test, leaving most people testing for the default lists. The researcher 
collaborated on this issue with the development community to try to find a way of 
overcoming. 
Table 3-2 
Addresses in relevant OONI test lists 





Notes: lists from https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/tree/master/lists 
In addition to testing for blocked websites, other tests conducted and data analysed 
for including common and potential artificial Internet limitations that were decided on 
based on examining reports and news available on Internet limitations in the countries of 
interest. The test covered the following common artificial Internet limitations: 
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• Limiting access and blocking websites, tested through testing web connectivity, 
availability of the website requested, comparing responses for site request from 
multiple networks, and testing for Domain Name Server manipulation. 
• Limiting access and usage of circumvention tools, including the use of proxies, 
testing for the usability of common services like Tor, Lantern, and Psiphon. 
• Blocking instant messaging applications and protocols, testing for reachability of 
common services like Facebook Messenger, Telegram, and WhatsApp. 
• Censorship, surveillance, testing for middle boxes that are common for tools used 
in censorship, surveillance, and trying to identify the technology used. 
• Testing for performance and speed of the network to identify the potential 
limitation of quality of service in areas or for services. 
Either the data collected through the probe is then transferred to the OONI primary 
collector, where it is made available to the public through the OONI explorer web 
interface, or through an Application Programmable Interface (API), which allows queries 
to run on the dataset online, a third method would be to download the datasets, and 
conduct offline analysis. For this research, a combination between the available interfaces 
was used to allow for an in-depth analysis, especially when there is no particular 
conclusion on a specific test or measurement, as this is possible when OONI does not find 
enough evidence supporting definite result for a status of a website or service. One 
scenario is when a measurement shows that a website is inaccessible through the direct 
route, but it is through the Tor route, but there is no enough measurement to eliminate the 
possibility of a temporary error, and the result was not a page stating that the site is 
blocked. 
A new tool that promised the opportunity to further validate research findings, the 
AccessCheck tool, announced by Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard 
University in June 2019 as part of their Internet Monitor project  (BKCIS, 2019). The tool 
follows a similar method for network measurements as used in the research by utilising 
the OONI methods, but allows for real-time checking of accessibility through a series of 
servers located in locations around the world. The researcher obtained real-time access to 
the data and testing services as a verified researcher by the platform. The end nodes 
available included four ISPs in each of Estonia and Singapore, but none in Bahrain, for 
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reason matching the limitations faced by this research of inability to access the Bahraini 
network. The results from this study take the form of quantitative results representing the 
existence of artificial Internet limitations and the scale of these limitations. In the case of 
website blocking, the results take the form of percentage of websites and services blocked 
from the country and global test lists, and the category these limitations fall into. In the 
case of tampering and performance interruption, the results take a similar form of 
percentage and possibly the scale of the tampering, and the percentage of population 
affected where possible, the last is conceivably possible when looking at Internet 
shutdowns that affect specific regions within the countries of study. The results in this 
format would allow an objective point of view on what Internet limitations are in 
existence in each of the study countries and constitute an original contribution to research 
in digital inequalities by shedding light on the role of limitations in determining 
opportunities. 
3.4.1.2. Laws and reports 
In order to expand the study of Internet limitations in terms of coverage and depth 
of the research, it included a study on laws, regulations, and practices that limit the use 
of the Internet and affect tangible outcomes of said use. These include collection and 
analysis of existing reports on the status of the Internet in research countries, as well as a 
look at laws and regulations related. The research is interested in any available 
information that may be related to affecting how people use the Internet, from research 
papers and reports, reports from human rights organisations and civil society interested 
in freedom of expression and Internet to news items. 
Reports and laws were collected through desk research in library and journals, as 
well as online resources, including the OpenNet Initiative research project, which ran 
between 2007 and 2014, collecting and reporting on Internet censorship in countries 
around the world. The project concluded with several reports and three books published 
(Deibert et al., 2008, 2010, 2011), which are used in this research extensively, but with 
scrutiny, as a valuable resource, particularly their reporting on Bahrain, as Bahrain did 
not receive enough attention and coverage in other reports. The OpenNet Initiative 
reports, although outdated, provide well-developed evidence than can be used to develop 
research context and general understanding, which we aim to augment and provide 
updated information through this research. This lack of extensive coverage made it 
challenging to get details and data, but at the same time, provided an opportunity for this 
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research to contribute further to knowledge, especially that much of the data collected, 
and information used has not been previously documented in scientific research. 
A valuable input also comes from Study 2 tools, where its survey carried questions 
on perceived limitations to the benefit of Study 1, and the interviews were used to provide 
valuable insights in this regard. The questions at the survey allowed participants to 
express how they feel their school or work, Internet service provider, or government is 
controlling or monitoring their Internet access. In addition to that, the questions on tools 
used and know can also provide an idea of how people feel about the openness and 
freedom of their Internet access and use. 
This approach allows an in-depth overview of determinants or predictors of 
Internet use, which in addition to measurement collected in the other part of Study 1, 
would fulfil enough confidence in the results to conclude on level of artificial limitations 
allowing for achieving good correlation with Study 2. 
Results from this part of Study 1 would be beneficial and can be related them to 
the first part as many of them are quantitative in nature, as in the rankings and scores were 
given to countries in issues related Internet limitations and digital inequalities in reports 
and studies. The qualitative output also proves paramount value here, as it does provide 
insight and explanation to many of the findings throughout the research. 
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3.4.2. Study 2 
Study 2 also adopts a mixed-methods approach as in Study 1. However, it has a 
different approach to sources of data, with surveys among random sample to get as much 
data as possible, and interviews specific to carefully selected sample to confirm and 
expand survey results. Steps planned to achieve this study can be highlighted as the 
following: 
1. Select a framework to measure Internet use outcomes. 
2. Select countries and regions as groups to be studied. 
3. Select samples among study groups. 
4. Design and test survey. 
5. Conduct survey. 
6. Conduct Interviews. 
7. Analyse results, compare the primary outcomes from surveys and interviews. 
The approach adopted for Study 2 has two instruments: survey and interviews. 
More specifically, the interviews with expert aimed to target outcomes of Internet use in 
different countries, known as the Third Level Digital Divide. This choice was made with 
the nature of research taken into consideration to increase reliability of data collected. 
The main framework that stood out in the review is what van Deursen and Helsper used 
in their article "Third-Level Digital Divide: Who Benefits Most from Being Online?" 
(van Deursen and Helsper, 2015), and later adopted at large scale research titled Digital 
Skills to Tangible Outcomes (DiSTO) at London School of Economics and University of 
Twente. The DiSTO study included several projects aiming at measuring people’s digital 
skills, digital engagement, and outcomes of Internet use covering several countries around 
the world. The framework was also applied in sub-projects in the UK, Netherlands, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Kuwait, as well as other projects targeting specific user groups, like the 
DiSTO Youth project. 
This framework had a similar aim and focus on this research in terms of measuring 
tangible outcomes of Internet use as determinant of digital inequalities. Nonetheless, to 
focus on artificial limitation predictors as possible variables, related dimensions inspired 
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by the sequential model of access described by van Dijk in their book "The Deepening 
Divide" (2005a) were added, particularly questions on perception of information controls 
and artificial limitations, and the use of circumvention tools. The researcher has 
developed a draft survey based on the above, this survey was translated to main locally 
used languages to fit users of different countries of the study and was customized based 
on feedback from piloting the survey with ten participants speaking the four languages of 
the survey. A printed version of the survey is supplied as an annexe. 
The survey relies on the offline activity influenced by Internet use fields as 
described in framework mentioned above, which are economic (labour and commerce), 
social, political, institutional (governmental and health), and educational. Questions 
added to refer to perception of information controls and artificial Internet limitations, and 
the use of circumvention tools, which are necessary for relation to this research.  
A second instrument designed to add validity and reliability to Study 2, and to 
expand the results of the survey, is a set of semi-structured interviews, with subjects 
carefully selected for having a particular interest in at least one of the fields of use 
mentioned above. The data provided by both instruments are expected to provide 
adequate coverage to the subject of the study, allowing understanding of difference in 
Internet use outcomes among countries of the study. 
3.4.2.1. Survey 
The survey instrument used in Study 2 was designed to cover tangible outcomes 
of Internet use, as well as including standard demographic questions, and questions to 
assist in determining perceived limitations, which is used as a source for Study 1. Fields, 
question grouping and scales used in the tangible outcomes of Internet use segment of the 
survey are designed to be compatible with the framework set by van Deursen and Helsper 
and used for this research, providing invaluable ability for continues benchmarking of 
results collected against results reported from previous research that used the same 
framework in other countries. Another goal served by assuring compatibility is to increase 
the impact of this research by allowing use of the results as part of further research 
increasing the representation at the same countries of this research, or projects that cover 
wider regions. 
The highest level, or the second level, of grouping of tangible outcomes of Internet 
use, is through the four fields of Economy, Culture, Social, and Personal aspects, allowing 
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coverage of different aspects of a person’s life. Questions for the tangible outcomes where 
logically distributed over four pages mirroring these four fields, with two matrices of 
questions for each classification, one for achievements in aspects related to this 
classification, and the second for satisfaction related to these aspects. Each field was also 
divided into groups of questions with two questions on achievement, and two other 
questions on satisfaction in each, this level of grouping was not displayed to participants, 
but used in the analysis. The scale was unified across all aspects to make the questionnaire 
as easy as possible to answer. All questions focused on online activities in the year prior 
to taking the survey, with standard five points Likert scales with two added options, one 
for not applicable, and another for when the participant does not know about what is asked 
about in the question. 
The Economic field questions included four groups of benefits and outcomes. The 
groups in this field focused on uses and outcomes related to the person's economic and 
financial position and opportunities, labelled as property, finance, employment, and 
education. The property group is composed of buying and selling products online in terms 
of price and quality, the finance group is composed of information and services found 
and used online to improve financial situation, and insurance bought online. While 
employment group is composed of things found online influencing person's job and jobs 
found online, and the last group, education, is concerned with certificates obtained that 
would not have been obtained without the Internet, and educational material found online 
and their quality. 
The Cultural field followed a similar composition of two questions per group for 
achievement and two others for satisfaction, but within only two groups, Identity and 
Belonging. The identity group focused on understanding gender differences and learning 
about the participant’s own ethnic group and satisfaction with information online about 
religion. The Belonging group questions were more concerned with connecting with 
peers of similar age and interests, and people with shared religious or spiritual beliefs, 
comparing online and offline encounters. 
The third field, Social, included three groups of questions covering three types of 
social networks and associations, informal, formal, and political. Questions in these 
groups looked at friendships, memberships and affiliations, and government-related 
information and connections, to measure how people made use of the Internet to benefit 
themselves socially, increasing and maintaining their social capital, and satisfaction 
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related to affiliations and relationships. Governmental services accessed and used, as well 
as interaction with local political and governmental entities, were assessed as well. 
The last field in the tangible outcomes of Internet use segment was the Personal 
field, with three groups of questions on health and lifestyle, Self Actualisation, and 
leisure. The questions covered decisions, and use of information found online in relation 
to health and medical care and lifestyle, general knowledge and understanding of social 
issues, and entertainment and leisure achieved as a result of using the Internet, in addition 
to a question on general feeling about spending time online. 
Each question in the survey was given a sequence within the main field it serves 
and a code identifying what subfield it is part of, representing the combined scale that is 
calculated from responses. One example is in questions EconomicA (SQ001) and 
EconomicA (SQ002), the questions read, “I save money by buying products online” and 
“I sell goods that I would not have sold otherwise”, together they constitute the scale of 
Economic Achievement in terms of Property at the first level of aggregation. On the 
second level, when this scale is combined with other subfields of Economic Achievement 
in terms of Income, and Education or Employment, constitute the scale of Economic 
Achievement. Figure 3-2 includes the questions and the different levels of aggregation 
used to develop the scales. 
Figure 3-3 
Fields of Tangible Internet Outcomes Studied  















Property EconomicA(SQ001) I save 
money by buying 
products online 
EconomicA(SQ002) I sell goods 
that I would not 
have sold otherwise 
Income EconomicA(SQ003) The 
information and 
services I found 
online improved my 
financial situation 
EconomicA(SQ004) I bought 
insurance online 
that I would not 




EconomicA(SQ005) The things I 
found online 
influenced how I do 
my job 
EconomicA(SQ006) I found a 
job online that I 
could not have 
found offline 
EconomicA(SQ007) I got a 
certificate that I 
could not have got 
without the Internet 
EconomicA(SQ008) I found 
educational material 
online that I could 










Property EconomicS(SQ001) The quality 
of the last product 
that you bought 
online 
EconomicS(SQ002) The price 
you get for the 
products you sell 
online 
Income EconomicS(SQ003) The last 
financial service you 
used (e.g. banking) 
EconomicS(SQ004) The 
insurance or other 
financial product you 
bought online 
Edu/employment EconomicS(SQ005) The job you 
got online 
EconomicS(SQ006) The way the 
Internet has 
influenced how you 
do your job 
EconomicS(SQ007) The quality 
of the course that 
you found online 
EconomicS(SQ008) The quality 
of the educational 













en t Cultural Identity CulturalA(SQ001) The things I 
came across on the 
66 
Internet made me 
think about the 
differences between 
men and women 
CulturalA(SQ002) Through the 
Internet, I learned 




CulturalA(SQ003) Through the 
Internet, I found 
people of a similar 
age that share my 
interests 
CulturalA(SQ004) Due to the 
information I found 
and people I have 
met online I feel 
more connected 










Cultural Identity CulturalS(SQ001) The 
information you 
come across about 




come across about 





people of your age 
online (as compared 
to offline 
interactions with 
people your age) 




share your religious 
beliefs (i.e. in 
comparison with the 













Personal SocialA(SQ001) I am in 
touch with my close 
friends more 
because I use the 
Internet 
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SocialA(SQ002) People I 
meet online are 
more interesting 
than the people I 
meet offline 
Formal SocialA(SQ003) I became a 
member of a hobby 
or leisure club or 
organisation that I 
otherwise would not 
have found 
SocialA(SQ004) I became a 
member, donor of a 
civic organisation 
(e.g. those involved 
in environmental or 
human rights 
campaigning) I 
would not have 
become a member 
of otherwise 
Political/Public SocialA(SQ005) I have 
discovered online 
that I am entitled to 
a particular benefit, 
subsidy or tax 
advantage which I 
would not have 
found offline 
SocialA(SQ006) Online, I 
have better contact 
with my Member of 











Personal SocialS(SQ001) Your online 
communication with 
friends and family? 
(i.e. in comparison 
with the offline 
communication you 
might have) 
SocialS(SQ002) Your online 
communication with 
people online who 
are not close friends 
or family? (i.e. in 





Formal SocialS(SQ003) The last 
club or organisation 
you became a 
member of online 
SocialS(SQ004) Your online 
involvement with 
the last organisation 
you joined/donated 
to 
Political/Public SocialS(SQ005) The last 
online government 
service you accessed 
SocialS(SQ006) Your last 
interaction with a 
Member of the 
Parliament, local 















Health PersonalA(SQ001) I have made 
better decisions 
about my health or 
medical care as a 
result of the 
information / advice 
I found online 
PersonalA(SQ002) Information 
I found online gave 
me more confidence 
in my lifestyle 
choices 
Self actualisation PersonalA(SQ003) My 
knowledge increased 
because of the 
Internet (i.e. looking 
up information, 
talking to others) 
PersonalA(SQ004) Using the 
Internet helps me to 
form opinions about 
complex social issues 
I would not fully 
understand 
otherwise 
Leisure PersonalA(SQ005) Online 
entertainment 
(games, listening to 
music, reading jokes) 
made me feel 
happier 
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PersonalA(SQ006) I go to 
events and concerts 











Health PersonalS(SQ001) The way in 
which the last bit of 
advice, program or 
app you used has 
influenced your level 
of fitness 
PersonalS(SQ002) The way 
you changed your 
lifestyle as a result of 
information you 
found online 
Self actualisation PersonalS(SQ003) In general, 
the information you 
find online about 
topics that interest 
you 
PersonalS(SQ004) The way in 
which the Internet 
helps you think 
about social issues 
Leisure PersonalS(SQ005) The last 
concert or event you 
went to after finding 
information or 
buying the ticket for 
the event online 
PersonalS(SQ006) In general, 
how do you feel 
about spending time 
online 
 
In addition to the tangible outcomes segment, the survey included questions to 
measure other possible Internet use predictors as educated by the review of literature, in 
an effort to capture as many predictors as possible to allow for more accurate analysis 
and conclusion. These questions included aspects related to the respondent of age, age at 
first Internet use, gender, education level, employment type, and devices available for 
use. Questions also included locations where the person is using the Internet, whether at 
home, work or school, while travelling using mobile devices, or at public or other places. 
A copy of the survey as used in English is included as Appendix I. 
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Recruitment of the respondents proved to be challenging, as the classical methods 
of random sampling as described in the literature, as in Creswell and Clark (2010), 
required resources not available to this study, a best effort approach to random sampling 
was adopted. The approach adopted was to access the population through multiple 
communication media and access point, and spread the survey as much as possible 
through social media platforms and trusted local people, to generate as much exposure to 
the survey as possible to gain some randomness. The survey was promoted on social 
media platforms of Facebook and Twitter for people from the countries of research fitting 
the age criterion, and announced over mailing lists for a various local interest group, as 
well as sending emails for address lists obtained through list providers, and announcing 
the survey on local online fora. Contact with key local people used for the interviews also 
proved to be very beneficial to the recruitment of subjects for the survey, as they have 
announced and shared the survey to their social networks, and have asked people with 
high number of local followers to do the same. This method, although unorthodox, 
resulted in a diverse sample with best effort for randomness and showed some 
stratification characteristics to fit that of the population, as described in Chapter 5. 
3.4.2.2. Interviews 
The second instrument of Study 2 is a set of semi-structured interviews with 
people from different groups in countries of research. This instrument was designed to 
shed more light at the status of the Internet and Internet use, as well as expanding the 
scope of research to capture any factors and variables that may not have been captured 
well through the survey. The initial design placed the interviews as the stage after 
collecting the survey data and conducting the analysis to be able to build on the survey 
results in expansion and validating through the interviews fulfilling the sequential 
explanatory design (Creswell and Clark, 2010). However, as the data collection started, 
it was clear that the survey would require much more time than planned to reach the target 
number of responses. A change in design occurred here to commence with the interview 
process as the first set of preliminary survey results became available in order to maintain 
the overall timeline of the research. This decision proved to be useful for two reasons. 
The first is that the interview participants were also helpful in reaching to more survey 
participants, and the preliminary survey results available then provided enough insight 
and understanding to inform the survey questions. 
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The semi-structured approach deemed to be the fittest where a list of guide 
questions is used for all interviews, and there is enough room for individual and specific 
expansion questions, as well as open-ended discussions. The pre-set structured questions 
provided higher rigour with reliable and comparable results that can be reflected on 
survey results as well. At the same time, the flexibility of open-ended questions, and room 
for any further comments allowed an opportunity to touch on issues specific to a specific 
country or field of outcomes studied with full freedom of expression for the participant. 
Interview participants were selected to represent different groups of people with 
a particular interest in at least one of the offline activity fields influenced by Internet use 
as described by the reference framework used previously detailed, fields and sample 
target type are described in table 3-3. 
Table 3-3 
Categories of Interview Sample 
Field Code Field Sample Targeted 
EL Economic, Labour Jobseeker  
EC Economic, Commerce Online entrepreneur, e-commerce user 
S Social General user 
P Political General user, local activist 
IG Institutional, governmental General user/citizen 
IH Institutional, Health General user 
E Educational Student, Educator 
It was challenging reaching the sample target working remotely without actually 
being in the country of research. The sample target was reached through local contacts, 
and access through social media sites, particularly professional networks like LinkedIn, 
as well as cold emails to key people in each field, a special effort was put to assure that 
people selected thoroughly represent the user group. 
Structured questions were designed to be simple and straight forward, beginning 
with what the participant thinks of the role of the Internet in affecting people’s lives in 
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their country. Then followed by questions specific to the way the Internet is used in the 
sector or field the participant is involved in, what services are available and how it is 
related to people’s opportunities, and if these services are making people use the Internet 
more. The questions then target Internet limitations, and how the participant sees them 
affecting Internet use, to what extent, and in which aspects. Then, open-ended questions 
are asked based on the previous responses to expand the results, and the respondent is 
offered the chance to discuss and provide the commentary they believe related to the 
research. 
Data collected through the interviews are analysed manually and summarised in 
a way to allow comparison. The manual analysis seemed to be the best fit for the scale of 
interview. Later on, responses are compared to related field of Internet use outcomes of 
the survey, and insights are used in discussing the analysis results. This method allows 
for deeper understanding of the outcomes of the analysis, and better reflects the status of 
digital inequalities, and the tangible outcomes of Internet use sought after in this research, 
allowing for better correlation with artificial Internet limitations. 
3.4.3. Study 3 
As we have the results from Study 1 and Study 2, we can project the results of 
having artificially limited access to the Internet on opportunities in terms of outcomes of 
Internet use. To fulfil the transformative goals of this research, we look at one of the 
projects that are providing access to new Internet users, with a critical eye on what digital 
opportunities they provide or hurdle. The project of focus of this research is Free Basics 
by Facebook, because it is one of the few projects that moved beyond planning and testing 
to actual implementation, and because of the clear constraints it has on its users, and the 
fact that is one of the leading projects in this regard. Steps for this study are as follows: 
1. Select a project to focus on. 
2. Study artificial limitations of that project. 
3. Analyse results, compare outcomes with results of Study 1 and Study 2 
correlations. 
The final part of the research, Study 3, takes an approach similar to that of Study 
1, but focusing on a network, rather than a region, to conclude on what are the possible 
effects of artificial limitations set on that network have on outcomes of the use of it. 
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3.4.4. Cross-study analysis and correlation 
The core of the research is the main research question on the effect of artificial 
Internet limitation on digital inequalities in terms of outcomes of Internet use and the third 
digital divide, comparing the countries of research through the hypotheses described earlier. 
The approach taken to answer this question is through accepting or rejecting hypothesis by 
comparing the studied artificial Internet limitations as measured in Study 1, correlating them 
with outcomes of Internet use as measured in Study 2, and then comparing the correlation 
among the countries as communities, and among the whole sample as individuals. The 
approach allow for correctly placing the correlation step at the forefront in terms of 
importance and originality of this research. The correlation is performed at multiple levels, 
from the sub-field level at Internet tangible outcomes to aggregate scales and overall 
outcomes. 
As educated in the literature review, there are several determinants that may affect 
digital opportunities, particular to the person’s traits and their status. These determinants or 
predictors were included in the research data collection as classical predictors to account for 
and eliminate their agency to gauge with success for the effect of the main predictors related 
to this research, artificial Internet limitations. The classic predictors include socio-
demographic variables such as age, gender, education, employment, and years of Internet 
experience, as advised by the literature review, while the research predictors are variables 
related to perception of limitations, use of circumvention tools, and skills to bypass 
limitations, which will be further detailed in chapter 5. 
These two groups of predictors are tested against the outcomes of Internet use as per 
the data collected through the survey, to measure what predictors have the highest effects on 
usage outcomes, and where there is an effect, the null hypothesis can be rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis accepted. The predictors above are used as the independent variables 
that we analyse the outcomes of Internet use variables against, which should provide a clear 
idea on what affects the uses people make of through the Internet, and to what level. 
3.5. Validity and reliability 
The validity of the research stems from the validity of each of the studies 
comprising the correlation. Study 2 validity is based generally on the fact that the 
framework previously adopted for the tangible Internet outcomes study was tested and 
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proofed as part of the DiSTO2 project in several countries as previously detailed. The 
results and literature produced shows that the framework is capable of measuring Internet 
use outcomes as required by this research. 
Key component of the reliability of this study comes from the extent of survey 
responses and coverage of interviews. Although the level achieved provides good and 
generally reliable results, the responses collected does not catch the full reliability and 
representation desired. This is tackled through additional interviews to support the 
reliability of the study, and understandable given the time and resource restraints of this 
research. 
The depth of tests conducted to cover a vast number of possible artificial Internet 
limitations can assure validity of study 1. The measurement framework selected serves 
this purpose by providing reliable results in accordance with scientific rigour, as 
described by M-Lab. In addition to that, the study of indirect, or soft artificial Internet 
limitations, adds further validity of the research by connecting both types of limitations 
to Internet use outcomes, giving equal footing for both types of limitations. Reliability of 
this part is assured by the breadth of tests conducted, with testing planned to cover all 
main networks providing access to Internet users in each of the research countries. 
Tests are conducting through OONI probes software that can be run on computers 
or through a customized Linux image that runs on Raspberry PI and similar single-board 
computer, called Lepidopter. This image includes ready to run OONI probe software with 
all the needed dependencies and makes it easy to run tests from different locations and 
networks efficiently. However, this ease of use cannot be compared with the mobile 
application, first launched in February 2017 (OONI, 2017), and provide an easy to use 
interface to run network tests and contribute measurements to primary OONI data 
collector, making it possible to test mobile networks through mobile data, and residential 
or public networks through WiFi-connected mobile devices. With the high availability of 
smartphones in the countries of research, this proposes an opportunity rather than a 
limitation, as majority of the population are able, in theory, to run tests and collect 
measurements. 
 





A vital part to any research is acknowledging the assumption made and limitations 
expected and faced, here is a list of main limitations expected, and the measures the 
research is taking to mitigate their effect on validity and reliability of the research. 
• The low response rate to the survey: it is expected that many of the people 
receiving calls for participation not take action or begin with the survey and 
that many other people may drop before finishing the survey. This is mitigated 
by shortening the survey as much as possible. Interviews are helpful here in 
providing added reliability to the results. 
• The tendency towards positive responses in survey: It is possible that 
responses to survey are skewed towards the 'right answer', for example, 
participants may deny that they use proxies for Internet connection, which 
may be illegal in some countries, interviews help here, by providing closer 
look at network habits in the country. 
• Dynamic nature of limitations and networks: Limitations on the Internet are 
not static, they are dynamic and respond to various changes in the countries 
of research, we are handling this by documenting results from previous studies 
on Internet limitations and connecting changes to main events in these 
countries. As a result of the dynamic nature of the limitations, change in use 
habits may not be directly simultaneous to changes in limitations, and 
interviews provide valuable insight here. 
• Unavailability of network measurements from some networks: It is possible 
that network measurements do not include all of the networks available in 
regions of interest; this may be due to restricted nature of some networks, or 
simply because of lack of people interested in running tests from these 
networks. Reports on limitations, especially collected from fieldwork, are 
useful here to fill this gap and provide information on overall Internet 
limitations. 
• Limitations discovered might be local to specific networks: It is possible that 
limitations discovered are local to specific network regulations, and are not 
affecting overall Internet users, to address this, and where possible, limitations 
discovered on specific Autonomous Systems are labelled to be local to these 
networks unless proof was available to generalise over other networks. 
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3.7. Ethical considerations 
The research, in general, does not pose primary ethical considerations, however, 
due to the nature of the research and geographies studied, some areas in relation to 
interviews and network measurements proved to require attention, which dictated the 
utmost measures and care taken to protect the identities and safety of participants, as 
detailed below. After finishing the data collection, all research data as collected from all 
of the studies were stored on an encrypted USB stick as well as an encrypted backup 
available on the University's OneDrive following University data retention schedule and 
guidance. At the end of the project, data is sanitised from any possibly identifying 
information and made available as a data set for other projects where possible, it was clear 
to participants through the studies that this is possible, and consent was collected 
accordingly. 
Study 2 survey is an online survey aimed at a random sample of adult Internet 
users. The survey itself is general, and asks questions related to Internet usage habits, 
with questions to assist in categorisation, but no identifying information was collected. 
Participants are presented with introductory text on the aims and objectives of the survey 
and how the data used, stating with clarity that participation is voluntary. Nonetheless, 
data collected was dealt with utmost security on many levels. The survey tool first 
selected was University of Bristol Online Survey tool (onlinesurveys.ac.uk), which was 
migrated to Jisc, the UK not-for-profit company working to support educational institutes 
in October 2017 (Jisc, 2018). However, and due to lack of support to languages of the 
survey, the need for another trusted platform rose after some research, it was apparent 
that the best solution was to run a self-hosted instance of the open-source survey platform 
Lime Survey 
The domain name InternetStudy.xyz was dedicated to this research, with the main 
page allowing participants to select the language they would like to use for the research 
survey. This domain name will be later dedicated to displaying the main outputs of the 
study. Security measurements have been taken at the server and survey design levels to 
assure security of results, and protection of participants’ identities. Trusted and valid 
Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) certificate is provided to assure secure 
communication. 
Raw results are available through restricted access to the survey system, and the 
data was pulled from the service and stored online with the procedure detailed above for 
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the whole data related to this research. The only pieces of data that can be used to locate 
the person at the survey are their Internet Protocol (IP) address, and the email they are 
asked to provide optionally if they wanted to enter the draw for a reward offered as an 
encouragement to them. The IP addresses are sanitised at the end of the research, and 
emails are extracted and removed from the dataset regularly, used for the draw then 
purged. 
Interviews part of Study 2 requires attention to assure that no identifying 
information is stored beyond analyses phase, contact details of participants, conversation 
logs and any recordings of the interviews are stored according to University guidelines, 
with safety and security of participants as the top priority. Interviews themselves were be 
conducted over secure and encrypted connections that support anonymity, preferably with 
no login or sign up required and require no special skills to operate, meet.jit.si, 
ricochet.im, and chatb.org are good choices here, as the interviewee needs only to click 
on a link to access a chat area, and all use encrypted channels for communication. 
Measurement collected through OONI for Study 1 is made available online 
through OONI explorer, which is already sanitised from personal information. Thus no 
special effort needs to be done on the collected data in this regard, most effort required 
here is analysing what is openly available, conveying in no need for any special ethical 
consideration. However, we needed to be careful when asking people to conduct the tests, 
as, at some locations, the mere act of running network testing may put the person running 
them at risk. In response, and to protect the survey participants, the call to run tests at the 
end of the survey was carefully written to reflect this potential, with a clear statement 
asking the person to make sure that they are not breaking any laws when using the tools 
and are not putting themselves in any danger. In addition to that, the concern was 
communicated to developers of OONI with a suggestion to implement a less aggressive 





Internet Limitations, Context and Analysis 
 
79 
4 Study 1: Internet Limitations, Context and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Studying effects of artificial Internet limitations require a clear understanding of 
the potential controls that may pose limitations to accessing the open network, and 
different predictors determining digital opportunities for utilising the technology of the 
Internet for individuals to enhance their life opportunities. The potential limitations are 
measured through a mixed-methods approach in compliance with the methodology and 
methods used in this research, covering measurements of actual limitations on the 
networks through probing access and discovery of control of access, protocols, and 
services. The second part of the mixed methods looks at qualitative coverage of main 
reports and news items covering Internet controls in the countries of the research. As well 
as incorporating brief findings from Study 2 including the interviews that deem relevant 
at this stage, further incorporation and crossing of Study 1 and Study 2, including the 
survey results of Study 2, is studied in depth in Chapter 6. 
The structure of this chapter follows the logical categorisation of the three 
countries studies as three communities of Internet users, fulfilling the requirements of the 
transformative-emancipatory perspective to mixed methods, which this research is 
influenced by to maintain rigour. Each country is looked at in separate but comparable 
sections, starting with a brief context on the country, including history of Internet and 
related market structure, then a look at digital inequalities and inclusion efforts that affect 
digital opportunities. An examination of network measurements collected from networks 
in that country as descriptive and brief critical analysis follows, then a review of reported 
Internet limitations to advice change in policies and perceived limitations, to conclude 
each section with key findings. The chapter ends with a comparison of critical findings 
as conclusion, which is incorporated and further studied in the discussion chapter. 
Although balance was sought after in writing the sections, the difference in 
limitations found and available reports, which is expected given the difference in 
limitations known in each country, resulting in noticeable variance in size among 
sections. Nonetheless, each country did receive the coverage needed to arrive at a 
conclusion and appropriate understanding to advise the research questions at a suitable 
level of elaboration. The difference in section size plays yet another indication to the 
extent of limitations, whether technical or perceived. The size limitations have affected 
the level of analysis included in this section, forcing move of higher-level analysis to later 
chapters, limiting this chapter to providing needed overview of the situation. 
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The chapter ends with a summary of findings to advise for further discussion and 
analysis in the discussion chapter later on, where the research questions will be looked at 




Bahrain underwent reforms after the Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa took the 
throne in 1999 following the death of his father to become the Emir, the head of state 
position of the then State of Bahrain. Reforms included the ending of political repression 
and promising a period of human rights (Amnesty, 2001), this included a new constitution 
promulgated in 2002, which redefined the political regime of the country. The changes 
followed a referendum on a National Action Charter proposed by the new Emir to return 
the country to constitutional rule and moved the country to become the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, with Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa as the first king of the small island. 
Bahrain is home to 1.37 million, of which 647,835 are Bahraini nationals3. The 
official language is Arabic, with English, Farsi, and Urdu common, and Islam is the main 
religion, with Shia majority, and Sunni royal family, and Christian and Jewish 
minorities4. Bahrain is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and lies in a location within 
close proximity to Iran and, a bridge connecting it to Saudi Arabia. The composition of 
the country and its location proved to make Bahrain a location for tensions between 
different groups of the population. 
This section establishes the context and situation of the Internet in Bahrain by 
going through a brief history of Internet and Internet market structure in Bahrain, from 
the first days of the Internet in Bahrain, principal players in the field of regulations and 
activity of civil society organisations, to current Internet penetration rates. Then the 
section looks at digital inequalities in Bahrain in terms of skills and participation of 
citizens in online services, to develop an idea on the general level of digital skills and 
initiatives of e-participation. The section later reaches the core of this study, with details 
of the network measurements Collected in Bahrain through Open Observatory of 
 
3 Data retrieved from http://www.data.gov.bh/en/DataAnalysis  
4 Data from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ba.html 
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Network Interference (OONI) probes, as described in the methodology chapter. An 
elaborative part on reports on Internet situation in Bahrain is included with necessary 
level of details to develop an adequate understanding of the timeline and evolution of 
Internet controls and technologies used for control and surveillance. By the end of this 
section, findings of each part are compiled to produce an analysis of the situation of 
Internet limitations in Bahrain. 
4.2.1 History of Internet and market structure in Bahrain 
Since 1995, Internet has been promoted by the Bahraini government as a tool 
towards development, with a bid of the government to position Bahrain as a leader in 
telecommunications in the Arab Gulf, serving as the main regional hub (HRW, 1999). 
Bahrain was the third country in the Arab Gulf region to have public Internet access, just 
months after Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (Palmer, 2000), this demonstrates the 
leadership the country had in the field at that time, and its interest in the Internet and what 
it offers for the businesses and society alike. As part of this leadership, the government 
of the small island kingdom realised early the need for skill development to reach the 
potential benefits of technology in general and the Internet in particular.  
With an eye on investment promotion, the Bahraini government worked in line 
with the private sector to establish a healthy telecommunication market environment, 
beginning of the establishment of  Bahrain Telecommunication Regulatory Authority 
(TRA) as a governmental institution in 2002 (BahrainTRA, 2016) as part of 
telecommunication sector reforms through legislative decree no. 48 of 2002 promulgating 
the telecommunications law (BahrainTRA, 2009). Establishment of the TRA and the new 
telecommunication law allowed for the liberation of the telecommunication market to 
allow companies to enter and compete with the incumbent telecom provider, Bahrain 
Telecommunications Company (Batelco). The first step in opening the market was to 
grant the second telecommunication license in 2003 to MTC Vodafone after two decades 
of Batelco monopoly (BahrainTRA, 2016). Over the years, the market evolved, and 
Batelco’s dominance was challenged with 26 companies providing Internet and 
communication services, of which 13 licensed as ISPs as of the end of 2017. The third 
mobile telecommunication operator, VIVA Bahrain, a Saudi Telecommunication 
Company (STC) subsidiary, launched its services in 2010. Nonetheless, a better indicator 
of market dominance would be market share, which is not clear, making the number of 
licensed ISP as the best estimate. 
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A look at the development of proportion of broadband Internet by the method of 
access as published in Bahraini TRA Telecommunications Markets Indicators Report of 
2017, shows that mobile broadband became the primary method of access, with 52% of 
traffic delivered through mobile technology, from 31% in 2013 (BahrainTRA, 2017). 
This reflects higher dependence on mobile technology, which is hugely overtaking other 
access methods, especially fixed wireless broadband, which dropped from 41% in 2013 
to 18% in 2017, while fixed wired broadband maintained its share at 28 to 29% over the 
years. These numbers are helpful in determining what companies control most of the 
Internet access. In this case, we can deduce that at least half of all Internet traffic goes 
through the three mobile operators in Bahrain, giving them network access control 
powers. 
Civil society has also been involved in the areas of access availability and Internet 
use, with a clear focus on better Internet service offering and availability to residents of 
Bahrain. One of the notable efforts is Bahrain chapter of the Internet Society, Bahrain 
Internet Society (BIS). BIS objectives include training for citizens on computer 
fundamental and specialised seminars, workshops, and fora, encouraging the innovative 
and effective use of technology, and providing advisory to entities on technology-related 
matters5.  
Nonetheless, the Bahrain Internet Society turned a blind eye to political blocking 
and artificial Internet limitations, as none of its publications mentioned any of limitations 
set by the government, despite being documented by other parties, as we will see later. 
On the contrary, their activities on social media suggested they were promoting higher 
control of states on the Internet, as in the retweeting of a news item on a proposition of 
new controls to allow countries to block websites easily, as in figure 4-1, taken from the 





5 Based on the data published at the official website of Bahrain 
Internet Society: http://bis.org.bh  
6 Available at https://twitter.com/InternetBH  
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Screenshot from Internet Society Bahrain Twitter account retweeting of a 
proposition for easier Internet controls 
 
The increased offering of the Internet and digital inclusion efforts, as well as 
public demand, resulted in fast and wide adoption of the Internet in Bahrain, with 
percentage of users rising steadily over the years from a mere 6% in 2000 where it 
equalled the same statistic for the world in the same year, to 98% in 2016. This percentage 
is one of the highest in the world, and represents double the percentage of Internet users 
as part of the world population statistic for the same year, putting Bahrain as the country 
with highest Internet penetration rate among the Arab World and the Middle East (World 
Bank, 2016). 
Figure 4-2 demonstrates the increase in the number of Internet users in Bahrain. 
The table shows impressive leaps between statistics of 2007 and 2008, and 2010 and 
2011, in each of the two leaps we can see about one-fifth of the population join the 
Internet users group. Two jumps of one fifth seem huge in terms of percentage of the 
population, but when taking into consideration the small size population of Bahrain, the 
numbers sound possible when compared to actual numbers of people joining when. It is 
worth mentioning that 400,000 SIM cards were deactivated in Bahrain in August of 2010 
following a revision by the TRA to address inflated subscriber numbers (Curwen and 
Whalley, 2018), however, does not seem to have affected the trend of change in the 





Individuals using the Internet in Bahrain as a percentage of the population 
between 2000 and 2017 
  
The business of providing access whether in the form of access lines, as in Internet 
lines, or time of connected device use, as in Internet café’s, has benefited from the quick 
jump in adoption of the Internet. This is notable especially in the early 2000s, which came 
with a considerable spread of Internet Café's in different areas of the country as well as a 
noteworthy increase in commercial offering for residential fixed lines and an increased 
demand for data and mobile Internet. This increased demand was cited as the driver for 
the growth of the mobile telecommunication market (OBG, 2015). The increase 
demonstrates the potential of the Internet in developing new business models to provide 
access and allow for a window of competition that would make Internet access more 
affordable. 
Parallel to the developments in access, the Bahraini government realised early the 
opportunities open Internet access have on freedom of expression, mainly political. The 
government sustained its 1990s history of telephone and correspondence monitoring and 
surveillance by applying the same concepts in the form of monitoring of Internet activity 
and imposing controls on access. The controls imposed included the blocking of several 
websites that deemed critical to the regime in Bahrain, especially when it comes to 
criticism of the ruling family. Over the years, this control took several forms and was 
assigned and implemented through different governmental bodies. In 2002, the 
government issued a decree-law to control the press, law number 47/2002, the law 
restricted coverage of sensitive subjects and resulted in the prosecution of journalists and 
activists for allegedly defaming government officials, insulting the king, or inciting hatred 

























Based on the law 47/2002, and the telecommunication law number 48/2002,  the 
Ministry of Culture and Information issued the ministerial creed number 1/2009 to ISPs 
to adhere to block websites as per the ministerial blocking orders, in addition to blocking 
of websites of pornographic nature and those that violate public morals, blocking the use 
of circumvention tools. The creed also directs ISPs to implement an official and unified 
filtering system (MoCC, 2009). 
Another related legal instrument was issued in 2009, this time by the Bahraini 
Telecommunication Regulation Authority, requiring telecommunication licensees to 
implement lawful access to their networks and data (BahrainTRA, 2009). Lawful access 
meant that “The Licensee providing all technical resources, including 
Telecommunications Equipment, systems, programs and communication links” (2009, p. 
2) to every entity concerned with national or international security, giving them access to 
information sent via the telecommunications networks, as well as user identifying 
information and location of access. This tool confirms the increased need of the Bahraini 
government, with its different arms, to expand its control on information and networks. 
Few years later in 2010, King Hamad separated the Ministry of Culture and 
Information to establish the Information Affairs Authority, which mandate included 
controlling Bahrain official media outlets, the Bahrain News Agency and Bahrain Radio 
and Television Corporation, as well as regulating press and publication in the country, 
and acting as spokesperson of the government of Bahrain. The authority expanded its 
powers in censoring information to controlling Internet limitations, by blocking websites 
and controlling access to services (ONI, 2009; Bahrain Royal Court, 2010; Yasin, 2012). 
Despite all the regulatory instruments, the executive branch of the government of 
Bahrain practices what seem to be efforts to ordain the environment of fear among the 
citizens of Bahrain when it comes to online activity. An example of such efforts comes 
in the use of official social media outlets to publish simple yet effective messages on 
interpretations of related laws, figure 4-3 shows a message published by Ministry of 
Interior official twitter account with 439,600 followers,  warning that following what they 
called inciting accounts may put the individual at risk of being held accountable. The 
Arabic version includes the same message as the English one, but adds a message at the 
end that read “closing it immediately is a national duty”. Such a message is clearly meant 




Screenshot from the official Bahraini Ministry of Interior Twitter account, the 
message is published in Arabic and English languages. 
 
The practices of direct and indirect limitations and coercion in relation to Internet 
use in Bahrain is covered the coming sections, from looking at digital inclusion initiatives 
and status in Bahrain, to understand the position of the individual in relation to digital 
skills, as well as the availability and affordability of the Internet . The chapter then takes 
the path through network measurements and empirically attempt to enumerate limitations 
and understandings the scope and scale of these limitations, as well as technologies and 
practices behind them. The natural next step followed in the chapter is looking at reports 
and other studies one the Internet and networks of Bahrain, particularly in the lens of 
limitations and access potential, to devise the history and timeline of limitations, the 
related laws and regulations, as well as potential developments planned to take place in 
the future.  
4.2.2 Digital inclusion in Bahrain 
The swift spread of Internet access in Bahrain Initiative by the government and 
private sector to provide access to the public imposed challenges related to adoption and 
use of the Internet, and the digital skills. The skills and adoption motivation are required 
for people to be included in the network society, and be active members that are able to 
exploit the full potential of Internet affordances in their lives. This section looks first at 
the skills and initiatives related to it, and then cover eParticipation as a gateway for citizen 
participation in public affairs, or its illusion. 
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Skills 
To address the issue of digital skills, the government launched and supported 
several initiatives towards spreading access and developing digital skills of the citizens. 
One of the first initiatives was part of a partnership between Microsoft's Unlimited 
Potential initiative and the Bahraini Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) in 
2004 to address digital inclusion by providing training courses in subjects related to 
technology, Internet, and electronic commerce (Microsoft, 2004). The partnership 
allowed Bahrain to make use of Microsoft's training curriculum and funding to bridge the 
digital skills gap by developing a cadre of qualified IT professionals, rather than 
developing the digital skills of the society overall. This is understandable given the 
challenges faced by Bahrain then of unemployment and a shortage of trained IT 
professionals. The impact of this project is not clear, as there is no available report that 
measured outcomes. 
Further iterations of the governmental training programmes were launched in 
2009 and 2011 under the brand eCitizen at the beginning, to be later rebranded to 
Qudurat, Arabic for capabilities, as an overarching project with a broader aim to train 
7,500 beneficiary of the country's population of 1.3 million on general digital skills. In 
2014, it was announced that 16,951 of the population were trained through Qudurat in the 
six years since its launch (Bahrain Government, 2018). The programme was a result of a 
collaboration between the Ministry of Social Development and General Organisation for 
Youths & Sports and various non-governmental organisations focusing on different 
aspects of the society. Programme advertising material mentioned affiliation with 
Microsoft through its IT Academy Program (Bahrain Government, 2004), but there is no 
clear indication on the type of affiliation from any of the parties. 
Courses offered through Qudurat consisted of two programs based on Microsoft 
IT Academy Program offered in two streams, Basic and Advanced. The Basic stream 
covered 20 hours of topics of computer use basics, the Internet and the World Wide Web, 
digital lifestyle, Microsoft Word and Microsoft PowerPoint, eServices offered through 
the Bahrain eGovernment Portal, and Social Media. The Advanced stream of the 
programs added computer security and privacy, eCommunications, and Microsoft Excel 
(Bahrain Government, 2018). These programs would provide the necessary skills needed 
to be able to navigate the online world but would require personal initiative to advance 
more and better make use of the Internet. 
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A fourth iteration of the programme seem to have been launched in 2015 as a 
result of a partnership between the Bahraini government and the principal 
telecommunication company at the kingdom, Batelco, as a programme targeting the 
whole country to enable participants to make use of technology, Internet and electronic 
commerce, mainly through the governmental electronic services portal. As part of this 
partnership, Batelco committed to providing special telecommunication access packages 
for trainees, as well as hosting training at their training centre (Batelco, 2015). There are 
no details available on the status of the programme after the announcement. This 
programme has been portrayed as the primary digital skills development programme in 
the country, and incorporated several other programmes, making the statistics mentioned 
earlier on Qudurat representative of overall digital skills development initiatives related 
to the government in Bahrain. 
Citizen participation through technology (eParticipation) 
As the Internet penetration and use developed in Bahrain, e-participation efforts 
have also increased, defined as initiatives to use of technological means for citizen 
participation in the democratic process. This comes despite Bahrain being defined as a 
non-democracy, as detailed by Åström et al. (2012), who discussed that e-participation in 
non-democracies, including Bahrain, is increasing in rates similar to, if not more than, 
democratic states. The main driver behind the increase for non-democracies comes from 
pressures of economic globalisation pushing the countries to maintain the appearance of 
democratic participation and modernisation as a form of symbolism to attract players in 
the international environment  (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  
When combined with state surveillance and control of Internet traffic, the concept 
of e-participation losses a lot of its significance and potential, as citizens would have 
fewer opportunities in knowing about, discussing, and sharing information that would 
affect their participation in politics (Åström et al., 2012). This conjecture further 
demonstrates the importance of open and unfettered access to the Internet in increasing 
the opportunities of people in effective political participation. Although the categorisation 
of democracies and non-democracies is sensitive and can be even set as problematic, the 
concept of access to opportunities for meaningful participation in decisions relating to 
one’s life is much clearer. Making the results of Åström et al. work apply to further 
contexts and societies in relation on how surveillance and control of communication 
technology, including the Internet, is there, regardless of the context being categorised as 
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democratic or not, to project opportunities in access to information and ability to initiate 
and contribute to decisions.  
In the case of Bahrain, the findings of increased initiatives of e-participation, with 
the existing level of surveillance and control of the Internet suggests the motivation of 
these initiatives comes from a determination to position the country as a modern place 
suitable for investment. Another potential driver is using the e-participation facilities as 
a vent for pressure building up among people by allowing them the illusion of 
participation, even if in a symbolic way. Nonetheless, we cannot totally deny the 
candidness of some of the efforts, particularly in the early 2000s, when the instability was 
not as materialised, and the Internet was not looked at as a tool of political opposition. 
4.2.3 Measured Internet limitations 
At the beginning of this research, there were zero measurements collected in the 
OONI data repository, which means that either no measurements were conducted, or no 
measurements could be transmitted from the local probes to the OONI data repository, it 
is more probable that the former is the reason, as after studying limitation patterns, they 
were reactive in nature. Which means that there would be at least one measurement 
collected before filtering systems would study the traffic and deem it should be blocked. 
Another reason that contributed to the lack of tests from Bahrain was that until early 2017, 
to be able to run OONI probe, a person with access to the network to be tested need to 
connect a probe device, or run the probe on a desktop computer, which posed a hurdle for 
running OONI tests. As the research developed, OONI launched its mobile probe making 
it possible to run tests from a mobile device, as a result, measurements started to flow, 
but not as much as expected or as much as was collected from Singapore or Estonia. 
After communications with Bahrain Watch to coordinate research efforts, it was 
clear that the action of running OONI probe by itself could put the person in danger. Thus 
the research did not actively promote running the probe, except with a message at the end 
of the survey, making it clear that it is optional, and up to personal judgement, as well as 
coordination with Bahrain Watch for possible methods to conduct tests. This was one of 
the reasons for the limited number of tests to 1100, of which 1045 were included in the 
analysis producing 4688 measurements between 9 February 2017 and 25 April 2019. 
Nonetheless, the tests conducted covered major ISPs of Bahrain, as detailed in 
Table 4-1, which shows each Autonomous System Number (ASNumber) and count of 
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tests conducted on that network. The tested networks include six of the 13 ISP license 
holder in Bahrain (BahrainTRA, 2017), Nuetel, Kalaam, Infonas, and the three leading 
mobile and telecommunication providers, Zain, VIVA, and Batelco who had most of the 
tests with over 90% of tests. The incumbent communication provider, Batelco, was 
represented with almost one-third of tests. It is worth mentioning that some smaller ISP 
be using the network of another major one, and is included in the results of it under one 
of the major networks. The entry AS0 indicates that the test could not determine the actual 
network from the ASNumber, however, detailed examination of results showed that the 
IP addresses connected were part of the Batelco and VIVA networks. Nonetheless, and 
to keep in line with the methodological practices used with the rest of the countries, the 
53 tests coming through it were excluded. 
The other excluded tests came from AS22363, a number reserved for a network 
called PHMGMT-AS1 - Powerhouse Management Inc, belonging to a company registered 
in Texas, the USA as per IPInfo.io database. The involvement of this number in Bahrain 
networks is probably through a small ISP or a specialised service provider with not 
enough information to identify. The two tests that came from that network were Network 
Diagnostic Tool (NDT) tests, testing for networking speed and trying to diagnose any 
network problems. The type of test and insignificance of the number of tests, in addition 
to the ambiguity of the network itself, prompted exclusion from the analysis. 
Table 4-1 
Number of tests conducted in Bahrain per network 
ASNumber Network / ISP Tests % 
AS51375, 
AS39015 
VIVA Bahrain BSC 396 37.71% 
AS5416 Bahrain Telecommunications Company (BATELCO) 
BSC 
350 33.33% 
AS31452 Zain Bahrain BSC 265 25.24% 
AS39273 Kalaam Telecom Bahrain BSC 26 2.48% 
AS35568 Nuetel Communications SPC 5 1.24% 




Testing in Bahrain faced a significant problem as access to TOR network, the 
network used for control requests, was itself blocked, thus testing was not able to be 
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conducted in the manner designed, following the rigorous method of OONI no results 
were labelled as confirmed in the OONI data explorer and dataset. However, the 
measurements collected are precious, as all results that showed blocking characteristics 
are categorised as anomaly results. The results with anomalies are then categorised into 
four-colour system, depending on anomaly type, with green indicates no probable 
restriction, yellow as a failure in connection with no high probability of blocking, orange 
for measures that have a high probability of blocking, and red for confirmed blocking.  
This categorisation made it possible to take sites with anomalies with Orange and 
Red categories as positive results of blocking. To reinforce this assumption, testing of 
direct access through a browser for results through contacts in Bahrain confirmed that 
these websites are indeed blocked, promoting confidence in taking website access results 
with anomaly as positive cases of limitations. A more in-depth analysis of the raw data 
from the tests showed that for these tests, the typical result was a successfully served page 
that is either empty, confirming the existence of content manipulation and non-
transparent blocking. Pages could also redirects to the website block.bb.zain.com on Zain 
network, or anonymous.com.bh on Batelco network, both showing that the website 
intended to access is blocked. The anonymous.com.bh website request included 
information that can help to identify the person trying to access the website intended, 
including IP address and network trying to access through.  
Tests conducted varied in nature, and covered aspects such as blocking of 
common instant messaging platforms, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Telegram, diagnostics 
of network interference affecting speed (NDT), Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP 
test (DASH) which tests for manipulation of streaming quality, existence of middleware 
and manipulation of requests, and blocking of websites in terms of web connectivity. The 
test frequency, detailed in table 4-2, shows the interest of people for testing network 
interference and speed, with 644 tests, followed by manipulation of requests and website 
blocking, with 52 and 141 tests respectively. This result showed that one of the main 
motivations behind running OONI testing was to test for speed of the Internet as the main 






Number of tests analysed in Bahrain per type 
Test Type Tests Measurements 
Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP - DASH 46 46 
Facebook Messenger 16 16 
HTTP Header Manipulation 52 52 
HTTP invalid request line 120 120 
NDT, Network issues affecting the speed 644 644 
Telegram 9 9 
Web Connectivity, Website access 141 3784 
WhatsApp 17 17 
Total 1045 4688 
 
For most of the test type, each type would collect one measurement as it measures 
specific aspects with no need for multiple measurements, while website access tests for 
several websites in each test from the local and international test lists, as described in the 
methodology chapter. The OONI probe and application run the tests as far as the user 
allows it to cover as many websites as possible. A total of 1499 websites were tested from 
the URLs included in the Global and Bahrain test lists used by OONI, now these lists 
have a combined size of 1754 URLs, this number would have been higher or lower during 
different testing times, as these lists are maintained regularly to keep it up to date, and 
remove any inactive websites. Another reason to edit the lists is also to reach a level of 
balance in size of categories to assure no one category gets more testing resources than 
other categories, based on discussions with the OONI community. This is particular with 
the Pornography category, which is reviewed regularly to include a sample rather an 
extensive list. 
The URLs tested included websites from 31 categories, covering aspects related 
to common types of websites and content that are susceptible to blocking and information 
controls, from pornography to circumvention tools, and Human Rights issues. Table 4-3 
lists categories of websites tested in Bahrain, with the number of URLs in each of them, 
as well as the number of websites with anomalies found in each category. 
Table 4-3  
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Categories in lists tested in Bahrain and the number of anomalies found in each 
Category URLs in current 
Lists 
Tested in Bahrain With Anomalies  
Alcohol & Drugs 43 40 1 
Anonymization and 
circumvention tools 
71 51 29 
Communication Tools 105 73 4 
Control content 13 0 0 
Culture 57 32 1 
E-commerce 18 12 1 
Economics 24 21 3 
Environment 30 26 0 
File-sharing 49 37 0 
Gambling 44 38 32 
Gaming 27 24 1 
Government 51 31 3 
Hacking Tools 46 41 4 
Hate Speech 14 12 2 
Hosting and Blogging 
Platforms 
68 52 1 
Human Rights Issues 269 145 5 
Intergovernmental 
Organisations 
4 4 0 
LGBT 91 33 3 
Media sharing 49 45 2 
Miscellaneous content 1 1 0 
News Media 235 96 4 
Online Dating 36 21 2 
Political Criticism 96 26 1 
Pornography 22 24 22 
Provocative Attire 21 20 3 
Public Health 29 28 2 
Religion 106 59 3 
Search Engines 40 27 0 
Sex Education 31 30 0 
Social Networking 40 38 3 
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Category URLs in current 
Lists 
Tested in Bahrain With Anomalies  
Terrorism and Militants 24 15 1 
Not in List 0 330 54 
Total 1754 1432 187 
The categories show that the tested URLs covered most of those in Bahrain and 
Global test lists, with at least 85% coverage. Some categories, as in Pornography, have 
more URLs tested than what is currently in the lists because, at the time of testing, more 
websites were included in this category, and they were later trimmed to maintain balance 
among categories, as described earlier. 
The websites with anomalies shows that blocking covered most of the categories, 
except for Environment and Sex Education, and is particularly extensive in the Gambling 
and Pornography, and to a slightly less extent in Anonymization and circumvention tools, 
while is apparently selective with categories like Religion, News Media, Human Rights 
Issues, LGBT, and Communication Tools. This reflects the motivation of blocking to be 
more of blanket blocking with Gambling and Pornography, without neglecting media 
control as the main issue, especially ability to bypass blocking and monitoring, features 
provided by anonymization and circumvention tools. 
Of the URLs tested in Bahrain, 226 URL showed anomalies of potential blocking 
in access, including 187 with consistent anomaly across all measurements collected for 
them through the study period, and can be considered blocked with high confidence. 
While the other 39 URLs had results varying between the existence of anomaly and not 
from different tests, this change in results, which happened in two dimensions, time, and 
network, reflect changes in blocking practice over time, and inconsistency among 
networks. 
One website that showed inconsistency among networks was ArabTimes.com, a 
website categorised under news, and serves more of satire news and conspiracy theories, 
was consistently blocked over Zain and VIVA networks with three identical 
measurements on each, but two measurements on Batelco network showed that it did not 
show any anomaly reflecting blocking. This case had five of the measurements taken 
during February 2017, including two on the same day from different networks, showing 
that the time dimension was not a factor in explaining the discrepancy across 
measurements. 
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On the other side, the website hacktivismo.com, categorised as providing hacking 
tools, was tested four times on three networks, including two tests on Zain that provided 
different results, the first test was on 11 April 2017 returning an anomaly, while the 
second, conducted 16 days later on 27 April 2017, showed no anomalies. This suggests a 
change in blocking policy for that website between those dates. It is also possible, since 
access to the testing control network was blocked, that an aspect of temporal network 
interference caused this result, however, a look at few other websites, with similar results 
of change during the same period on the same network provides confidence in the policy 
change postulation. 
The delicates.co.uk, a website that sells lingerie, and categorised as provocative 
in the OONI global test list, showed no anomalies consistently on three tests before 26 
June 2017, and anomalies afterwards, showing another proof for policy change over time 
between the last two tests conducted on 13 May 2017 and 26 June 2017. During that same 
period, results for centcom.mil, the website of the US Central Command, categorised as 
official website in the OONI global list, changed from no anomalies in tests conducted 
until 13 February 2017 to anomalies in tests conducted on 19 May 2017 on Zain network. 
The third website from a third category showed also similar result change during May 
2017, carnivalcasino.com, a gambling site, had test results changing from no anomaly to 
anomaly between 11 April and 8 May 2017. Similar symptoms were also measured on 
other networks, as in Batelco’s change of results for cartercenter.org, a Human Rights 
website according to OONI global list, from an anomaly in February 2017, to no anomaly 
in three tests conducted afterwards. These examples serve as a proof for policy change 
over time, suggesting active monitoring, and updating of blocking lists, a feature 
consistent with large scale filtering systems. 
An investigation conducted by Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto to 
discover hosts and fingerprints using Internet filtering systems manufactured by 
Netsweeper, Inc., the Canadian company, determined the existence of Netsweeper 
products within networks in Bahrain. The method used by these systems include injecting 
a frame in the response page when requesting a blocked website, confirming blocking of 
88 URLs in four categories, Pornography, Gambling, Circumvention Tools, and News 
websites, all of the URLs confirmed were tested in the networked measurements  
discussed earlier in this section and resulting in anomalies with high confidence of 
blocking. This investigation also confirmed the method of blocking by injecting frames 
using Netsweeper technology to confirm blocking. 
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Network measurements conducted in Bahrain clearly show the existence of 
network fettering in Bahrain, with the most apparent method as URL blocking, as evident 
from the tests with website access anomalies. Access to the control network necessary to 
verify the measurements was blocked in itself, resulting in blocking confirmed solely 
through the OONI method, however, combining the OONI results with direct testing 
through contacts in Bahrain, confirmed blocking of websites tested, allowing for usage 
of anomaly results of OONI as blocking. The websites blocked spanned across the 
majority of categories tested, but the intensity of locking varied hugely among categories, 
with most of Gambling and Pornography websites tested blocked, and websites related to 
circumvention of access and free access to news and information strong as well. The 
results also advised the dynamicity of blocking across time and variation between 
networks, which imply that there is no one central filtering system covering all networks, 
but somewhat different setups in different networks. 
4.2.4 Reported Internet limitations 
Bahrain’s history in communication controls from telephone and correspondence 
monitoring to protecting the regime and ruling family, and the fitting of these practices 
to cover modern communication technologies to serve the same goals, placing the small 
kingdom in the Middle East as an example country when it comes to communication and 
Internet monitoring and control. Several organisations covered these practices in their 
reporting on Internet freedoms in the world, and other organisations dedication most of 
their efforts on Bahrain to study human rights, including Internet limitations. These 
reports provided an important resource to support this research as a complementary 
source of information that covers a timeline extending from early 2005 until recent days, 
with details allowing a conclusion on the evolution of technologies used and practices. 
Website blocking in Bahrain has existed since the early 2000s. The issuing of 
legislative decree no. 48 of 2002 promulgating the telecommunications law restricted 
coverage of sensitive subjects and placed the legal basis for the prosecution of journalists 
and activists for allegedly defaming government officials, insulting the king, or inciting 
hatred against the government with minimum jail time of six months(BahrainTRA, 2002). 
In the same year, there were several websites blocked by the then sole telecommunication 
provider, Bahrain Telecommunication Company, sparking public action and a small 
demonstration in May 2002 outside of the telecommunication company, to protest 
governmental censorship on the Internet (BBC, 2002). As we will see later in the 
interview instrument discussion, Interviewee B3 participated in that demonstration and 
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reflected on it in their interviewee for this research. The reflection included how the mere 
act of participation in such demonstration placed them on a watch list that they could 
never get out of that affected the course of their life, giving additional context to the effect 
such demonstrations have in that country. 
The blocking and activism against it came shortly following the height of political 
reforms that promised citizens with high respect for human rights and ending the 
notorious history of the 1990s political oppression. The blocking also came a few months 
before the first parliamentary elections in 27 years, which ran in October of 2002 (BBC, 
2005). The promises for reform placed Bahrain as the new hope for democracy in the 
region. Nonetheless, website blocking served as an example for limiting freedom of 
expression and access to information. The timing of the blocking contributed to it 
receiving international media coverage and prompted researchers and organisations to 
consider studying the case of Bahrain when it comes to measurement of Internet 
limitations. 
One of the earliest efforts to scientifically measure and document Internet 
limitations in Bahrain was OpenNet Initiative testing for blocked websites in 2004 and 
2005, with the results published in March 2005. The tests covered 6,000 sites susceptible 
to blocking found a small number of eight websites that are actively blocked (Palfrey et 
al., 2005). Five of the reportedly blocked websites covered politics and religious subjects, 
while the other three were pornographic websites in nature. These finding does not 
necessarily mean that these websites were the only ones blocked because of the 
composition of the test pool. The large pool of websites susceptible to blocking included 
a world-wide list of websites that may not be relevant to the case of Bahrain and 4566 
sites collected through searching online for terms that may be relevant, increasing the size 
of the pool, but not necessarily making it extensive. 
Nonetheless, the findings confirm that despite the cover of protecting virtue and 
blocking pornographic content as the drive behind website blocking, blocked websites 
proved to be not only related to pornography, but serve political goals as well, a finding 
that was mentioned in interviews conducted on Bahrain, particularly B1, B3, and B4. The 
report also concluded that the blocking efforts have eased from previous years, with 
websites that faced blocking in 2002, are now accessible. Since blocking measurement 
concluded that a small number of websites were blocked and that other websites offering 
content similar in type to the few that were blocked were still accessible, the report 
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concluded that blocking was more of symbolic in nature than it is actually prohibitive. 
However, no matter what the number of blocked websites, the practice of blocking itself 
based on political position is a pretext for further practices against freedom of expression 
and produces a chilling effect on online political participation by aggrandising self-
censorship. 
The report detailed technologies behind the blocking as a simple form of blocking 
based on address, or URL, and in limited cases covers the IP address of the server as well. 
The telecommunications provider would return a page detailing that the website the 
person is trying to access is blocked. The fact that although there were eight ISP active in 
Bahrain at the time, they all had to go through a single primary ISP, made the blocking 
easier to control technically. An exciting aspect of this report was that, similar to what 
most other tests do, relied on a response of a site-blocked page or an HTTP error code 
403/Forbidden to determine the status of availability of the website while comparing with 
access from external networks.  
This method, although technically sound, opens the door for possible false 
negatives, where a website is blocked but the blocking system is not acting transparently, 
returning an error similar to “Page not Found” rather than the standard site-blocked page. 
It is worth mentioning here that although error 403 mentioned here should return in theory 
form the website itself saying that the user does not have right to access that content, 
many blocking systems use it to give the impression that blocking is coming from the 
website operators rather than the blocking body. 
OpenNet Initiative continued testing for Internet limitations in Bahrain as part of 
their efforts, and issued a report covering 2006-2007, as a follow up for the first report. 
This report also concluded that Internet filtering and blocking is limited in coverage, 
especially when compared to other countries in the region, but increased in topics subject 
to filtering to include in addition to pornography, political, and religious content, topics 
of LGBTQ discussions and websites that offer proxies and anonymizing servers. The 
report also mentions that some websites and services can be blocked temporarily or for 
extended periods.  
One of the services that were blocked temporarily was Google Earth, which was 
blocked for three days in August 2006 (ONI, 2007a) following what seems to be spread 
of a document that includes images taken from Google Earth showing the variance in 
land ownership between the ruling family and the public. Another example of the 
99 
inconsistency and temporality of blocking is the discrepancy pointed by this ONI report 
with a similar report covering the same period by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 
which listed two websites as blocked, while ONI testing could not find evidence on that. 
The websites, Bahrain Center for Human Rights, www.bahrainrights.org  and the popular 
blog instrumental in a local political scandal known as BandarGate, www.mahmood.tv, 
were both highly critical of the regime. Either this can point to flaws in the testing 
methodologies of either organisation or that the blocking itself was dynamic in either 
coverage or time, the second is more likely given the nature of the websites in question.  
In terms of intensity, the ONI report of 2006-2007 does not reflect any differences 
in methods of Internet filtering, but points out that some websites received higher 
attention from the regime resulting in the blocking of not only their server IP addresses 
in addition to the standard blocking of the URL, as in the case of bahraintimes.org and 
bahrainonline.org. Another essential notice this report mention is that blocking is not 
always transparent in Bahrain, in that some of the blocked websites would return a “Page 
not Found” error message rather than a standard site-blocked page. This confirms that the 
analysis that the 2005 report may not have been extensive because it relied on the 
assumption that blocking was transparent, expecting a site-blocked response to confirm 
blocking. 
In its last report on Bahrain, ONI’s Internet Filtering in Bahrain of 2009 
confirmed the lack of transparency in the blocking method, especially with filtering and 
blocking of political content and websites (ONI, 2009). In terms of surveillance, the 2009 
report reflected the interest of Bahraini government to tighten its control on online 
activity, including establishing a special unit at the Ministry of Culture and Information 
to monitor websites for possible blocking. The report also cited Bahraini official sources 
on monitoring of circumvention techniques in addition to websites, as well as reports 
indicating government interest monitoring the press and Internet content through a special 
commission (2009, p. 4). 
In its 2006-2007 and 2009 reports, ONI used a scale to present their findings at a 
glance that looked at four categories of filtering, Political, Social, Conflict/Security, and 
Internet Tools, with ranking of level of filtering from no evidence of filtering, to 
suspected, selective, substantial, and pervasive levels of filtering (ONI, 2007a, 2009). The 
level of Political filtering has increased from substantial to pervasive, while social moved 
two levels from selective to pervasive as well, Conflict/Security related filtering moved 
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from no evidence to selective level of filtering, and filtering of Internet tools have gone 
up from selective to substantial (ONI, 2009, p. 1). These results show a general increase 
in levels of filtering and limitations applied to the Internet in all categories, indicating 
increased efforts and possibly investments, as we will see later, in Internet control 
technologies. 
The report and the network testing conducted by ONI confirmed the continuity of 
blocking practices in Bahrain, but on a limited scale that targeted a small number of 
websites up until the end of 2008. 2009 began with the ministerial decree number 1/2009, 
demanding ISPs to implement unified blocking systems and to adhere to blocking orders 
by the Ministry of Culture and Information (Ministry of Information and Culture, 2009), 
coming into action. This yet again iterated the level interest of the government to control 
Internet access and use not only through the leading and incumbent telecommunication 
provider, Batelco but also over all the networks of the country. It is providing a sign for 
transformation from sporadic blocking and Internet controls, to a more pervasive and 
consistent approach, covering not only Internet access but also circumvention tools as 
well. 
ONI stopped issuing special country reports for Bahrain after extensive testing 
and studying between 2002 and 2009. This was part of the phasing out of the ONI project, 
which officially ended in 2014 (ONI, 2014). The events at the evident beginnings of 
Internet controls in Bahrain of 2002 attracted another organisation towards covering the 
blocking and arrests in the small island but from the perspective of freedom of 
information and freedoms of the press. Reporters without Borders, RSF, issued several 
reports and press releases on the status of freedom of information and access in Bahrain, 
including Internet blocking and monitoring, as well as statements directed at the Bahraini 
government to protest Internet controls and resulting offences against journalists and 
websites. 
In 2002, when Bahrain was looked at as one of the quickly rising countries in 
terms of telecommunication availability in the Middle East, RSF protested about blocking 
of several websites to the Bahraini government and “urged it to cancel the measure to 
restore the country's good image” (RSF, 2002). The websites in question included 
websites related to a human rights organisation, opposition political party, and an online 
newspaper, showing again how selective the blocking was at that time, and exposing the 
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motivation behind as an apparent effort to control information to maintain power 
asymmetry to the benefit of the state.  
Between 2002 and 2005, RSF reporting on Bahrain was focused mainly on press 
freedoms, to get back to covering online information controls from 2005, with the 
intensification of arrests of bloggers and online activists. One of the cases reported was 
the arrest of three moderators of the online form Bahrainonline.org in February 2005, to 
be released two weeks after being interrogated for charges that included “Defaming the 
King” (RSF, 2005c). In a statement following Ukrainian government rescindment of the 
decree requiring online publications to register with it, RSF cited Bahrain as one of the 
few countries in the world that had similar laws of online publications registration (RSF, 
2005a). this practice, according to another RSF statement, started in April 2004 but was 
suspended for online publications, including fora and blogs, but not for books, following 
“loud protests” (RSF, 2005b). It is nonetheless worth mentioning that this law was 
referred to in RSF and ONI publications, but it is not listed in the database of Bahrain 
laws and regulations available at legalaffairs.gov.bh. These activities, among others, 
reflect a move from direct blocking of websites, to the threat of action and intimidation 
of online activists to develop a culture of self-censorship. 
The move towards threat of action and intimidation did not mean stopping of 
actual blocking, as the Bahraini authorities blocked access to websites that published 
information on the political scandal tagged as Bandargate and involved high-level 
politicians and people close to the regime, as RSF reported on October 2006 (RSF, 2006), 
one month before the legislative elections. The websites related to this scandal and other 
websites that were blocked in the same period were mentioned in an open letter from RSF 
to the king of Bahrain in January 2007 (RSF, 2007). The letter condemned the increase 
in censorship of online content and publications, and the requirement of websites dealing 
with Bahrain to register with Ministry of Culture and Information, which they described 
as hard to apply, and indicating “a desire to place inappropriate controls on the Internet” 
(RSF, 2007). 
Over a year later, Bahraini government studied amendments to its press law to 
allow for more freedom of expression, however, despite the improvements, RSF 
pinpointed to some failings in the amendments that would keep the threat of jail for 
journalists and officials the power to block websites (RSF, 2008). The press law, which 
was relied on at in most cases of blocking, had improvements suggested that would 
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abolish most of the prison sentences, but kept some, meaning that it can still be used to 
imprison people based on actions related to information sharing, including over the 
Internet. By the time RSF issued the statement that hailed the suggestions with 
reservations, at least 24 websites were blocked, including websites that were deemed of 
“sectarian nature” (RSF, 2008). 
The move towards easing the laws, while maintaining effective control and 
blocking practices, shows that the Bahraini government wanted to maintain appearances 
of openness in the face of international community, including RSF, which listed Bahrain 
as a country to be watched for its violations in its first Online Free Expression Day earlier 
in 2008 (RSF, 2016). Later reports on blocking of human rights websites following the 
Ministry of Culture and Information orders explicitly mentioned press law 47/2002 as the 
base and justification for blocking (RSF, 2009). This statement of January 2009 did not 
only cover website blocking but also stated that proxy websites that can be used to gain 
access to blocked content had been blocked since 14th of the same month (RSF, 2009). 
By 2010, RSF concluded that information control and arrests based on opinion 
and activism in Bahrain is systematic, issuing statements shedding light on some of the 
cases, and outlining latest practices. One of the new practices that RSF outlined was 
banning the use of Blackberry chat application, which was Bahrainis used to share local 
news through groups, including information on traffic, cultural exhibits, and religious 
content, one of the groups including 11,000 subscribers. A government official justified 
the ban as a needed measure to manage chaos and confusion caused by news sent through 
these applications (RSF, 2010b). 
Another statement from September 2010 identified the blocking of dozens of 
websites categorised as political, religious, and free speech websites, and the arrest of 23 
people with the pretext of combating terrorism, and accusations of conspiring and inciting 
sabotage against the monarchy (RSF, 2010a). A specific case they mentioned in this 
report was BahrainOnline.org, which is an online forum that has been blocked in Bahrain 
for years as previously mentioned but still received 100,000 visitors per day, the chief 
editor of the forum was arrested with accusations of disseminating false information 
(RSF, 2010a). In an interview for this research, one of the key people behind this forum 
stated that they used to distribute scripts that when people click on, would direct them to 
the website through proxy servers, this shows that some people would use circumvention 
tools with no need for prior digital skills specific to using proxies. 
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After issuing public statements, and letter to government of Bahrain about the 
state of blocking access to information and freedom of press, RSF used the occasion of a 
visit from the then U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to send a statement voicing 
their grave concerns on the situation in Bahrain from violations to freedom of expression 
and human rights and hoping that Mrs Clinton would defend these principles with the 
Bahraini authorities. The letter included valuable details on the status of website blocking, 
including a campaign launched in 2009 against online pornography and a radical content 
filtering policy that affected “all content of a political or religious nature regarded as 
obscene or damaging to the royal family’s dignity”  (RSF, 2010c) and a new practice of 
blocking access to specific Facebook pages. 
The practice of blocking access to specific pages on social networking services, 
which is not technically easy to implement mainly when people use Secure Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTPS), was apparently replaced by taking down pages on social 
networking services. The change in practice was referred to in a statement by RSF 
published in June 2011, citing the taking over of Facebook and Twitter pages of a primary 
news source on human rights violation in Bahrain, Rasad News (RSF, 2011b). This came 
along with blocking access to whole platforms, as in the group chat service PalTalk, and 
several websites that provided anti-government news in a widespread crackdown (RSF, 
2011b). 
This crackdown came within the height of demonstrations that began early 2011, 
and continued in different capacities to date, following the wave of revolutions in the 
Arab world, the Arab Spring, that started in Tunisia and moved to Egypt and other 
countries. One of the first large scale demonstration in Bahrain was in solidarity with 
Egyptian revolutionists, and took place in front of the Egyptian Embassy on the 4th of 
February 2011 (Malas, Hafidh and Millman, 2011),  followed by a series of 
demonstrations against the Bahraini government starting with a “Day of Revenge” on 14th 
of the same month (Reuters, 2011). The demonstrations in Bahrain were the largest of the 
Arab world relative to the size of the population (Zunes, 2013). The demonstrations were 
faced with a ruthless and uncompromising stance from the Bahraini government since, 
with measures that have affected Internet access as well, the crackdown virtually 
eliminated all opposition over time, according to Human Rights Watch World Report of 
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2019 (HRW, 2019). RSF responded to the events of 2011 by issuing 74 statements7 
related to Bahrain that year, showing a hike in arrests of journalists, bloggers, and 
netizens, and in blocking of websites and Internet controls. The reports also exposed 
international companies that help oppressive regimes in Internet controls, including 
Bahrain (RSF, 2011a). RSF ended the year 2011 with placing Bahrain in its list of the ten 
most dangerous places for journalists, citing systematic repression, the jailing of bloggers, 
and censorship as some of the reasons for the designation, which did cost a newspaper 
executive and a netizen their lives(RSF, 2011c). 
The demonstrations and the way the Bahraini government dealt with it brought 
attention of several organisations to the situation of Internet freedoms limitations in the 
country, in addition to ONI and RSF, including Freedom House, Harvard’s Berkman 
Klein Center for Internet & Society, and IFEX network, as well as establishment of 
dedicated organisations to cover the situation in Bahrain. One of the acclaimed efforts is 
Bahrain Watch, a collective of academics and activists focusing on researching issues in 
Bahrain related to digital security, media and information control, economic corruption, 
and arms control8. Bahrain Watch issued reports on the status of telecommunication in 
Bahrain, technologies and measures used, and on governments and companies that are 
complicit in providing monitoring and control technologies, documenting the changes 
they observed in terms of practices and technology used, as we will see next. 
A substantive reporting source on the status of Internet freedoms in Bahrain came 
from FreedomHouse, who was part of the annual Freedom on the Net reports since 2011. 
The initial Internet freedom status of Bahrain according to the 2011 report was Not Free, 
scoring 62 on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning no obstacles at all, and 100 for totally 
closed access (Freedom House, 2009), the score is based on scoring in three categories, 
Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content, and Violations of User Rights. Bahrain scoring 
was consistent with the limitations found on the Internet networks in Bahrain so far, with 
violations of content as the main problem of Internet access, followed by limitations on 
content, and finally, obstacles to access. 
 
7 Reports collected from RSF website through searching for the 
keyword Bahrain in 2011: 
https://rsf.org/en/rsf_search?key=bahrain&y=2011 
8 Details on BahrainWatch from their website: 
https://bahrainwatch.org/about.php 
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Scoring for Internet freedoms in Bahrain jumped to 71 in the year after, with a 
significant increase in the measures that constitute violations of user rights (Freedom 
House, 2012b). Bahrain maintained a score fluctuating between 71 and 74 over the years 
until 2018, With the worst year being 2014 with a score of 74 (Freedom House, 2009, 
2012b, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). The reports included details that supported 
earlier conclusions of the Internet being widely available and affordable, but at the same 
time, facing high limitations in the form of direct limitations on content through blocking 
of websites and services, and high indirect limitations in the form of violations of user 
rights. 
The consistency in the reports from various sources suggests that the bleak picture 
it draws of Internet freedoms in Bahrain is a good representation of the reality, with 
consistent efforts since the early 2000s to curb Internet usage in relation to freedoms of 
access and expression, especially with dissidents. Bahrain has been working relentlessly 
by introducing new technologies for limitations, limiting access to anonymization and 
circumvention tools, and through measures of surveillance, and targeting dissidents with 
spear attacks. 
Methods Used for Testing and Reporting 
The reports above mention used different methodologies to collect and analyse 
the data they based their conclusions on, including actual network testing, to reported 
observations. OpenNet Initiative (ONI) has studied Internet controls in Bahrain through 
collecting network measurements by testing access ability to websites and services on the 
networks in Bahrain comparing it with access testing results from control environment 
with no access limitations. This method is similar to the network testing methodology 
adopted in this research. The difference between ONI testing and the network 
measurement done through this research is that ONI relied on proxy servers in Bahrain 
provided through contacts, rather than through standalone probes or mobile applications, 
as with OONI testing utilised here. The researchers of ONI would connect to the machines 
in Bahrain using remote desktop applications, and attempt to access a prepared list of 
websites that may be blocked, and compare the results with access attempts from 
locations with no known filtering. Later on, the results were validated through volunteers, 
as well as through a specific method used for Bahrain, which relied on direct testing of 
five Batelco servers to test for consistency (Palfrey et al., 2005). This method was detailed 
in their 2004-2005 report and was consistent with the methods in their later reports (ONI, 
2007a, 2009). 
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RSF on the other hand, do not detail how they collect their data, but the reports 
and statements give the impression that information on websites blocked is collected 
through news from owners or operators of these websites and journalists on the ground. 
This method provides the ability for a deeper understanding of individual blocking cases 
as they happen, including measures that accompany the blocking of a website or a blog, 
as in summoning or arresting of website administrators or editors, and a more accurate 
timeline for websites that were blocked temporarily. Nonetheless, this method is prone to 
underreporting of the number of websites blocked, and may not cover international 
websites blocked, but the critical weakness this method has lies in the verifiability of 
blocking reporting, affecting the trust in results. However, when crossing the reports of 
RSF with the more scientific, and thus reliable, method of ONI, we can find that they 
have many similarities, except for the few discrepancies mentioned before of the cases of 
www.bahrainrights.org and www.mahmood.tv, which leads to increased trust in RSF 
reporting, and at the same time, in ONI testing. 
The reliance on local sources is also the base for FreedomHouse Freedom on the 
Net annual reports, which rely on at having at least one researcher in the country of study, 
who are usually Internet freedom experts. The local researchers’ job is to document 
Internet freedom developments and assess it based on common Freedom on the Net 
methodology to suggest a change in results of the country score. The change suggestions 
are then assessed and verified by FreedomHouse staff before being included in their 
annual report. The results are reported based on scoring weights for categories of 
obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights, effectively covering a 
different aspect of artificial Internet limitations. 
The results of RSF and FreedomHouse cannot be considered academically valid, 
as they do not have academic rigour in terms of validation, which is available in the 
methods of ONI testing and reporting. Nonetheless, these sources provide a good 
indicator of the status from direct sources. Most importantly, these sources provide 
reports of all countries included in this research, enabling direct comparison on coverage 
and results among different reports and sources over the years, allowing for the dimension 
of time to be considered when looking at and comparing artificial Internet limitations. 
Technologies Reported 
Reports published over the years on Internet limitations in Bahrain showed a 
definite increase in the interest in higher control by the government on information 
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exchange online. The increase in interest is evident in the increase in investment in 
blocking and monitoring technologies to increase its effectiveness and coverage. First 
reports on website blocking from ONI in 2004-2005 conclude that although Internet 
filtering was not a focus of the Bahraini government nor a significant obstruction to 
Bahrainis to use the Internet (ONI, 2005a). Nonetheless, the report also states that the 
Internet infrastructure of a single primary ISP, Batelco, and a state-mandated Internet 
Exchange Point (IXP) (2005a, p. 3), provided centralisation of access that allows for easy 
and fast implementation of Internet controls. 
Nonetheless, the same report mentions indications of simple domain name or 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) based filtering, which is done through listing a 
predefined set of domain names and route all requests of these domains at the Domain 
Name Server to serve an access-blocked page, or respond that the domain name requested 
is not available in an error message. The error message is a response indicating a non-
transparent blocking, which does not explicitly tell the user that the website they are 
trying to access is blocked, but rather imply that there is an error with the address or the 
server. This method is the simplest of blocking methods, and as apparent from ONI’s 
testing, is easily circumvented, as in one case the domain name www.playboy.com is 
blocked, but if the user tried to access playboy.com, they would be able to bypass the 
blocking (2005a, p. 11). Another possible circumvention method would be to change the 
Domain Name Server that the user is using, from the one provided by the network they 
are connected to one that is not controlled by Bahraini government or companies, or 
simply, they can try accessing using the IP address instead of the domain name. 
ONI’s report of 2006-2007 does not indicate any change in the infrastructure or 
blocking technology used, conducting its tests on Batelco network to conclude that testing 
has increased in coverage, with more websites blocked from different categories, and 
blocking of some website IP addresses in addition to their domain names. Nonetheless, 
despite these advancements, the technology behind filtering did not seem to have 
changed, and it kept returning error messages when people tried to access services that 
are blocked. 
Following the ministerial creed number 1/2009, which reinstated ministerial 
powers to require ISPs to block websites, in addition to default blocking of websites that 
violate public morals through implementing an official and unified filtering system, ONI 
reports a change in the blocking behaviour, indicating that ISPs have started using a 
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commercial filtering system. ONI testing did not specify the commercial system used, but 
its effect was apparent in the spike of the number of websites blocked, and the consistency 
of the blocking across different ISPs. The creed also required ISPs to blocking 
circumvention tools, making it harder for people to access blocked content, and more 
effectively limit their access to information. However, ONI states that the blocking was 
still not fully transparent.  
On the surveillance front, the year 2009 also witnessed the institutionalisation of 
access to telecommunication infrastructure usage information (BahrainTRA, 2009), 
allowing authorities to monitor how is accessing what, and who is communicating with 
who, however, verification of actual technology used or whether this was implemented is 
not available. 
One of the first reported technologies used for automated filtration in Bahrain was 
mentioned in a report on the use of western technology by Middle East censors published 
by ONI in 2011  (Noman and York, 2011). The report included Bahrain as one of the 
countries that use the American-made SmartFilter, developed by Secure Computing 
Company, acquired by Intel and then McAfee. This solution relied on centralised lists of 
websites in a multitude of categories, ISPs would select what categories to block, for 
example pornography, nudity, extreme, tobacco, information security, to block websites 
that are classified by the company under any of these categories, blocking changes 
whenever a website is added or removed from a blocked category. ISPs could also add 
their own lists of blocked websites, which allows blocking of websites that the censor 
requires to be blocked. 
In addition to the blocking technology, Bahraini government resorted to other 
methods in an effort to identify account holders of social media and website users that try 
to conceal their identity and protect themselves from possible prosecution based on their 
online activity, especially people that are highly critical of the government. A method that 
BahrainWatch reported that Bahrain’s government used since at least 2011 to identify 
specific users, was to send malicious links to those users. When the user clicks on that 
link information on the machine the user is accessing from, such as IP address and type 
of browser and operating system, is logged and may be used to identify the real identity 
of the user, BahrainWatch dubbed this method as IPSpy (BahrainWatch, 2013b). The 
report also named Ministry of Interior’s Cyber Crime Unit as the body managing and 
conducting these phishing and social engineering attacks. 
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During the interviews, interviewees B1 and B3 mentioned the IPSpy method, 
elaborating that it is common knowledge in Bahrain that people should be very cautious 
with links they receive and do not open any website they do not know and trust. They had 
also stated that this is possibly one of the reasons many people did not trust the research 
survey, link except when they received it through people they know. This method created 
an environment of mistrust, especially that the government would send the malicious 
phishing links through various media, from emails to social media platforms, and chatting 
applications. The technology used behind this is freely available IP Spy services as 
described by BahrainWatch (BahrainWatch, 2013b). 
Use of western technology to support oppression was one of the reasons for 
practices in Bahrain gained attention, including the use of technology platforms to 
monitor electronic communications and using it against dissidents. In this regard, 
Bloomberg published an article in 2011 on spy gear that Bahrain bought from by Siemens 
AG and maintained by the German company Trovicor GmBH, a Nokia Siemens 
Networks divested unit (Silver & Elgin, 2011). The gear provided the ability to record 
transcripts of calls and SMS sent by targeted individuals and groups, which was crucial 
in assisting the Bahraini authorities to pre-empt demonstrations and collect evidence used 
against activists.  
The article also mentioned Monitoring Centres, set of gear used to facilitate 
electronic surveillance, to be sold by other companies to regimes in the Gulf by 
companies like the Israeli Nice Systems Ltd, and the American Verint Systems Inc., 
without clearly indicating if these were also used in Bahrain. As we have learned earlier, 
the Lawful Access directive issued by Bahrain TRA in 2009 facilitated the use of this 
equipment, by requiring telecommunication providers to allow access to law enforcement 
forces to communication and user data. 
Another advanced technology that was found to be in use by Bahraini authorities 
was the FinFisher suite, a set of tools marketed as a governmental intrusion and remote 
monitoring solution by the German company FinFisher GmbH, and distributed by 
Gamma International UK Ltd (Marquis-Boire and Marczak, 2012; Cox, 2014a, 2014b). 
The FinFisher Suite allows targeting of individuals and groups through providing an 
environment that allows exploitation of vulnerabilities in technology and deployment of 
malicious code, and later assists in what they call tactical intelligence gathering from 
specific targets and devices, and strategic intelligence gathering from wide-scale 
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interception and monitoring 9 . The use of this spyware by Bahraini authorities was 
unfolded in 2012 after research by Citizen Lab, that analysed leaked promotional material 
on the tool and several pieces of malicious code sent to Bahraini activists. Citizen Lab 
concluded that the code indicates that the control servers of this code point to IP addresses 
owned by Batelco, the Bahraini telecommunication company (Marquis-Boire and 
Marczak, 2012). 
Later on, and following another leak of information related to FinFisher’s 
company in 2014, Privacy International and Bahrain Watch analysed the information and 
reported that among the countries that have been actively using FinFisher spyware to 
attack activists was Bahrain. Privacy International focused on the fact that some of the 
targeted people were living in the UK after fleeing Bahrain, making this a case of possible 
international espionage, and lodging a criminal complaint with the National Cyber Crime 
Unit at Scotland Yard  (PrivacyInternational, 2014). Bahrain Watch analysis of the leaked 
information found that at least 77 computers where hacked using FinFisher tools between 
2010 and 2012. Most of these computers were for known human rights lawyers, 
journalists, exiled activists, and Bahrain’s largest opposition party, Al-Wefaq, Bahrain 
Watch suggested that since FinFisher is sold solely to governments, the Bahraini 
government is probably the one that is operating these instances  (BahrainWatch, 2013a). 
The year 2016 came with a plethora of reports on Internet control and surveillance 
technology being used in Bahrain, especially after awarding a USD$1.2 million contract 
for a national website filtering solution February that year (IFEX, 2016). The Canadian 
company Netsweeper provides the solution in question, and it was not long until network 
testing in Bahrain conducted by Citizen Lab, the interdisciplinary laboratory based at the 
Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, verified the use of 
Netsweeper technology was present on several ISP networks in May and July 2016 
(CitizenLab, 2016). Citizen Lab concluded that although the Netsweeper technology in 
itself is simple, it is effective, and can be used in building what they called Great Firewall 
in Bahrain. Netsweeper devices detect requests to blocked content and websites, and send 
a response to the user that the page requested is blocked, thus providing a more 
 
9 As described in solutions section of FinFisher official website 
https://finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html 
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transparent blocking method, but it can also be used to serve malware by injecting 
malicious code in web page response. 
Besides the implementation of advanced filtering and blocking solutions, the 
Bahraini government was found in 2016 to be using Pegasus, a suite that allows for 
remote monitoring and control of mobile devices, developed by the Israeli NSO 
(BahrainWatch, 2016). This finding instigated a two-year investigation by Citizen Lab to 
scan the Internet for servers that match the fingerprints of Pegasus, and found that it was 
used in at least 45 countries. Bahrain was as one of the six countries with significant use 
of the tool, with political theme arising from the names of the machines and targets 
discovered, defying the claim that these tools are designed only to protect against 
terrorism group (Marczak et al., 2018). 
For access to user devices, reports found that the Bahraini government is using 
specialised equipment, including the Israeli forensics product Cellebrite, to breach mobile 
devices, in some cases bypassing PIN codes or passwords, to retrieve data including chat 
logs, texts, and other information stored on the device (Biddle and Desmukh, 2016). This 
practice is evidence that the Bahraini government did not only rely on remote monitoring 
and surveillance technology but also relied on technologies that are capable of accessing 
devices even when secured communication and circumvention tools are used. 
Surveillance and monitoring of people’s activity have also extended to the streets, 
with investigations by Bahrain Watch revealing that two companies have provided 
Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior with systems to facilitate facial recognition that can be used 
to identify protestors  (BahrainWatch, 2014). The systems, supplied by Pelco and 
iOmniscient, included installation of no less than 2000 new cameras, and computer 
equipment to conduct the facial recognition. 
Nonetheless, all the technologies listed above does not seem to have provided 
Bahraini authorities with the satisfaction of feeling in control and resorted to the radical 
measurement of shutting down Internet access for whole regions. Between 23 June 2016 
and 30 July 2017, people in the Duraz village had their access through both fixed lines 
and mobile data on all mobile operators cut off daily between 7 pm and 1 am  
(BahrainWatch, 2017b). The pattern and breadth of disruption made Bahrain Watch 
conclude that it is probably the result of a Service Restriction Order (SRO) from the 
Bahrain Government (BahrainWatch, 2017a). This shutdown demonstrates how far is the 
Bahraini government willing to go to control communication and access to information, 
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making Bahrain on of the six countries in the world that shut down the Internet in all or 
parts of the country in 2016 (Zittrain et al., 2017). 
4.2.5 Key findings 
After promises for reforms since the end of the 1990s and an eye on investment 
promotion, the Bahraini government worked along with the private sector to establish a 
healthy telecommunication market environment, resulting in high availability and 
adoption of Internet access and services. However, a parallel realisation of the effect the 
open Internet access has on freedom of expression, particularly political motivated the 
government to extend its 1990s practices of monitoring and surveillance to Internet 
activity and imposing controls on access, with a series of bodies established to control 
online activity, and laws, regulation, and creeds issued. This disconnection between the 
motivation to increase Internet adoption and at the same time maintaining control of its 
uses was apparent in the efforts for digital inclusion and e-participation and left the e-
participation a tool to spread the illusion of participation, especially after the short 
political instabilities of the early 2000s. 
Network measurements for Internet limitations showed the existence of active 
measures set on the networks operating in Bahrain to limit access to specific websites and 
services. The limitations of access tested through probing networks faced a significant 
setback, as the control network for the measurements was blocked itself, forcing the 
reliance on anomaly analysis, which required further effort to analyse specific cases and 
previewing of response in the cases of transparent blocking. The tests showed that at least 
187 website tested showed anomalies consistent with blocking over almost all of the 
categories tested, with almost blanket blocking on gambling and pornography categories, 
and high focus on anonymization and circumvention tools, and a more selective blocking 
on websites falling under the religion, news media, human rights issues, LGBT, and 
communication tools categories. The tests also reflected inconsistency among networks 
in what is blocked and for how long it is blocked, suggesting that the centralised blocking 
is not implemented yet, and it is conducted following orders of the government to ISPs. 
Reports on Bahrain confirmed the findings of the network measurements of access 
limitations, providing information on the technicalities behind them that is also compliant 
with the findings of the network measurements in that blocking is highly reliant on 
classical DNS blocking of URLs. The reports also pointed out monitoring through the 
lawful access requirements of telecommunication providers, and targeted surveillance 
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through digital espionage tools, as with the cases of FinFisher and iSPY. The timeline of 
blocking as advised by analysing reports and studies on Bahrain reflect changes over time 
in accordance to political instability, for instance, there was an increase in levels of 
filtering and limitations applied to the Internet in all categories between 2007 and 2009, 
following demonstrations. The limitations moved over time to a more pervasive and 
consistent approach, covering not only Internet access but also circumvention tools as 
well, and in some cases, full Internet shutdowns. 
This section provided evidence supporting the conclusion that in Bahrain, The 
stronghold on Internet access is achieved through technical limitations, as well as an 
environment of fear of repercussions of online expression and digital activisms, leading 
in several cases to prosecution and criminal charges, developing high levels of self-
censorship. The limitations did also include targeted attacks on dissidents in attempts to 
identify them and put them under surveillance, even when they are outside of Bahrain. 
4.3 Estonia 
Estonia regained its independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union (USSR) and went through a transition process affecting most aspects of life, and 
not stopping at media and telecommunication. The attitude towards communication 
technologies in general under the USSR was driven by surveillance and maintenance of 
control, which affected how telephony and media policies are formulated, gearing them 
towards keeping the sector underdeveloped and under control (Vartanova, 2004). The 
results of telephony and media policies under the USSR could be seen in the concentration 
of access to media with what was known as the Nomenklatura or Nomenclature, or the 
ruling elite, necessarily creating an informational divide between the ruling class and 
citizens of the union. On the other hand, technologies related to digitisation were seen as 
scientific developments, and unlike communication technologies, not a political threat, 
allowing some development in the sector, and allowing connectivity with other countries, 
although still limited then (Vartanova, 2004). 
The attitude towards communication technology diverged after Estonia’s 
independence, with the efforts to re-establish the country looked at technology as a tool 
to guide the transition, resulting in the launching of initiatives to connect with citizens, 
and developing the democratic system. A key strategy set then in Estonia was the 1998 
"Principles of Estonian Information Policy", outlining regulations related to the 
information society. The principles lead to Information Policy Action Plan that included 
actions items for modernisation of legislation, supporting the development of the private 
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sector, shaping the interaction between the state and Estonian citizens, and raising 
awareness of problems concerning the information society (Principles of Estonian 
Information Policy, 2015). 
Estonia maintained open and free Internet access locally, with no monitoring or 
surveillance to be mentioned (Freedom House, 2018). Nonetheless, on the international 
arena, Estonia was among nine EU countries to issue a working paper to support looser 
controls on spy software exports, a step backwards for the fight to control surveillance 
technology, the working paper lessens controls on surveillance software exporters to 
maintain the competitiveness of EU-based industry (RSF, 2018). 
4.3.1 History of Internet and Market Structure in Estonia 
With the dissolution of USSR in 1991, only 21% of Estonians had phone lines, 
but with strong believe in communication technology as an enabler for state-building, the 
government set to reach and connect people all over the country, starting with the Tiger’s 
Leap plan in 1996 and introduction of Public Internet Access Points (PIAP) from 1998. 
Tiger’s Leap was a programme aimed at providing ICT infrastructure to schools, support 
content creation, and support ICT-related skill development in Estonia (Runnel, 
Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt and Reinsalu, 2009). PIAP at the same time aimed at providing 
public locations with free access to computers connected to the Internet, introduced with 
the support of United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2015), and later Open 
Estonia Foundation, the PIAPs started to spread around Estonia, from main cities, 
expanding to reach small towns and rural areas. The success of Tiger’s Leap encouraged 
the launch of a follow up program, Tiger Leap II between 1999 and 2000, as a massive 
technological reformation of the Estonian government, to move towards a paperless 
cabinet with reliance in teleconference and other technologies in the cabinet’s work. 
Another initiative aimed at providing access to the public was the grassroots 
initiative Wifi.ee, a group of technology activists with social agenda to increase Internet 
access and availability through setting up wireless access points all around Estonia. The 
initiative collaborated with businesses like cafés, hotels, and the like to provide free WiFi 
access to the Internet, growing from around 80 access points in January 2003, to over 
1100 in 2008 (Saarenmaa and Suominen, 2004; Kallio, 2008). The project, nonetheless, 
seems to have ceased, with the last appearance of its website Wifi.ee dating to December 
2018. 
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In terms of commercial Internet Service Providers, the small state is home for six 
mobile operators, and over 200 operators offering communication services, including 
numerous Internet Service Providers, all of whom are required to register with the 
independent telecom regulator, and the Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority 
(Freedom House, 2012b, 2018). The plethora of communication providers and 
governmental initiatives in spreading access and focus on providing services online 
contributed to the rapid increase of number of Internet users in Estonia from around 29% 
of total population in the year 2000, doubling in five years to 61.5% in 2005, and reaching 
near 90% in 2017, as demonstrated in figure 4-4. 
Figure 4-4 
Individuals using the Internet in Estonia as a percentage of the population 
between 2000 and 2017 
 
Estonia government was a pioneer in adopting the Internet as a platform for 
eGovernment, where the individual can do most of the interactions with public service 
over the web, relying on the first national-wide Public Key Infrastructure that allows 
securing transaction by identifying individuals using encryptions keys part of the national 
ID card system. Interviewee E3 from Estonia said, “… that you can do everything online, 
except divorce, but they are working on that.” The government have also extended its 
plans to achieve national coverage of broadband access with at least 30Mbps connection 
for every Estonian citizen by 2020 through the EstWin program (EAS, 2018). This 
approach of combining access availability and service created an environment where 
individuals are pushed towards developing their technical skills. Nonetheless, not all 

























4.3.2 Digital inclusion in Estonia 
 Initiatives to spread the Internet and digital inclusion in the country and its 
success placed Estonia as an Internet nation with high reliance on digital and e-
government services, leading the way and setting records for e-government initiatives. 
Including being the first nation to conduct nationwide voting over the Internet in 2005, 
and later the first presidential elections with electronic voting in 2007, and being the first 
nation to acknowledge digital signature is equal to conventional signatures in 2000 (EAS, 
2018). Policies and initiatives to bridge the digital divide and enhance ICT adoption by 
organisations and the government are considered effective in propelling Estonia away 
from the neighbouring countries in terms of access and use (Hsieh et al., 2012). 
However, digital inequalities still exist in Estonia, with the level of education 
stands out as the most influential factor affecting digital opportunities, with a clear gap 
between Estonians with high and medium levels of education have much better 
opportunities of use compared to those with a low level of education (Cruz-Jesus et al., 
2016). Earlier studies referenced lack of motivation as the main factors, particularly 
among people over the age of 50 and blue-collar workers, as well as preferring to do 
things the old-fashioned way (Kalkun and Kalvet, 2002).  
Classical factors of economic, class and social structures have also been studied 
to provide difference in opportunities online in Estonia with social status as the primary 
determinant, this can be understood when considering that class structure in these 
countries is largely unsettled as the society is rapidly changing (Klamus, Talvis and 
Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, 2013, p. 204). The social status here combines factors of 
economic and cultural capital, digital literacy, and sufficient leisure time. 
The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) by the European Union provided 
information on Connectivity, Human Capital, Use of Internet Services, Integration of 
Digital Technology, and Digital Public Services, with conclusions similar to the research 
referenced previously, and further establishing Estonia’s position as a leading country in 
terms of trajectory of development across the spectrum  (European Commission, 2018). 
The next part of this section looks at possible Internet limitations to help to establish a 
wider picture on the status of the Internet in Estonia, from digital opportunities to 
accessibility of Internet services and possible limitations. 
117 
4.3.3 Measured Internet limitations 
Network measurement in Estonia collected through the ONI problem, including 
the mobile probe, covered 22 autonomous system numbers or networks, from Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), Institutions, and technology service providers, including 
hosting and cloud service providers. For the sake of this research, only measurements that 
represent networks individuals can connect through to the Internet were included, 
meaning that the five networks of hosting and cloud service providers had to be excluded 
in compliance with the practice done for the rest of the countries, leaving 17 networks, 
from 15 providers and institutions, included in the analysis.  
The first measurements for networks in Estonia began with a small number of 
measurements, four, conducted in January 2015, followed by intensive tests between 
April and December 2016 resulting in a massive 206,424 measurements of the overall 
382,951 collected from the ONI API until May 2019. However, most of the measurements 
in that period came from excluded networks, leaving mere 1,219 measurements collected 
up until the introduction of the ONI mobile probe application. Since the introduction of 
the mobile application, the measurements included in the analysis soared to 67,408 
measurements. The figure 4-5 represents the measurements included and collected from 
Estonia over time. 
Figure 4-5 
Timeline of Estonia Measurements 
 
The networks included in measurements collected from Estonia represented major 
Telecommunication and Internet Service Providers, Tele2, Elisa Eesti, and Telia Eesti 
representing a total of 88% of all measurements included, in addition to smaller ISPs and 
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measurements collected and networks covered represent good coverage of main networks 
of Estonia, providing adequate measurements to advise understanding of the status of the 
Internet in Estonia as measured. 
Table 4-4 
Networks in Estonia included in the analysis, grouped by ISP or Institute 
ASNumber ISP/Institute Tests % 
AS1257, 
AS39301 
TELE2 662 29.28% 
AS13272, 
AS2586 
Elisa Eesti / Teleteenused AS 450 19.90% 
AS196743 OU Interframe 1 0.04% 
AS198966 Fill Ltd. 31 1.37% 
AS201321 Levikom Eesti OU 5 0.22% 
AS202652 Skylive Telecom AS 1 0.04% 
AS3221 Hariduse Infotehnoloogia Sihtasutus 30 1.33% 
AS3249 Telia Eesti AS 869 38.43% 
AS3327 CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V. 23 1.02% 
AS39823 Compic OU 1 0.04% 
AS42016 AS Tallinna Lennujaam 1 0.04% 
AS42300 Top Connect Ou 4 0.18% 
AS51504 Telset ltd 44 1.95% 
AS61307 AS STV 31 1.37% 





ONI tests conducted in Estonia covered most of the tests ONI is capable of, except 
the DNS consistency test, with 2,261 tests covering limitations set on common 
communication applications, as with Facebook Messenger and Telegram, to more general 
limitations on access to anonymization tools. Other tests looked at the possibility of 
middleware boxes that may be manipulating content as with the HTTP Header 
Manipulation test, but the most common test run is the simple web connectivity test, 
which collected 56,566 measurements from 216 tests run on the networks included in the 
analysis of Estonia. There were no confirmed limitations on any of the tests and 
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measurements, while the Web Connectivity tests showed 1,485 anomalies as detailed in 
Table 4-5. These anomalies obligated further investigation to understand the potential of 
limitations set on web access in Estonia. 
Table 4-5 
Tests and measurements from networks included in the analysis in Estonia by 
Type 
Test Name Test Count Measurements Count Anomalies 
Dynamic Adaptive Streaming 
over HTTP - DASH 
53 53 0 
DNS Consistency 0 0 0 
Facebook Messenger 263 263 0 
HTTP Header Manipulation 111 111 0 
HTTP invalid request line 139 139 0 
MEEK fronted test / TOR 
Bridged 
43 86 0 
Multi-Protocol Traceroute 2 2 0 
NDT, Network issues affecting 
the speed 
902 902 0 
TCP Connect 46 8800 0 
Telegram 190 190 0 
TOR Direct Accessibility 43 43 0 
Web Connectivity, Website 
access 
216 56566 1485 
WhatsApp 253 253 0 
Total 2261 67408  
 
The anomalies found through the Web Connectivity tests indicate the possibility 
of filtering and blocking of websites by responding unexpectedly to the request sent from 
the ONI probe. The unexpected response is defined as having a discrepancy between the 
web page as requested by direct request method, and to requesting access to the same 
page tested through TOR network, which allows comparison between the website in 
question availability in Estonia compared to that from other locations. Anomalies indicate 
possible restrictions. However, with more profound and direct analysis of the websites 
that are marked as producing anomalies, there were some that returned a page indicating 
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that the website is blocked, particularly with gambling websites. Figure 4-6, shows the 
blocking page as served by the Estonian Tax and Custom Board, indicating that there is 
a centralised system with the purpose of redirecting requests to illegal remote gambling 
sites to this board, or that ISPs have implemented this as a policy across the industry. 
Figure 4-6 
Transparent Blocking Response Page in Estonia 
 
Gambling websites are not the only sites that have a high potential of blocking, as 
anomalies were found in 25 of the 30 categories tested. Although most of the anomalies 
found cannot be directly linked to blocking, some clearly showed response with a page 
served to users at time of testing that indicate that the web page is blocked. An example 
of such blocking pages is Figure 4-7, which shows a blocking page served through an 
organisation that is connecting to the Internet through Telia Eesti ISP for 
http://www.schwarzreport.org/, a web page categorised under the Culture category in the 
Global testing list. The blocking page indicates that the blocking is conducted through 
networking equipment supplied by Dell SonicWall, a content control solution, which may 










Organisational Blocking Response Page in Estonia 
 
Table 4-6 lists the finding of all the categories tested in Estonia. It is clear strong 
anomalies were recorded in the in the Gambling category, with less prominence in the 
other categories tested. This result reflects the confirmed existence of blocking for 
gambling websites that are not considered legal in Estonia, with lesser blocking on other 
types of websites, in what seem to be confined to local and corporate content control. 
Table 4-6 
Categories of websites tested in Estonia and the number of anomalies found in 
each 






Alcohol & Drugs 43 42 2 
Anonymization and circumvention 
tools 
67 62 5 
Communication Tools 99 94 6 
Culture 53 44 4 
E-commerce 18 17 0 
Economics 24 27 1 
Environment 30 31 1 
File-sharing 35 36 0 
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Gambling 38 38 21 
Gaming 25 26 4 
Government 28 30 9 
Hacking Tools 44 48 3 
Hate Speech 14 13 0 
Hosting and Blogging Platforms 64 61 5 
Human Rights Issues 155 156 7 
Intergovernmental Organizations 4 4 0 
LGBT 63 53 2 
Media sharing 49 50 4 
Miscellaneous content 1 3 1 
News Media 94 104 9 
Online Dating 20 24 3 
Political Criticism 22 24 4 
Pornography 19 27 3 
Provocative Attire 21 22 2 
Public Health 29 28 1 
Religion 60 61 6 
Search Engines 32 30 0 
Sex Education 31 33 1 
Social Networking 40 46 3 
Terrorism and Militants 16 17 2 
Not in List  753 24 
Grand Total 1238 2004 133 
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Anomalies were found to be distributed over the various networks tested, with 
slightly over 1% of all tests conducted, resulting in an anomaly with potential blocking 
of web access. Networks with a small test sample, CITIC, Fill, and Skylive, showed no 
anomalies, while other small networks showed some anomalies. Nonetheless, this may 
not reflect the actual case at the network because of the small sample size. While the tests 
for the three larger networks, Telia Eesti, Elisa Eesti, and Tele2, have enough sample size 
to provide reasonable confidence in the results. The status of anomalies in comparison to 
regular results from Estonia networks is summarised in table 4-7. 
Table 4-7 
Results of Web Connectivity tests in Estonia 
Network Regular Anomaly Anomaly 
% 
Telia Eesti AS 45121 533 1.17% 
Elisa Eesti / Teleteenused AS 6179 77 1.23% 
TELE2 3107 35 1.11% 
Hariduse Infotehnoloogia Sihtasutus 301 8 2.59% 
AS INFONET 158 3 1.86% 
CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V. 51 0 0.00% 
Levikom Eesti OU 45 2 4.26% 
AS STV 44 1 2.22% 
Fill Ltd. 32 0 0.00% 
Skylive Telecom AS 32 0 0.00% 
AS Tallinna Lennujaam 11 1 8.33% 
Total Web Connectivity Measurements 55081 660 1.18% 
 
Network measurements from Estonia determine the existence of controls on web 
access particularly with gambling websites that are not licensed in Estonia, with people 
trying to access these websites receiving a page from the Estonian Tax and Customs 
Board stating the reason for blocking of the service. While there are non-conclusive 
results for websites falling within categories ranging from official websites, news and 
media, human rights, and dating websites among others, but in an inconsistent manner, 
suggesting that the blocking is either part of local institutional policies or an error in 
measurement. To empower these findings further, the following part looks at reports and 
124 
news items related to Internet limitations in Estonia to help to build a clear picture of the 
status of the Internet in Estonia. 
4.3.4 Reported Internet limitations 
The status of Internet in Estonia was extensively covered in several reports and 
news items, from the perspective of highlighting successes of the small state in the 
digitisation efforts and spread of the Internet, as being one of the most digitally advances 
countries in the world (Freedom House, 2016). However, reports and studies covering 
Internet limitations in Estonia are not as extensive. OpenNet Initiative (ONI) mentioned 
Estonia in some of its reports, while FreedomHouse included it in its annual Freedom on 
the Net reports from 2011, after an early evaluation and inclusion in Internet freedom 
index in 2009. 
ONI mention of Estonia was limited, with one of the few mentions published 
coming in their weekly roundup Threats to the Open Net of 29th of July 2011. In the 
roundup, ONI included a news item on a plan by several European nations, including 
Estonia, to increase Internet surveillance in response to terrorist attacks happening in 
Norway a week before the weekly roundup (Abell, 2011). 
Estonia had a secure entry to the FreedomHouse Freedom on the Net (FoN) 
reports, by being ranked as the highest for digital media and online freedoms in their 
index of 2009 (Freedom House, 2009), the ranking established Estonia for the Freedom 
on the Net reports as a positive example for a country of interest. The perception carried 
on with the first Freedom on the Net country report of Estonia in 2011, where the report 
portrayed a success story of a country moving from Soviet rule to one of the “most wired 
and technologically advanced countries in the world”, ranking it the first in the world in 
Internet freedoms (Freedom House, 2012a). 
The FoN report included the existence of Internet content controls in Estonia 
under two main categories. The first category is for content removal requests following 
civil court orders based on inappropriate content or comments from news websites while 
the other category is gambling websites following a law passed in 2010 requiring 
providers of remote gambling to register with Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The 
board ask ISPs to block all non-licensed gambling websites through a list updated 
regularly, starting with 298 websites as of July 2010, to over 15,000 in 2019 (Freedom 
House, 2012a; EMTA, 2019). 
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Another main item mentioned in the FoN report of 2011, was the 2007 cyber-
attacks on Estonian Internet infrastructure and institutions, these attacks were considered 
as the most severe threat to internet freedom in Estonia, leading to increased interest in 
digital security and safety in the country(Freedom House, 2012a). The interest in 
cybersecurity prompted the establishment of the National Cyber Defence League, and 
later hosting the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cyber defence centre 
(Freedom House, 2014). 
The following FoN reports of Estonia were pretty much similar as the 2011 report, 
including the development in Internet access and services in Estonia and status of Internet 
market, while mentioning highlights of new regulations and practices of the periods 
reported. The 2012 FoN report included aspects related to possible regulations to protect 
copyright on the Internet, and discussions on the legal liability of online fora for 
comments, following rulings by the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of 
expression (Freedom House, 2012b). This issue was highlighted as critical developments 
mentioned in the FoN 2013 report as well as amending Estonia’s penal code to comply 
with EU directive on the criminalisation of hate speech, including online (Freedom 
House, 2013). On a similar topic, FoN report of 2014 highlighted the direction of Estonian 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication on a development to ensure people 
would have the agency to know and decide when, by whom, and for what their personal 
data is used in the public sector, as a pioneer in the issue in Europe (Freedom House, 
2014). The same theme was maintained in the 2016 and 2017 reports, while the 2018 
report included a major development regarding a vulnerability in ID cards used by 
Estonians for identification and digital signing of documents, exposing more than 
760,000 ID cards, the case was nonetheless quickly fixed, and keys for the affected 
individuals were re-issued (Freedom House, 2018). 
A look at the FoN reports on Estonia over the years show a common theme of an 
interplay between the regulations of Estonia and the EU, where Estonia pioneered 
regulations for eGovernment and online freedoms while maintaining compliance with 
European Union proposals and regulations. The reports analysed portrays a country 
where Internet access as a given fact and where discussions have moved from access and 
limitations to “security, anonymity, protection of private information, and citizens’ rights 
on the Internet” (Freedom House, 2012b).  
Nonetheless, the reports also imply the existence of procedure for limiting access 
and controlling content, as evident by the blocking of gambling websites, which places 
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an instrument in the hand of the government to control the Internet, although no firm 
evidence has been found on such use beyond gambling and following court orders on 
limited scale. 
The limited reports available on Estonia seem to be a result of lack of practices of 
limitations and user rights violations that would intrigue international organisations to 
cover the country, which reflects yet another time the status of openness of the Internet 
in Estonia. This position helps Estonia to play the role of the control country in this 
research, taking into consideration the findings of the network measurements of finding 
a limited implementation of website filtering as well. 
4.3.5 Key findings 
Measurements of networks on Estonian networks covered main ISP and some 
smaller networks, however, due to the nature of the Internet, it is possible that some small 
ISPs run under the networks of other ISPs, and access the Internet as if they were coming 
from the same Autonomous System, with the same ASNumber. This means that the 
measurements analysed could have been from more than the 15 listed. This was evident 
with some of the blocking pages collected that relied on enterprise access-control systems 
and firewalls. The measurements showed with no doubt transparent blocking of several 
gambling websites, a finding supported by the reports and research on regulations on the 
2010 law on remote (online) gambling. Other websites had transparent blocking in what 
seemed as institutional or corporate access, while some measurements showed anomalies 
that may indicate further non-transparent locking, although minimal. 
The reports available and analysed on Estonia were limited but shared the 
eagerness of Estonian regulators to lead in regulations supporting freedom of access and 
expression, while maintaining compliance with European Union regulations, with high 
focus on cyber-security. Estonia maintains relatively open Internet access, fettered only 
to limit gambling websites that are considered illegal and limited blocking on multiple 





The Republic of Singapore, the island city-state in Southeast Asia, gained its 
independence in 1965. During the period of independence, the newly established country 
was not different from any third world country at the time, with no natural resources to 
count on. But in a few decades, it turned into one of the first countries in the world in 
terms of income per head (Mauzy, Milne and Milne, 2002). The People’s Action Party 
(PAP) was in control of the government since the independence of Singapore, and is 
considered to be the main political party to date. Some media reports attribute the success 
of Singapore to the party, particularly economic policies pushed by Lee Kuan Yew to 
attract investments of multi-national companies (Mauzy, Milne and Milne, 2002), leading 
it to become “Switzerland of the East” with international banking and manufacturing 
welcomed (NYTimes, 1973). 
The conscious process of nation building prevailed the national identity in 
Singapore, with people feeling that they are part of the process and hold responsibility 
towards being active positively in the society through collective values rather than 
autonomous individuals (Hill, Lian and Lian, 2013). The creation of national identity 
resulted in multilingual, multicultural, and multiracial education to reach shared and 
common values among the citizens, even at the cost of individual and media freedoms. 
The country, despite its economic success and openness, is regularly ranked as 
lacking freedoms, with the Economist calling it a “Flawed Democracy”  (2019), Reporters 
Without Borders raking it 151 out of 171 countries (2019), Privacy International and 
Electronic Privacy Information Center giving it “endemic surveillance society” 
(PrivacyInternational, 2014)  , and Transparency International raking it third in perceived 
level of corruption (2018).  
Part of the reason for this view on the freedoms in Singapore comes from the fact 
that the government have direct and indirect control over media in the country, through 
owning an equity stake in media conglomerates in Singapore. The control of the print 
press is depicted in the fact that Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), with its very close ties 
to the PAP, controls all of Singapore’s daily newspapers through ownership, while 
broadcast media is controlled by MediaCorp a company owned by the state investment 
agency (ONI, 2005b). It is creating an environment where the ruling party and the 
government assimilate into an entity controlling most information and media of the 
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country, transferring it to a link between the state and the public, with little or no room 
for independent reporting or opinion. 
This section goes through a brief history of Internet and Internet market structure 
in Singapore, to a short introduction on digital inequalities establishes the context and 
situation of the Internet in Singapore by going through digital inequalities and inclusion 
in the country, to later detail findings of the study on Singaporean Internet in its two parts. 
The first part of the study lists main findings of network measurements collected from 
Singapore, while the second part goes through reports on the status of Internet in 
Singapore from main sources that did study the country of multiple years, in the needed 
level of detailing to understand the development of Internet controls and monitoring over 
the years. The subsections build up towards the understanding of the Internet situation in 
Singapore, to inform further analysis and discussion to relate it to tangible outcomes of 
Internet use, the core of this research. 
4.4.1 History of Internet and market structure in Singapore 
Internet was first available in Singapore to the academic community through 
universities since the late 1980s, and to secondary schools since 1993, after setting up the 
National Computer Board (Teo and Tan, 1998). A year later, the Internet was then 
available to the public, with two services available to the public through SingNet and 
Teleview-SingNet, both are parts of SingTel (Palvia et al., 1995). Since then, several 
companies entered the market to provide communication services in the country, licensed 
through the Infocommunications Media Development Authority, a public agency part of 
the Ministry of Communication (Freedom House, 2018).  
Singapore has been a leader in the utilisation of technology at the state level, with 
the formation of the National Computer Board in 1981, and the Civil Service 
Computerisation Programme (CSCP) between 1980-1985, to guide computerisation of 
government and state business and development. By 1986, the CSCP showed 
considerable progress, and was followed by the National IT Plan (NITP) 1986-1991, and 
the IT2000 master plan of 1991, with the objective to develop Singapore into an 
intelligent island, with every home, office, and government ministry connected by 2005 
through the National Information Infrastructure (NII) (Palvia and Tung, 1996).  
Singapore has also been a leader in controlling and limiting access to Internet and 
online content, with regulations related to censorship and standards reviewed to include 
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all media in 1991, at the same year Singapore’s National Computer Board (NCB) began 
studying effect of information technology on quality of life in Singapore, and as a 
competitive advantage (Ang and Nadarajan, 1996). In fact, it can be argued that 
censorship of online communication began even before the world wide web, with 
attempts to control anonymous messages and using algorithms to look for censored words 
used on USENET groups, and using  (Ang and Nadarajan, 1996). 
In the early days of the World Wide Web, censors in Singapore extended 
censorship to emerging forms of media, in one case, they scanned 80,000 image files 
stored in.GIF file format from public Internet accounts of a business service users to find 
five images of pornographic nature, the users that had these pictures where issued 
warnings  (Ang and Nadarajan, 1996). Other methods included algorithms to scan for 
censored words in public websites of Singapore. The practice of scanning user accounts 
continued with at least two scans in 1994, the year Internet access was available to the 
public, these scans looked at email accounts for pornographic content on user accounts 
of the leading network at the time, SingNet, with other scans reported as late as 1998 
(Lee, 2000). However, as the Internet grew larger in terms of content availability and 
number of users, the authorities realised that direct censorship in the same methods would 
no longer be effective. Nonetheless, Singapore’s authorities concern to maintain a habitus 
of control proved to be a more significant motive than technology exploitation when 
setting communication regulations and standards (Lee and Birch, 2000).  
The authorities have portrayed themselves as the protectors of the people from the 
evils of open online content, vowing to keep them in “well-lit areas and not allowing them 
to stray to the wrong side of tracks” as Knoll described statements from Singaporean 
officials in relation to Internet controls (Knoll, 1995). Internet growth in Singapore is in 
itself remarkable, entering the third millennium with 36% of its citizens having access to 
the Internet, rapidly increasing to 60% in 2004, then steadily to around 85% in 2017, as 












Individuals using the Internet in Singapore as a percentage of the population 
between 2000 and 2017 
 
In 1995/1996, as the traditional legal measures where assumed to fall short of 
controlling ‘undesirable’ online content, Singaporean authorities introduced new 
regulations that “addressed the multifarious nature and insidious impact of the Internet”, 
the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA) issued a set of acts to regulate Internet 
content (Endeshaw, 1996). The new regulations, the Internet Policy, the Internet Code of 
Practice, as well as the Class Licensing Scheme covered licensing of Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) and Internet Content Providers (ICP) (Lee, 2000). The regulations set 
expectations for the desirable and undesirable content and practices online with broad 
definitions of content that should be censored, including content that can be considered 
to jeopardise public safety or national defence, content that is deemed dangerous to racial 
and religious harmony, and content that is thought to promote immorality (Hogan, 1998). 
The broad categories allowed for a flexible interpretation of websites to be blocked, and 
content to be censored. Nonetheless, the Class Licensing scheme put the ISPs and ICPs 
in charge of implementing the censorship, maintaining the authority’s promise of “light-
touch” regulations (Josephine, 2013). 
Following the SBA regulations of 1995/1996, Singapore’s authorities maintained 
a symbolic list of 100 websites blocked via proxy servers of ISPs (Lee, 2000), the list 
served as a constant reminder the blocking exists, and it is possible to expand, especially 

























to use their best efforts to blocking access to content and websites that harm public 
morals, racial and religious harmony, and security or national defence, encouraging, do 
not mandate, ISP to offer the use of parental control software tools. This allowed for 
blocking of websites at the discretion of ISPs beyond the 100 websites list, and given the 
close relationship with the ruling party, PAP, leading to the expectation that blocking is 
used as an instrument to benefit the party and the regime in Singapore. 
With its early efforts in Internet limitations, other Asian countries learned from 
Singapore how to control the Internet. One of the most notable examples here is the case 
of China, which sent its senior information official Singapore to learn about Internet 
policing strategies mid-1996, few months before the first Internet controls implemented 
in China (Rodan, 1998). Singapore did also share the experience with Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through a meeting on September 1996 for the 
ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information to collaborate on finding ways to control 
the Internet and activities on it (Rodan, 1998).  
Nonetheless, the SBA found that the nature of the Internet, with a myriad of 
sources of information and the decentralized environment, makes it virtually impossible 
to implement comprehensive Internet censorship, leading to an adoption of a new model. 
The new model relies on symbolic blocking and censorship of a small blacklist through 
technological means and industry-led self-regulation (Malakoff, 1999), mixed with 
higher reliance on monitoring of activity, and an environment with strong regulations 
punishing immoral use, defamation, and sedition, effectively relying on self-censorship 
(Rodan, 1998). 
Within the regulations and licensing, a number of Internet Service Providers 
provided high-quality Internet services, even offering what was the fastest home 
broadband plan in the world in 2015 at 2Gbps fibre-optic connection available through a 
new player in the market, ViewQuest (Freedom House, 2015). However, majority of the 
market of still in hold of the big three ISPs, SingTel, the incumbent telecom provider with 
the government own the majority of, StarHub, which SingTel owns a controlling stake 
in, and M1 (Freedom House, 2018), showing yet another level of control by the 
government by directly controlling two of the big three ISPs through ownership. 
The progress of Internet development and adoption in Singapore over the years 
show the interest of the authorities to spread the use of the Internet from state business to 
the individuals as a tool for development and to attract foreign investment while 
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maintaining a controlled environment of media and information through series of 
regulations and control through ownership and investment. The following part provides 
a brief look at the use of the Internet in Singapore from the perspective of digital inclusion 
and digital inequalities. 
4.4.2 Digital inclusion in Singapore 
The plans for connectivity and computerisation reaped its benefits through the 
increased use and spread of Internet technologies as we have seen earlier, as well with as 
the early of Internet services for education, commerce, and other services, putting 
Singapore as a leader in the use of communication technologies since the mid-1990s. This 
part looks at the status of the digital divide and inclusion in Singapore among different 
groups of the population. 
One of the earliest studies on the use of Internet services in Singapore looked at 
awareness and use of the Internet among academic staff and undergraduate students in 
two universities in Singapore in 1995. The two universities, National University of 
Singapore, and Nanyang Technological University showed an interestingly high level of 
Internet use among both, academic staff at 80%, and undergraduate students at 39%, 
students that know about the Internet but are non-users were 78% of all students (Palvia 
et al., 1995). That study also showed that communication affordances and information 
access were the main reasons for using the Internet, with email and USENET Newsgroups 
taking most of the time of use for academic staff. Almost 90% of the staff were using the 
Internet for teaching and research purposes, while students used it mainly as a pastime 
and hobby, both groups had the activity of keeping in touch with overseas friends as the 
second main reason for use (Palvia et al., 1995). 
For companies, the Internet was also a significant item of interest in the mid-
1990s, with research by Teo and Tan in 1995 showing that two-thirds of 188 companies 
operating in Singapore can be considered as Internet adopters, while half of the non-
adopters intended to adopt Internet use within six months (Tan and Teo, 1998). The same 
research also listed the main reasons for adoption as providing information about the 
company to customers, and advertising their products and services, with 29% of 
companies adopting Internet use sell directly online(Tan and Teo, 1998).  
For eCommerce, another study showed that people between the ages of 15 to 29, 
16% bought an item online in 1998, while 74% of the 1,800 respondents viewed online 
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commerce positively(Meng Poon and Phau, 2000). The results demonstrate how 
considerable Internet was spread among companies only one year after the Internet was 
available to the public, showing yet again high interest among the public and corporate 
in utilising the Internet as part of their life and business. 
The spread of the Internet in Singapore was facilitated through the countrywide 
infrastructure projects, particularly the national information infrastructure (NII), as well 
as the teaching of Internet use skills at schools and universities since the mid-1990s 
(Palvia and Tung, 1996). The government initiatives to advance infrastructure in 
Singapore carried on, with the latest plan to launch the NextGen National Infocomm 
Infrastructure (Next Gen NII) announced in 2018 (IMDA, 2018b) in relation to  the 
Digital Economy Framework for Action which involved plans centred around 
collaborations with partners and platform enablers to put Singapore as a leading digital 
economy  (IMDA, 2018a). The plan looks at infrastructure as a critical enabler in boosting 
the overall competitiveness in Singapore, particularly in the ICT sector and new industries 
by covering aspects of connectivity as well as the development of a Data Centre Park to 
attract multinational companies. 
The policies and plans, although aiming primarily at economic growth and 
increasing competitiveness, covered two aspects of the traditional digital inequalities, 
access and skills. However, the limited number of research available about digital 
inequalities showed that gender, age, marital status, income, education, and perceived 
Internet efficacy significantly affected Internet use, with young single males with high 
education and income are at the fortunate end (Cheong, 2007). In addition, interviews 
conducted for this research showed that interviewees generally agreed that there is a gap 
in use of the Internet among generations, with the older generations at the losing end, 
while other socio-demographic factors were not as dominant in the views of interviewees. 
Despite the efforts to make the Internet ubiquitous in availability to every home 
and office in Singapore, and the early adoption of skills education and infrastructure 
projects, the alarming view of the authorities for the open communication and access to 
information affordances of the Internet resulted in tightening attempts to monitor and 
control access. The next parts look at empirical evidence to assess the level of monitoring 
and control from network measurements and review of related reports.  
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4.4.3 Measured Internet limitations 
Collecting network measurements from Singapore through OONI probes began 
in November 2014, with data available up to May 2019. Measurements were clearly 
affected by the release of the OONI mobile probe app, with the considerable increase in 
the number of tests conducted from 4,544 tests included up until February 2017, 27 
months from the date of release of the OONI mobile probe, to 202,076 measurements 
afterwards to May 2019, 27 months after the release. The increase is a notable increase 
of almost 45 times over a similar period of time. Figure 4-9 demonstrates the increase in 
measurements collected over time, with the shaded region representing the time before 
the mobile probe. This further reinstates the finding from Bahrain analysis that the 
availability of mobile application as a probe, instead of the standalone or computer run 
probe, thus mainly increases public participation in testing networks and contributing 
measurements to the OONI data repository. The existence of measurements collected 
before the mobile app also serves as evidence that the connection between the probes and 
the centralised OONI data repository was not blocked. 
A closer look at the tests and measurements collected, shows that they were 
conducted on 73 Autonomous System Numbers (ASN), the number assigned for a 
network, indicating the count of networks tested. However, not all the 73 networks were 
included in the analysis, as some of the networks tested were part of cloud computing 
locations and data centres operating in Singapore, which does not represent that status of 
the Internet as used by individuals in Singapore.  
Network list was scrutinised to include only networks that individuals may use to 
access the Internet through directly, resulting in limiting the results to 33 networks, with 
9,401 tests, resulting in 89,375 measurement points. Although this process decreased the 
overall number of measurements to 43% of the 206,620 total measurements, the resulting 
analysis is more representative for what an average person would experience of 
limitations when they connect to the Internet in Singapore, rather than through a hosting 
server or server leasing access. Figure 4-9 illustrates the number of measurements 
collected before and after the release of the OONI mobile probe app, and the 
measurements included in the analysis as part of all measurements collected and stored 





OONI Network measurements collected from Singapore over time 
 
The networks tested represent those of the three large Internet Service Providers 
active in Singapore, SingTel and its subsidiary SingNet, StarHub, and M1 with 75% of 
included tests, as well as institutes and organisations having their own ASNumbers, as in 
Nanyang Polytechnic, National University of Singapore, and Temasek Polytechnic 
Singapore. It is interesting to see how many organisations and institutes have their own 
ASNumber, for the cost and management effort required to maintain one compared to the 
more conventional way of connecting through getting access through a larger supplier 
that manage their own ASNumber. However, this contributes to further potential for a 
higher level of details when it comes to finding and measurements. Table 4-8 lists 
networks included in the analysis for the purpose of this research, with the ASNumbers 
of each network, and the total contribution of each as a percentage of the total tests 
analysed. The big three ISPs contributed the majority of the tests, with 83% of total test 
sessions, this provides a better understanding for access most people are offered in 
Singapore, thus empowering confidence in results. 
Table 4-8 
Networks in Singapore included in the analysis, grouped by ISP or Institute 
ASNumber ISP/Institute Tests % 
AS10091,AS4657, 
AS55430,AS9874 
StartHub 1339 14.24% 
AS132356 Singapore Changi Airport 130 1.38% 
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136 
ASNumber ISP/Institute Tests % 
AS17547, AS4773 M1 4330 46.06% 
AS17617 Nanyang Polytechnic 5 0.05% 
AS17733 Singapore Management 
University 
2 0.02% 
AS17927 WebSatMedia 6 0.06% 
AS18106 ViewQuest 153 1.63% 
AS24312 AXGN 7 0.07% 
AS24482 SG.GS 555 5.90% 
AS4628 Pacific Internet 2 0.02% 
AS4817 TPG 2 0.02% 
AS4844 SuperInternet 8 0.09% 
AS55415 Marina Bay Sands Buildings 3 0.03% 
AS55919 Singapore University of 
Technology and Design 
4 0.04% 
AS56300 MyRepublic 280 2.98% 
AS63916 IPTELECOM Global 4 0.04% 
AS703 Verizon Business 74 0.79% 




SingTel and its subsidiaries 2102 22.36% 
AS9009 M247 123 1.31% 
AS9292 Temasek Polytechnic Singapore 5 0.05% 









Tests from Singapore included in the analysis covered the majority of tests offered 
by OONI, from testing for service disruptions, as with DASH, to test for limitations 
affecting live video streaming, Telegram and WhatsApp for limitations affecting the 
mainstream instant messaging application. Tests also covered limitations on access to 
circumvention networks with TOR access testing, both direct access and access through 
bridges to bypass direct access limitations, and network interference affecting speed 
(NDT). Most of the measurements, as detailed in table 4-9, came from HTTP request 
testing and website accessibility, testing for blocking of websites and online content, with 
a combined sum of 80,198 measurements conducted, this is understandable since these 
tests test for an extensive list of URLs in each. 
Testing for limitations on the OONI access to control network could not be 
established using the tests conducted, as only 33 tests were conducted over five networks, 
Singapore Changi Airport, National University of Singapore, and the three major ISPs, 
SingTel, M1, and StarHub. All of the tests failed, but the low number of tests does not 
establish a positive conclusion. However, the fact that web access testing could not be 
completed because of the inability of accessing the test control network for most tests 
suggests possible blocking. According to sources in Singapore, default TOR setting are 
indeed blocked, but users follow online advice and change the settings to bypass 
blocking10. 
Table 4-9 
Number of tests and measurements from networks included in the analysis in 
Singapore 
Test Name Test Count Measurements Count Anomalies 
Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over 
HTTP - DASH 
873 873 0 
Facebook Messenger 130 130 0 
HTTP Header Manipulation 1167 1167 0 
HTTP invalid request line 1386 1389 0 
 
10  A sample online advice on how to bypass TOR blocking in 
Singapore suggests changing default port number from 80 to 8080, as 
port 80 is “blocked by default in Singapore” https://www.quora.com/Is-
Tor-blocked-in-Singapore 
138 
Test Name Test Count Measurements Count Anomalies 
HTTP Request 114 26475 0 
MEEK fronted test / TOR Bridged 8 16 0 
NDT, Network issues affecting the speed 3666 3666 0 
TCP Connect 7 1662 0 
Telegram 120 120 0 
TOR  Direct Accessibility 17 17 0 
Web Connectivity, Website access 1776 53723 1219 
WhatsApp 137 137 0 
Total 9401 89375  
Testing for blocking of websites and access relied on trying to access websites 
from a set of URLs predefined in a list, in compliance with the description in the 
methodology chapter. The URL lists used included the Global list for OONI probe and 
application, as well as the list explicitly predefined for Singapore, including websites that 
are either know to be blocked, or are known to be under risk of blocking, either for what 
they offer, or because they fall within a category that is known to be targeted in Singapore. 
The Global and Singapore lists included 1,754 URLs; almost all of them were tested with 
at least one measurement, at an average of 30 measurements per URL. The number of 
sites tested presented 95% of those included in the lists, a number that is higher than that 
of Bahrain, which was at 85%. As indicated in table 4-9, measurements were also 
collected for six hundred URLs that are not included in the current test lists. The rationale 
behind is that these URLs represent either websites that were added by the user directly, 
or websites that used to be in the testing list, but were removed in the periodic list reviews, 
which aims at keeping the lists up to date and balanced among different categories. 
Categories and websites tested, as detailed in table 4-10, covered most types of 
websites that are prone to blocking and content control, from religious, political, human 
rights websites, cultural, to lifestyle websites, websites offering tools to bypass censored 
and blocking, and websites related to information access and sharing, providing a broad 
spectrum of coverage for different models of censorship and control based on access 
limitation. Nonetheless, what these tests do not cover, is limitations that do not rely on 
technical measurements, as with self-censorship induced by an environment of fear, 
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which can be sensed in other research instruments, including review of reports and 
regulations, and interviews, which this research uses in the subsequent sections for this 
purpose. 
Table 4-10 
Categories of websites tested in Singapore and the number of anomalies found in 
each 







Alcohol & Drugs 48 46 1 
Anonymization and circumvention tools 73 66 14 
Communication Tools 127 111 0  
Culture 53 46 0  
E-commerce 20 20 0  
Economics 28 28 0  
Environment 34 33 0  
File-sharing 38 36 2 
Gambling 38 38 27 
Gaming 28 27 0  
Government 45 44 1 
Hacking Tools 50 49 2 
Hate Speech 15 14 0  
Hosting and Blogging Platforms 75 66 3 
Human Rights Issues 163 161 0  
Intergovernmental Organizations 4 4 0  
LGBT 67 59 6 
Media sharing 53 51 1 
Miscellaneous content 7 7 0  
News Media 113 112 3 
Online Dating 27 26 0  
Political Criticism 25 25 0  
Pornography 28 28 17 
Provocative Attire 25 25 0  
Public Health 31 29 1 
Religion 62 62 1 
Search Engines 33 30 2 
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Sex Education 35 35 4 
Social Networking 49 47 0  
Terrorism and Militants 20 20 1 
Not in List 600 47 
Total 1414 1945 133 
 
Testing showed that around half of the tested URLs presented symptoms for 
possible blocking, with 996 websites falling in this group, spanning across all of the 
categories tested. All of the sites falling under the Gambling, Pornography, and Human 
Rights Issues categories showed such symptoms. The categories that had less than half of 
the websites tested showing anomalies are Culture, eCommerce, LGBT, and Social 
Networks. The Miscellaneous Content category, which includes websites that do not fall 
under any of the other categories, but are suspected to be blocked, showed that only one 
website of the seven tested had symptoms of access fiddling, the “Body Modification 
Ezine”, http://www.bmezine.com. The results show that content in Singapore is highly 
monitored with active blocking across all categories of websites tested.  
Blocking in Singapore is considered transparent, with blocking page displayed to 
people trying to access blocked pages. For this research, the following block pages were 
found, five of which from the StarHub network, and one from the M1 network. The 
blocking page recorded from M1 network, shown in figure 4-10, refers to the website as 
contravening IMDA Broadcasting and Class License act as the base for blocking. 
Figure 4-10  
Transparent Blocking Response Page in Singapore Network M1 
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The StarHub network blocking pages uses cookies, which may be used to identify 
the user and record some of the user web surfing activities. They also communicate to the 
user the reason or rationale for blocking and the body responsible in the blocking page 
returned, as in figure 4-11. The bases for blocking as collected from the StarHub blocking 
pages were as following: 
1. Website preaching the Parliamentary Election Act. 
2. Prohibited material against the public interest, with a call to visit 
scamalert.sg or to call the anti-scam helpline. 
3. Website is blocked pursuant to order from High Court of Singapore. 
4. Prohibited material, with reference to IMDA classification details. 
5. Website blocked by IMDA for breaching elections advertising under 
Presidential Elections Act. 
Figure 4-11 
Transparent Blocking Response Page in Singapore Network StarHub 
 
Blocking pages on SingTel networks showed a different approach, the block page 
as shown in figure 4-12 points the blocking to be as part of a local policy set by the 
network administrator or IT department, even though the request came through SingTel 
network. The page code indicated that this is part of “Cloud Web Filtering” as “Powered 
by SingTel”.  
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Figure 4-12 
Transparent Blocking Response Page in Singapore Network SingTel 
 
A very similar blocking page is used by local institutes, as with the page displayed 
in figure 4-13 from SIM University through M1 network. This page code indicates that 
the blocking is provided by using solutions from Fortinet networking products. The 
interesting in this blocking page is that it does not only store or pass user information to 
the network operators, but also display it to the user, feeding into the increased sense of 
monitoring by making the user conscious about what information is known about them, 
including their university username. The username is redacted from the figure to protect 
the identity of the individual. 
Figure 4-13 
Transparent Blocking Response Page in Singapore Network SIM University 
through M1 
 
One may think that network type, whether an ISP or an institutional network, 
would give different results in terms of websites blocked. However, a look at the results 
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by type of Network, shows that of the 996 sites in all networks showed symptoms of 
blocking, 921 did so on the leading ISPs, showing conformity in blocking across various 
types of networks in Singapore, whether public ISP or institutional access. 
A look at the results from another perspective shows that from the 50,723 web 
connectivity measurements only 3,000 showed anomaly of blocking, detailed in table 4-
11, indicating that the blocking is not constant, but somewhat sporadic, creating a sense 
that at any moment of time, blocking is minimal and more of nominal than hindering 
limitation. This form of blocking is achievable through dynamic blocking lists that rotate 
blocking across URLs over time, with no need for much human intervention or effort. 
There is no clear indication on whether this is implemented in Singapore, but the pattern 
is consistent with this method, which makes it plausible, especially when taking in 
consideration that censors in Singapore claim that they maintain a list of only 100 blocked 
websites, the list is not published  (ONI, 2005b), which makes it possible that the list is 
rotated. 
Table 4-11  
Results of Web Connectivity tests in Singapore 
Network Regular Anomaly Anomaly % 
AXGN 16 0 0.00% 
M1 22918 757 3.20% 
M247 374 3 0.80% 
MyRepublic 1124 7 0.62% 
Nanyang Polytechnic 25 3 10.71% 
Nanyang Technological University 57 0 0.00% 
NUS Information Technology 250 3 1.19% 
SG.GS 1760 5 0.28% 
Singapore Changi Airport 3467 28 0.80% 
Singapore University of Technology and Design 1286 131 9.24% 
SingTel 12327 234 1.86% 
StarHub 6616 47 0.71% 
SuperInternet 33 0 0.00% 
Temasek Polytechnic Singapore 22 0 0.00% 
ViewQuest 407 1 0.25% 
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Network Regular Anomaly Anomaly % 
Whiz Communications 41 0 0.00% 
Total Web Connectivity Measurements 50723 1219 2.35% 
 
Table 4-11 shows one difference between public ISP networks and institutional 
ones, the persistence of blocking. It is clearly less intermittent on some institutional 
networks, over 10% of measurements in all of Singapore University of Technology and 
Design, Nanyang Polytechnic, and Temasek Polytechnic Singapore, while drifting 
between 3.7 and 6.7% in the major ISPs, M1, SingTel, and StarHub. In all cases, a simple 
look at the number of websites blocked at any moment of time would give the illusion 
that a nominal number of websites is blocked, while in reality, the overall number of 
websites limited is vast, covering a broad spectrum of websites and categories. 
A selected set of websites were tested through AccessCheck tool, to show that the 
inconsistency remained the main attribute for limitations in Singapore. For example, 
testing for the website proxify.com, which enables bypassing limitations, and was found 
to be blocked by OONI measurements, returned inconsistent result through AccessCheck, 
where it showed anomalies of blocking on two of the four ISPs tested. A similar manner 
was found with websites from other categories. 
The data analysed shows clear indication for a high level of Internet control on 
website access in Singapore that covers a large number of websites and content types and 
is not limited to morally questionable content as implied in Singaporean official 
statements. Nonetheless, the blocking is sporadic in nature, and blocking lists seem to 
rotate over time, possibly to maintain an illusion of a small number of blocked websites 
at any given time. The following section looks at reports on the Internet in Singapore to 
provide a deeper understanding of the historical context of Internet controls in the 
country, to provide further explanations for findings of the data. 
4.4.4 Reported Internet limitations 
The research relies on multiple resources to outline as much as possible of the 
status of the Internet in terms of limitations. Although the network measurement provided 
a good view on limitations over the data collection period, a review of related reports 
published over the years has the potential to provide a more comprehensive view, from 
timeline to various forms of control. OpenNet Initiative (ONI) and FreedomHouse, 
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among others, more recently covered the model of artificial Internet limitations in 
Singapore in a series of reports. The coverage was more extensive than the papers 
mentioned earlier by including a component of testing for limitations implemented, rather 
than limitations announced, nonetheless, the finding mostly match. The match 
demonstrates the good level of transparency when it comes to censorship between the 
Singaporean government and the citizens, a component that although promotes 
confidence, serve a role in the Singaporean model that is reliant on fear and self-
censorship. 
The first report from ONI on Internet limitations in Singapore, titled Internet 
Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005, stated that Singapore maintained its robust control 
over the information its citizens have access to, whether formally or informally, through 
different media, including the Internet, mainly targeting the content of pornographic 
nature and fanatical religious content. Singaporean Media Development Authority 
(MDA), a new body formed by the merger of SBA and other media-related authorities, 
maintained the blacklist approach of the SBA and kept a claim of blocking a symbolic 
list of 100 websites, to promote social values and maintain national unity (ONI, 2005b). 
ONI testing confirmed the blocking of just a small set of websites, eight of the 1,632 sites 
tested, marking Singapore’s technical filtering system one of the most limited. 
Nonetheless, the report indicated that Internet limitations in Singapore are substantial 
through access controls in the form of licensing, and legal pressures, in the form of 
defamation lawsuits and the threat of imprisonment  (ONI, 2005b). This finding confirms 
again, the model of censorship described earlier and concluding that this low-tech model 
is potentially effective (ONI, 2005b, p. 15).  
Licensing was discussed in detail in the report, including the Class License 
Scheme, which requires any Internet Content Providers and Internet Services providers, 
as well as political parties, religious groups, and even individuals, to register with the 
MDA. Registration included that they should comply with the Internet Code of Practice, 
and conform to MDA requests regarding the content and discussions on their websites  
(ONI, 2005b, p. 9). Although the Internet Code of Practice did not provide restrictions or 
punishments, it still placed Internet users under the risk of criminal penalties if proven of 
possession of banned material, as with pornography. The requirement of registration 
effectively placed site operators at risk of prosecution for published content and online 
discussion, further extending self-censorship to group-censorship, and encouraging 
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operators of different networks, as in a university or work networks, to implement higher 
levels of blocking to safeguard themselves against liability. 
ONI report of 2005 went into details of the Singaporean model by including 
description on the great level of control Singaporean government have on media in 
general. Through strict licensing schemes, frequent formal actions to control content, and 
informal investment ties between companies with strong relations to the ruling party 
(People’s Action Party - PAP) and all of Singapore’s daily newspapers, and similar ties 
with broadcast media, resulting in “lack of a free and independent press” (ONI, 2005b, p. 
9). The report includes examples of the use of legal pressures to control the content, with 
defamation suits and the threat of cutting studentships for bloggers who publish content 
that deems critical to politicians or governmental agencies. 
The report also indicated that Internet content regulations in Singapore started in 
1996 (ONI, 2005b), this is true for the use of proxies to limit access to content and 
websites through the World Wide Web. However, as we have seen earlier, Singapore had 
previous attempts to control content over the Internet on technologies that predated the 
World Wide Web, as in the image scans on USENET accounts. 
The second report from ONI on Singapore was issued in 2007, with similar 
findings to the previous report, of an environment with selective Internet filtering, 
massive control on local media and publication, and strict rules and regulations that 
maintained a climate of pervasive self-censorship, including political discussion and 
commentary, particularly to opposition to PAP, the ruling party (ONI, 2007b). The report 
referred to a set of acts that contributed to the climate of control, including Internal 
Security Act, Criminal Law Act, Undesirable Publications Act, Class License Scheme, 
and Sedition Act, which threatens dissidents with sanctions, fines, and even jail time and 
criminal prosecution, which “inhibit more open discourse in an otherwise vibrant Internet 
community” (ONI, 2007b, p. 9). 
ONI left Singapore out of their reporting after 2007, except for few mentions in 
the book Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace, 
where Singaporean model was compared against methods and practices of other 
countries, particularly in Asia, to outline differences. One of those mentions compared 
Malaysian registration requirements introduced in 2007 to those in effect in Singapore, 
referencing the success in the later in chilling online political speech (Thien et al., 2011, 
p. 46). Later, the authors added to the comparison of the difference in online activism, 
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iterating that Singaporean activism is less visible and vocal despite the significantly 
higher Internet penetration rate in Singapore  (Thien et al., 2011, p. 51). 
Another substantive reporting on the status of Internet freedoms in Singapore 
came from FreedomHouse, who started to include Singapore in their annual Freedom on 
the Net reports from 2014. The initial Internet freedom status of Singapore according to 
the 2014 report was Partly Free, with a score of 40 on a scale from 0 to 100 (Freedom 
House, 2014), the score is based on three categories, Obstacles to Access, Limits on 
Content, and Violations of User Rights. Singapore scoring was consistent with the 
Singaporean Internet control model described earlier, with limited obstacles to access, 
and higher limitations to content and violations of user rights. 
The 2014 report concluded that the Singaporean government, under the leadership 
of the long-ruling People Action Party (PAP), does not use Internet filtering and blocking 
as primary means for Internet control, but instead use sedition, defamation, and contempt 
of court laws to manage dissent, including online dissent, creating an environment of self-
censorship. Up until 2011, the Singaporean Internet saw an increasing flow of online 
activity critical of the government, but the general elections of 2011, which saw the first 
set back for the PAP, triggered higher sensitivity towards online content and dissent, 
resulting in an increase in cases of content takedowns and use of laws against online 
activists (Freedom House, 2014).  
The 2011 elections were referenced as a turning point in the move towards open 
Internet and online activism as per the interview with S5, where the decrease in popularity 
of PAP as reflected in the general elections that year, saw a definite increase in Internet 
controls. S5 Even mentioned a sudden decrease in Internet quality of service that was 
sensed by the general public, probably because of the implementation of monitoring 
facilities, but not much objection came from the public because of the environment of 
fear that dominated the Singaporean public sphere. Freedom on the Net 2014 report 
confirmed that saying that “any restraint of online discourse is mainly due to fear of post-
publication punitive action – especially through strict laws...” (Freedom House, 2014, p. 
4). 
The same report mentioned cases of law proceedings against people for their 
online activity, including the first case of an individual blogger being sued by a 
government leader, where the prime minister of Singapore initiated defamation 
proceedings against an activist blogger. There were also several cases of content 
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takedown notices issued to online content providers, and increase in coverage of the class-
licensing scheme and restrictions applied in a highly selective and intermittent manner, 
to include more websites and limitations, including limitations on foreign funding. The 
changes drove multiple web outlets to close, citing the onerous requirements, as with 
Breakfast News, closed in 2013, and Sintercom. Other websites, such as Mothership and 
Yahoo News, opted to assent to the regulations, and joined nine other websites that belong 
to mainstream media, already connected to the government, to register under the newly 
introduced individual licensing framework of 2013. This act large affected online news 
sites, requiring them to comply with takedown notices within 24 hours, and perform in 
compliance of the Internet Code of Practice  
An important aspect that helps in understanding the situation of Internet 
limitations and controls in Singapore is the understanding that surveillance in the island 
state is an accepted fact of life, where citizens know that they are under constant 
monitoring, and a belief that the government can access any private data it wants 
(Freedom House, 2014, p. 11). This understanding puts in perspective the power of 
suggestion in Singapore that is leading to a high level of self-censorship, with very little 
open dissidence. 
The 2015 report of Freedom on the Net showed that the status of Internet freedoms 
remained almost the same, with one point difference in the Violations of User Rights, 
moving Singapore score from 40 to 41, a slightly less open score (Freedom House, 2015). 
The report maintained the conclusion that blocking of social media and applications, as 
well as online content, is non-existent to minimal. However, it clearly reiterated the 
findings of the previous report of the high level of controls set indirectly resulting in an 
effectively limited ability to use the Internet within the rigid boundaries of laws and 
regulations, while enumerating cases of user rights violations. 
Freedom House review of press in Singapore concluded that the news websites 
that are connected to mainstream media do not deviate significantly from the official line 
of news in political issues. These outlets revert to editing articles post publishing when 
they feel the content is potentially contentious, in a practice of self-censorship that 
heightened towards the 2015 elections (Freedom House, 2015, p. 7). The concern of 
elections followed the lesson PAP, and government officials learned from the 2011 
elections, including putting tremendous efforts in having their say in the online world 
with representation on a different social media platform and news sites. 
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The years between the two elections saw an increase in online and digital activism 
in Singapore, including successful campaigns to change policies, as with the campaign 
related to the government pension scheme, which resulted in changing of the policy to fit 
more the requirements of the public mid-2014, however, it was clear that the success of 
online mobilisation is constrained by offline restriction more than by online ones 
(Freedom House, 2015, p. 9).  A new law came around the same time to protect citizens 
from online harassment, the Protection from Harassment Act, which included a section 
with remedies for false statements of facts published about a person, which was quickly 
used as an instrument by the government against critics (Freedom House, 2014). 
The new law added yet another instrument for the regime quiver towards the 
protection of civil and political order and stability, even when at the cost of civil and 
individual liberties and political opposition and freedoms. Nonetheless, cases showed that 
Singaporean public are reactionary in general with a tendency to break the silence, sign 
petitions and go on rallies when they feel injustice. One case was when a 16 years old 
child was prosecuted for content they published online, including a video of themself 
speaking against the prime minister and later a manipulated image depicting two 
politicians having sex (Freedom House, 2015). 
Twenty Fifteen also included an important aspect related to the revelations of 
Edward Snowden, which showed the involvement of SingTel, the Singaporean incumbent 
telecommunication company, in facilitating intelligence agencies’ access to traffic 
passing through one the major undersea telecom cables. The revelations stirred discussion 
on total information awareness, a concept where the state has access to all digital activity 
and electronic records related to their citizens, an analyst was quoted in the Freedom on 
the Net 2015 report saying “Singapore has become a laboratory not only for testing how 
mass surveillance and big-data analysis might prevent terrorism but for determining 
whether technology can be used to engineer a more harmonious society” (Freedom 
House, 2015, p. 14). 
In the years leading to 2018, Singapore maintained the same score at Freedom on 
the Net reports, with the same status as partly free. The three reports of 2016, 2017, and 
2018, described what seems as stability and consistency in the model of Internet 
limitations and controls, with low dependency on technical filtering and blocking, and 
high dependency on maintaining an environment of monitoring and control towards self-
censorship among the citizens through legal instruments and ominous surveillance 
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(Freedom House, 2016, 2017, 2018). The year 2016 saw such use of legal instruments 
when two editors of a website that operate from outside of Singapore, and deemed to 
publish controversial material, editors of The Real Singapore were sentenced for ten 
months under the sedition laws when they visited Singapore (Freedom House, 2016). 
Restructuring in the authorities in charge of media and Internet regulations was 
conducted in 2016, with the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) was 
succeeded the Infocommunications Media Development Authority of Singapore (IMDA), 
as the authority responsible of infrastructure, and the infamous MDA restructured into 
Government Technology Organisation (GTO). The changes followed government 
promises towards a competitive industry structure with an all-fibre Next Generation 
Network for the whole city-state (Freedom House, 2016). These moves reconfirm the 
interest of the government in developing Internet usage and reliance on technology for 
economic advancement. Nonetheless, since the Internet limitations did not see any 
meaningful change, the need for constant control of the government does not seem to 
have changed, and limits the advancement interests to the economy, but not for freedom 
of expression. This can be further confirmed with what FoN2016 report described as a 
gradual normalisation of online space to match the offline media environment of PAP 
ideological dominance of content (Freedom House, 2016, p. 7). 
Key developments in the years 2016 to 2018 were in more legal instruments to 
increase control and expression, including online use and expression, as in the 2016 
statute to codify the offence of contempt of court and the Administration of Justice 
Protection Bill, which specified publishing material that interferes with ongoing 
proceedings as an offence. The contempt of court law proved as one of the most applied 
laws against bloggers writing on the treatment of opposition politicians and LGBT 
activists (Freedom House, 2017). Another key law that was passed in 2018, but pre-
empted in 2017, was the Public Order and Safety Act, and the works towards laws that 
target “fake news”, which were received as drastically restricting online media and 
freedom of expression (Freedom House, 2018). 
Overall, reports covering the state of the Internet in Singapore were mostly in 
agreement when describing the existence of a light-touch control in terms of filtering and 
blocking, and an impressively capable heavy hand of laws, regulations, and surveillance 
resulting in a highly controlled environment reliant on self-censorship on the individual 
and website levels. The prospects of Internet freedoms in Singapore is limited, with no 
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indication of the change in the attitude of the government, on the contrary, it is exporting 
the model of control to other countries for its effectiveness, with limited objection from 
citizens of the country. 
4.4.5 Key findings 
As this section mapped the status of the Internet in Singapore, the first look 
reflected a service with very high availability and early adoption provided over a 
sophisticated infrastructure with an environment supportive for digital skills 
development. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals what carries the potential for 
hindering outcomes of the use of the Internet in the form of governmental aptitude 
towards maintaining control over all media and information access, from conventional 
media to the Internet, in the form of stringent laws and regulatory processes governing 
Internet use and content production and communication. 
The regulatory environment and the business connections with the regime played 
a role in the companies and service providers introducing technical limitations on 
accessing online material and websites that may be deemed controversial, especially 
material that fall under moral, racial, and religious sensitivities of the country. While for 
individuals, the environment of legal prosecution based on content shared and in 
possession, and opinions expressed online created an atmosphere of high self-censorship 
that, according to the reports studied, was even more effective as a method for control of 
online use than technical limitations, in a model that Singapore was attributed as a pioneer 
of. Singapore did provide the expertise of Internet controls to other countries and regimes 
that shared similar yearn to control, including China, since the mid-1990s. 
Nonetheless, and despite relying on a model that relies more on fear than technical 
limitations, network measurements showed prevalent anomalies and signs of blocking for 
most websites checked and in every category tested, from pornography to websites of 
Intergovernmental organisations and even translation services. The network 
measurements result reflected the sporadic nature of blocking, with what seems as if the 
lists rotate over time, providing an image that only a small number of websites is blocked 
at any given time. 
The findings of this sections show that the network measurements collected and 
reports reviewed to support the conclusion that Internet use in Singapore is highly 
controlled through a setting that encourages self-censorship empowered through light-
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handed rotating website blocking with the stern regulatory environment. These findings 
carry the potential for effectively controlling Internet use and outcomes in the country, a 
matter that is covered in detail in Study 2. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter fulfilled its role of providing knowledge on the status of the Internet, 
particularly from the perspective of availability and limitations set on the network and the 
environment, by looking at measured Internet limitations and reported limitations and 
practices that affect Internet and digital rights in the three countries of research, Estonia, 
Bahrain, and Singapore. The chapter findings push theory of three different approaches 
and concepts in how each of the countries views and deals with affordances of the Internet 
in relation to freedom of expression, activism, and further uses of the medium. 
Estonia maintained a positive outlook to affordances of the Internet, encouraging 
use by offering initiatives to spread access and digital skills, and offering a wide suite of 
public services online, while maintaining an open environment for expression, and use. 
The few limitations and filtering found occurred mainly as a result of regulations for 
licensing of gambling providers, and blocking non-licensed or illegal providers, 
indicating the existence of technological means for blocking at ISP level, but with no 
findings to support appropriation of those means to limit access to information and 
freedom of expression. 
Singapore and Bahrain shared a similarly positive outlook towards technology 
and its benefits for development as Estonia, and running initiatives for spreading access 
and development of digital skills, but with reluctance of the potential of communication 
technologies to assist in producing imbalance in the delicate equilibrium of races and 
religions in each country as conserved by its governments. This reluctance resulted in 
developing strategies to maintain control over the Internet as a medium, and the message 
communicated through it. Despite the difference in approach, the resulting limitations as 
found by the study can confidently support grouping of Bahrain and Singapore in one 
group as the countries with high level of artificial limitations set on Internet. 
In Bahrain, the controls observed are embodied in limiting access to several 
websites serving content that is deemed dangerous to the public morals as with 
pornography, as well as circumvention tools, websites of political nature, and news and 
media outlets, with the blocking fluctuating between transparent and non-transparent. The 
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filtering is combined with a high level of surveillance and monitoring that is acted upon 
with force in many cases, endangering people’s freedoms and resulting in incarceration 
at some times. These practices created an environment of high self-censorship in dealing 
with media in general, and the Internet in specific. 
Singapore on the other hand with a slightly different strategy, maintaining a light-
hand of technical blocking in what seems to be a rotating list of pages that are blocked, 
resulting in a more dynamic blocking that would reflect covering a small list of websites 
limited at any point of time covering several categories of transparent blocking. Singapore 
tends to be relying more on developing and maintaining an environment of fear and self-
censorship supported by laws and regulations, including stringent defamation laws, rather 
than mere technical blocking. 
The data collected through this study and the information deduced help in building 
the picture of powers in the network society, with each of the countries comprising a 
community that have different opportunities as reflected by the difference in power 
relations’ influence on access and availability of services and content provided over the 
Internet. This picture is critical in the studying of tangible outcomes of Internet use, as in 
the chapter on Study 2 and the later discussion chapter, where it is playing as a lens to 
appreciate the digital inequalities among individuals in these communities and across 
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5 Study 2: Tangible Outcomes of Internet Use 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter carries on with the quest to answering the research questions by 
delving into tangible outcomes of Internet use as a measurement for inequalities in 
opportunities for Internet users building on the knowledge developed in the previous 
chapter on the Internet Artificial limitations in the countries of research. The 
Methodology chapter elaborated on the studies part of this research, with the second study 
dedicated to measuring tangible outcomes of Internet use through mixed-methods 
approach combining a survey instrument and a set of interviews to augment the survey 
results and provide an explanation where needed. 
This chapter looks at these two instruments, beginning with the survey, detailing 
the population and sample researched, and how that sample was reached as well as its 
main characteristics. The following sections then study the responses of the sample on 
questions aimed at building an understanding of the societies being studied in terms of 
the perception of limitation and use of technology, as well as demographic indicators. 
Then the chapter flows to study responses on questions specific to the four fields of 
tangible outcomes of Internet use, Economic, Cultural, Social, and Personal, dissecting 
the differences among different societies, which are then correlated with predictors. 
The correlations with predictors explore the effect of the predictors with 
significant correlation with the tangible outcomes fields and sub-fields where necessary. 
This exploratory effort helps to understand what attributes of the individual in 
communities with different levels of limitations that affect Internet access and use, 
whether direct as with content and service blocking, or indirect as with promoting self-
censorship through building an environment of fear surrounding usage and expression. 
The predictors combined to produce a profile of people who have higher potential for 
opportunities to better achieve, and be more satisfied, with Internet affordances. 
As the findings of the survey become apparent, the chapter moves to cover the 
interviews conducted as part of this study to verify and expand the findings and increase 
the validity of the research. In addition to connecting the interviews with the findings, 
additional findings came up from the interviews that the scope of research would not have 
found otherwise. The interviews are organised by country, with each country’s interviews 
written to reflect the main themes discussed. 
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The build-up for the discussion chapter, where most of the critical input is 
produced, runs throughout this chapter, with the critical outtakes of Study 2 summarised 
in the last section of this chapter, combining the main findings of both instruments used 
in this study. 
 
5.2 Survey 
As discussed in the Study 2 design in the methodology chapter, the first of the two 
instruments used for Study 2 was a survey conducted with respondents in countries of 
research to measure tangible outcomes of Internet use and collect information on skills 
and use of circumvention tools, as well as perceived limitations and monitoring on 
Internet use. The survey was available online since November 2017, with most responses 
collected between the end of 2017 and the middle of 2018. The survey contributed 
quantitative measures that are later augmented with interviews as a sequential explanatory 
instrument to provide an adequate understanding of the relationship between artificial 
Internet limitations and tangible outcomes of Internet use, the core of this research. 
This section is arranged to first look at the survey in terms of structure and aims 
with an effort to limit any overlapping with the survey design as detailed in the 
methodology chapter. Then the section includes a series of descriptive statistics for the 
research sample and responses, including characteristics of responders, and responses to 
questions related to skills and usage of technologies associated with this research, 
particularly circumvention tools. The section then discusses the main correlations 
between the variables to establish findings to be used in the analysis of Chapter 6. 
5.2.1 Sample and characteristics of responders 
The survey, being open over the Internet to respondents from all over the world, 
received 756 responses in total, of which 536 responses from the countries of interest, 
Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore. Progress through the survey differed among countries, 
with 55 respondents from Bahrain dropping the questionnaire at the questions on 
perception of control and limitations in the second of the six-page questionnaire. The 
number of respondents dropping at this stage from Bahrain is significant when compared 
to the 17 from Estonia and the six from Singapore who dropped at the same stage. 
Responses that included answers beyond the second page are considered useful to the 
research as they provide insight into demographics and knowledge and use of 
circumvention tools, as well as the perception of artificial Internet limitations in the forms 
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of monitoring and control. Thus, the responses included in the analysis were the responses 
that went beyond the second page, with a total of 459 responses, 176 from Bahrain, 157 
from Estonia, and 126 from Singapore. Complete responses that answered all the 
questions up to the end of the survey were 361 in total, 120 from Bahrain, 137 from 
Estonia, and 104 from Singapore. 
According to interviews from Bahrain, an explanation for the high number of 
people dropping the survey at questions related to perception to limitations lies in that at 
that stage people get the feeling that the questionnaire is related to politics, particularly 
that questions asked whether people feel that the government does control or monitor 
access and use of the Internet. Politics is a highly dreaded subject in Bahrain, and it is 
conceivable that the fear of being framed as a dissident, even by participating in such 
survey, caused many people to leave the survey at that stage. 
Although the survey was available in the four main languages used in the 
countries of study, Arabic, English, Estonian, and Chinese, only two responders started 
the survey in Chinese, one from Singapore and the other one was surprisingly from 
Bahrain, possibly an expat living in Bahrain. Nonetheless, as expected, the English 
version was the version most used in Singapore, the Estonian in Estonia, and the Arabic 
in Bahrain. It is worth mentioning that, since the users had the possibility of switching 
language at any stage of the survey without disturbing their progress, it is imaginable that 
some users switched between language versions at any stage of the survey, but that 
change would not be recorded as only the start language is. 
For other indicators on the characteristics of the survey sample, the survey 
followed conventional demographic indicators, maintaining compliance with the DiSTO 
framework on which the survey consulted to measure tangible outcomes of Internet use 
as described in length in the Methodology chapter. The indicators comprised of the sex, 
age, level of education, and employment status. The sex indicator question responds to 
the sex variable in the reference framework but is named sex as it included only two 
options following the reference framework, with samples of Bahrain and Singapore 
consisting of around half male and half female, while, as shown in table 5-1, the Estonian 






Sex distribution for the sample from each of the research countries 
Sex Bahrain Estonia Singapore  Total 
Female 82 118 67 267 
Male 94 39 59 192 
Total 176 157 126 459 
 
Age distribution of the sample showed that half of the respondents from each of 
the countries is between 18 and 30 years old, while, as detailed in table 5-2, the sample 
from the age group of people over 61 years old ranged between almost 2% to 4% of the 
sample. Comparing these numbers with age distribution of the population over 18 years 
of age for all countries shows that in the age groups of 31-45 and 46-60 combined, the 
sample can be considered similar in representation of that of the population, with 54% to 
48% in Bahrain, 55% to 42% in Estonia, and 55% to 46% in Singapore11. The main 
variance of the sample comes from the age group over 61%, which can be related to 
recruitment of the sample and the fact that the population of the research is users of the 
Internet rather than the overall natural population of the country, which the population 
age distribution number available refer to. The age and sex distribution show a slight 
deficiency in the representation of this research, which should be mended in future work 
at a larger scale with better resources. 
Table 5-2 
Age distribution for natural population and sample from each of the research 
countries 
 Bahrain Estonia Singapore 
 Age Group Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
18-30 26.08% 50.00% 22.86% 55.41% 21.98% 50.40% 
31-45 30.64% 33.75% 30.27% 33.76% 29.27% 21.60% 
46-60 23.78% 14.38% 24.90% 8.28% 25.25% 24.00% 
Over 61 19.50% 1.88% 21.97% 2.55% 23.51% 4.00% 
 
11 Natural population distribution data from United Nations 
Statistics Division for the years 2018 and 2017: 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3a22  
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The questions for education and employment included several options to reflect 
most cases possible, as detailed in the survey design section of the methodology chapter. 
The options were grouped into three primary levels of education, and employment had 
six categories, in compliance with the analysis of the DiSTO survey used as a reference 
framework (Helsper, van Deursen and Eynon, 2015). In terms of education, the majority 
of respondents, 63%, fell in the High Education group, indicating that they have achieved 
education further than high school or equivalent, including college and university 
degrees. The following group in numbers was the Secondary Education group, with 
people who achieved high school or equivalent degree, with 33%. The third group, Low 
Education, which garnered less than 4% of responses, included people with any level of 
education that is less than high school or equivalent. For employment, 48% of the 
respondents across the countries are employed in full-time jobs, and 35% are students, 
while the distribution of the rest was unemployed 9%, retired 5%, and homemakers 2%. 
The results here show that the sample distribution was slightly biased towards people 
with higher education who either are employed or are students enrolled in full or part-
time education. 
Another aspect that was explored for having the potential to affect outcomes of 
Internet use is the number of years the person has been using the Internet for, as it reflects 
the possibility for increased skills in usage. Over the whole sample, less than 3% have 
been using the Internet for up to five years by the date they responded to the survey, while 
the majority, almost two-thirds of respondents, have between 10 and 20 years of Internet 
use experience as apparent in figure 5-1. The results show that since most of the 
respondents had more than 5 years of Internet use experience, it is expected that the level 
of use skills is adequate for people to be able to use the Internet at least at basic skills 
level. Previous research that counted for years of Internet experience as a predictor for 
use was not conclusive (Boulianne, 2009). However, its effect was measured for the 
sample and the results, as is shown later, has a positive effect with significant correlation 
on some of the tangible outcomes of Internet use. This substantiates including this aspect 
in this survey as being useful and helped in identifying an indicator that was not fully 







Years of Internet Use by Country 
 
In addition to Internet use experience, the survey did also include questions for a 
set of digital skills and use of tools and technologies, namely skills that would enable 
users to surf the Internet bypassing circumvention based on types of limitations that can 
be circumvented as mentioned in the literature review, particularly blocking and 
monitoring of access.  
These skills included the ability to access websites that are blocked, as well as 
ability to access websites and using the Internet without being caught through 
surveillance, the latter question was labelled as accessing a restricted website. Other skills 
included were skills related to communication, as with the ability to communicate 
securely and ability to encrypt communications, in addition to knowledge of file 
encrypting techniques to indicate a higher level of digital skills related to circumvention. 
The operationalisation of skills was counted for by asking about the use of circumvention 
tools, including the Tor browser and network, Proxies, and Virtual Private Networks 
(VPN), and communication tools that provide a level of encryption and has the potential 
to limit surveillance, such as Signal instant messenger and WhatsApp. Each question 
consisted of a question to check if the individual knows that tool, and the second is to 
check if the individual has used the tool in the past year, to measure the knowledge and 
use of these tools. 
Table 5-3 show the skills measured and percentage of respondents stating that 






































































website bypassing blockage and filtering, a similar percentage stated that they are able to 
communicate securely bypassing surveillance, showing that the sample from Bahrain has 
confidence in bypassing Internet limitations set in the form of blocking and surveillance. 
However, the majority, 88.4% of respondents, stated that they are not able to access 
websites bypassing surveillance.  
While in Estonia and Singapore, less than a third of respondents indicated the 
ability to access blocked websites, while the ability to communicate securely was at 75% 
of Estonian respondents, and 48% of Singaporean, indicating high levels across all 
countries of study to bypass limitation and thus limiting the effect of said limitations on 
the daily use of the Internet. The increased agency of Internet users surveyed to bypass 
limitations will receive further scrutiny from discussing its potential in sustaining 
opportunities for tangible outcomes of use across the countries studied. 
Table 5-3 
Skills reported by country of study 
Skill Bahrain Estonia Singapore Total 
Know how to access a blocked website 50.0% 33.1% 28.6% 38.3% 
Know how to access a restricted website 24.4% 21.0% 18.3% 21.6% 
Know how to communicate securely 56.8% 75.2% 48.4% 60.8% 
Know how to encrypt files 28.4% 49.7% 27.8% 35.5% 
Know how to encrypt communication 15.3% 33.1% 17.5% 22.0% 
Skill to bypass limitations (a) 52.3% 37.6% 31.7% 41.6% 
Notes: (a) calculated based on knowledge of how to access a blocked website and 
knowledge of how to access a restricted website. 
User’s agency and ability to bypass limitations is also reflected in the technologies 
known and used, with more than half of the respondents across the whole sample 
confirming that they know about proxies and VPNs. The later proved to be the most 
popular method used for bypassing Internet limitations, with 45% in Bahrain, 59% in 
Estonia, and 42% in Singapore, as evident in table 5-4. The percentage of people who 
have used at least one of the three circumvention tools covered in the past year was 
astonishing as well, with around half of the sample from Bahrain and Singapore, and 70% 
from Estonia. It is necessary to point out here that during the Interviews, B4 confirmed a 
tendency that requires attention, that many people in Bahrain do use circumvention tools 
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without realising what technology it is, as they know that they need to run a specific 
program, which in most cases sets up a VPN connection, before using the Internet. This 
would result in a potential increase in the number of people who are able to bypass 
limitations by using circumvention tools, even if it was transparent to them. 
Table 5-4 
Tools Known and Used by Country of Study 
Tool Aspect Bahrain Estonia Singapore Total 
Tor Know 9.7% 35.7% 17.5% 20.7% 
 
Use 4.0% 12.1% 5.6% 7.2% 
Proxy Know 49.4% 67.5% 53.2% 56.6% 
 
Use 23.3% 37.6% 20.6% 27.5% 
VPN Know 52.3% 76.4% 76.2% 67.1% 
 




Use 49.4% 70.7% 50% 56.9% 
Signal Know 25.0% 9.6% 16.7% 17.4% 
 
Use 10.2% 1.3% 5.6% 5.9% 
WhatsApp Know 96.6% 84.7% 98.4% 93.0% 
 
Use 96.0% 43.3% 98.4% 78.6% 
 
The argument for using circumvention tools in the countries studied do not only 
include bypassing Internet limitations, as technologies such as VPN is a standard for some 
companies for staff to connect from outside of the premises to access business services. 
However, the interviews revealed an exciting reason for using services and tools that 
bypass the local Internet, geo-blocking. Interviewees from Estonia and Bahrain, for 
instance, expressed that the use of circumvention tools, particularly VPN, is widespread 
because people wanted their Internet access to appear as if coming from countries other 
than where they are physically located, to gain access to online content that is not 
available there through geo-blocking.  
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Geo-blocking is territorially based access control, a practice of restricting access 
to online content based on the user's geographical location (Yu, 2019), Implemented by 
the content provider to either comply with sanctions or licensing and distribution 
agreements. Compliance with sanctions includes, for example, geo-blocking of finance 
and banking sites as a result of US economic sanctions with Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba 
(McDonald et al., 2018). Compliance with licensing and distribution agreements, 
traditionally copyright and licensing, is prominent in the entertainment industry and has 
been based on availability in geographical markets, or require delays on content 
availability (Earle, 2016; Riis and Schovsbo, 2016). Interviewees from Estonia, 
especially E1, cited Netflix as one of the key content providers which people in Estonia 
use VPN to access, this is understandable when looking at the limited content available 
in Estonia on the platform, which includes only 13.2% of movies and 15.4 of TV shows 
available to the USA market12. 
Interviewees B3 and B5 from Bahrain mentioned geo-blocking as a drive for using 
VPNs. However, interviews have also shown that this use is secondary to bypassing 
blocking and filtering of websites and limiting surveillance and monitoring. In Singapore, 
the interviewees cited limiting the ability of local authorities to monitor Internet use and 
activity as the main reason for using VPNs. The noticeable use of circumvention tools in 
each of the communities studied reflect the main local limitations affecting individual use 
of the Internet and the need for people to bypass it to access what they need with less fear 
of consequences. 
In terms of communication tools, the questionnaire asked about knowledge and 
use of two common communication tools that promise the possibility for secure 
communication bypassing surveillance and monitoring through end-to-end encryption. 
The tools are WhatsApp and Signal, which are based on mobile applications but can also 
be accessed from the desktop environment. These tools are prevalent in Bahrain and 
Singapore, with WhatsApp having almost ubiquitous use. In Estonia, just a little over 1% 
of the sample use Signal while 43% use WhatsApp. 
An important aspect that was measured as part of the questionnaire is the 
perception of limitation and control based on the party that implements or enforces it. The 
questions asked respondents if they feel that their school or work, ISP, or government 
controls what sites and services could they open, or monitors what they say or do online. 
 
12 Data based on lists available at https://finder.com  
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Responses varied considerably across the countries, as detailed in table 5-5. The 
difference in response derived from how many people feel their Internet use is either 
controlled or monitored, and what party is more likely to do that. 
Table 5-5 
Source of Control and Monitoring and Its Forms as Perceived in Countries of 
Study 
Source and Control Type Bahrain Estonia Singapore All 
School/Work Control 48.3% 17.2% 61.1%* 41.2% 
ISP Control 51.1% 29.9%* 49.2% 43.4% 
Government Control 76.1%* 16.6% 59.5% 51.2%* 
School/Work Monitoring 40.3% 20.4% 44.4% 34.6% 
ISP Monitoring 42.6% 37.6%* 31.7% 37.9% 
Government Monitoring 60.2%* 15.9% 49.2%* 42.0%* 
Any Control 84.7% 39.5% 80.2% 68.0% 
Any Monitoring 65.9% 47.1% 64.3% 59.0% 
Any Monitoring and Control 88.6% 56.7% 85.7% 76.9% 
All Monitoring and Control 18.8% 3.8% 11.9% 11.8% 
Note. '*' denotes the main source of monitoring or control in each of the countries 
and overall. 
In Bahrain, half of the sample said that they feel that their school or workplace 
limit what websites they can open, a similar percentage felt that their ISP does that, while 
a stunning 76% feel that the government is the party that limits and controls their Internet 
use. A similar pattern was apparent in the monitoring results, but with around 40% feel 
that their school or workplace does monitor their Internet use, 42% for the ISP, and 60% 
for the government. This shows that people in Bahrain feel that the Internet is more 
controlled than monitored, with 85% of the sample feel that at least one party is 
controlling their Internet access and 66% feel that some party is monitoring their Internet 
use. The pattern does not reflect a high level of suspicion, as only 19% said that all parties 
are controlling and monitoring their Internet use. The latest number is humble towards 
89%, saying that at least one party is either monitoring or controlling their Internet use. 
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The sample from Singapore found that their school or workplace lifted the burden 
of conducting the most of limitations of Internet access with 61% feeling so, followed 
narrowly by the government with 60% and then the ISP with 49%. However, the balance 
is shifted with monitoring, with the government blamed for most monitoring at 49% of 
the sample seeing so, with 44% seeing that the school or workplace does the monitoring, 
and 32% blame the ISP. Overall, 80% feel that Internet is being controlled by at least one 
party, 64% feeling the same for monitoring, and 86% felt that some party does either 
monitor or control their Internet use, thus feeling that their Internet use is not free, with 
12% of the sample stating that they feel all the parties do monitor and control their use. 
Estonia, on the other hand, displayed a different pattern and level of how many 
people feel their Internet being controlled or monitored with over 43% seeing that no 
party is either monitoring or controlling their Internet use, or that they have free and open 
Internet, compared to only 11% in Bahrain and 14% in Singapore. However, among the 
sample, the ISP was pointed out as the party that does most of the control or monitoring 
of Internet access, with 30% pointing at the ISP for control and 38% for monitoring.  
The government, on the other hand, had less blame at 17% and 16% respectively, 
reflecting higher trust in the government not to fetter with their Internet access. The 
number of people in the sample from Estonia that displayed a high level of suspicion was 
less than 4%, and those are who said that they feel that all parties are monitoring and 
controlling their access. 
This difference between the countries is in line with the findings of Study 1 on the 
levels and methods of artificial Internet limitations, where Estonia enjoyed an open and 
free Internet with very limited limitations set on access, with an environment that supports 
free speech and expression online and offline. While Bahrain, on the other hand, applies 
a high level of limitations combined with an environment that suppresses and penalise 
what deems inappropriate of online expression. Singapore was a similar situation but with 
lower technical or direct limitations and higher control on people’s attitude and practice 
online. 
For the research sample from all of the countries, the government was seen as the 
primary party that controls access to the Internet through limitations with 51% feels so, 
as well as being the primary party that monitors or conduct surveillance on Internet use 
with 42% expressing that. Three-quarters of the whole sample expressed that they feel 
that some party limits access to the Internet or monitors usage while only the last quarter 
feels that their access to the Internet is free from any control or monitoring. 
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A factor analysis was conducted on the variables of perceived monitoring and 
control of each party, namely School/Work Control, ISP Control, Government Control, 
School/Work Monitoring, ISP Monitoring, and Government Monitoring, to check if it is 
possible to deal with them as a one scale reflecting the overall perceived artificial Internet 
limitations of monitoring and control. The goal is to simplify the statistical analysis of 
relations with tangible outcomes of Internet use with no significant loss of correlation and 
change to the results and to explore the possibility of an indicator reflecting the overall 
perception of Internet limitation.  
The factor analysis using Principal Component Analysis resulted in a positive 
confirmation that these factors can be indeed dealt with as a single component, with one 
factor extracted, where they all had high significance with each other at 0.000 level, and 
the Principal Component Analysis extraction method resulted in one component, details 
of analysis included in Appendix III. As this component represents the overall perception 
of artificial Internet limitations in terms of monitoring and control, it is labelled 
Perception of Limitation in the analysis forward on and is the summation of the six scales 
of perception of monitoring and control. 
Another factor analysis was conducted on the variables of skills to bypass blocking 
and skills to bypass monitoring, to check if it is possible to deal with them as a one scale 
reflecting overall skills of bypassing artificial Internet limitations of monitoring and 
control, labelled Skill to Bypass Limitations. The goal is to simplify the statistical analysis 
of relations with tangible outcomes of Internet use when needed. The factor analysis 
resulted in a positive confirmation that these factors can be indeed dealt with as one 
component, where they all had high significance with each other at 0.000 level, and the 
Principal Component Analysis extraction method resulted with one component extracted, 
details of analysis included in Appendix III. As this component represents the overall 
skills for bypassing of artificial Internet limitations in terms of monitoring and control, it 
is labelled Skill to Bypass Limitations in the analysis later on and is the summation of the 
two scales of skills of bypassing monitoring and blocking. 
The questions on artificial Internet limitations in the form of monitoring and 
control provide a great outlook on how people perceive access to the Internet in terms of 
monitoring and control. In Bahrain and Singapore, the feeling that no one is controlling 
or monitoring their Internet access was not common, which is in line with the results from 
Study 1 described in the previous chapter. Which measured limitations and reviewed 
reports on practices connected to monitoring and control of Internet use to conclude the 
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existence of an environment that supports controlling Internet access and conduct 
surveillance and monitoring of access as part of more extensive policies to control 
individuals and perpetuate a chilling effect on Internet use and promoting self-censorship. 
In Estonia, the results are also aligned with previous findings to advise that even though 
access controls are present as part of the regulatory framework, particularly for remote 
gambling websites, the environment around Internet use is not affected with such self-
censorship.  
Around 43% of respondents from Estonia stated that they feel no party is fettering 
with their Internet access, and thus having free and open access, demonstrating the 
possibility for content regulation to exist without necessarily producing a chilling effect 
on Internet use in general. This supports the hypothesis that perception of monitoring and 
control is used as a tactic to control and limit online expression and thus affecting Internet 
use through promoting self-censorship. 
The results also support the conclusion that much of the circumvention use, 
especially in Bahrain and Singapore, is to bypass Internet limitations and to limit exposing 
Internet use to surveillance giving Internet users the feeling that their access to the Internet 
is free from these measures, allowing for a higher potential of use and, in turn, tangible 
outcomes of Internet use. Nonetheless, this assumption requires further investigation that 
can be provided by correlating perceived monitoring and control with skills related to 
circumvention, knowledge of circumvention tools, and use of said tools. Table 5-6 shows 
the results of bivariate correlation for this purpose, represented by the vector of 
correlation, or value and direction, with significant correlations marked. 
Table 5-6 
Correlation Effect Size between Skills and Tools Known and Used and Perception 
of Limitations 
  Control Perception Monitoring Perception 
  School/Work ISP Gov. School/Work ISP Gov. 













.162** 0.064 .114* .154** 
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-0.025 -0.015 0.048 -0.012 




-0.031 0.043 0.058 0.032 
Know - encrypt 
communication 
-0.006 0.013 -0.018 0.066 0.073 0.027 
Know Tor 0.010 0.041 -0.039 0.058 0.089 0.001 
Know Signal .117* 0.085 .092* 0.052 0.067 .179** 
Know Proxy 0.035 .118* 0.034 0.036 .131*
* 
0.042 
Know VPN 0.068 0.070 0.012 0.042 0.088 0.033 
Know WhatsApp 0.073 0.015 .126** -0.016 -0.051 0.077 
Use Tor 0.024 .097* 0.002 0.028 .113* 0.019 
Use Signal 0.017 0.043 0.077 .110* .110* .125** 
Use Proxy 0.051 0.053 -0.025 0.034 0.083 0.020 
Use VPN 0.016 0.061 -0.006 -0.005 .145*
* 
0.025 
Use WhatsApp .295** .166*
* 
.332** .133** -0.009 .218** 
Note. '**' denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * denotes 
correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The results in Table 5-6 show a clear correlation between knowing how to access 
blocked websites and perception of monitoring and control from any of the parties 
involved, with a highly significant relation, except for School or workplace monitoring, 
which is still significant but not as much as the others. A similar relation exists between 
knowing how to access websites bypassing monitoring, or without being caught by 
surveillance, except that the relation with perceiving monitoring at school or workplace 
is not significant. No significant relations were present between skills of knowing how to 
communicate securely, how to encrypt files, or how to encrypt communication and 
perceived monitoring and control. 
 This result supports the argument that the people who feel that their Internet 
access is being limited or controlled, would have an incentive to learn how to bypass any 
blocking or monitoring in order to access the Internet more freely, no matter of what 
community they are in. The result also reinforces the assumption that the use of 
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circumvention tools is motivated by a want to access the Internet with no limitations, 
whether politically motivated or as part of geo-blocking. This assumption was tested in 
the interviews with several interviewees confirming this motivation, as in the interviews 
with B1, B2, B3, B4 from Bahrain, E1 and E3 from Estonia, and S1 and S2 from 
Singapore. 
It is critical to mention here that the circumvention tools are not a silver bullet 
aimed at all types and forms of artificial Internet limitations and many are in fact 
themselves blocked and cannot be used in some locations. Circumvention tools studied 
have the potential to bypass the types of limitations that are added on top of rather open 
Internet access, as with content and website blocking and filtering, thus deemed artificial, 
and utilises the ability to access other websites or other routes to bypass these limitations. 
They also have the potential to control the exposure of usage on the immediate networks, 
including work or school, ISP, or at a governmental level, but do not help with tracking 
that is based on platform, as with Facebook’s tracking of users’ activities through cookies. 
A practical example on the second problem of blocking access to circumvention tools is 
included in Study 1 where the blocking of the TOR network in Bahrain and the blocking 
of the default settings of the same network in Singapore have affected the research and 
OONI measurements by forcing the reliance on anomaly analysis rather than confirmed 
status of blocking. 
In terms of knowledge and use of tools that offer the potential for more secure 
communication, here, the security-oriented application Signal and the more common 
WhatsApp. The results show that perception of government control is related to 
knowledge of Signal and WhatsApp but not to the use of any, while the perception of 
government monitoring is related to knowledge and use of Signal. As well, the perception 
of ISP control or monitoring is connected to knowledge of Proxy tools and Tor, while 
VPN use was only related to the perception of ISP monitoring. Users of Signal had a 
higher tendency to feel monitored by any of the parties.  
These results indicate that different people have different approaches and use 
different tools for circumvention, and no one tool is preferred, except WhatsApp. 
WhatsApp correlation results show that is connected with almost all aspect of control or 
monitoring perception, but nonetheless, we cannot deduce causality here because 
WhatsApp was the tool most commonly used across the entire sample by far. Unlike 
Signal, security and privacy are not the main features of WhatsApp, and it is possible that 
people are using it for its other affordances or because of the network effect. 
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5.2.2 Tangible outcomes of Internet use: achievement and satisfaction 
The target measurements of the study are the tangible outcomes of Internet use, 
as defined and described in the literature review to be the opportunities people are gaining 
as a result of Internet use to enhance their lives. The tangible outcomes are measured 
based on the methods detailed in the Methodology chapter, through a survey that is 
informed by the DiSTO framework, and a series of sequential explanatory interview. Four 
pages of the survey were dedicated to questions aimed at measuring outcomes in the fields 
of Economy, Culture, Social Activity, and Personal Development. 
Each of the fields, as described earlier, is measured in two dimensions, 
Achievement and Satisfaction. The achievement dimension aims at measuring the 
achievements in activities the individuals are gaining through the internet in comparison 
for conducting the same activities offline. The satisfaction dimension measures how 
individuals feel satisfied with using the Internet for activities, in comparison with 
satisfaction from conducting the same activities offline as well. The combined results of 
each of the questions produce the achievement and satisfaction for the first level of 
aggregation as described in the Methodology chapter to include Economic Achievement 
and Satisfaction in terms of Property, Income, and Education/Employment, Cultural 
Achievement and Satisfaction in terms of Cultural Identity and Cultural Belonging, 
Social Achievement and Satisfaction in terms of Personal, Formal, and Political, and 
Personal Achievement and Satisfaction in terms of Health, Self Actualisation, and 
Leisure.  
The mean results of responses for questions of each field have also been used to 
generate the overall levels, or second level of aggregation of achievement and satisfaction 
for each of the fields. Table 5-7 show a list of means of the aggregate and sub-fields, or 
the first level of aggregation, of tangible outcomes of Internet use by country, and by 
Bahrain and Singapore as one group of countries with high limitations as found in Study 
1, and the whole sample. The means show similar trends across the countries and sample, 
contributing to the validity of comparison among countries, as well as the possibility to 







Means of Results of Aggregate Fields and Sub-Fields of Tangible Outcomes of 
Internet Use by Country 




Economic Achievement 3.79 3.69 3.63 3.72 3.71 
 -- Property 3.57 3.61 3.6 3.59 3.59 
 -- Income 3.3 3.22 3.23 3.27 3.25 
 -- Education / 
Employment 
4.07 3.95 3.84 3.97 3.96 
Economic Satisfaction 4.04 4.4 4.18 4.1 4.21 
 -- Property 4.06 4.49 4.25 4.15 4.29 
 -- Income 4.12 4.56 4.3 4.2 4.35 
 -- Education / 
Employment 
4.01 4.29 4.05 4.03 4.12 
Cultural Achievement 3.83 3.35 3.58 3.72 3.58 
 -- Identity 3.77 3.47 3.59 3.69 3.61 
 -- Belonging 3.89 3.17 3.58 3.75 3.55 
Cultural Satisfaction 3.56 3.79 3.52 3.54 3.63 
 -- Identity 3.46 3.64 3.51 3.48 3.53 
 -- Belonging 3.7 3.78 3.53 3.62 3.68 
Social Achievement 3.78 3.32 3.39 3.6 3.49 
 -- Personal 3.92 3.2 3.46 3.7 3.51 
 -- Formal 3.8 3.36 3.21 3.5 3.44 
 -- Political 3.46 3.65 3.38 3.42 3.51 
Social Satisfaction 4.16 4.19 3.87 4.03 4.09 
 -- Personal 4.34 4.17 3.99 4.17 4.17 
 -- Formal 3.96 4.02 3.55 3.73 3.85 
 -- Political 3.91 4.39 3.88 3.89 4.09 
Personal Achievement 4.21 4.2 4.13 4.17 4.19 
 -- Health 4.09 4.07 3.97 4.03 4.04 
 -- Self Actualisation 4.31 4.49 4.38 4.34 4.4 
 -- Leisure 4.2 4.1 4.06 4.14 4.12 
Personal Satisfaction 4.04 4.11 4 4.02 4.06 
 -- Health 3.88 4.04 3.79 3.84 3.91 
 -- Self Actualisation 4.13 4.29 4.15 4.14 4.2 
 -- Leisure 4.05 4.01 4.04 4.05 4.04 
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Survey questions on outcomes of Internet use were answered on a five-point 
Likert scale, with 3 set as neutral, 4 and 5 meaning that the person did achieve the activity 
in question online better than offline, for the achievement questions, and satisfied with 
the online affordances for doing the activity asked about in satisfaction questions. While 
points 1 and 2 meant the opposite, with the respondent finding that doing the activity 
offline helps them achieve better results than online and that they are not satisfied by the 
related online affordances. For the aggregates, the threshold was to have results over 3.5 
to indicate positive response, results under 2.5 to indicate a negative response, and 
anything in between as neutral, in compliance with the reference framework project report 
(Helsper, van Deursen and Eynon, 2015). 
In terms of aggregates at the field level, higher levels of satisfaction and 
achievement were contested between Bahrain and Estonia, with Bahrain leading in level 
of achievement and Estonia leading in satisfaction of all the four fields. The field with 
the overall highest levels of both achievement and satisfaction across the sample is the 
Personal Development field, as shown in figure 5-2. The results show that the level of 
achievement and satisfaction of using the Internet is indeed positive with all of the fields 
having results of over 3.5. The Social Achievement field had a rounded mean of 3.5, 
barely on the positive side, meaning that although individuals feel that the Internet 
provided affordances and opportunities to achieve better outcomes in life in all aspects, 
respondents did not feel that the Internet did enhance or advance their personal, formal, 
and political social activities as much as with other fields. 
Figure 5-2 
Tangible Outcomes of Internet Use Mean per Field and Country 
 









Sample Mean Singapore Mean Estonia Mean Bahrain Mean
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A closer look at the perceived achievement and satisfaction in terms of tangible 
outcomes of Internet use by country, as represented in figure 5-3 show again how 
respondents in all of the countries, over all of the fields, feel that the Internet did 
contribute positively to their tangible activities, with very little polarisation between 
positive and negative. In other words, not many people disagreed that the Internet helped 
them achieve better in their lives, while some were neutral, and the majority agreeing on 
the proposition. Respondents from Bahrain had views that are more positive when it 
comes to achievement, while respondents from Estonia showed higher satisfaction, and 
Singapore sitting in between in all of the fields, the findings were discussed in the 
interviews as will be explained in the section on interviews. 
Figure 5-3 
Expression of Tangible Outcome of Internet Use by Field and Country 
 
The variance between achievement and satisfaction across countries reflects 
general contentment in services available and ability to use them in Estonia, while in 
Bahrain there is higher discontentment but at the same time, indicating that they still 
achieve more using the Internet than through offline methods in different activities. When 
crossing this with the perception of Internet freedom discussed earlier, we can see that 
there is a negative relation between perception of monitoring and control of Internet 
access and satisfaction with Internet use outcomes.  
Respondents in Estonia showed low level of perceived monitoring and control 
from any party at 57%, table 5-5, with overall satisfaction at 4.14, while Bahrain and 


























































































































































































89% and 86% and overall satisfaction levels at 3.94 and 3.92 respectively as clear in table 
5-8. Nonetheless, achievement is different, and does not follow the same pattern with 
respondents from Bahrain and Singapore indicating better achievements using the 
Internet than Estonia. 
Table 5-8 
Overall Achievement and Overall Satisfaction by Country 
 
Overall Achievement Overall Satisfaction 
Bahrain 3.87 3.94 
Estonia 3.61 4.14 
Singapore 3.68 3.92 
 
A helpful method to look at the reason for the variance in patterns of achievement 
between the respondents would be to look at the whole sample as one community and 
study the different predictors that contribute to the variance. This method is compatible 
with the transformative-emancipatory perspective this research is influenced by, as 
detailed in the methodology chapter. One of the main predictors that affect the agency of 
people to evade discontent of Internet openness and perception of monitoring and control 
as advised by the interviews is the ability to bypass blocking and escape immediate 
network monitoring.  
The achievement and satisfaction levels of as reported by respondents in 
connection with self-assessed ability to circumvent blocking and access blocked websites 
is shown in figure 5-4, and with ability to bypass monitoring is shown in figure 5-5, across 
the four fields of tangible outcomes, each as achievement and satisfaction. To 
demonstrate self-efficacy in dealing with situations related to blocking and monitoring, 









Tangible Outcomes by Field and Ability to Access Blocked Websites 
 
The figure shows that people who expressed that they can access blocked websites 
have indeed higher levels of achievement and satisfaction across all of the fields of 
tangible outcomes of Internet use studied. Showing, with no doubt, that even if you were 
discontent with your Internet access because of perception of monitoring and control you 
can still reap the benefits of the Internet to achieve better in activities and be more 
satisfied if you had the agency to bypass said artificial limitations on Internet access. This 
discontent is not related to the quality of access. The only field where respondents with 
the skill to bypass monitoring and people without that skill scored closely was the Social 
Satisfaction, with less than 1% difference, this field will receive further scrutiny to 
understand this later in this research. 
Figure 5-5 

















































































































































































































































































































































































Cannot Bypass Monitoring Can Bypass Monitoring
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 People who expressed that they know how to access blocked websites were less 
likely to be neutral in aspects of achievement and satisfaction, except for the Social 
Achievement field, as shown in figure 5-4. A similar result is found through the 
comparison between the overall tangible outcomes and the skill to bypass monitoring, 
except that here the fields that this relation does not apply are the social achievement and 
the social satisfaction fields. This finding and the previous one on the closeness in results 
in the field of social satisfaction and skill to bypass monitoring further indicate the 
uniqueness of the social aspects when compared to other tangible outcomes of Internet 
use. This status of the satisfaction field receives further investigation when looking at 
predictors of each field in details. 
A valid argument would be to look at skills to bypass Internet limitations as part 
of the overall higher digital skills, and thus the people with those skills may report higher 
achievement as a result of higher general ability to perform the activities in question, and 
not only because of the specific ability to bypass Internet limitations. To factor for this 
argument in an effort to isolate the effect of this particular set of skills, the research 
included indicators on the actual use of the skills to bypass Internet limitations. The actual 
use, or operationalisation, of the skills to bypassing artificial Internet limitations of 
monitoring and control can be understood through a look at the use of circumvention 
tools. As the purpose of these tools is to provide relief from artificial Internet limitations 
set on the local network by shifting the access to appear as if coming from location 
different to that of the user. 
The survey included questions on whether the respondent is using any of the three 
main technologies for circumvention, Tor Network, Virtual Private Networks, and 
Proxies, these tools serve the similar goal of escaping immediate network but through 
different technical means. A new scale was created combining the responses to the three 
questions to indicate whether the respondent has used any of these tools in the past year. 
This scale was later mapped to perceived levels of achievement and satisfaction with the 
results illustrated in figure 5-6 to get an idea on the difference in satisfaction and 
achievement in tangible outcomes of Internet use because of using, or not using, 
circumvention tools. 
A further proof to support the suggestion that the use of circumvention tools is the 
operationalisation of skills of bypassing artificial Internet limitations of monitoring and 
control lies in the manner of connection between the use of circumvention tools and the 
fields of achievement and satisfaction of Economy, Cultural, and Personal, and the Social 
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Satisfaction. The manner of the connection is similar to that of skills to bypass limitations, 
showing yet again the role played by opportunities to achieve offered by the ability to 
bypass limitation.  
Figure 5-6 
Tangible Outcomes by Field and Use of Circumvention Tools 
 
In short, respondents that use circumvention tools found that they are able to 
achieve more and be more satisfied with activities in these fields through the Internet 
when compared to the offline world alone. The same people indicated that they are able 
to achieve slightly less in the Social field using the Internet compared to doing these 
activities offline, in an indication to a possible side effect of the escapism affordance 
provided by the use of circumvention tools, or the existence of other predictors to explain 
this behaviour. The different predictors of each of the tangible outcomes of Internet use 
are detailed next with statistical correlation and regression to indicate significance and 
magnitude to explain the results of the research better. 
5.2.3 Predictors of tangible outcomes of Internet use 
Questions on classical predictors for tangible outcomes of Internet use as advised 
by the literature review were covered in the survey to fortify the previous analysis on 
relations between agency for bypassing artificial Internet limitations and tangible 
outcomes of Internet use, namely age, sex, years of Internet use, education level, and 
employment status. This section looks at predictors of the fields at the highest level of 
aggregation for achievement and satisfaction of each. The predictors include the classical 
predictors and predictors related to artificial Internet limitations in terms of perception, 
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and control, to achieve a rigorous understanding of what affects tangible outcomes of 
Internet use and at what scale. 
Another hypothesis tested in the following analysis is the role of skills of 
bypassing limitations, as invited by perception of limitation, in minimising the effect of 
artificial limitations on tangible outcomes of Internet use as characterised by higher levels 
of achievement and satisfaction in the fields of outcomes tested. These relations are tested 
through mediator analysis when correlation circumstances allow that, as this analysis 
require each of the predictors to have a significant correlation with the dependent variable. 
When needed, analysis at sub-field levels is also included in determining specific tangible 
outcomes and the predictors of it to point out relations as a more detailed level, where 
there is significant difference between the correlations at the field and the sub-field levels 
to account for behaviours that may not be harmonized with other sub-fields of the same 
field. 
Testing the measured scales for goodness of the data for correlation through 
testing for normality and asymmetry was conducted by calculating skewness and kurtosis 
values for the field scales, and comparing the values to what was advised by Westfall and 
Henning    (2013). Westfall and Henning advised that where absolute values of skewness 
higher than two indicate that the variable is asymmetric, and values of kurtosis greater 
than or equal to three indicate that the variable’s distribution is different from a normal 
distribution, with a tendency to have outliers.  
Table 5-9 
Summary Statistics for Aggregate Tangible Outcomes of Internet Use Variables 








Economic Achievement 418 1.00 5.00 3.71 0.74 -0.54 0.46 
Economic Satisfaction 415 1.00 5.00 4.21 0.63 -1.25 3.15* 
Cultural Achievement 355 1.00 5.00 3.58 0.86 -0.65 0.46 
Cultural Satisfaction 340 1.00 5.00 3.63 0.80 -0.40 0.83 
Social Achievement 361 1.00 5.00 3.49 0.84 -0.37 0.03 
Social Satisfaction 364 1.00 5.00 4.09 0.66 -0.65 0.79 
Personal Achievement 362 1.00 5.00 4.19 0.61 -1.03 2.05 
Personal Satisfaction 359 1.00 5.00 4.06 0.57 -0.85 2.53 
Note. '*' denotes the variable kurtosis value reflects a tendency for distribution 
different from normal. 
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The results of the skewness and kurtosis analysis for the Internet use outcomes 
fields are summarised in table 5-9, showing that all the variables fulfil the skewness 
requirement displaying symmetry, and all but the Economic Satisfaction have kurtosis 
values that indicate normality in distribution, enabling the move forward with the 
correlation analysis with confidence in the data collected. A similar analysis was 
conducted at the first level of aggregates of the tangible outcomes of Internet use, and 
displayed similar results, with the Economic Satisfaction Aggregate in terms of Property 
as the only variable displaying kurtosis values that indicate an abnormality in distribution, 
details on the results of the statistical analysis are listed in appendix III. 
Nonetheless, since the kurtosis values for Economic Satisfaction was not far from 
the threshold of three, sitting at 3.15, the correlation was conducted but using Spearman’s 
correlation method to counter for that, since no direct comparison is conducted between 
the factor values, this does not pose problems in the analysis afterwards. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient offers an improvement in statistical power over other methods, and 
thus was chosen for correlation analysis, except for Economic Satisfaction which utilised 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient as it is not as sensitive as Pearson’s to excess kurtosis, 
mainly that the variables are continuous scales (Chok, 2010). 
Following the testing of validity of data for correlational analysis, each of the 
fields is analysed to test the independent variables that act as determinants for the 
achievement and satisfaction of each field, to answer the research questions by testing the 
effect size and significance does variables related to Internet limitations have on tangible 
outcomes of Internet use. The results are detailed in the following sections, with overall 
analysis to follow in the analysis chapter. 
5.2.3.1 Economic field 
Tangible outcomes of the economic field include the achievement and satisfaction 
the person attain as a result of the affordances and opportunities provided by the Internet 
in relation to economic activities. The activities, as detailed in the methodology chapter, 
are the dimensions of achievement and satisfaction in relation to property, income, and 
education or employment. These fields measure whether people were able to have better 
opportunities in achieving better outcomes because of the Internet use compared to 
opportunities available offline only, and the level satisfaction perceived as a result of 
using the Internet for each of these activities. 
To answer the part of the research question on the relation of Internet limitations 
and tangible outcomes of Internet use, the effect of determinants of Economic component 
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of the tangible outcomes was studied by conducting Pearson statistical correlation 
coefficient analysis of survey responses to predictors related to economic achievement 
and satisfaction to measure the effect of these determinants. The predictors included the 
set of classical of Age, Years of Internet Use, Sex, Education Level, Employment Group, 
while the research determinants tested included Perception of Limitation, Skills to Bypass 
Limitations, and Use of Circumvention Tools. These sets of predictors make use of the 
discussion in the literature review, and the design in the methodology chapter, in 
compliance with the reference framework. 
 The results, presented in table 5-10, indicates the existence of a significant 
correlation between a set of classical and research predictors and economic achievement 
and satisfaction fields as dependent variables. The independent variables in this analysis 
include the classical predictors of age, number of years of Internet use, sex, education 
group, and employment group, as advised by the literature review. While the research 
predictors include perception of limitation, skill to bypass limitations as a composite scale 
of skills to bypass blocking and monitoring, and the use of circumvention tools as a 
composite scale of using different tools, as advised by the analysis earlier in this chapter 
and the interviews. 
The field of economic achievement across the research sample was correlated to 
skills to bypass limitations, use of circumvention tools, age, sex, and perception of 
limitation, ranked by order of effect size. Skills to bypass limitations had very high 
significant correlation at 0.000 level, while the rest had a statistically significant 
correlation at 0.05 level or less. This mixture of classical and research predictors is 
expected to be the case with most of the fields, as it is unrealistic only to have one or two 
predictors to have a high effect on a general field like the economic achievement. 
Table 5-10 
Classical and Research Predictors Effect on Economic Achievement and 
Satisfaction in the Sample and in Sample from Countries with High Level of Limitations 









Age -.120* 0.062 -0.076 0.053 
Years of Internet Use 0.003 .167** -0.006 .124* 
Sex .108* -0.085 .147* -0.021 
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 Whole Sample High Limitation Countries 
Education Level Group -0.002 0.063 -0.052 0.060 
Employment Group 0.002 -.112* 0.063 -0.097 
Perception of Limitation .101* -.141** .194** 0.015 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .259** -0.014 .238** 0.066 
Use of Circ. Tools .187** .135** .159** 0.104 
Note. '**' denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), '*' denotes 
correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ⁂ Correlation calculated using Spearman’s 
method rather than Pearson’s 
The direction of influence of the age was the only one going in the negative 
direction, indicating that the younger the person is, the higher the potential for them to 
achieve and report better economic achievement. The other predictor showed that the 
higher the skills a person have in bypassing both of the artificial Internet limitations 
tested, monitoring and control, as measured by the composite scale skills to bypass 
limitations, the higher perception of limitation, if they use circumvention tools, and 
identify as males, then they have higher probability for accessing potential to achieve and 
report better economic achievement. 
The behaviour and effect of the classical predictors is compatible with that of 
previous research as advised by the literature review section on predictors. For the 
research determinants, or predictors, of tangible outcomes of Internet use, the skills to 
bypass artificial Internet limitations had the highest effect of economic achievement with 
the very high significance of the correlation, higher than that of perception of limitation. 
This place a signpost to the assumption described earlier of the skills to bypassing 
limitations being part of the overall digital skills, and thus may not reflect the exact effect 
of limitations on tangible outcomes of Internet use. Although this assumption is valid at 
face value, the action of utilising the skills through use of circumvention tools explains 
better how having the skills, by itself, is not enough to reap the benefits of the open 
Internet, but acting upon it when limitations are perceived is needed.  
When placing the skills aside to eliminate the effect of overall digital skills, and 
analyse economic achievement as a dependent variable through regression with use of 
circumvention tools and perception of limitation as independent variables, the result 
shows that the model is highly significant at 0.000 level. The results suggest that the 
model of higher perception of limitation coupled with the use of circumvention tools is 
indeed significant in determining the tangible outcomes of economic achievement, 
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supporting the argument that individuals that are less affected by artificial Internet 
limitations are less exposed to digital inequalities in terms of economic achievement. 
A look at the same correlations of table 5-10 for the countries that have high levels 
of artificial Internet limitations of monitoring and control as concluded in Study 1, 
Bahrain and Singapore, show little change in the predictors presented by the age factor 
losing it significance leaving sex as the only classical predictor relevant to economic 
achievement for the sample. Perception of limitation moved to the second significant 
predictor after skill to bypass limitations with higher significance that that with the whole 
sample. The change can be explained by that in the countries with higher limitations, 
being conscious about the limitations help the individual achieve better economic 
outcomes by factoring for the Internet limitations and adjusting their behaviour, possibly 
through the use of circumvention tools, which proved to have a significant effect within 
the countries with high limitations. 
The data for the Economic Satisfaction, on the other hand, displayed kurtosis 
value of slightly higher than three (3.15), which reflect a tendency towards abnormality 
in distribution, and thus the correlation coefficient was calculated using Spearman’s 
method as justified earlier. The correlation here showed that the determinants for 
Economic Satisfaction of the sample across all countries studied included years of 
Internet use as the primary determinant, followed by the perception of limitation, use of 
circumvention tools, and finally the employment status, in order of importance of effect 
as shown in table 5-10. The direction of effect shows a clear image of the way the 
dependant variables are affecting the level of satisfaction people have with Internet 
affordances related to Economic activities. The data show that the more experience of 
using the Internet a person has and the higher use of circumvention tools are correlated 
with higher satisfaction, while the more limitations on the Internet access people perceive 
the less they are satisfied with their Economic activities online. 
Economic satisfaction relation with Internet Limitations seems to be direct, with 
knowing that there are limitations set on Internet use lowers the satisfaction of Internet 
affordances related to economy, with the effect size putting the perception of limitation 
as being the second important factor after years of Internet experience. This reflects that 
the chilling effect of Internet limitations perceived, even if not applying to economic 
websites and services still have its toll on satisfaction. While the actual use of 
circumvention tools, rather than the skill of bypassing limitations, have a positive effect 
on satisfaction in this field with effect size just below that of perception of limitation, 
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suggesting that people who use circumvention tools possibly feel as if they have higher 
agency and thus higher satisfaction. 
The economic satisfaction in countries with high limitations, Bahrain and 
Singapore, however, does not reflect the same behaviour as the whole sample, with all of 
the research determinants losing their correlation significance, leaving only the variable 
of years of Internet experience as the determinant with significant correlation, but with 
less effect size than what it had with the overall sample. This finding suggests that it is 
not easy to predict economic satisfaction in countries with a high level of limitations. 
Nonetheless, interviews in these countries showed that people indeed do use the Internet 
affordances in the economic field, with considerable local influence and services 
available, however, the overall lack of trust people have with the Internet for not being 
fettered with or their activity monitored, further complicates the relation. 
The overall satisfaction for the economic field and its sub-fields is high over all 
the countries, with a mean of 4.21 across the whole sample, as displayed in table 5-10, 
with people in countries with high limitations displaying slightly less satisfaction, at 4.1. 
While in economic achievement, the overall sample was less positive, with a neutral 
perspective for using Internet affordances for increasing income opportunities. Countries 
with high limitations displayed higher achievement in the economic field and its sub-
fields, resulting in a view that people in these countries achieve more, but are less satisfied 
with the Internet affordances and access they have. This can be connected to the 
difference in how people in these countries think of their Internet access, where less than 
a quarter of the sample of these countries showed that they do not feel any party is 
monitoring or controlling their Internet access, as mentioned earlier. 
For sub-fields of the economic fields, which include economic achievement and 
satisfaction in relation to property, income, and education or employment, had 
correlations that are summed up in the top-level field of economic achievement and 
satisfaction, but separately had slightly different predictors. The three sub-fields of 
Economic achievement among the whole sample showed a significant positive 
correlation with skills to bypass limitations and use of circumvention tools among the 
research predictors, details on the statistical analysis data included in Appendix III. In 
countries of high limitations, the three sub-fields are correlated with skills to bypass 
limitations, but only economic achievement in terms of activities related to property is 
connected to use of circumvention tools.  
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The comparison between factors that affect economic achievement and economic 
satisfaction shows a clear correlation between skills to bypass limitations and the 
operationalisation of it by using circumvention tools as a result of the perception of 
limitation on one side, and economic achievement regardless of location on the other. 
Satisfaction predictors varied between the overall sample and the countries with high 
limitations, where the prediction of economic satisfaction in the countries with high 
limitations was not possible using any of the research determinants, reflecting non-
conformity in the relation between achievement and satisfaction. With some people able 
to achieve and be satisfied, and others able to achieve but, at the same time, are not 
satisfied with the Internet as a platform for economic activities, in what seems to be a 
result of perception of artificial Internet limitations. 
5.2.3.2 Cultural field 
The second field of tangible outcomes of Internet use tested in this research is the 
cultural field, including the achievement and satisfaction the person attains as a result of 
the affordances and opportunities provided by the Internet in relation to cultural activities. 
The activities, as detailed in the methodology chapter, are the dimensions of achievement 
and satisfaction in relation to identity and belonging. These fields measure whether 
people were able to have better opportunities in achieving better outcomes because of the 
Internet use compared to opportunities available offline only, and the level satisfaction 
perceived as a result of using the Internet for each of these activities. 
The set of classical and research determinants and their correlation with 
achievement and satisfaction of the cultural field were tested through Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient analysis, same as with the analysis of the other fields. The 
correlations help in understanding the potential effect of the predictor on the variables 
being measured, here the cultural achievement and satisfaction and their sub-fields. The 
correlation does not indicate causation but nonetheless produce a good idea on the 
opportunities change in a predictor have in influencing the achievement and satisfaction 
and thus produce a good idea on the relation between the predictors and inequalities 
among communities. The following discussion looks at the fields and sub-fields and the 
predictors with significant correlations to them. 
Cultural Achievement, the ability to achieve better online in activities related to 
identity and belonging, showed six of the eight independent variables tested as having a 
significant correlation with the dependent variable. Ordered by the rank of effect size, the 
determinants are Perception of Limitation followed by Age, then the three variables 
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Education Level, Skills to Bypass Limitations, and Years of Internet Use with close effect 
size, and finally Employment Group. Perception of Limitation, the determinants with the 
largest effect size on cultural achievement activities, had a very high significant 
correlation at less than 0.01 level, as in table 5-11, showing how people who are aware 
of the existence of artificial limitations on their Internet access have better chances to 
enrich their identity and find themselves belonging to closer groups. This was true for the 
whole sample, as well as the sample from countries with high limitations, suggesting no 
much difference in cultural achievement across different countries of the study. 
Table 5-11 
Classical and Research Predictors Effect on Cultural Achievement and 
Satisfaction in the Sample and in Sample from Countries with High Level of Limitations 









Age -.223** -0.084 -.251** -0.005 
Years of Internet Use -.165** -0.013 -.143* 0.004 
Sex -0.043 -0.080 -0.096 0.020 
Education Level Group -.169** -0.067 -.195** -0.049 
Employment Group .151** 0.008 .171* -0.079 
Perception of Limitation .278** -0.052 .245** 0.100 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .165** 0.044 .152* 0.075 
Use of Circumvention 
Tools 
0.084 .119* 0.047 0.055 
Note. '**' denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), '*' denotes 
correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The skills to bypass limitations have a significant relation as well, although with 
smaller effect size, nonetheless, the interesting factor here is the use of circumvention 
tools, which did not display correlation with cultural achievement correlates at levels 
higher than 0.05m with standard effect size. Showing that operationalising the skills to 
bypass limitations and perception of the limitation is not required to have better 
opportunities for achieving in the cultural field, reflecting that artificial Internet 
limitations as observed in the countries of study may not have a significant effect on 
achievement.  
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However, at the same time, the use of circumvention tools was the only 
determinant tested that showed a significant correlation to cultural satisfaction across the 
whole sample, while no variables showed any correlation to the cultural satisfaction in 
countries with high artificial Internet limitations, as apparent in Table 5-11. Cultural 
satisfaction as measured covers how people feel satisfied with affordances provided by 
the Internet to allow people to explore their identities, including religious and ethnic, 
better, and to connect with people from similar age group or people that share religious 
believes online.  
The results for the satisfaction of Internet affordances for this field may be 
different from other fields as it is strongly reliant over cultural differences across the 
countries of study, unlike other fields, which utilises a layer of identity that is more 
common with wider spread uses of the Internet, from economic to social. This note is 
valid for cultural satisfaction but does not necessarily apply for cultural achievement, 
which showed similar behaviour across the sample and the countries with high 
limitations. 
A more granulated look at cultural field activities and how its achievement and 
satisfaction measures contrast across the countries and communities of the study shows a 
slightly different view, with the statistical analysis data included in Appendix III. 
Observing the two activities that comprise the cultural field, identity and belonging, we 
find that the achievement in identity-related activities, including the ability to find 
information about sexual and ethnic groups identity, is correlated with the same variables 
as the overall cultural achievement, in addition to use of circumvention tools. While 
achievement in cultural belonging, measuring how people are able to find and connect 
with people of similar age sharing similar interests and are able to be more connected 
with religion or spiritual believes, maintains a comparable behaviour to that of the overall 
cultural achievement. For countries with high limitations, the only difference between 
determinants of the overall cultural achievement and that of the more specific 
achievement in identity and belonging is that it is less likely for education level and skills 
to bypassing limitations to be correlated with the achievement in activities related to 
cultural belonging.  
For cultural satisfaction, the sub-fields did show some correlation between sex 
and satisfaction in cultural belonging, with people identifying as females are more likely 
to be more satisfied in that field. While in countries with high limitations, the higher 
perception of limitation the person has, the higher they are satisfied with the use of the 
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Internet in cultural identity-related activities. These show that in countries with high 
limitations, people that are conscious about limitations are more likely to be able to access 
information that helps them in building their identities from information on sexuality and 
ethnic groups. This is particularly interesting given that many of the websites that face 
limitations in Bahrain and Singapore, as we have seen earlier, fall under categories related 
to sexuality, religion, and ethnicities. This help in clarifying why, as seen in Table 5-7 
earlier, respondents from countries with high limitations showed higher positive outlook 
for cultural achievement, and at the same time, and less cultural satisfaction for what the 
Internet offers in the same field, than of Estonia, which showed higher satisfaction than 
achievement. 
Overall, the determinants of the cultural field displayed significant divergence 
between the achievement and the satisfaction, while maintaining a close mean between 
the two dimensions, at 3.58 and 3.63, respectively. The means of the dimensions show a 
slight tendency towards the positive in how people perceive the Internet affordances that 
allows them to achieve better and be more satisfied, in comparison to same activities 
without the Internet for the overall sample. The divergence in determinant reflects the 
inability of both groups of independent variables tested, classical and research, to reflect 
the two dimensions as an entity, but they do indeed correlate with the achievement, and 
some with specific aspects of satisfaction, as we have seen earlier. 
The verdict for the relation between artificial Internet limitations and the tangible 
outcomes of Internet use in the cultural field when compared to means and perception of 
achievement and satisfaction show that in countries with high limitations, people who are 
conscious about limitations, and are able to bypass limitations, but not necessarily use 
circumvention tools, are able to achieve better tangible outcomes generally. While the 
overall satisfaction in cultural affordances in these countries is considerably less than that 
of Estonia, the country of study that showed little to no limitations. 
5.2.3.3 Social field 
The social field of tangible outcomes of Internet use, as tested in this research, 
include the achievement and satisfaction the person attains socially within three types of 
networks through the Internet, informal, formal, and political networks. As detailed in the 
methodology chapter, the informal network includes friends and family, and interesting 
people met online, while the formal networks include clubs and organisations, leaving 
the political networks to include public bodies and government services. As with other 
fields, this field measures whether people were able to have better opportunities in 
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achieving better outcomes because of the Internet use compared to opportunities available 
offline only, and the level satisfaction perceived as a result of using the Internet for each 
of these activities. 
A review of correlation coefficients to achievement and satisfaction for the whole 
sample showed the existence of a significant effect of six independent predictors on social 
achievement, and just one determinant on social satisfaction. The predictors with 
significant correlations with social achievement are, as displayed in table 5-12, age, 
education level, employment group, years of Internet experience, perception of 
limitations, and skills to bypass limitations, in order of effect size from the highest to the 
least effect. Younger people with fewer years of Internet experience, lower education, 
who are not employed in full-time employment or are students, have a higher perception 
of limitation and have higher skills to bypass limitations, have the better opportunities to 
achieve better with social activities online. These predictors are the same as the ones that 
were correlated with cultural achievement, showing a possible relation between the two 
fields of tangible outcomes of Internet use, highlighting another potential for relations 
that will be considered in a later section. 
Table 5-12 
Classical and Research Predictors Effect on Social Achievement and Satisfaction 
in the Sample and in Sample from Countries with High Level of Limitations 










Age -0.240** -0.01 -0.208** 0.005 
Years of Internet Use -0.187** 0.056 -0.159* 0.065 
Sex 0.029 -0.125* 0.037 -0.015 
Education Level Group -0.206** -0.056 -.232** -0.102 
Employment Group 0.201** 0.022 0.170* 0.025 
Perception of 
Limitation 
0.140** -0.051 0.097 0.094 
Skill, Bypass 
Limitations 
0.126* -0.01 0.155* 0.058 
Use of Circumvention 
Tools 
0.023 0.07 0.071 0.028 
Note. '**' denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), '*' denotes 
correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
189 
 The sample from countries with high limitations as advised by Study 1 of this 
research, Bahrain and Singapore, showed a similar behaviour, except that the role of 
perception of limitation is limited with no significant correlation. The data leave the skill 
to bypass limitations as the only research variable affecting social achievement in these 
countries, along with the same classical determinants as with the whole sample.  
Social satisfaction, on the other hand, was only correlated with the sex as its only 
predictor for the overall sample, with people identifying as females more likely to express 
higher satisfaction with social activities online. For the sample from countries with high 
limitations, no variable showed a statistically significant correlation with social 
satisfaction as an aggregate field. The services that are mostly affected by artificial 
Internet limitations in the countries of the study included fora and other services that 
facilitate social interaction, contributing to the idea that limitations affect mainly the 
satisfaction more than achievement. This makes it not easy to predict satisfaction of 
tangible outcomes of Internet use that is affected by artificial Internet limitations, as we 
have seen with the cultural satisfaction field, and now with social satisfaction. 
The sub-fields of the social field that deals with informal, formal, and political 
networks showed slightly different behaviour than that of the overall social field. The 
social achievement in informal networks in the whole sample was the closest in behaviour 
to the overall field, but with the higher effect of perception of limitation and ability to 
bypass limitation, overtaking the effect of age and years of Internet experience. The 
correlation analysis, included in Appendix III, also shows that this achievement in 
countries with limitations is only correlated with education level, skills to bypass 
limitations and employment, with the same effect direction as with the whole sample and 
the overall field. The effect direction suggests that people who are less educated, have 
higher skills to bypass limitations, and are not employed in full-time employment or are 
students having the better probability for achievement opportunities in informal social 
networks.  
Social achievement with formal networks, however, showed similar behaviour 
among the overall sample and the countries with high limitations with the overall 
achievement in the social filed, with the difference that in the sub-field, across the whole 
sample and the countries with high limitations, perception of limitation does not show 
any significant correlation with the achievement. This leaves the skill to bypass 
limitations as the only skill of the research predictors that have the potential to affect 
social achievement with the formal networks, with a positive correlation. The lack of 
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correlation with neither perception of limitation nor the operationalisation of skills to 
bypass through the use of circumvention tools suggests, however, that this correlation 
may reflect the overall digital skills people have that would contribute to better 
achievement, rather than skills specific to artificial Internet limitations.  
The interviews with people from countries with high limitations showed the 
recurring theme of the local organisation in non-personal networks as thriving. Examples 
of networks mentioned included food-related groups in Singapore and non-political 
interest groups like entrepreneurs in Bahrain, these networks would not usually fall under 
limitations set over Internet access, and people may not feel it is as monitored as 
potentially political groups.  
The social communication and interaction with public services and political 
groups and representatives were covered in the third sub-field of social achievement. This 
field showed lower than positive results in the countries of high limitations, with a mean 
of 3.46 in the sample from Bahrain 3.38 in the sample from Singapore and 3.42 in the 
samples from both countries combined, compared to 3.65 in the sample from Estonia as 
per table 5-7. These activities, however, did not show any correlation with any of the 
research predictors, showing a significant negative correlation with age for the whole 
sample, and age and years of Internet experience for countries with high limitations. This 
suggests that no matter what your perception of limitations, skills to bypass limitations, 
or use of circumvention tools, artificial Internet limitations would affect your 
achievement in this regard. Study 1 concluded that governments of countries with high 
limitations leave no room for trust in the government when it comes to online services 
and use of the Internet for political reasons. The same conclusion is confirmed in the 
interviews and the earlier data in this study showing that people in these countries blame 
the government for most monitoring and control of their Internet use. 
Social satisfaction in the sub-fields for the whole sample showed no correlations 
between classical or research predictors on social satisfaction in informal and formal 
networks for the whole sample, and a correlation between the level of education and 
perception of limitation on one hand and social satisfaction in informal networks in 
countries with high limitations. The correlation found showed that in countries with high 
limitations, people with lower education and a higher perception of limitation have higher 
chances to be satisfied with using the Internet to interact with their informal networks. 
Social satisfaction in political networks, however, had four predictors with strong 
correlations in the whole sample, perception of limitation, years of Internet experience, 
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skills to bypass limitations, and sex, with exciting relation direction. People with less 
perception of limitation, more years of Internet experience, less skill level in bypassing 
limitations and identify as females, have the higher chances to be satisfied with using the 
Internet to interact with public services and communicate with government and political 
representatives and groups.  
This field is the only one where a lower level of perception of limitation, 
combined with less skill to bypass limitations is correlated with better satisfaction or 
achievement. The explanation can be that people who are less conscious about the 
limitations have general fewer qualms about interacting online with public services and 
political networks online. Nonetheless, these correlations do not show any significance 
in countries with high limitations, leaving age and years of Internet experience as the only 
predictors, with positive relation direction. 
It is also interesting to note that the overall social achievement and social 
achievement in personal and formal activities was higher for countries with high 
limitations than Estonia except the social achievement in political networks, which was 
less than the threshold for a positive perspective. The social satisfaction showed that in 
all but the personal network in countries with high limitations expressed less satisfaction 
than that of the sample from Estonia, showing yet another time the potential of Internet 
limitations in affecting the satisfaction of use more than achievement in use. 
The social field, in its two dimensions, is correlated to some extent with a set of 
classical and research predictors, that vary at a high level among the sub-fields, with 
social satisfaction being the harder to predict on an individual level based on the 
predictors tested. However, the difference in satisfaction at country level shows that 
people living in countries with a high level of artificial Internet limitations achieve less 
in the social interactions at the political or public networks, and are generally less satisfied 
in the social field, particularly with formal and political or public networks. These 
findings suggest the success of these limitations in lowering satisfaction while failing to 
have a high effect on achievement at the informal and formal networks. 
5.2.3.4 Personal field 
The personal field as tested in this research cover ability to access information 
related to health and lifestyle, accumulating knowledge towards self actualisation, and 
opportunities for entertainment and leisure, along with the satisfaction of using the 
Internet for each of those sub-fields. The health and lifestyle aspect looks at the ability to 
access information on lifestyle choices and opportunities to make better decisions about 
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health or medical conditions based on information access through Internet use. While self 
Actualisation aims to measure the affirmation people receive for their overall knowledge 
received through the Internet, and build opinions on complex social issues as well as the 
satisfaction of the role the Internet played in that. The leisure aspect looks at affordances 
of the Internet to make a person happier through access to entertainment and opportunities 
to go to events offered by the Internet, with the level of satisfaction of the time spent 
online. 
The set of predictors that displayed significant correlation for the personal 
achievement, as shown in table 5-13, ranks from age, skills to bypass limitations, use of 
circumvention tools, education level, and employment group, with age being the factor 
with the highest effect. Younger people with the ability to bypass limitations, who are 
using circumvention tools, with lower education and are students or unemployed, have 
better opportunities in achieving better in the aggregate personal field for the overall 
sample. In the countries with a high level of artificial Internet limitations, the skills to 
bypass limitations jump to the highest important predictor, followed by education, then 
use of circumvention tools, and finally age. In these countries, people who have the skills 
to bypass limitations and have lower education, use circumvention tools, and are younger, 
have better chances to achieve better in the personal field.  
Table 5-13 
Classical and Research Predictors Effect on Personal Achievement and 
Satisfaction in the Sample and in Sample from Countries with High Level of Limitations 










Age -.211** -0.06 -.141* -0.009 
Years of Internet Use -0.063 -0.005 -0.005 0.04 
Sex -0.048 -0.026 -0.006 0.035 
Education Level Group -.146** -.152** -.160* -.170* 
Employment Group .123* 0.09 0.106 0.067 
Perception of Limitation 0.007 -0.002 0.088 0.106 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .207** 0.08 .217** .155* 
Use of Circumvention Tools .200** .146** .146* .156* 
Note. '**' denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), '*' denotes 
correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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The sub-fields of personal achievement showed diverse behaviour among them, 
with the achievement in the health aspect being correlated to skills to bypass limitations, 
age, use of circumvention tools, and sex, with people are able to bypass limitations, 
younger, use circumvention tools, and identify as females showing potential for higher-
level for achievement in the overall sample. While in the countries with high limitations, 
that form of achievement is solely correlated to skills to bypass limitations.  
Self Actualisation as a form of achievement and a tangible outcome of Internet 
use in the overall sample displayed correlation to age, education level, and skill to bypass 
limitations, with similar effect direction to that of the same predictors in health and the 
aggregate field of personal achievement. Giving people who are younger, have the skill 
to bypass limitations, and who have a lower level of education, better opportunities to 
achieve Self Actualisation as a result of Internet use. Countries with high limitations, 
however, had an added emphasise on skills to bypass limitations and circumventions use 
as the first two predictors, followed only by age. The data showed that where there are 
high limitations, people who are able to bypass limitations and do operationalise these 
skills by using circumvention tools, are generally able to achieve Self Actualisation as a 
result of Internet use. 
The personal achievement in terms of leisure had the most number of predictors 
with significant correlations among the personal achievement sub-fields, with five 
predictors for the overall sample, and four among the sample from the countries with high 
limitations. In the overall sample, people who are younger, students or unemployed, with 
lower education level, that use circumvention tools, and have the skills to bypass 
limitations, in order of effect size, have better opportunities to achieve tangible outcomes 
related to leisure and entertainment. In countries with high limitations, the actual use of 
circumvention tools loses its significance, making people with lower education are 
younger, and are students or unemployed, and have skills to bypass limitations having the 
better chances for that form of personal achievement.  
The difference among the whole sample and the countries with high limitations in 
the different forms of personal achievement shows that although the limitations found in 
Study 1 would not affect the achievement in this regard much. Skills to bypass limitations 
and the use of circumvention tools still play an essential role, particularly with Self 
Actualisation for countries with high limitations, and in leisure for the whole sample. The 
later correlation between the use of circumvention tools in the whole sample and 
achievement in terms of leisure that can be attributed to geo-blocking, the subject 
194 
discussed earlier, and which interviews showed that many people do use circumvention 
tools to bypass it. 
Personal satisfaction proved to be less predictable than achievement, in a manner 
similar to the other fields, with only two predictors showing a significant correlation to 
personal satisfaction in the overall research sample, giving people who use circumvention 
tools and are of lower education levels better changes to be more satisfied. In the countries 
with high limitations, a third predictor is included for people who have the skills to bypass 
limitations as a predictor with effect size slightly less than that of the use of circumvention 
tools. 
For the satisfaction in the sub-fields in personal outcomes, none of the predictors 
tested showed significant correlation with personal satisfaction in health for the whole 
sample and the sample from countries with high limitations. While for the personal 
satisfaction in Self Actualisation, lower education showed correlation with higher 
satisfaction in the sample from countries with high limitations, but it was more 
complicated for the overall sample, with four predictors showing a significant correlation, 
in order of effect size, use of circumvention tools, employment, education, and age.  
The direction of the effect makes people who use circumvention tools, are 
students or unemployed, with lower education, and are younger, as the advantaged group 
in satisfaction of Self Actualisation affordances of the Internet. The complexity of 
prediction was reversed in the satisfaction of leisure aspects, with only two predictors 
with significant correlation for the whole sample, making people who are with lower 
levels of education and use circumvention tools having better satisfaction than others do. 
In countries with high limitations, people that found a need to use circumvention tools 
have lower education, are able to bypass limitations, and have high perception of 
limitation to be on the right side when it comes to the satisfaction of the leisure 
affordances of the Internet. This suggests a negative effect of artificial Internet limitations 
on opportunities to be more satisfied when using the Internet for leisure. 
Overall, that effect can also be seen in the fact that in this research people in 
sample from countries with high Internet limitations showed lower levels of both, 
achievement  and satisfaction, than the people in the sample from Estonia in the fields of 
personal achievement and satisfaction, and their sub-fields of health and Self 
Actualisation, but not in leisure. With a higher difference in satisfaction than that of 
achievement, in a continuation of the trend of lower satisfaction results in the aggregate 
fields of tangible outcomes of Internet use. 
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The personal field, in its two dimensions of achievement and satisfaction as an 
aggregate and in its sub-fields showed a correlation to a set of classical and research 
predictors, but the importance of research predictors for the aggregate dimension, 
particularly use of circumvention tools and skills to bypass limitations, was more critical. 
At the same time, the perception of limitations did not show any significance, except for 
a slight effect on personal satisfaction in terms of leisure. These and the divergence in 
satisfaction and achievement as reported between the countries with high limitations and 
Estonia show that artificial Internet limitation has the potential to affect achievement, and 
at a more considerable extent satisfaction, on the personal, tangible outcomes of Internet 
use. 
5.3 Interviews 
To support quantitative data collected through surveys in Study 2, and network 
measurements and reports in Study 1, the research included a set of interviews with a 
varied sample of people from the countries of research. The interviews proved to be of 
high value to the research, as they extended the depth of data collected, and provided an 
explanation for anomalies found, as well as increasing confidence in results collected 
earlier. The interview followed the design described in the Methodology chapter as 
sequential explanatory instrument fulfilling Mixed-Methods research requirements as per 
Creswell and Clark (Creswell and Clark, 2010).  
Access to interviewee was achieved through researching for people that fulfil the 
requirements of the respective fields, and selecting the best people that would provide 
advice based on experience and affiliation as available through their profiles online, or as 
recommended by contacts in the countries of research to establish a pool of potential 
interviewees. The interviewees were contacted through direct emails and messaging 
through social media platforms, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. From the pool of 50 
people that were contacted, 15 responded and agreed on conducting the interview, of 
those, 12 actually participated in the interviews and agreed on using the interview details 
for the research. During the first round of attempts to connect with interviewees, three of 
each country was interviewed, however, there seemed to be a need to add more 
representation from Singapore and Bahrain, to be able to reach more information on 
aspects that seemed contested between interviewees, an additional interview was added 
from Singapore, and two from Bahrain. The interviews finally covered the countries with 
five interviews from Bahrain, four from Singapore, and three from Estonia, covering the 
aspects needed with ample details for the research. 
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The 12 interviews were conducted with people carefully selected to represent at 
least two of the sample targets related to the categories and fields of the research, as 
described in table 5-14. The sample for the interviews was split in half with six identifying 
as males and six as females, with ages ranging between 18 and 60 years old. The fields 
correspond with the fields of tangible outcomes of Internet use and the overarching 
framework of the research as well as information collected to expand and verify on the 
information collected as part of Study 1 on the status of the Internet and artificial Internet 
limitations in the countries of the research. Interviewee pool was developed through 
online researching for people that fit in the categories listed and are active and leaders in 
these fields, as well as the general public. Table 5-14 lists the fields of interviews as 
designed in the methodology, along with the sample target of interviewees that would 
fulfil the requirements for that field and be able to advise on it, along with the list of 
interviews that fulfilled information for each of the fields by country. 
Table 5-14 
Fields of Interviews, Sample Targets, and Corresponding Interviewees by 
Country 
Field Code Field Sample Targeted Interviewees 
EL Economic, 
Labour 
Jobseeker  Bahrain: B1, B3, B5 
Estonia: E2 





Bahrain: B1,B2, B3, B5 
Estonia: E1, E2, E3 
Singapore: S2, S4 
S Social General user Bahrain: B1, B2, B3, B5 
Estonia: E1, E2, E3 
Singapore: S2, S3, S4 
P Political General user, local 
activist 
Bahrain: B1, B2, B3, B4, B5 
Estonia: E1, E2, E3 
Singapore: S2, S4 
IG Institutional, 
governmental 
General user/citizen Bahrain: B1, B2, B3, B5 
Estonia: E1, E3 
Singapore: S2, S3 
IH Institutional, 
Health 
General user Bahrain: B3, B5 
Estonia: E2, E3 
Singapore: S4 
E Educational Student, Educator Bahrain: B3, B5 
Estonia: E2, E3 
Singapore: S2, S3 
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 The interviews followed a semi-structured flow, beginning with an introduction 
to the research project, then a statement on data usage and confidentiality followed by 
consent collection, verbal for voice interviews, and written for in-person interviews. The 
interview here moves to short discussion to know more about the interviewee and develop 
rapport and trust, to move to the set of structured questions, with enough flexibility to 
allow focusing on aspects brought up by the interviewee that deems relevant and 
important to the course of the research. At the end of the interview, the interviewee is 
given time to say anything they would like to add that may benefit the research. 
Following is a summary of the main themes covered in the interviews and the 
main takes of it by a country, more detailed summary of each interview is included in 
Appendix II. The details included in the Appendix help to build the context, comments, 
and answers of each interview to offer a clear picture on how people with direct 
knowledge of each of the countries of the study feel about artificial Internet limitations, 
and how it is affecting outcomes of Internet use. The main themes covered below provide 
the ability to verify and expand on research findings, thus contributing to the overall 
reliability of the research. 
5.3.1 Interviews on Bahrain 
The five interviews covering the situation in Bahrain provided more in-depth 
details and information on findings of Study 1 and the survey instrument of Study 2, 
allowing for verification of findings and explanation to build better understanding to the 
relation between artificial Internet limitations and tangible outcomes of Internet use. The 
interviews were conducted in Arabic and English, as per the preference of the individual 
interviewee, with three of the interviews conducted over audio conferencing, and two 
conducted in-person. The interviews added to the reliability of the research, with the 
number of interviews increased from the initial three to five to cover aspects that were 
not covered in full in the first three, or to conclude on aspects that were contested to reach 
to a broader consensus. 
The interviews on Bahrain covered all of the fields and topics sought after in the 
study design, with at least two interviews for each of the fields. More contested fields, 
mainly political, social, and relation with the government, were covered with four to five 
interviews each. The participants ranked from general Internet users to entrepreneurs 
interested in electronic business and commerce, to prominent activists that were among 
the first to be prosecuted for online activism in the country. The variety of interviewees 
provided rich and diverse views on the different aspects, nonetheless, despite the variety 
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of the views, a set of common reflections can be deduced to offer a good understanding 
on the status of the Internet and artificial Internet limitations in Bahrain, and how it 
changed over the years. 
The general agreement among the whole sample from Bahrain was that the 
Internet is vastly available with high access and use rates among the population and that 
people in Bahrain generally have adequate to good digital skills to be able to use the 
Internet for much of their needs. Interviewee B2, for instance, expressed pride with the 
very high Internet penetration rate and use in Bahrain, as well as what they have felt of 
excellent digital skills Internet users in Bahrain stating that they feel that 80% of the 
population in Bahrain is “well-versed” in technology, while the other 20% have a lower 
level of digital skills, but still capable of basic usage of online services.  
This high level of adoption is driven by social aspects as per B5, with high use 
and reliance on social media platforms to interact and communicate, while B3 sees that 
people use the Internet in all aspects of their lives. B3 further expanded to attribute access 
to the Internet to multiple phenomena, from effect on clothing choices to eating habits 
and choices to understanding of accents and dialects of other Arabic-speaking states. This 
allowed for an increase in exposure to the world, and contributed to the satisfaction of 
Internet use, as people felt its influence relatively quickly, which B3 does not fail to 
mention it is a double-edged sword, that can contribute to loss of community and social 
values at its shoddier end, and to positive social change and participation at the better end. 
At the same time, B1 had strong views on the Internet availability in Bahrain, 
stating that although they agree on the high penetration rate and general availability, there 
are no guarantees for open access to the Internet. With controls implemented by 
companies and the government focus on limiting access to political content rather than 
aiming at protecting end-users from online attacks, resulting in an Internet environment 
with complete lack of confidentiality and privacy. Bahrain government practices, 
according to B1, include blocking and filtering of political content that is considered 
critical to the current regime, controlling media outlets, and surveillance and infiltration 
targeted at political dissents and human rights defenders, which would ultimately result 
in incarceration for activity on the Internet. B1 concluded their position on Internet 
limitations by saying that Bahrain does not respect the freedom of citizens and individuals 
in the exchange of information and knowledge through the Internet. 
A primary drive for Internet use, according to B2, B3, and B5 is electronic 
commerce. B2 even sees it as the primary useful usage of the Internet in Bahrain, allowing 
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economic opportunities for Bahrainis by allowing access to better offers and deals, as 
well as opportunities for people to open their own online businesses, besides what they 
described as 90% of time spent on the Internet to be spent as “junk time”. B3 and B5 
agreed with B2 by pointing to a massive wave moving towards online business, including 
setting up simple stores over Instagram, a field that the government is stepping to regulate 
and now people can start a business totally based online without requiring any physical 
presence.  
However, the limitations inherently involved with online shopping, like the ability 
to touch items and try clothes play a significant role in the preference of some people to 
head to the offline shopping experience, as per B5. Payment methods are also an issue, 
but there are services that are now available to address that, like BenefitPay, the National 
Electronic Wallet System, a system that enables people to pay to services and other 
individuals in Bahrain without the need for credit cards, using debit cards and agreements 
with local banks13. The service has also facilitated money transfers among individuals 
through phone number. B1 pointed to similar limitations to eCommerce, particularly 
payment methods, summarising it as a two-fold problem, the availability and popularity 
of credit cards is not yet at a level that would allow for active e-commerce markets, with 
around 20% penetration. The second problem is the attitude towards paying over the 
Internet is still unfavourable, with people fearing for their privacy. This attitude prompted 
for alternative payment business models, from pay on delivery, to dedicated prepaid 
payment cards, and payment at points of presence to be a standard option for e-commerce 
in Bahrain, for services from buying groceries to ordering home car wash and laundry 
services online. 
In terms of economic achievement in the labour market, in addition to the 
opportunities of starting online businesses, the interviewees pointed out that the use of 
Internet affordances to find jobs is still developing. B5 stated that the case for the online 
job market differs a lot between domains of work, although for some jobs and companies 
they rely heavily on recruiting people online, in others, design, for example, handing CVs 
by hand is the norm, as most do not even advertise online, and one needs to go and ask 
for open vacancies. B3 had a more optimistic perspective, indicating that this aspect is 
rapidly growing in Bahrain, with more and more jobs posted mainly online for locals and 
 
13 Details on the service was verified and expanded through its 
official website: https://www.benefit.bh/Services/BenefitPay/ 
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expats. Nonetheless, given the social structures and size of Bahrain, traditional methods 
for finding jobs through physically visiting potential employers and direct 
recommendations are used mainly. 
The first part of Study 2, the survey, concluded that the economic achievement 
among the sample in Bahrain is the highest of the three countries of study, with an average 
of 3.79 compared to 3.69 and 3.63 in Estonia and Singapore respectively. The sub-fields 
of economic achievement in income and education and employment showed similar 
results, while the economic achievement in property showed that the sample of Bahrain 
perceives achieving less than the samples of Estonia and Singapore. These results seem 
to be in negation to the prevailing views of people interviewed for Bahrain, but after 
discussing the discrepancy with the interviewees, it shows that there are great 
expectations and potential for economic achievement combined with dissatisfaction with 
the overall environment around the Internet use, and the supporting environment for 
electronic commerce in specific. The outlook for higher economic achievement is also 
reflected in the economic satisfaction reported in the survey, with Bahrain scoring the 
lowest levels of satisfaction in the economic field and all of its three sub-fields. 
Social affordances of the Internet were also covered extensively in the interviews 
from Bahrain, with interviewees B1, B2, B3, and B5 expressing high levels of reliance 
on the Internet for social interaction, particularly at the informal or personal level through 
social media platforms. B3 and B5 went further to say that the Internet did affect the daily 
lives of Bahrainis are social and news aspects, with more and more people relying on the 
news they receive online, especially social and health-related news and information more 
than politics related content. Social achievement is also related to the difference between 
generations, according to B5, reflecting a possible digital divide among generations. The 
findings of the survey support the suggestion of the interviewees that social achievement 
in Bahrain is high. The overall social achievement mean for Bahrain is higher than in 
Estonia and Bahrain, at 3.78 for the overall social achievement, compared with 3.32 in 
Estonia, and 3.39 in Singapore, proving to be the only country with social achievement 
in the positive band. 
The sub-fields of social achievement, however, showed that the finding above is 
valid for the informal and formal achievement scales, but not for the scale of the political 
network, as the achievement dropped to slightly below the threshold for a positive 
outcome at 3.46, compared to 3.65 in Estonia, and 3.38 in Singapore. 
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Satisfaction with social affordances of the Internet in Bahrain showed that it was 
positive in the overall and all of the sub-fields, but fell behind Estonia in the overall social 
satisfaction, and formal and political networks, and was the lowest among the countries 
in terms of informal networks. The discrepancy between achievement ranking and 
satisfaction was again explained by B1 that blocking and filtering of political content that 
is considered critical to the current regime, controlling media outlets, and surveillance 
and infiltration targeted at political dissents and human rights defenders would ultimately 
result in incarceration for activity on the Internet. The direct and indirect Internet 
limitations in Bahrain have produced a chilling effect on online expression, but people 
have coped with that and moved on to utilise the Internet to the fullest in their daily lives, 
from economic benefits to social, and cultural ones. B1 continued to remark that mistrust 
with the government forced people to keep a distance and deal with suspicion with 
government services provided online. 
Aside from the strong and direct views of B1, the political environment did 
nonetheless receive mixed opinions from the interviewees, with B2 stating that active 
monitoring and surveillance is justified according to especially after the 2011 “political 
mess”, but still left its toll on other aspects of Internet use as well. With this statement, 
B2 seemed to be negating themselves when they asserted earlier in the interview that 
there is no website blocking other than blocking of pornography website and torrent-
based websites that offer pirated software with no effect whatsoever on the Internet use 
in Bahrain. B3 did agree with B2 on the scope of monitoring and control of the Internet 
in Bahrain at the beginning of the interview, stating that they do not feel any limitations 
on Internet use and that the blocking, if existed, only helps in limiting access to 
pornography websites and other indecent content which helps in maintaining the 
conservative feel of the society. 
 B2 was more inclined during the course of the interview to mention the existence 
of limitations on a political basis, which is justified in their opinion, but covers “very 
limited number of blogs and news sites”, and that they personally did not feel any 
limitations. The inputs from the interviews showed how some people in Bahrain tend to 
neglect the existence of limitations, or feel that the limitations are in a way justified and 
do not affect them, contributing to the idea that the responses for perception of limitation 
questions in the survey may be affected by that attitude, with people expressing fewer 
limitations than they actually perceive. On the other hand, B1 expressed their position on 
Internet limitations by saying that Bahrain does not respect the freedom of citizens and 
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individuals in the exchange of information and knowledge through the Internet, showing 
the difference views on Internet limitations in Bahrain and its justifications, while all 
agreed on the existence of limitations at various levels. 
The restriction on the Internet, according to B5, is not something that has always 
been there and at the same level, with them remembering that when they were in school 
the early 2000s, the Internet did not have many restrictions. However, they think that the 
government monitoring of Internet use can be a reality in Bahrain, but the perception of 
Internet monitoring overshadows any facts on whether monitoring is persistent or not, 
which in itself plays a vital role in affecting people’s use of the Internet, like thinking 
twice before posting anything online. B5 sees self-censorship a very touchy subject and 
hesitantly adds that it is mainly fear of sharing and expressing political aspects and views, 
more than any other aspect. This fear is consistent with how people are feeling about 
expressing themselves offline. This view supports the development of Internet limitations 
as discussed in Study 1, with the increase of focus on limitations happening in the early 
2000s, and the maintenance of an environment of fear around free expression, online and 
offline. 
B4 was another interviewee who provided great insights on the artificial Internet 
limitations in Bahrain from their history to their scope and pervasiveness, benefiting from 
their first-hand experience with their online outlets being targeted and blocked, to them 
being persecuted based on online expression and living in exile under constant fear. The 
account of B1 matched the findings of Study 1 in terms of scope of limitations and reach 
as reflected in the network measurements, as well as the timeline for development and 
forging of limitations and the political and legal environment surrounding it as reflected 
in the report and regulations review part of that study.  
The input of B4 expanded the finding of Study 1 on the Internet limitations, and 
the use of circumvention tools findings of Study 2, by providing details on how many 
people in Bahrain rely on circumvention tools but are agnostic to it. B4 gave an example 
for that by pointing to the reliance of people on ready-made scripts distributed by activists 
like B4 to establish secure connections through circumvention without having to know 
about the scripts more than that they needed to click on it before accessing the Internet. 
Consequently, the use of these scripts in the manner described have the potential to affect 
the results of the questions on the use of circumvention tools in Bahrain by showing an 
account that is lower than the actual use. 
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The use of circumvention tools received a good portion of the interviews, to get a 
better understanding of the tools used and the motivation behind it, as well as the 
difference in the tangible outcomes of Internet use it may offer. B1 shared a similar 
position with B4 on how people may be using circumvention tools without realising or 
putting it in a technical perspective. The motivation use of circumvention tools, according 
to B1, is a direct result of the restrictions set on Internet use, with people using VPNs and 
Proxies to maintain privacy and access blocked content. B1 also suggested that some 
people would express their satisfaction in the survey because many did not have the 
chance to know any better Internet openness, and even when they do, the fear built 
through government’s controlling policies will push people to overestimate their 
satisfaction and not to express any frustration they may feel.  
On the same subject, B4 suggested that people prefer to use VPNs to circumvent 
Internet controls in Bahrain over proxies, with popular tools being shared among 
individuals until a point when the government catches up with it and block it when new 
ones are circulated again. This practice is encouraged and possible because people in 
Bahrain are aware of government surveillance and monitoring and put an effort to protect 
their digital privacy. As a result, Internet use and tangible outcomes, according to B4, 
may not be affected much aside from political participation and expression using real 
names. However, the one practice that B4 sees had the most effect on Internet use, and 
left people with minimal agency to circumvent it, is Internet shutdowns, similar to what 
happened in Duraz area. The Internet in the Duraz area was shut down in the night for 
over a year, with the ISPs claiming that it is due to technical problems, the practice that 
was covered in Chapter 4. 
On the other end, B2 connected the increase in the use of VPNs and proxy services 
to youngsters trying to access websites with “immoral” content or to access services 
blocked by other countries when visiting them, giving an example of using a VPN to do 
WhatsApp calls from the United Arab Emirates. However, later on, with more trust 
established during the interview, B2 added that part of the surge came after events of 
2011 when people wanted to access blocked blogs and news sites, negating their previous 
ascertain on type of websites blocked. These views were also shared by B3, who said that 
circumvention tools are used to access blocked content, which they see as only 
pornography websites. Later on, B3 added that they know some people that use 
circumvention tools when they are outside of Bahrain in countries that are more restricted 
to be able to access the Internet and to call home and friends using Internet telephony 
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services that are blocked in neighbouring countries like the United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia. Another use, according to B3, was to access games and content that may 
not be available in Bahrain because of geo-blocking.  
A different outlook on the use of circumvention tools in Bahrain was provided by 
B5, who feels that a lot of people in Bahrain use circumvention tools with the primary 
motivation to bypass geo-blocking and access online content as with Netflix, and 
Pokémon Go when it was first released, as it was not available in Bahrain. Nonetheless, 
B5 did not underplay the role of Internet limitations, which they see as coming mainly 
from the government blocking explicit content and building an environment of fear of 
monitoring.  
The percentage of people using circumvention tools in Bahrain as found in the 
survey instrument of Study 2 to be around 50% for each of VPN and Proxies, was 
challenged by B2 and B3, suggesting that the numbers may be less, and B2 suggesting it 
to be more in the range of 30-40% for VPN. While B1 and B4 both suggested that the 
actual number of people that use circumvention tools, as mentioned earlier, is larger than 
the number of that would do so knowingly and admit to doing so. These conflicting views 
on the outcomes of the survey suggest that the numbers may be accurate, as even the most 
conservative numbers suggested by B2 still indicate that a large number of the population 
do use circumvention tools. 
For the rest of the tangible outcomes of Internet use fields as categorised for the 
interviews, namely institutional from the public service and government perspective, 
institutional from the health perspective, and educational, showed that interviewees from 
Bahrain feel that there are more and more uses and reliance on the Internet to achieve 
activities related to these affordances. The potential for more use exists with more skill 
development and supportive environment needed. 
The interviews from Bahrain provided remarkable views and explanations for the 
research, supporting the findings of Study 1 and the survey instrument of Study 2. 
Including the existence of artificial Internet limitations in Bahrain at several levels, and 
the predominance of a perceived monitoring and control environment that affects the 
ways people use the Internet and express themselves online and offline, and as a result 
affecting tangible outcomes of their Internet use. The interviewees also provided 
confidence with the number of people using circumvention tools and the general 
perception of limitations, as well as the levels of achievement and satisfaction in the 
various fields of Internet outcomes as found by the survey. 
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5.3.2 Interviews on Estonia 
The Interview instrument for the research of Estonia did not require as many 
interviews as Bahrain or Singapore, as the outcomes of Study 1 and the survey instrument 
of Study 2 showed that the Internet environment in Estonia in terms of artificial Internet 
limitations and uses did not show the level of complication as in other countries. Estonia 
in this research played the role of the control country, with minimal Internet limitations 
and the three interviews covering Estonia provided the explanation needed for the 
outcomes of the previous research instrument. The three interviews on Estonia were 
conducted in English using audio conferencing. 
The interviews covered all aspects aimed at for the interviews, of Economic 
Labour (EL), Economic Commerce (EC), Social (S), Political (P), 
Institutional/Government (IG), Institutional/Health (IH), and Educational (E) fields. The 
interviewees included an expert in the issues of technology and society, E1, who was able 
to provide an expert view on the Internet and its uses in Estonia, including the history of 
social transformation using technology. The second interview was with E2, who is a 
technical person with experience of living inside and outside of Estonia. While the third 
interview was with a health expert, E3, who themselves are not a technical person, thus 
able to provide an overview of the general user, 
The three interviewees agreed on the findings of Study 1 on the status of the 
Internet in Estonia, including the historical development of access availability following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the new Estonian leadership steered 
the country towards successful use of technology after the independence and state-
building following the dissolution. E1 explained how much of the focus on state building 
was on developing the infrastructure and skills of Estonians, including providing schools 
with Internet connectivity and computers across the country, as part of the Tiger Leap 
project. 
E2 and E3 added that they are proud of the speed available and services of Internet 
Service Providers. For affordability, they believe that the Internet cost is generally 
acceptable at prices approachable for most people, with a high level of competition 
between providers resulting in many offers available over different technologies available 
depending on location. E3 clarified that in the rural areas Internet availability in a bit 
problematic especially with problems recently arising with the landline telephone 
network, however, the ministry of telecommunication promises a 100% coverage, which 
is almost done according to E3. About affordability, E3 confirmed that Internet access is 
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very affordable for the typical household, as well as having affordable prices for mobile 
Internet, with plenty of options including Internet over wireless and fibre. They also 
praised the high level of customer service available.  
In terms of tangible outcomes, economic benefits are clear, according to the 
interviewees, with a variety of online stores available that includes several local retailers 
offering popular services, in addition to the leading international players, like Amazon 
and eBay. Electronic commerce is highly relied on in Estonia as per E2, with a good 
supportive environment from payments to the delivery network. The interviewees have 
highlighted the ease of creating new business, where you can do that entirely online, and 
later manage that business online as well, including submitting taxes and managing bank 
accounts and activities. The latter services were experienced first-hand by E3, who is 
providing services to the citizens through an online speech therapy platform, this 
experience proved to them that setting up an online store and starting your business is 
relatively easy, and requires only a few hours if one had enough ambition and motivation. 
Setting up business through the Internet is part of a wider array of services offered 
as part the eGovernment initiatives in Estonia, which according to E3, are first-class 
services that allow one to do anything online, as the saying in Estonia, you can do it all 
online except getting divorced, joking that they are working on it now. At the same time, 
E1 responded to a specific question on whether moving to digital-only governmental 
activities, as in tax submission and voting, will result in the exclusion of some people, E1 
clarified that this is possible mainly with elderly people who may ask someone else to 
help them in it, but will not result in total exclusion. 
E2 also described how the eGovernment services are prevalent in Estonia, 
covering most facets of interaction with the government, providing ease of use and speed 
for services. One example they mentioned was tax filing, which allowed citizens to 
submit their taxes easily with few simple clicks, as the information is already available to 
the government. Access to health services is also included in the electronic services as 
per E2, in addition to the extensive use of the Internet by people to benefit themselves 
and learn more about their health and health conditions. 
E3 provided an expert view on the health services offered online, as being a 
practitioner that provide health-related service online themself, as well as being involved 
in the public services related to health. E2 evaluate online health services as being humble 
compared when compared to other public electronic services, eHealth services in Estonia 
are not where they should be. The functionality offered through patient portals is limited, 
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with people having access to view their information now with no much interaction, except 
for digital registration system, which was added recently did not have that much use so 
far. Another aspect is that elderly people and people with more severe illness rely on 
institutions and not the services provided online, while the younger generation that is 
more familiar with information-seeking online help themselves through eHealth services 
knowledge available and services provided. 
 E3 stated that the work they are involved in, which is connected to the 
government, has a vision towards a patient-centric health system with eHealth services 
as the tool. At the same time, E2, as a user of online health services, showed satisfaction 
with what was offered, especially when comparing it with services available other places 
in the world, with the extensive use of the Internet by people in Estonia to benefit 
themselves and learn more about their health and health conditions. The changes E3 
hinted at where covered in further elaboration by E1, who added to the interview that they 
are working on rewriting the country codes, which are the rules that the eGovernment 
follows, to service design rather than IT design, allowing it to accommodate changes in 
a better manner. 
In addition to the high satisfaction with Internet services and achievement in the 
tangible outcomes by means of Internet use, the interviews also covered freedom of 
expression and Internet openness. E1 considers the Internet in Estonia to be free, with no 
restriction on access or content and cites that they see no much social limitations on 
Internet use in Estonia. Nevertheless, they later mention constant pressure to control 
expression online coming from political groups, especially with the spread of fake news 
and weaponisation of social media for political gains. E1 makes it clear that fake news is 
well spread over Estonian networks, sometimes through external influence, to the point 
that people in Estonia got used to it, and it became normalised, with little influence and 
ability to convince people, who learned how to check the facts by time and experience 
and allowed for further involvement in politics online. 
The sense for Internet openness in Estonia was also shared by E2, who noted that 
people in Estonia use online media to express their different views, including political, 
openly and with no worry for consequences, unlike other places that E2 lived in, where it 
is possible to be summoned by authorities based on your online activity as what E2 noted. 
This created a healthy online environment for discussion and debate. However, E2 shared 
their concern about the social aspect of the Internet, stating that it is causing a decline in 
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direct relationships and communication, with people focusing on their phone all the times, 
even when they are with family or friends.  
These optimistic views on the current state of the Internet in Estonia, combined 
with worry on the future from potential negative results reflect the healthy conversations 
on the future of the Internet hinted by E1, but also reflects the voices calling for more 
controls on the Internet, whether to target misinformation, or to improve quality of social 
life. This should be viewed in light of Study 1 findings on the eagerness of Estonian 
regulators to lead in regulations supporting freedom of access and expression while 
maintaining compliance with European Union regulations, with high focus on cyber-
security, as balancing these regulations is a hard aspect that may lead to inadvisable 
artificial limitations on the Internet. The regulations may also lead to an environment of 
self-censorship, which interviewees on Estonia showed that it is not an issue currently in 
the country. 
Despite the environment of general openness of the Internet in Estonia, the survey 
instrument of Study 2 showed a notable percentage of the sample stating that they have 
used circumvention tools, particularly VPN, over the past year. The interviews dwelt to 
answer that non-expected finding, especially that the research began with the expectation 
that circumvention tools are used to bypass artificial Internet limitations with a focus on 
limitations set to limit people’s agency in expression and access to information for 
political reasons.  
While E2 stated that they do not feel many people use VPN because there is no 
need to it as everything is open and there no sense to fear any surveillance or monitoring, 
the other interviewees had a different take. E1 and E3 expressed their agreement with the 
number of people using circumvention tools in Estonia as found, explaining the primary 
motivation to be bypassing geo-blocking, or as E1 puts it, the very bad access to films 
and content online, particularly on Netflix, forces people to fake their location and use 
circumvention tools to access the content they like. E3 shared the view of geo-blocking 
to access online content not available to Estonian networks, adding that people also may 
use it for business to access corporate networks, and education, to access institutional 
database access. Another major reason for using VPN, which E3 did theirself, is to access 
online content that is geo-blocked but from outside Estonia to access content only 
accessible from inside Estonia, as with some of the national television channel content. 
Internet is Estonia is also crucial in forming individual identities, as described by 
E3, enabling people to affiliate themselves with people feeling more connected to their 
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online acquaintances, including groups and networks they are using, and what news they 
read, with people using the affordances of the Internet to identify themselves based on 
their interests rather than their geographical location. This is facilitated with the standing 
of the Internet in Estonia as being free with no limitations other than cost to some extent 
and general literacy on knowing how to use connected and smart devices. E3 compared 
the limitations to other countries in terms of blocking and controls especially that no 
political party is thinking of extending any control or power over the Internet, unlike other 
places like Russia. However, despite that, the survey sample for Estonia did not report 
achievement levels in the related cultural fields, nor in any of its sub-fields of identity and 
belonging compared to other countries, but it did report higher satisfaction here, as well 
as higher achievement in personal achievement’s sub-field of Self Actualisation. 
The satisfaction of the Internet uses mentioned above, was reflected in the 
findings of the satisfaction of tangible outcomes of Internet use fields in the survey of 
Study 2, which showed that satisfaction levels for all the four top-level fields of 
Economic, Cultural, Social, and Personal activities online is higher in Estonia than the 
rest of the study countries. However, the achievement levels reported by the sample from 
Estonia varied in position to the other countries, with Estonia leading in three sub-field 
economic/property, social/political, and personal/self actualisation. The disparity 
between achievement and satisfaction levels reported by the countries shows yet another 
time that artificial Internet limitations have a higher impact on satisfaction than it does on 
achievement. 
The interviews from Estonia played the role expected of them to provide 
confidence in the findings of the previous research instruments, and to provide additional 
insight and explanation for those findings. That was clear in this section with the input 
from interviewees matching most of the findings, especially with the level of satisfaction. 
However, the level of achievement in outcomes as portrayed in interviews is higher than 
that expressed by the survey sample when compared to the results from the rest of the 
research countries, indicating that people perceive more outcomes than is currently 
offered by the technology. The interviews also provided a critical input explaining the 
use of circumvention tools despite the apparently open Internet environment. Despite the 
fact that the number of interviews for Estonia is less than the number of interviews for 
Bahrain or Singapore, the input collected provided a clear picture that supported the 
research significantly. 
210 
5.3.3 Interviews on Singapore 
Singapore interviews followed the same pattern and process of interviews as with 
the interviews for Bahrain and Estonia, with interviewees being selected to provide expert 
advice to cover all of the aspects aimed at in the fields of interviews as described in the 
Methodology chapter. The interviews on Singapore were conducted in English, with two 
of them conducted in-person, and two conducted through online audio conferencing 
facilities on mediums to support the anonymity of individuals. The interviews aimed at 
providing details and information on findings of Study 1 and the survey instrument of 
Study 2, as a method for verification of findings and explanation to build better 
understanding and confidence in answering the research questions. 
As with the interviews on Bahrain and Estonia, the interviewees on Singapore 
expressed how high they regard Internet services in Singapore in terms of quality and 
availability. S2, for instance, expressed how they see the essential and crucial role of the 
Internet in the development of Singapore as an economy and community as a global 
platform that is moving towards using as a central location for all of our information, 
including files we share and store online, and data on our Internet use of different 
platforms. S1 and S3 shared a similar perspective but highlighted an essential difference 
among generations when it comes to outcomes of Internet use. 
While S1 sees themself as being of a generation that knows the world through and 
with the Internet, with online tools and websites, as well as applications, being their 
primary gateway to communication, social interaction, knowledge and information 
gathering, and business. S3 sees that Internet is used positively by almost everyone in 
Singapore, with a distinction between the uses across generations. The older generation, 
according to S3, tend to rely more on the Internet to communicate with family and friends, 
and for entertainment in the form of following television shows and dramas online. While 
the generations of people who are younger than 40 years old, rely on the Internet as a 
news source to stay informed and up to date with what is happening in Singapore and the 
wider world, in addition to communication and entertainment.  
Use of the Internet beyond communication, entertainment, and accessing news is 
still not as expected because people feel an alienation between their daily lives and the 
Internet according to S3 as people look at it as a media that serves as a window on 
themselves to the government, making it hard for the Internet to become a normalised 
part of daily activities as. S4 shares a similar view with the Internet in Singapore being 
used mainly for leisure, with and one of the trending aspects is blogs and discussion on 
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food, saying that this is because “in Singapore, people have a tendency to talk more 
openly about food rather than for example politics”.  
Tangible outcomes of Internet use for the economic field was common among the 
interviewees, falling for some under leisure and entertainment, as S1 described the 
Internet as their main shopping destination, if not for actual purchases, to browse what is 
available at stores and go in person to purchase, especially for clothes and equipment. 
Online shopping and conducting business online, in addition to communication 
affordance, are the main drivers behind Internet adoption in Singapore, especially that it 
provided a promise for a more free atmosphere for expression, nonetheless, S1 points out 
to an increase in practices by the government to address hate speech and what is being 
labelled as fake news outlets online. The practices have also affected many regular people 
that were trying to speak their mind, which resulted in increased mistrust in the platform 
and transcending of the general fear culture from the street to the online world. 
For the other fields of tangible outcomes of Internet use, education stood out as 
an area where interviewees felt there were no restrictions and more people and institutes 
are turning to the use of the Internet to access and provides educational material and 
services. S3 for instance, said that people in Singapore are open and comfortable to access 
educational material and courses available over the Internet, even if it did not originate 
from Singapore, as Singaporeans, according to S3, considers themselves active members 
of the global online community, or network society. The survey found that the sample of 
Singapore looked positively at economic achievement and satisfaction in relation to 
education. Another aspect that was looked at positively in the survey is the personal 
achievement and satisfaction in relation to health services offered an available online. S2 
confirmed that attitude by praising were the health services offered online, whether 
public, or from other sources, is heading, as they think it is doing a good job in reaching 
out to people over the Internet.  
The Internet facilitated cultural, and identity development in Singapore was also 
covered, with S4 seeing that the Internet is allowing for more access to culture-related 
content, and allowing for art to reach a wider audience beyond the creative sector. In term 
of identity and affiliation, S4 said that new forms are being developed based on the 
affordances of the Internet, connecting people with similar interests, even decreasing the 
importance of the Singaporean aspect of people’s self-identification. 
Despite the limitations, S1 states that most people would ignore the perception of 
limitation and use the Internet for business, communication, and entertainment with no 
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worries as long as they avoid political content, even the official discourse. This effect 
came to a realisation during the interview with S2, which showed that they are wary of 
speaking of official limitations and restrictions on the Internet, ignoring the questions on 
government involvement and focusing on Internet limitations in workplace or school. For 
example, when asked about the reports on website blocking in Singapore, they said that 
it is justified especially in the banking industry because you have a lot of information that 
you do not want employees to leak out, so companies limit access to work-related content 
and sites only. 
A similar practice was described by S3 as a disconnection between Internet uses 
that may be deemed non-political versus what is deemed as political, including discussing 
current affairs. The disconnection, according to S3 is part of tactics people of Singapore 
developed to deal with government policies by altering their activities that can be seen by 
the government, including those over the Internet, as a form of self-censorship and 
methods to stay off the government radar. At the same time, people in Singapore 
developed methods to express themselves freely while avoiding that monitoring, 
effectively constructed multiple groups of activities people deal with in separation, 
activities that are passable to be monitored, and activities that people prefer to keep off 
the eyes of the government. 
The political expression online was affected by a change in Internet openness and 
even quality after the narrow win of the incumbent ruling party People’s Action Party in 
2011 according to S4, where the government extended its control over the Internet. S4 
sees this as a turning point in the voices of the opposition over the Internet, but there came 
many rules that controlled online expression, including a rule requiring blogs and 
websites talking about politics to register with the authorities in compliance with the 
findings of Study 1. S4’s advantage of being able to see the Internet from inside and 
outside Singapore allowed them to feel the change in the level of openness, while their 
friends in Singapore would not know that a website was stopped, because they just would 
not see it. Another aspect was a sudden surge of trolls on discussion fora that would 
repeatedly publish “rubbish” that would undermine the reliability and respect of the 
platform, a practice that was not fully covered in the reports studied in Study 1. 
Study 1 described the method of Internet control in Singapore as the Singaporean 
model for artificial Internet limitations, a model that relies on spreading an environment 
of fear and self-censorship while taunting blocking and surveillance, without necessarily 
implementing widespread blocking and filtering on Internet websites and services. The 
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interviews touched on this subject, with S4 confirming that model, and further expressing 
confidence that rumours of what is allowed and what is not supposed to be discussed 
online affect how people use the Internet for political expression, creating an environment 
of self-censorship. 
This model, according to S4 and S1, is carried on from the days before the 
Internet, through the early days of the Internet reaching current time. In the early days of 
the Internet, before Social media Sites, pornography and websites related to drugs were 
the only websites that people could not access, but after some time, the government 
realised that existing measures and laws could not handle the Internet as expected, 
encouragement creation of new rules, which people did not protest as S4 said. A related 
point of view was expressed by S1 on the transcendence of the general fear culture from 
the street to the online world, as discussed earlier, putting the online expression especially 
when it comes to politics a zone people in Singapore avoid. S3 reflected how they feel 
the split in how people interact with the Internet, between what they want to be seen, 
versus what they do not what to be seen, is an extension to general culture in Singapore 
that was developed as a form of resilience to increased monitoring and surveillance in the 
country. 
The Singaporean model is seemingly successful in affecting people’s use of the 
Internet and the opportunities they receive online, as shown in the survey results, which 
showed that the sample from Singapore did not express achievement or satisfaction in 
any of the tangible outcomes of Internet uses measured higher than the other two 
countries. Even further, the economic achievement with income, and the social 
achievement, with all of its sub-fields of personal, formal, and political networks, did not 
pass the threshold for positive achievement, reflecting that the sample has more of neutral 
feeling towards affordances of the Internet in these activities. This was in line with the 
interviews where interviewees consistently limited the uses of the Internet in Singapore 
to mere communication and entertainment for much of the population. 
The social achievement with public and political networks, which included 
interaction with public services available online and the government, fell under the group 
of activities, that people in Singapore feel passable to be monitored as per S3. The result 
is that people provided a positive attitude and outlook to these activities in terms of 
satisfaction but not an achievement, as they are trying to make the most of it to save 
themselves time and effort, as S3 put it. The online activities included applies to licenses 
and other electronic government-related processes, but fell short in terms of political 
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expression, except when it is in line with the government and the main party official 
discourse. 
The use of circumvention tools in Singapore was the lowest among the sample, 
sitting at 42% for VPN and 20% for Proxies, which the interviewees found as plausible. 
S4 went further to clarify that people in Singapore did not rely on circumvention tools in 
the past, but it is increasing with the increase of blocking and the influence of Chinese 
use of circumvention tools, which was facilitated through the strong social ties between 
Singaporeans and Chinese. S4 said that if they were in Singapore right now, they would 
use circumvention tools to bypass blocking, and protect themselves from monitoring and 
surveillance. This assertion comes from the feeling that someone is always monitoring, 
fortified by observing a sudden drop in speed that coincided with elections, despite 
thinking that technology to manage increased demand is there, S4 believes that change in 
quality is related to the introduction of surveillance facilities. The increase in the use of 
circumvention tools was also pointed at by S1 and S2. 
The set of interviews on Singapore provided the required level of confirmation 
and expansion to the findings of the previous research instruments, from network 
measurements to researching reports and regulations, and the survey. The interviews did 
support most of the findings, particularly where people are more satisfied with Internet 
affordances, and the positive outlook many have for the opportunities the Internet is 
offering to enhance people’s lives. However, the main take was an understanding on how 
people in Singapore tend to shape their online behaviour to suit what they believe would 
save them troubles with the government, having two sets of activities, the activities that 
are passable under monitoring and surveillance, and the activities that people prefer to 
keep private form the government. However, even with these tactics, the Singaporean 
model of artificial Internet limitations that transcend fear of expression from the offline 
world to the online arena is seemingly effective in curbing people’s usage, and in turn 
limiting tangible outcomes to simple uses looking at the Internet mainly as a mean for 




This chapter covered Study 2, the part of the research that aims at measuring and 
understanding the tangible outcomes of Internet use as a measurement for digital 
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inequalities and access to opportunities in the different communities studied. The Study 
made use of mixed methods with a qualitative leg in the form of a survey available to 
Internet users in the countries of Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore, and a qualitative leg in 
the form of sequential explanatory interviews in the same countries. Both instruments 
followed the design described in the Methodology chapter and this chapter discussed how 
they were carried, with the data analysed and the main findings produced. 
The survey collected useful responses from a sample of 459 respondents from the 
three countries of study. The respondents spanned across age groups, years of Internet 
use experience, education and employment groups, as well as sex as classical 
sociodemographic indicators. The survey included questions aimed at identifying the 
tangible outcomes of Internet use in the field of economic, cultural, social, and personal 
activities online. The survey also included questions to gather individual research 
predictors that measure the perception the individual has of limitations on their Internet 
access, their ability to bypass those limitations, and the operationalisation of those skills 
by means of circumvention tools. 
Leading indicators of the sample along with correlations with classical and 
research predictors showed across the whole sample, and then over two groups of 
countries, countries with high limitations on Internet access, Bahrain and Singapore, and 
Estonia as the country with low Internet limitations, as advised by Study 1. The main 
findings for the survey and correlations can be summarised as follows: 
1. In countries with high limitations, less than 14% of the sample felt that 
their Internet access is free with no party monitoring or controlling their 
Internet use and access, compared to 43% in Estonia. 
2. The sample indicated that most monitoring and control is done through the 
government, followed by their ISP, and lastly their school or workplace. 
3. In the sample, skill to bypass limitation is correlated with perception of 
limitation, and then the use of circumvention tools is correlated with the 
skill to bypass limitations. 
4. Achievement varied among countries across the tangible outcomes of 
Internet use fields, generally, Bahrain reported higher achievement than 
Estonia, except with economic achievement with property, social 
achievement with public and political networks, and personal achievement 
with actualisation, where Estonia was ahead. 
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5. The overall satisfaction of Internet is reportedly lower in all of the overall 
fields and sub-fields in countries with high limitations than in Estonia, 
except for social satisfaction with personal networks, and personal 
achievement with leisure where Bahrain was in the lead. 
6. Respondents who reported that they are able to bypass limitations reported 
higher achievement and satisfaction across all of the fields. 
7. Respondents who reported that they use circumvention tools reported 
higher achievement and satisfaction across all of the fields, except the 
social achievement. 
8. The research predictor of perception of limitation is significantly 
correlated with higher achievement in the economic, cultural, and social 
fields for the whole sample, and just the economic and cultural field for 
the countries with high limitations. It was only correlated with satisfaction 
in the economic field for the whole sample. 
9. The research predictor of skills to bypass limitations is significantly 
correlated with higher achievement in all of the fields for the whole sample 
and for the countries with high limitations and only correlated with 
satisfaction in the personal field for the sample form countries with high 
levels of limitations. 
10. The research predictor of use of circumvention tools is significantly 
correlated with higher achievement in the economic and personal fields 
for the whole sample and the countries with high limitations. It was also 
correlated with satisfaction in the economic, cultural, and personal fields 
for the whole sample, and just the satisfaction in the personal field for the 
sample from countries with high limitations. 
The second instrument was a series of interviews conducted with carefully 
selected individuals that are expert on the countries of research, to verify and expand on 
the findings of Study 1 and the survey of Study 2. The 15 interviews generally approved 
the findings of the research and provided vital insight to fortify the findings with a better 
explanation for outcomes of the research. Main findings of the interviews can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Interviewees agreed on the high numbers of users of circumvention tools, 
particularly VPN, found in the survey, 59% in Estonia, 45% in Bahrain, 
and 42% in Singapore. In Estonia, that was explained as a way people use 
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to bypass geo-blocking and access more content online. In countries with 
high limitations, the same reason was reported, but interviewees suggested 
bypassing Internet limitations of blocking and monitoring as the primary 
motivation. 
2. Interviewees form Bahrain suggested that many people do use 
circumvention tools without technically knowing that, as for some it is 
how they know the Internet is accessed, suggesting that the number of 
users in Bahrain may be under-reported. 
3. Interviewees from Bahrain also noted that the circumvention tools are only 
useful with some types of blocking, for others, as in total shutdown of 
Internet connectivity, which some parts of the countries experienced, are 
useless. 
4. Interviewees from countries with high limitations confirmed the findings 
of Study 1 of the details of practices in place in their countries in relation 
to limiting access and the evolution of it over the years, whether the more 
technical blocking methods as in Bahrain, and the methods relying more 
on environment of control and fear as in Singapore. 
5. Interviewees from Singapore suggested that people have coped with the 
environment of fear surrounding open Internet use and free expression by 
shaping their use to what they think is acceptable by the government as 
their activities that they do openly online, while being very careful with 
other activities and may use circumvention tools at that time. Nonetheless, 
the Singaporean model is seemingly effective in curbing people’s usage, 
turning the Internet, mainly to a mean for communication and 
entertainment. 
The findings of this study confirm that there is substantiated evidence to support 
that artificial Internet limitations effect how people use the Internet, and how they make 
use of it in their daily lives to access opportunities otherwise unavailable, with limitations 
affecting satisfaction more than achievement. The discussion chapter later on mixes the 
findings further with the literature reviewed to achieve conclusion on the research 
questions, with its potential to affect communities where new networks are being set up 
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6 Discussion: Connecting Internet Limitations with Tangible Outcomes of 
Internet Use 
6.1 Introduction 
Hopes to advance communities through technology have been accompanying 
new technologies since at least early days of electrical communications, when 
breaking the barrier of time and space and allowing additional opportunities for 
people to interact and access and share information, enlighten the masses and add 
material to aspects of life as summed up by Nikola Tesla (Tesla, 1904). The digital 
forms of communication, particularly the Internet, was not different, in offering the 
potential for people from around the world to communicate and access information 
in a manner that surpassed every previous technology in adoption and potential for 
empowering individuals (Shane, 2004). However, that did not come without 
inequalities, whether propagated from existing inequalities, or novel to the digital 
world, predicted by several individual and collective attributes, from access to 
resources to the political environment and local policies regulation what people can 
access and do online. 
In this context, this research explored the specific forms of inequalities in 
access mandated by artificial Internet limitations, and their differences among various 
communities, to understand nuances of Internet usage through the lens of tangible 
outcomes. This chapter aims to building on the knowledge developed throughout the 
previous chapters to offer response to the two research questions, contributing to the 
knowledge on the effects of artificial Internet limitations on tangible outcomes of 
Internet use as the first research question. As well as providing material to support 
decision-making and shaping expectations of communities with Internet access that 
is artificially limited, including some of the projects for connecting new Internet 
users, as a response for the second research question.  
The chapter goes through the same structure as the research so far, from 
establishing the grounds for analysis based on the literature review, including the 
concepts and predictors of differences in opportunities and digital inequalities, to 
laying the details of the studies conducted. Then the chapter goes to cover the findings 
of Study 1 and the differences in artificial Internet limitations across communities 
studied as a foundation for comparison, as well as Study 2 and the outcomes of the 
investigation on the tangible outcomes of Internet use in those communities with 
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focus on the effect of different predictors on these outcomes. The findings are 
discussed to provide advice for an application on other networks, particularly which 
are limited by design, to predict outcomes of use among the communities they will 
serve as in Study 3. 
6.2 Grounds for analysis 
With the development of the Internet to become the base for digital 
communication in the current human era, opportunities offered by technology 
expanded horizontally to cover broader aspects of the daily lives of people. 
Nevertheless, the role played by the Internet is dependent on a series of variables that 
dictate who can do what, in an extension of inequalities to the digital world. Internet 
adoption and usage were more complicated than those of previous technologies, as 
making use of it relied on a collection of variables from the availability of electricity, 
devices, and connectivity, and the specific sets of skills required by the individual to 
be able to access and use the Internet. However, these variables were still unable to 
capture the full picture to predict inequalities in what outcomes and benefit people get 
from the Internet. 
The variables affecting digital opportunities were studied in the field of 
communication as predictors for the diffusion and adoption of the Internet and 
differentiation in access and use through positional, personal, technological, and other 
factors. The literature review looked through main theories in the field including van 
Dijk’s sequential model for technology adoption, which transitioned from adoption 
to participation in society, whether economic, social, spatial, cultural, political, or 
institutional (van Dijk, 2005a). The difference in digital access to opportunities, or 
the digital divide, continued to receive research to understand what predicts it in the 
hope of mending it to fulfil the hopes for equality and advancement of humanity. 
The digital inequalities research included researching the three primary levels 
of the digital divide, with the difference between who has access and who does not, 
as with the first level of digital divide (van Dijk and Hacker, 2003). And the second 
level of digital divide looked at the difference in the ways people use the Internet 
online and the digital skills they possess, or lack of thereof (van Dijk, 2006; Parent 
and Cruickshank, 2009; Ragnedda and Muschert, 2015). This level introduced factors 
that have the potential to cross-cut classical social stratifications reflection on digital 
inequalities, as well as the third level of the digital divide pushed forward research on 
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digital inequalities to study the tangible outcomes of Internet use, in what is known 
as the third level digital divide (van Deursen and Helsper, 2015; Ragnedda, 2017).  
Researchers like van Dijk summarised differences to revolve around four 
main categories of inequalities, including the immaterial inequalities as life chances 
and freedom, material inequalities including capital and resources, social inequalities 
such as position, power, and participation, and educational inequalities such as 
capabilities and skills (van Dijk, 2006). The variation in opportunities in these 
categories had the potential to capture most differences on the individual level, as 
well as wider differences that affect wider communities in a multidimensional 
perspective of inequalities, however, as qualified by the literature review, the body of 
research studied covered predictors of access with no much coverage on differences 
in limitations imposed on access. The limitations covered in the body of research 
included what is imposed on a small scale of communities as in schools or libraries 
on access to knowledge, or on political participation in countries, as discussed by 
Wagner & Gainous (2013)  and Yang et al. (2013). Nonetheless, the limited coverage 
of the issue of fettered or artificially limited access and its effect on digital inequalities 
offered the grounds for this research. 
Inequalities in the digital world encompasses individuals within communities 
and structures of the connected, as part of the Network Society, defining the 
interactions and power relationships across social actors in relation to the online 
world, with the asymmetrical influence guiding the opportunities different parties 
receive and possibly intensifying alienation and social inequalities as a cost of 
technology (Castells, 2004, 2011; van Dijk, 2005b). Although Castells view of the 
network society is not necessarily technical, their description of the network society 
fits the structures of the digital society, with different players exerting their powers to 
control the infrastructure and media, the message, and the relations between nodes of 
that structure. 
This research built on the body of knowledge of differentiation among 
individuals in the opportunities as mandated by differentiation in artificial limitations 
imposed on their Internet access as communities. The artificial Internet limitations 
are the controls set over the Internet that shape the access, as described in the literature 
review to include content, website, and service blocking and censorship, as well as 
speed control and other access limitations to full Internet shutdowns. The common 
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among these limitations is that they fall under the networking and network-making 
powers of the network society putting the decision power in the hand of gatekeepers 
and network programmers (Hargittai, 2000; DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2001; Castells, 
2011). These actors can be the controllers of the immediate networks as with school 
or workplace networks, to broader networks Internet Service Provider, and national 
networks governed by governmental regulations and influence. 
Studying the differentiation in opportunities online, or digital inequalities is 
manifested in this research as the study of opportunities of tangible outcomes of 
Internet use for individuals, relying on the framework developed by the Digital Skills 
to Tangible Outcomes project (Helsper, van Deursen and Eynon, 2015). However, the 
effort taken to minimise the size of the survey within the framework limited the 
outcomes to general common aspects, and did not capture, for instance, issues directly 
related to freedom of expression, leaving it to be deduced from other tangible 
outcomes, such as communication within the public networks and from the other 
research instruments, including the interviews. Nonetheless, this framework offers 
the potential to understanding differentiation in usage, especially among communities 
with high Internet adoption rates and high digital skills to understand how digital 
inequalities are either normalised and faded away or stratified through an enduring 
pattern of inequalities. To measure the change in opportunities as a function of 
artificial Internet limitations, the research looked at three communities part of the 
global network society that differs in the level of artificial Internet limitations, 
Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore. Finally, the outcomes are compiled as predictors of 
outcomes that can be projected to other limited networked communities to predict 
outcomes there. 
6.3 Artificial Internet limitations in communities studied 
Analysis of network measurements collected through tests on networks 
operating in the countries of study reflected the current state and the forms of artificial 
Internet limitations that are implemented as part of these networks, and the extent of 
the limitations with details on what categories of content and services is being 
controlled as a form of applying network powers. However, as clarified in the chapter 
on Study 2, these results apply to the lists of websites and services tested, leaving a 
room for other websites and services that may be controlled to not being documented 
or tested, and producing false negatives. While false positives, or the mis-
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categorisation of a service as blocked while it is not, is less likely to happen within 
the testing framework. 
All of the three countries studied showed levels of artificial Internet 
limitations applied to networks in it, with most of the limitations being enforced by 
the respective governments and implemented by the Internet Service Providers, the 
power exerted by the governments stem from the regulatory environment and 
requirements set to license the companies to operate. This displays a level of 
governmental control that challenges trends of communication sector as predicted by 
van Dijk, who argued that the private sector will set loose of governmental control to 
be the final result of regulatory development (van Dijk, 2005b, p. 84), or at least 
indicate that the current situation is far from what it may achieve in the future. 
van Dijk's predictions have also suggested the need for measures governing 
computer networks to protect against threats on privacy produced by the expansion 
of networks and integration with individual lives while control and authority are 
unchanged, through legislation, self-regulation, and technological solution (van Dijk, 
2005b, p. 117). However, the findings of Study 1 suggest that the legislation is moving 
towards protecting the status quo under the pretext of protecting public morals and 
racial and religious sensitivities of the society in a manner that implies imposing 
artificial limitations on Internet use. The limitations were found to be direct 
limitations through technical blocking and filtering, and indirect through regulations 
that penalise forms of use and expression, in a manifestation of the code relations as 
an instrument of power, as described in the literature review. 
In Bahrain, these limitations were found to be a continuation of the 
government’s 1990s history of telephone and correspondence monitoring and 
surveillance concepts extended in the form of monitoring of Internet activity and 
imposing controls on access. The controls targeted outlets and services that are 
deemed critical to the regime in Bahrain, especially when it comes to criticism of the 
ruling family, as well as websites and services that fall under various categories of 
content, particularly gambling, pornography, and anonymization and circumvention 
tools. The limitations did not leave content and services that fall under other 
categories sparred but are more selective by limiting less number of websites that fall 
under the religion, news media, human rights issues, LGBT, and communication tools 
categories as tested. 
224 
The results also showed symptoms of dynamicity of the blocking across time 
and variations between networks, implying that there is no one central filtering system 
covering all networks, but slightly different setups in different networks that follow 
governmental instructions. The government control over the Internet took several 
shapes over the years, with multiple bodies established and regulations issued to 
control media and information especially online, reflecting how important the 
government thinks of the Internet as a mobilisation media. The executive branch did 
also interfere with the Internet with what seems to be efforts to ordain the environment 
of fear among the citizens of Bahrain when it comes to online activity by issuing 
messages to the public warning of the repercussion of sharing misinformation or even 
following accounts that do so, as reported in Study 1. 
The main form of technical blocking in Bahrain as found through network 
measurements is based on as URL blocking, which can be bypassed using simple 
circumvention, including changing domain name servers used to ones that are not 
controlled by Bahraini ISPs or using tools as with proxies and VPNs. However, other 
forms of limitations have been practices in Bahrain that did not allow for a margin of 
circumvention, as with Internet shutdowns and deep packet inspection. Despite the 
high limitations found to be affecting access to anonymization and circumvention 
tools and the blocking on related services, such as the underlying TOR network, the 
research found that there is a high level of use of these tools in Bahrain with half of 
the survey responders stating that they use at least one of those tools. The interviews 
suggested that the actual scale of use of circumvention tools is likely higher than 
reported because many people do use it without realising the technical terms for it.  
Another form of artificial Internet limitations in Bahrain takes the form of 
wide-scale surveillance assisted by technologies implemented to monitor online 
activity, and plans to implement centralised Internet control and monitoring solutions, 
as advised in Study1. In addition to that, Study 1 also unveiled targeted surveillance 
and technical attacks against individuals, including dissidents and people expressing 
their opinion online, which, when accompanied with the media coverage it brings 
along, contributes to the intimidation of people in Bahrain from the consequences of 
Internet use.  
Internet limitations, whether through access control or monitoring and 
surveillance, are highly visible to people in Bahrain as reported in the survey and 
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interview instruments of Study 2, with 89% of respondents to the survey feeling that 
at least one party is monitoring or controlling their Internet access. This visibility 
provides fertile soil for a political stronghold on the Internet that produces a chilling 
effect on Internet use and a high level of self-censorship. However, the survey of 
tangible outcomes of Internet use showed otherwise, as the visibility of limitations in 
Bahrain does not appear to be negatively affecting achievement in the general tangible 
outcomes of Internet use, but is clearly affecting satisfaction. 
In Singapore, studying the Internet and the artificial limitations imposed on it 
showed that there are many similarities with the situation in Bahrain, both countries 
have very high Internet penetration rates with high availability and affordability in 
Internet access, and the governments in both are similarly concerned of Internet as a 
medium and the message that it carries. The motivation form imposing limitations in 
both countries are labelled as to protect morals and maintain delicate civil equilibrium 
across different components of the respective societies. Nevertheless, despite these 
similarities, there are fundamental differences, as observed in this research, in the 
model used for implementing Internet limitations to serve the announced and subvert 
motivations for controlling access to media and information.  
The model in Singapore puts less weight behind technical limitations while 
relying heavily on shaping of individual’s behaviour online through intimidation and 
establishing fear in the minds of people in Singapore from use that deems immoral or 
can be a reason for persecution based on libel laws and content shared or in 
possession, as well as opinions expressed online. The fear factor is also achieved 
through light-handed technical controls, particularly transparent blocking, that the 
network measurements of Study 1 found to be of sporadic nature with the list of 
blocked websites rotating over time. The rotating blocking results in maintaining an 
image that only a small number of websites is blocked at any given time while 
building fear for anyone that is unlucky enough to try to access any of those websites 
when they blocked through a series of laws. Some of the troublesome laws include 
the recent Public Order and Safety Act and the works towards laws that target “fake 
news”, which, as described in Study 1, were received as drastically restricting online 
media and freedom of expression. 
The Internet limitation practices in Singapore seem to be more effective in 
controlling and shaping the use of the Internet, as was established in the interviews 
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and the survey results conducted as part of Study 2. The interviews confirmed that 
people in Singapore see the limitations as a fact of life, and as a result, have developed 
coping techniques by shaping their use as two types, what they think is tolerable by 
the government as the type of activities they conduct openly. While any other activity 
that may put them under the radar or under risk fall under a category of uses that 
people are very cautious with, and may use circumvention tools to conduct.  
However, despite these coping techniques, the interviews recognised that 
Internet use in Singapore is below its potential and is mainly limited to 
communication and entertainment, a fact that was also reflected in the survey, where 
Singapore scored the lowest levels of mean achievement and satisfaction in most of 
the fields of tangible outcomes of Internet use. The only fields where the survey from 
Singapore reported levels higher than the other country with high limitations, Bahrain, 
are the economic achievement in terms of property, all of the economic satisfaction 
sub-fields, and personal achievement and satisfaction in the Self Actualisation sub-
field, but it always fell behind what was reported from Estonia. 
The country that seemed to be in odds with the other two countries in how 
Internet affordances are perceived and dealt with in this research is Estonia. Alike the 
other countries, the Internet is seen as a force for development, but Estonia differs in 
that there are no official positions that perceive the Internet as  source of nuance and 
a threat to morals and stability, but rather a system that looks at technology as key to 
state-building, relying heavily on electronic government solutions for public services.  
Network measurement in Estonia detected transparent blocking of several 
gambling websites, a finding supported by the reports and research on regulations by 
the 2010 law on remote (online) gambling. Other limitations detected showed limited 
transparent blocking at institutional or corporate networks, while some measurements 
showed anomalies that may indicate further non-transparent locking, although 
minimal. The transparency in applying the technical limitations, and the supportive 
environment for Internet use that does not involve intimidation or coercion for 
dissident expression and use, had clear results in the survey. One aspect showed that 
43% of survey respondents from Estonia reflected that they do not feel that any party 
is either monitoring or controlling their Internet use, compared to a shy 11% in 
Bahrain, and 14% in Singapore. 
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Study 1 also unveiled that through the reports analysed on Estonia, there is an 
eagerness of Estonian regulators to lead in regulations supporting freedom of access 
and expression while maintaining compliance with European Union regulations, with 
high focus on cyber-security. Estonia maintains relatively open Internet access, 
fettered only to limit gambling websites that are considered illegal and limited 
blocking on multiple levels, with no repercussions for online expression, resulting in 
no or little self-censorship. 
Structures related to providing and controlling Internet services in the 
countries studied reflected a tripartite relationship between governments, network 
operators, and individuals. The governments in all of the countries studied would 
practice regulatory and licensing powers, in an incarnation of Castells’ networked and 
network making powers, as described in the literature review, over ISPs as network 
providers to implement Internet controls to fulfil its needs in the form of exercising 
gatekeeping as part of networking power over individuals. In addition to the controls 
of blocking and limiting access to content and services that are deemed unlawful, the 
controls would also include providing the ability to monitor usage. One example of 
the later is the lawful access requirements of the Bahraini Telecommunication 
Regulatory Authority, which requires network operators to provide means necessary 
to conduct surveillance and monitoring of individual Internet usage to entities 
concerned with national or international security (BahrainTRA, 2009). 
In countries of high limitations, another form of power relation was prominent 
in the research finding is the direct implementation of the networked power by the 
governments over individuals, through the rules, regulations, and practices that 
empower coercion and intimidation of use that may be deemed illegal or pose threat 
to the country’s ethnic and religious stability or national security. This was clear from 
the Study 1 findings of the laws implemented, and cases acted on, as well as the 
interviews of Study 2, and was noticed to take place in countries of high limitations 
on Internet access. Figure 6-1 shows the different power exerted in the tripartite 
relationships, with the difference between Estonia as the country with low levels of 



















Regulatory and Coercion Powers *
 
Note: * Denotes powers prominent in countries with high limitations. 
The potential of individuals to spring over digital inequality divides in the 
countries studied faced artificial Internet limitations that have played a role in shaping 
individual use of the Internet and their agency to utilise Internet affordances to 
achieve better tangible outcomes of use. Study 2 showed that these limitations are 
reported as visible by 77% of the sample who felt that at least one party is controlling 
or monitoring their Internet access. This effect is challenged by the agency to bypass 
said limitations, as measured in the survey by the ability to bypass monitoring and 
accessing blocked websites and services, and the knowledge and use of circumvention 
tools, table 6-1 shows the results of these factors from different countries of study. 
Table 6-1 
Levels of Perception of Limitation, Skills to Bypass Limitations, And 
Circumvention Use in Countries of Study 
 
Bahrain Estonia Singapore 
Perception of 
Limitation 
21.61 13.78 20.81 
Skill, Bypass 
Limitations 
5.85 4.78 4.75 
Circumvention Use 3.72 4.08 3.68 
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Although the interviews instrument of Study 2 showed that some of the usages 
of circumvention, principally in Estonia, is motivated by will to access content 
artificially limited by means of geo-blocking imposed by content providers rather than 
local governments or network operators, primary motivation in countries with high 
limitations was reported to be involving bypassing control and monitoring politically 
driven. Because of the role of the factors of perception of limitation, skills to bypass 
limitations, and circumvention use have in overcoming artificial Internet limitations, 
they represented the research variables for determining digital inequalities in the form 
of tangible outcomes of Internet use. 
6.4 Limitations as predictors of tangible outcomes 
This research built on the growing literature in the field of digital inequalities 
to establish the indicators that can be relied on to foresee differences in opportunities 
among members of the network society who are members of communities where 
Internet access is widely diffused, an area that was described as a place we know little 
of (van Deursen et al., 2016). The research set to study predictors beyond the classical 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic predictors prominent in the field Inspired by 
the post-modernist approach to digital inequalities as described by Servaes and 
Oyedemi (2016), and the newer Weberian perspective to digital inequalities 
(Ragnedda, 2017). This approach allowed for broad multidimensional encapsulation 
of inequalities and the inclusion of artificial Internet limitations related variables as 
predictors along classical predictors of digital inequalities. 
The approach, as described in the methodology chapter, relied on measuring 
tangible outcomes of Internet use and contrasting them from two perspectives. The 
first viewpoint is how inequalities differ between communities that have different 
levels of artificial Internet limitations imposed, while the second deals with the whole 
research sample as one network society and studies the inequalities among individuals 
based on predictors related to individual attributes of artificial Internet limitations. 
The first viewpoint provided clear results that linked artificial Internet 
limitations and related predictors on the community level with tangible outcomes of 
Internet use in terms of achievement and satisfaction in economic, cultural, social, 
and personal activities. Study 2 instruments showed that satisfaction in all of the fields 
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was higher in Estonia than any of the countries with high limitations, Bahrain and 
Singapore. Bahrain was leading in achievement of most of the outcome fields, as 
detailed in Chapter 5, except with economic achievement in property, personal 
achievement in Self Actualisation, and social achievement with political networks. 
To understand the differences among different communities, the tripartite 
groups of the network society as described by van Dijk (van Dijk, 2005b, p. 174), 
detailed in the literature review, provides an adequate structure to understand the 
results of the research on tangible outcomes. The structure suggests the Information 
Elite as a group who have the power to make all-important decision in society, in our 
context, these are who are able to use the Internet in any form or method they like, 
with no limitations imposed, from the satisfaction levels, the research suggests that 
Estonia as a community falls into this group. The peculiar aspect here is that the 
Estonian community is transforming from having its own information elite and access 
privileged, or Nomenklatura (Vartanova, 2002), into becoming one as a community 
among other countries in the world. 
The second and third groups of the tripartite are the Participating Majority 
and the Disconnected and Excluded. Bahrain and Singapore seem to be falling in 
between these groups, as these communities do have high levels of access and do 
participate in the network society as evident by the achievement levels of the tangible 
outcomes of Internet use. However, the artificial Internet limitations set on their 
access, whether direct or indirect, is limiting the satisfaction with the affordances and 
use of the Internet, as in both countries, and shaping the uses of the Internet access by 
affecting achievement as prominent in the case of Singapore, where, as interviewees 
put it, the Internet is used for communication and entertainment. Even in 
communication, the survey showed that the sample from Singapore achieved less than 
the threshold for positive achievement in the social field particularly in political and 
formal networks, leaving entertainment, as represented by personal achievement in 
terms of leisure, achievement, and satisfaction in personal Self Actualisation, and 
economic achievement and satisfaction as the highest reported outcomes in 
Singapore. Through the same view, the outcomes that were not viewed positively in 
Bahrain were the economic achievement in income, social achievement in political 
networks, and cultural satisfaction with identity. 
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When looking at the two countries with high limitations, another relation can 
also be constructed from the skills to bypass limitations and the use of circumvention 
tools on the one hand, and the achievement and satisfaction reported by these 
countries. The relation suggests that activities that would involve using local services, 
as with the economic activities, as advised by the interviews, are the ones were less 
use of circumvention use provides better satisfaction and achievement. On the other 
end, activities that would involve accessing wider networks or ability to participate in 
more full discussions, such as cultural and social aspects, including political activities, 
were higher where there were higher skills for bypassing limitations and higher use 
of circumvention tools.  
Social achievement and satisfaction in terms of interaction with public 
services and political networks as compared among the countries of study showed 
that achievement and satisfaction was higher in Estonia than in the countries with 
high limitations, with the survey sample from Singapore providing the lowest levels 
in both sub-fields reflecting what the literature review described as the democratic 
divide. This form of the divide is described by Norris (2001) to be the differentiation 
in the use of the Internet for civic participation and the gap between those utilising 
the Internet to participate in public discussions and change, and those who use the 
Internet as passive consumers. The same findings also add to Seong-Jae Min’s views 
on the democratic divide (2010), which found that skills and motivation are essential 
in addition to access to encourage meaningful use of technology for politics, the 
addition is that this research showed that coercion as a form of artificial Internet 
limitation is also influential in this divide, although negatively. 
The findings at community level suggest that the ability of using 
circumvention tools and possession of skills to bypass limitations have the potential 
to counterbalance artificial Internet limitations by allowing for better achievement. 
These aspects of skills and use were found to be related with higher perception of 
limitation, an aspect that the research proved to be connected to lower levels of 
satisfaction among individuals. The connection between outcomes and perception of 
limitation suggests a method for measuring embodied coercion practised by the power 
in control of the networks in countries with high limitations through studying Internet 
use satisfaction and perceived limitations. The relations described above yet again 
show that coercion is more effective than technical limitations in deteriorating 
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Internet open use and satisfaction, especially when combined with a limited ability of 
using circumvention tools that allow an agency to offset for the deterioration in use. 
However, the ability to offset limitations, whether direct or indirect, 
necessitates knowing how to bypass the limitations and to operationalise that 
knowledge, with the use of circumvention tools as a possible application. The 
research suggested that it is possible for people to be using circumvention tools 
without realising the technicalities behind it, and thus reporting that they do not have 
the skill to bypass limitations nor do operationalise it. That still does not weaken the 
position of that measurement as an indicator but suggests a room for quantitative 
network measurements to count for that more accurately. 
Studying inequalities at the community level, despite the merits it offers, 
would still be limited and prone to influence of other cross-cultural aspects that may 
wither when reviewing inequalities with predictors at the individual level with the 
whole sample as members of one network society. Here, studying predictors at the 
individual level offered wider range of predictors by gauging against 
sociodemographic indicators as well as research indicators of perception of limitation, 
skills to bypass limitations, and circumvention use as described earlier. 
Analysis of Study 2 showed a relation between possessing skills to bypass 
limitations and the achievement and satisfaction at the individual level in a manner 
similar to that at a community level. Individuals who possess the skill to bypass 
artificial Internet limitations reported higher achievement and satisfaction than 
individuals who do not possess such skills across all of the fields studied. However, 
this metric at its own may not entirely reflect the relation and is prone to providing 
false positives because people may have the skill to bypass limitation as part of the 
overall digital skills and not necessarily as a response to limitations. 
A possible method to factor for the possible false positives related to overall 
digital skills, actual operationalisation of the skill to bypass limitation through the 
actual use of circumvention tools offer a metric to connect limitations and the agency 
to bypassing them to achievement and satisfaction. The validity of that assumption is 
further amplified when taking into consideration the input from interviews that 
suggested that the primary motivation for using circumvention tools in the countries 
with high limitations is to bypass limitations, as explained earlier. 
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The use of circumvention tools proved to be related at the individual level to 
higher achievement and satisfaction across all of the fields studied, except the social 
achievement. The level of opportunities offered by the use of circumvention tools is 
slightly less than that of the skill to bypass limitation across the fields, suggesting that 
there is, in fact, the factor of overall digital skills to provide higher opportunities no 
matter of limitations imposed. The social achievement field showed that people who 
reported that they do use circumvention tools achieve less than those who do not, 
The effect of using circumvention tools to limit that effect of artificial Internet 
limitations at the individual level can be interpreted through the normalisation of 
access view of digital inequalities as proposed by Norris (2001). The normalisation 
view proposes that over time, with more people connected and technology becoming 
more available to people, the digital divide would shrink to the point that it is no 
longer relevant, as opposed to the stratification view where the digital divide is 
maintained as difference in Internet adoption starting point of different social groups 
dictates difference at endpoints.  
When looking at the achievement dimension of tangible outcomes of Internet 
use levels as different endpoints, and the opportunities held through imposing 
artificial Internet limitations as starting point. The agency provided by the use of 
circumvention tools appear to be bridging the gap, and offering people falling in the 
limited group the opportunity to achieve equally or better than people in the non-
limited group. The gap here is normalised, but at the same time, people who do not 
use circumvention tools are still affected until their agency is developed to 
counterbalance the limitations. 
However, the satisfaction dimension has a different trend, which can be 
described under the stratification view, where people under limitations as a starting 
point, report less satisfaction as the endpoint than those who use the Internet 
unfettered. Thus effectively maintaining different strata of individuals based on their 
ability to bypass artificial Internet limitations and the operationalisation of that ability. 
As we have seen earlier, the indirect limitations have a more substantial effect in this 
regard, with coercion as the main power that is limiting the individual from enhancing 
their opportunities for better outcomes of Internet use. 
Study 2 went further to study the correlations between classical and research 
predictors at one end, and the different fields and sub-fields of tangible outcomes of 
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Internet use. The tabulation used so far between findings offered a good overview of 
the results, but statistical correlations offer a more particular view of the predictors 
that displayed significant correlation and the effect size of that correlation. The 
statistical correlations were generally in agreement with the tabulation results, but 
some of the relations did not pass the significance threshold assessment, and thus 
dropped. 
The correlations that passed the correlation significance threshold for the main 
fields of tangible outcomes of Internet use are summarised in figure 6-2, demonstrated 
as achievement and satisfaction of each of the fields. For achievement, the predictor 
representing how aware an individual is about limitations set on their networks, the 
perception of limitation, is positively correlated with economic, cultural, and social 
achievement, meaning that people who are more conscious about limitations have 
better opportunities in achievement.  
Figure 6-2 














































Skills to bypass limitations proved to be positively correlated to all of the 
tangible outcomes of Internet use, with the highest effect on economic achievement 
and personal achievement, followed by cultural and personal achievements, 
respectively. At the same time, the operationalisation of those skills, the use of 
circumvention tools, proved to be positively correlated with economic and personal 
achievement. 
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The behaviour of the predictors in countries with high limitations was slightly 
different from that with the whole sample, with perception of limitations affecting 
economic achievement and cultural achievement, as detailed in figure 6-3. The skills 
to bypass limitations proved to be important in predicting all of the four fields of 
achievement, as well as personal satisfaction, while the use of circumvention tools 
was correlated with personal achievement and satisfaction. 
Figure 6-3 
Correlations between Research Predictors and Tangible Outcomes in the 










































An explanation for the positive correlations of research predictors is the 
coping mechanisms, as advised by the interviews, where people that are aware of the 
limitations, although may not be satisfied, develop techniques related to use of 
Internet activities. The techniques, as described in by the interviewees, particularly in 
Bahrain and Singapore, involve developing skills to bypassing limitations and using 
circumvention tools. However, as the survey results and further explanation from 
interviews concluded, the coping practices predict different outcomes in satisfaction. 
The satisfaction with the tangible outcomes of Internet use proved to be harder to 
determine using the research predictors, with the perception of limitation negatively 
correlated with economic satisfaction, while the use of circumvention tools provided 
opportunity to enhance levels of satisfaction in personal, economic, and cultural fields 
respectively. 
The positive correlation between the use of circumvention tools and 
satisfaction is particular in that it does not follow the same findings of the study at 
community level, which showed that people in communities with high levels of 
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limitations are less satisfied in general with internet affordances. To look further into 
this finding, the correlations between use of circumvention tools and levels of 
satisfaction at the individual level in the countries of high limitations were examined, 
to find that use of circumvention tools in these countries is only significantly 
correlated with the personal satisfaction field. The examination suggests that the 
difference in results comes from the high levels of satisfaction reported from users of 
circumvention tools in Estonia, who are the highest among the whole sample at 60% 
of respondents from Estonia. Since use of circumvention tools in Estonia is motivated 
by limitations set by content providers as a form of geo-blocking as found earlier, it 
is fundamentally different from the forms of limitations of interest to this research at 
this level but is relevant to Study 3. As a result, it seemed logical to drop the 
assumption of correlation between use of circumvention tools and satisfaction at 
individual level across the whole sample, and maintain it with countries of high 
limitations and at community level. 
The various outcomes of Internet use and their satisfaction, and the 
relationships found with artificial Internet limitations provide a substantiated view to 
support the hypothesis that artificial Internet limitations do affect Internet use, even 
when they are limited in technical implementation and covering a limited number of 
websites and services. In fact, the higher effect comes from coercion and intimidation 
of monitoring and surveillance of Internet use that leads to prosecution, as with the 
case in Singapore, and to some extent, Bahrain. Predictors related to limitations had 
equal of higher correlation with outcomes than classical determinants, suggesting the 
necessity of including artificial Internet limitations as a factor when studying digital 
inequalities. 
6.5 Summary 
Building on the knowledge assimilated in the literature review, this chapter 
set to explain the compiled findings of Study 1 and Study 2 to answer the first research 
question, what is the relationship between artificial Internet limitations and tangible 
outcomes of Internet use, following the design set in the methodology chapter. The 
aim is to test the hypothesis that artificial Internet limitations do indeed. 
The Internet, as a digital form of communication, offers the potential for 
people from around the world to communicate and access information in a manner 
that allows for digital inequalities, in theory, to diminish away as better access is 
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available to more people. However, in practice, digital inequalities seem to be 
persisting, taking different forms and shapes. This research proved that even among 
communities with very high Internet availability, digital inequalities persist as a result 
of artificial Internet limitations. To reach an informed conclusion, this research 
surveyed the field of digital inequalities to enumerate the most common predictors 
studied and worked to augment them with predictors that are able to perceive the 
limitations and agency in relation to the hypothesis. The classical determinants in the 
current dominant body of knowledge follow classical socio-economic inequalities 
determinants, with socio-demographic and socio-economic factors. This research 
extended the predictors with variables that reflect the existence of limitation and 
perception, as well as the agency to bypass limitations in the form of skills to bypass, 
and the operationalisation of that skill by means of circumvention tools use, following 
the post-modernist view of inequalities. This view, in contrast with the structuralist 
and culturalist views, allowed for capturing most variation in opportunities on the 
individual level, by allowing for different variables from different groups to be 
studied, as well as differences that are more extensive to affect wider communities, 
in a multidimensional perspective of inequalities. 
The artificial Internet limitations found to exist in the networks studied in the 
form of governments practising networked and network making powers through 
regulatory and licensing enforcement over ISPs, as network providers, to implement 
Internet controls to fulfil its gatekeeping and control needs as part of networking 
power over individuals. In Bahrain and Singapore, the Internet controls followed suit 
long traditions of media and message controls, with an additional power found 
prominent and exerted by the government directly over individuals. Through 
regulations and practices that empower coercion and intimidation of media use that 
may be seen as a threat to the regime under the pretexts of protecting country’s ethnic 
and religious stability and national security. 
On the individual level, some of the people surveyed in all of the countries of 
the study expressed, at different levels, which they are conscious about the limitations 
set on their Internet use, have the skills to bypass these limitations, and do use tools 
that allow utilisation of the skills to bypass limitations through using circumvention 
tools actively. These parameters were found to effect tangible outcomes of Internet 
use, with some fields of the outcomes showing higher correlations with these 
determinants than other outcomes, suggesting that the effect is not uniform over all 
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forms of outcomes in terms of achievement and satisfaction. The effect was more 
apparent with the satisfaction than that with the achievement, suggesting that 
individuals tend to find ways to exploit Internet affordances no matter of the 
limitations imposed on them, but this does not mean that their dissatisfaction coming 
from the limitations is compensated for. 
The research did also conclude an important aspect related to the limitations, 
the assumption pertinent to agency counterbalancing artificial Internet limitations is 
that it is possible to circumvent these limitations and bypass controls and monitoring 
that are part of it. The practices in the countries studied did show that circumvention 
is possible despite the efforts put in place to limit the accessibility of websites and 
services that offer such abilities, however, when more extreme measures have been 
taken, as with regular network shutdowns in areas of Bahrain, circumvention was not 
possible, and the effect would be much more strident. Nonetheless, the research 
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7 Study 3, Tangible outcomes as predicted for the Internet for the Next Billion(s) 
networks 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates Internet for the next billion projects through the 
knowledge on the predicted tangible outcomes of Internet use by determinants related to 
artificial Internet limitations developed in the previous chapters to indicate opportunities 
at a community or individual level, and the digital inequalities constructed or eradicated. 
The Internet for next billion access is discussed as a community of mainly new Internet 
users having that form of access as their only or primary medium. As a response to the 
second research question, the chapter is an application for the research findings and is 
meant to provide information to support policy decision-making in relation with Internet 
availability and forms of it by highlighting the consequences of artificial Internet 
limitations and thus contributing to the transformative prospects of the research. 
Connecting the next billion aims at reaching the unconnected where being 
connected is not a matter of choice by building and extended infrastructure, and making 
access more available, necessarily addressing the primary condition of being on the right 
side in terms of digital inequalities, access. The unconnected in this case, and as found 
earlier, are mostly from countries with the lowest income resulting in the global digital 
divide (WorldBank, 2018), essentially the disconnected and excluded at the periphery of 
the information society as described by van Dijk (2005b). The global digital divide was 
also described as an aspect of the economic divide between countries, resulting in the 
countries on the wrong side to be deprived of political power and related cultural skills. 
Which are a requirement for active participation in the information society as per Fuchs 
and Horak, indicating a digital apartheid as a result of hundreds of years of exploitation, 
exclusion, and dependency (2008). 
To address the global digital divide on the international level, connecting 
countries and communities that are on the deprived side of the divide was declared as a 
priority in multiple fora, from World Summit on the Information Society to the UN 
General Assembly (WSIS, 2003b, 2003a; UNGA, 2015a). Connecting the Next 
Billion(s), as described by the 2015 and 2016 Internet Governance Forum (2015, 2016) 
remained a priority and was included in the Sustainable Development Goals to be 
achieved by 2030 (UNGA, 2015b, sec. 9). However, the literature review highlighted that 
much of the effort conducted to reach the unconnected masses are led by companies with 
ambitious projects, from Company X Project Loon (Alphabet, 2017), to connect regions 
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through a network of connected balloons, to satellite constellations by OneWeb (2016), 
and another by SpaceX (Moon, 2016). Nonetheless, one of the few projects that 
materialised to be used in several regions around the world is Facebook’s Internet.org, 
which at this time relies on using existing mobile infrastructure to provide free access, 
with research on using drones to provide access (Facebook, 2017; Internet.org, 2017). 
The drive behind these projects to connecting the unconnected was discussed in 
the literature review based on the perspectives of shifts in Internet economies and the 
valorisation potential more connected people bring leading to digital labour and cyber-
proletariat (Andrejevic, 2012, 2013; Fuchs, 2012, 2014; Dyer-Witheford, 2015). The 
potential brought by more users instigated a connectivity race among the corporations 
that are in a position of power to be able to exploit the valorisation potential to their 
benefit, notably Google, through its sister company Company X, and Facebook 
(VentureBeat, 2016; Yim, Gomez and Carter, 2016). The position of power of Company 
X and Facebook put them in the position of holistic network providers, compared to 
infrastructure providers, like SpaceX and OneWeb.  
Although the methods different projects are taking differ immensely, the common 
form expected from any effort to connect the next billion is the abstract form of access to 
having the affordances to reach websites and online services. However, from the little 
information available on the technicalities behind some of the projects, such as Project 
Loon, it can be concluded that difference in range of access and other artificial Internet 
limitations seem to be setting different endeavours apart, with the holistic network 
providers having higher interest in keeping the users within their networks, or walled 
gardens. The maintenance of users within the network is a requirement for the valorisation 
of access, and with the scale of the network covered by each of the two companies 
mentioned. Each constitutes a considerable array of services, offered either directly or 
through partner sites. Alphabet’s network constitutes of all of Google services, including 
YouTube, and extends to any website were advertisements are served by Google, while 
Facebook’s network constitutes of the company's social media platforms, including 
WhatsApp and Instagram, as well as the flagship Facebook platform and its partner sites. 
Facebook’s efforts to reach to the next billion users can be identified as two-faced. 
The first face is researching into technologies to extend Internet infrastructural reach to 
remote areas, particularly through the drones mentioned earlier (Facebook, 2017). The 
second face is an effort that utilises current technologies by offering free access to 
connectivity to where there is already mobile service provisioned through collaborating 
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with mobile network operators as with the current Internet.org model through the Free 
Basics platform (Internet.org, 2017). Since Free Basics is the only project that has been 
provisioned and used by individuals in multiple areas, 61 countries as of 2017 
(Internet.org, 2017), it is best positioned as a case study for Study 3, with the countries 
covered in Study 1 and 2 not of the countries where the platform is available. The position 
of Free Basics allows reflecting the research findings on the service available to predict 
the contribution towards the bridging of access gap and digital divide enable digital 
equalities or establishing inequality as part of its design. 
7.2 Facebook’s Free Basics 
The model used with Facebook’s Free Basics is a form of zero-rating services in 
its essence. The zero-rating model is a spectrum of services and initiatives that differ in 
their taxonomy and motivation but share the concept of allowing access to select Internet 
services and content without incurring data charges or the data being deducted from their 
data allowance (Bates, Bavitz and Hessekiel, 2017). Although zero-rating offers a more 
comprehensive access to people by eliminating the need for funds to access content and 
thus have the potential to eliminate first level of digital divide, if one has access to a 
suitable device and network, it has been received with mixed views. 
Although views in support of zero-rating showed the benefits, it brings in 
increasing access as a stopgap measure, and a critical drive to enable innovation and 
consumer choice, as in the limited research of Lyons (2015). The counterpart had stronger 
views, and zero-rating has being accused of creating artificial scarcity and raising the 
price of the open internet, and in the process, jeopardising network neutrality rationale, 
which assumes that all traffic passing on the network is of equal importance and that the 
network should be agnostic to the traffic passing through it (Belli, 2017). The result would 
be creating a “tiered Internet ecosystem without providing meaningful benefits to the 
targeted beneficiaries” (Bates, Bavitz and Hessekiel, 2017). The effect of zero-rating in 
limiting access to a specific set of services has also been categorised by DeNardis as one 
of the five destabilising trends in Internet governance emerging issues (2015).  
Facebook’s Free Basics platform was launched as Internet.org in August 2013, as 
an initiative from Facebook, Ericsson, MediaTek, Nokia, Opera, Qualcomm, and 
Samsung to “connect the next 5 billion”, and potentially to increase Facebook’s market 
base (VentureBeat, 2013). The service allowed access to sets of websites without 
incurring data charges, the sites available differed by country, for example, when the 
service was launched in Pakistan early 2015, the platform included 17 websites (Attaa, 
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2015), the potential for adding new services was still limited with no open process to 
adding new services. 
Changes to the service to allow additional services to be included to the 
Internet.org platform was announced on May 2015, with the possibility for developers to 
submit their services to be included as part of the zero-rating offering. However, they 
were expected to encourage people to become paying Internet users and access the 
“broader Internet” as described in the official Facebook press release (Facebook, 2015a). 
The list of available services differ by country, but an example of how the service looks 
on Zain network in Jordan and what services are included as standard, as well as what 
services can be added is included in appendix IV. 
The announcement received backlash for the walled garden approach to the 
Internet it offers and breaking the concept of net neutrality, and concerns related to 
privacy, security, and net neutrality, as the platform during its first days did not support 
encrypted communication, including the Secure Socket Layer (SSL/TLS) and the Secure 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) (Gillula and Malcolm, 2015). Lack of encryption 
support meant that all the traffic passing through the network, including passwords and 
messages, is prone to eavesdropping by all the parties on the connection, from the ISP to 
the Facebook proxies, all the way to the servers of the service providers and back. 
Facebook addressed part of the encryption problems few days after the first launch by 
supporting SSL/TLS encryption on the Android app but did not tackle the HTTPS issue, 
or users of other platforms (Facebook, 2015a), but that was not enough to stop the 
backlash. 
Criticism of the platform continued with opinion pieces discussing nuances of the 
platform, including a clause in the participation guidelines that give Facebook non-
exclusive rights to any intellectual property content posted on or in connection with the 
company. As well as a feature that will warn users who have data packages when they try 
to access any service outside of the platform’s walled garden (Pahwa, 2015). The platform 
was later rebranded to Facebook’s Free Basics in September 2015, with more than 60 
new services announced with availability dependant on the market, as well as announcing 
that they have partially addressed the HTTPS encryption for secure browsing issue, and 
dropping statements that could allow Facebook to censor content (Facebook, 2015b). 
Nonetheless, the changes to the platform did not fulfil the expectations, as the 
encryption proposed would encrypt the data between the end user’s device and Facebook 
proxy, where it will be decrypted, and then encrypted again where possible between 
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Facebook’s proxy and the destination website. This method grants Facebook the ability 
to read all the traffic transmitted with no protection to the user’s privacy. The platform 
was still seen as a walled garden, with Facebook maintaining the ultimate gatekeeping 
powers, making it “still true that Free Basics would be much easier to censor than the real 
global Internet” (Gillula, 2015). 
Free Basics had its share of criticism and even activism against the service, In 
India for, instance, shortly after the platform was introduced to allow access to the 
estimated 75% of Indian population that do not have Internet access, net neutrality 
activists campaigned against the practices of picking-winners by selecting what services 
are offered free of charge (Godwin, 2015). Because of the campaigns and despite some 
voices that defended the practice by arguing that it does not break net neutrality because 
“differential pricing is an accepted practice both by private as well as government 
providers of services” (Tripuraneni, 2016) several companies pulled off from the 
initiative (HNGN, 2015). Later on, the Indian telecommunication regulator banned all 
zero-rated services, partially because of the affluence of the privileged place the Save the 
Internet (STI) campaign to support net neutrality services came from, and the techno 
cultural appeal it had over policymakers (Prasad, 2018). 
At the same time, research on Internet use barriers and user strategies in parts of 
Africa concluded that “none of the new Internet users that formed part of the focus groups 
reported that they went online because of the availability of Free Basics” (Chair, 2017). 
XL Axiata, a telecommunication provider in Indonesia, ditched the service shortly before 
its launch on its network following the controversy behind the initiative and concerns 
over its business model. The business model forces telecommunication provider to 
shoulder the data transfer to Facebook’s proxy and the marketing costs, however, the 
power of Facebook allowed it to find another telecommunication provider in Indonesia 
that was ready to collaborate, Indosat (Freischlad, 2015) 
7.3 Artificial Internet limitations on the platform 
The platform, which differs from Facebook Zero service, a stripped-down version 
of Facebook offered as a zero-rated service, continue to offer access to a predefined set 
of websites and services that vary by country at no cost, and allowed website operators 
to submit their websites to the platform through a process that involves Facebook 
approval. The approval, however, was found to be strictly technical in practice, but still 
allowed Facebook the final say in what to be included and what to not (Singh et al., 2017). 
Technical requirements for websites to be included within the Free Basics service offering 
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is that the website should operate without using any JavaScript, iframes, video and large 
images, and flash and Java applets, while technologies that would allow for tracking and 
identification of individual usages, such as cookies, original IP address, and tracking is 
allowed (Facebook, 2019). 
The limited empirical studies on Free Basics found out that the services offered 
through the platform pass through two proxies controlled entirely by Facebook before 
being delivered to the end-user, while the official technical documentation suggests one 
proxy (Singh et al., 2017; Facebook, 2019). It is not clear, however, whether traffic 
between the two proxies is encrypted or not, but it would, nonetheless, add additional 
hops that add to the route travelled, and thus, affecting performance. The model of 
encrypting communication between end-user and platform proxy, decrypting it, and then 
re-encrypting it again between the proxy and service server, particularly for accessing 
Free Basics from the web browser, is called dual certificate system by Facebook 
(Facebook, 2019). The naming of the certificate system provides a false sense of security 
by implying that the system uses double certificate encryption, rather than two separate 
encryption certificates with an unencrypted gap in between. 
Even when the traffic is genuinely encrypted end-to-end with a single certificate, 
not allowing Facebook to monitor the material and content passing through its proxies 
unencrypted, the single-node structure where all of the traffic must pass through allows 
Facebook to collect information on usage. The information Facebook may still be able to 
collect includes what sites individuals are accessing, how long are they staying there, and 
their whole path of Internet browsing. The information is then used to inform Facebook 
on what kind of information the individual is interested in to display more of on user’s 
news feed (West and Roberts Biddle, 2017). 
Being in the middle between the end-user and the website service provider with 
the ability to view the message transmitted was covered in Study 1 through the testing for 
middle boxes as part of the OONI tests, which results in no confirmed existence on the 
networks tested, even in countries with high limitations. The existence of Facebook proxy 
as a middle box with no limited access to the message places Facebook in a position of 
control, even countries with high limitations do not have. 
Circumvention potential, or the possibility of users of Free Basics platform to get 
over the walled garden and access websites and services available on the global Internet, 
cannot be wholly tested without having access to the network itself. In the case of people 
with no data packages, testing would not work, as the platform would not allow any 
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access not going through Facebook’s proxies, while for people with data packages testing 
would return results for the mobile network rather than Free Basics’. However, the design 
of the service allows for a minimal opportunity for traffic to pass through the network 
without being analysed thoroughly by Facebook, especially that the content is decrypted 
at the proxies controlled by Facebook, and thus very little window for circumvention. 
Several unofficial online resources promise the ability to use Free Basics as a 
gateway for an open Internet at no charge. These resources suggest using specific proxies 
and VPNs to piggyback traffic over Free Basics traffic, the methods described does not 
necessarily mean that the design of the service allow for a window of circumvention of 
the service boundaries to accessing the open Internet. The online resources point out the 
possibility for utilisation of specific services included in Free Basics that act in a manner 
different that they are supposed to, and offer access to the Internet by acting as a proxy, 
with several resources refer to a service called epage.cf14 or a proxy available through a 
service on a news website called todaydb15. Other resources refer to the possibility of 
going around the Bing search engine offering for Free Basics by accessing the HTTPS 
version of the search engine, which resembles more the full version of the service, and 
use the video preview feature to view the first 30 seconds of YouTube videos16.  
The methods described earlier refer to possible loopholes in the services that can 
be amended at any time, and not a circumvention tool that relies on the standards of the 
Internet to operate, testing for the methods conducted on Free Basics as available in 
Jordan showed that the two services are no longer available to be added to the platform. 
Figure 7-1 shows the results for trying to add epage to the Free Basics platform on Zain 
mobile network in Jordan, indicating that the service is no longer available. As a result, 
the conclusion on the inability of circumvention tools to allow for open access on Free 
Basics still stands. It is interesting to note that these resources are available outside of the 
Free Basics walled Garden, mainly on YouTube, while the search for similar content 
available on Facebook for instance, did not result in any meaningful results, indicating 
that people with only exposure to the Free Basics walled garden will not have the 
opportunity to know about these methods. 
 
14 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w17T53eHHX4 and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bq8RBlXyy9o 
15 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmdZ5QONdDE 




Results for Searching for epage Service on Free Basics on Zain Network in Jordan 
 
The position of Facebook within this platform, before and after the change from 
Internet.org to Free Basics, is controlling who joins the network, setting the environment 
of use, and having the potential to control and view every request passing through their 
proxies that are a necessary part of the network. Facebook here assumes much of the 
network powers as described by Castells through its control of the Free Basics platform, 
which, when adding the control of the Facebook as a platform and partner services to the 
mix, makes it the ultimate controller. The powers assumed by Facebook in this regard 
span over the medium, the message, and unrivalled power to exploit users, who have very 
little ability to jump outside of the walled garden, as digital labour to produce value to the 
company. The power is further felt when looking at how many users of Free Basics 
consider Facebook to be the Internet (Willems, 2016). 
The innate direct and indirect artificial limitations set by the Free Basics can be 
viewed as similar to those set technically in Bahrain and Singapore as found earlier in 
this research. With Facebook’s ability to control what people can access as direct 
limitations, and the vast surveillance potential as indirect limitations, however, the motive 
for control here comes from valorisation expectations more Internet users bring rather 
than controlling media discourse and communication to serve a political regime. The 
other difference between artificial Internet limitations studied earlier and Free Basics as 
a platform, lies is in the scope of the limitations. In all countries studied as part of Study 
1, it was found that the blocking targets a subset of available Internet resources, while in 
the case of Free Basics the user is confined to the few services available within that walled 
garden with everything else prohibited. 
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Indirect limitations in the form of coercion and fear building aside from warnings 
of potential charges when attempting to clicking on a link to outside of the services 
allowed, on the other hand, are dependent on the country the Internet or Free Basics is 
offered. These limitations are not connected directly to the network infrastructure, but 
rather practised through other media to intimidate individuals from using the platforms 
for anything that may be deemed critical and is reflected through the perception of 
limitation variable and are connected to the overall political environment in the country 
of concern. Thus, no generalisation on the effects of these limitations will be offered 
beyond the potential for platforms to allow for circumvention of surveillance on the 
immediate network and the monitoring potential for the traffic while placing the values 
for perception of limitation as dependant on the community. 
7.4 Predicted effect on digital inequalities 
Although the Free Basics platform offers the sole opportunity available for some 
people to access online services, it still puts their use, and in turn themselves, in a position 
of being controlled within the walled garden of the platform, and their activity being 
ultimately monitored by Facebook, anywhere within the walled garden, including beyond 
the Facebook platform. The controls on the network as being strictly implemented with 
little if no potential for circumvention allows for a safe assumption of the Free Basics 
platform at a community level to be a network with significant limitations, as with the 
networks of Bahrain and Singapore as concluded in Study 1. The limited agency available 
for individuals allows for the safe assumption that even when the perceived limitations 
are high, and skills to bypass limitations exist, the possibility of successful 
operationalisation to circumvent access and monitoring controls converges to null. 
The limited agency for individuals to decide what services they would like to use 
outside of the walled garden resembles the Internet shutdowns described in earlier 
chapters, where the individual is confined with no hope for access, and everything beyond 
the perimeter set by platform controllers is shut down, making people see the walled 
garden as the whole Internet. The perimeter, however, still allow for a glimpse of 
connectivity affordances within the approval of the ultimate gatekeeper, in this case, 
Facebook.  
Any content developer, being private or public, including governments with 
eGovernment services or national eHealth services for example, is required to shape their 
services to fit the technical specifications set by Facebook. They also need to seek the 
platform’s approval, and accept that Facebook will have the ultimate power to monitor 
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all traffic passing through, unencrypted, with the controller reserving the right to stop any 
service at their discretion. 
Level of control exercised by Facebook as a corporate ultimately matches the 
corporate control described in the literature review following DiMaggio and Hargittai’s 
(2001) aspect of corporate abilities to altering individual-level incentives and constraints 
to produce inequalities in technology and access, but here on decisions on services 
available and control on it, rather than decisions on devices or network infrastructure. 
Digital inequalities in this regard can be described to be stemming from the ability to 
access the open Internet as well as accessing websites that include features using 
technologies not supported by the technical requirements of the platform, including large 
images and videos. Measuring these inequalities would require a dedicated effort at the 
community level to compare affordances and discuss how the difference is affecting 
individuals. 
The digital inequalities as covered in this research compared the difference in 
starting points of individuals in terms of access to the Internet from environments with 
different levels of artificial Internet limitations, and the difference in end points in terms 
of tangible outcomes of Internet use. The research concluded on the effect of the 
limitations and the set of related predictors and their potential effect on digital 
inequalities. For the Internet for the Next Billion(s) platform chosen, Facebook’s Free 
Basics, the application of findings of studies 1 and 2 have the potential to advise on the 
expected effect of the innate limitations, as the starting point, on individual’s 
opportunities as the end points. 
The main take on the innate limitations of Free Basics is that they hinder 
individual’s ability to choose the services they use, possibility of accessing services 
outside of the walled garden, and accessing services with rich content facilitated by 
technologies not supported in the platform. Although the predictors were measured at 
individual’s level in the communities studied in Study 2, the stringent controls of Free 
Basics impose the predictors for individuals using the platform to be limited to the 
potential available within the network, which is in the case of the ability to using 
circumvention tools is almost non-existent. Table 7-1 shows comparison between 
predictors as averages in different communities studied, and how it is expected to be 
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High Low High 
Perception of 
limitations (a) 
High (77%) High (87%) Medium (57%) Vary by 
country 
Skills to bypass 
limitations (b) 






Medium (50%) High (70%) Low, not 
possible on the 
platform 
Notes: (a) see table 5-5, (b) see table 5-3, (c) see table 5-4 
Values of table 7-1 for Facebook’s Free Basics were based on the discussion 
earlier on the platform and its affordances and limitations. The values for artificial 
Internet limitations are based on the available websites and the blocking for everything 
that is outside of the limited walled garden for the direct limitations, and the ultimate 
monitoring and surveillance powers Facebook is granting itself for the indirect limitations 
thus the level of both is considered high. While the perception of limitation, as described 
earlier, is dependent on the overall political environment of the country or community, 
thus it is left with no generalisation on the platform level. These assumptions place 
communities with Free Basics in a similar position to those within the High Limitations 
group, so further predictions will be based on what was found for the countries in that 
group. 
The variable that can be generalised on individuals within the Free Basics walled 
garden based on affordances of the network itself is the use of circumvention tools, as 
using these tools can be safely considered to be futile in bypassing innate limitations of 
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the platform based on the discussion on its design earlier. The design of the platform 
places Facebook in total control over the message being transmitted, and any possible use 
of circumvention tools have the potential to be flagged immediately at the Facebook 
proxy, which acts as a middle box with ultimate access to the traffic.  
In relation to the use of circumvention tools and its reliance on the possibility of 
circumvention available over the network, which is low at best at the Free Basics 
platform, the skills individuals have that allows them to bypass limitations is irrelevant 
here. No matter what the skills the individuals have the inability to use circumvention 
tools makes it fruitless, and thus the measurement or prediction of a value for that variable 
is not valuable, leaving the only variable that can be used to predict outcomes of use of 
the limited network affordances of Free Basics to be the use of circumvention tools. 
The research so far showed that the use of circumvention tools in countries with 
high limitations is positively correlated with economic achievement and personal 
achievement and satisfaction. Since we have the expected effect of the use of 
circumvention tools as an independent variable has on the tangible outcomes of Internet 
use as concluded in Study 2, we can deduce the effect of having the circumvention use as 
null, as in the expected case of Free Basics. 
The general formula for estimating values through regression is as in the formula 
𝛾 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1, where 𝛾 is the predicted value of the tangible outcome of Internet use, 𝛽0 
is the y intercept, or the constant value, 𝛽1 is the slope or correlation coefficient, and 𝑥1 
represents the value of the independent variable, here the use of circumvention tools. 
Since 𝑥1 is negligible and can be considered to be zero in the case of Free Basics, the 
formula becomes  𝛾 = 𝛽0. Table 7-2 shows the y intercept as found in Study 2 for the 
overall sample covered, and from the countries with high limitations. 
Table 7-2 
 Base for Tangible Outcomes of Internet use in Communities with High 
Limitations 
Field y Intercept in Communities 
with High Limitations 
Economic Achievement 3.202 
Personal Achievement 3.775 
Personal Satisfaction 3.633 
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Using the base values for tangible outcomes of Internet use from the results of 
Study 2 has the risk of applying values collected from a group of communities to other 
very different communities. Especially that the communities studied in Studies 1 and 2 
are communities with high access and availability of the Internet, while communities 
covered by Free Basics have only availability of services within the walled garden, and 
may not possess digital skills similar to people in Bahrain, Estonia, or Singapore. 
However, given the limitations of this research, and the limited research available on the 
tangible outcomes of Internet use and digital skills among the users of Free Basics, this 
provides a good potential for approximation for outcomes. 
The approximation suggests that individuals within the Free Basics walled garden, 
bound by the zero circumvention potential it carries, are expected to achieve less than 
expected in economic activities, and just towards the positive side in personal 
achievement and satisfaction, while there is no enough evidence to support approximation 
for other tangible outcomes. However, these suggestions are bound to the availability of 
services that offer these affordances. In the personal fields, where it is estimated that 
people will be able to achieve slightly positively within a highly limited environment 
without the need for using circumvention tools, the affordances are related to health, Self 
Actualisation, and leisure. It is still possible for Facebook’s Free Basics walled garden to 
include services that allow for that, for example, in Jordan, as shown in Appendix IV, no 
health-related sites are among the standard offering, while the additional services include 
Your.MD Health Guide and Symptoms Checker, while no services indicated offered 
information on sex and sexuality, for instance. The offering still limits the individual to a 
limited source of information compared to users of the open Internet. 
Other aspects that are worth discussing is the network effect forced by the Free 
Basics platform, as individuals are bound to connect with people that use the social media 
services available through the platform. For instance, users of Free Basics alone would 
not be able to connect with people that use Twitter or Telegram, while being able to 
connect with people that use Facebook, and at the same time, are bound to the walls for 
Facebook as long as they are not moving to a service that allow access to the global 
Internet. The discussion chapter also concluded that people in communities with high 
limitations are bound to be within the Participating Majority and the Disconnected and 
Excluded. At the same time, the limited affordances for active civic participation in the 
network society leave them as passive consumers. 
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In conclusion, Free Basics does offer the opportunity for people who do not have 
access available otherwise to connect and use a limited portion of the global Internet and 
are able to use the services as long as they, and the people they communicate with, are 
within the walled garden. While it is predicted that the users of Free Basics as a highly 
limited community with no potential for circumvention, would have chances to develop 
at the personal field in terms of achievement and satisfaction, while remaining at the 
edges of the information society as passive consumers and digital labourers for the party 
in control of the walled garden. 
7.5 Summary 
Through this chapter, Facebook’s Free Basics platform was investigated as an 
example for the Internet for the next billion projects, to apply the findings on predictors 
of digital inequalities through the lens of tangible outcomes of Internet use on the network 
developed through this research. The investigation made use of the determinants related 
to artificial Internet limitations as developed in the previous chapters to indicate 
opportunities at a community or individual level, and the digital inequalities constructed 
or eradicated in relation to the artificial Internet limitations part of the platform 
Facebook’s Free Basics is a form of zero-rating services in that it allows access to 
a selected set of Internet services and content without incurring data charges or the data 
being deducted from the users’ data allowance. The service has changed over the years 
from a very limited offering to a more open platform where content developers can submit 
their websites to be included, given they satisfy Facebook’s technical requirements and 
approval. In addition to the powers stemming from maintaining the right to approve or 
reject services, Facebook also have the power to monitor all traffic coming from the web 
browsers to the platform at its proxy servers unencrypted in manner even countries found 
to be implementing high limitations do not have. The unmatched ability to monitor traffic 
and the high limitations set on access to content out of the walled garden available places 
the platform within the high limitations communities. 
Research predictors developed included perception of limitation, skills to bypass 
limitations, and use of circumvention tools. However, reflecting these predictors on 
individuals within the Free Basics communities is not straight forward, as the perception 
of limitation is related to overall political environment in the country of concern and is a 
result of practices through different media to intimidate individuals from specific uses of 
the platform, thus not directly connected to the infrastructure or platform. Studying 
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perception of limitation is possible through gathering data from individuals in a specific 
country, which is not possible in our case. 
The second predictor, the skills to bypass limitations was proven to be irrelevant 
in the case of Free Basics, as the possibility of circumvention available over the network 
is very low if not existent based on analyses of the network design, thus no matter what 
the skills are, individuals will not be able to utilities them. The utilisation, which is 
described by the third predictor, use of circumvention tools, is estimated to be at null in 
the case of Free Basics, as the circumvention tools cannot be used on the network thus 
the approximation can only rely on this predictor. The previous studies showed that the 
predictor of use of circumvention tools at null value is connected with less than positive 
achievement in the economic field, and slightly towards the positive in the personal 
achievement and satisfaction. 
Nonetheless, no matter what achievements or outcomes are predicted, the fact that 
the offering within the walled garden is very limited means that the networks the 
individual can be part of is limited to the networks available through the platform. 
Moreover, that they can only connect with people outside of the platform if those people 
were using services available within the platform.  
The discussion concluded that opportunities provided by Free Basics wither in 
front of the limitations set, leaving people with only access to that platform as passive 
consumers and part of the disconnected and excluded groups, as the platform limits the 











This research aimed to study artificial Internet limitations as a factor in 
determining digital inequalities, with a focus on the limitations that constitute limiting 
access to the open Internet, in the practice of creating Internet walled gardens. The 
research relied on two-tier approach, with two studies to analyse the limitations and 
their effect on tangible outcomes of Internet use in three countries selected to cover 
different levels of limitations and related practices, while sharing characteristics that 
limit the effect of digital inequality determinants not related to access limitations. 
A third study was implemented as a practical implementation for the findings 
on Facebook’s Free Basics network serving as one of the projects to reach new 
Internet users, commonly referred to as Next Billion(s), reflecting the findings on the 
network with its innate limitations following the transformative-emancipatory 
perspective adopted by the research. 
The first two studies aimed at measuring change in opportunities as a function 
of artificial Internet limitations by studying three communities that are part of global 
network society and differ in levels of artificial Internet limitations, Bahrain, Estonia, 
and Singapore. The selection of these countries allowed for studying effects from two 
dimensions, by looking at differences among countries as well as looking at all of the 
Internet users in these countries as one part of the network society with communities 
identified by the Internet limitations they face. 
8.1 The Research 
The first study established the grounds for comparison in terms of artificial 
Internet limitations across the countries studied, Bahrain, Estonia, and Singapore, 
through a mixed-methods approach to enumerate Internet access opportunities and 
artificial Internet limitations by the means of network measurements and a review of 
related reports, laws, and news. The artificial Internet limitations covered included 
the direct limitations that control access through technical measures and the indirect 
limitations that entice self-censorship and changes in behaviour. The first study 
achieved its goals and provided a clear landscape for what forms of limitation are in 
effect in each of the countries, the scope of these limitations, and the overall related 
environment, being legal or technical, with validity confirmed across the different 
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research methods used. The selection of countries proved to also be suitable in terms 
of access and skills, with the three countries sharing very high Internet adoption and 
availability levels, as well as acceptable digital skills across the populations, and a 
shared aspiration to the Internet as a gateway to development and prosperity.  
The study established that each of the countries had different models and 
scales of artificial Internet limitations exerted on them, but all of them shared a 
reliance on exerting regulatory power by the respective government on Internet 
service providers operating within their jurisdiction to implement limitations and 
controls. The shared model of limitations was exerted through transitive properties 
from the government on network operators as licensing and regulatory powers, to the 
individual in a form of Network Power. Another form of limitation was through direct 
implementation of Networked Power by the governments on individuals through the 
rules, regulations, and practices that empower coercion and intimidation of using the 
medium, this form was found to be in effect in Bahrain and Singapore. The latter form 
of power exertion, in addition to the findings of high use of Internet controls, places 
Bahrain and Singapore in a group of communities with high limitations. In these 
countries with high limitations, Internet controls were found to be an extension and 
continuation of governmental policies on the control of media, correspondence 
monitoring, and surveillance concepts. 
Singapore displayed a model of limitations that is highly reliant on 
establishing fear and extending the stronghold on individuals behaviour from the 
offline world to online practice, accompanied by light-handed technical controls that 
are designed to rotate transparent blocking over websites and services that are deemed 
immoral or a threat to national equilibrium. Bahrain exerted similar from of artificial 
Internet limitations as Singapore, but the research found that the approach was 
different, with a higher reliance on technical blocking through practices ranging from 
transparent to non-transparent blocking, to complete Internet shutdowns in specific 
geographical areas. The use of direct controls were accompanied by indirect practices, 
similar to those in place in Singapore, to maintain a level of fear that is thought to 
produce self-censorship. Estonia sat as the country with very narrow limitations 
covering a single form of websites at a national level, unregistered remote gambling 
websites, with high transparency regarding what is being blocked, without any 
indirect limitations recorded. 
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The second study fulfilled its goal of providing a body of knowledge on 
tangible outcomes of Internet use as a measurement for digital inequalities through a 
survey, and a set of sequential exploratory interviews that provided higher validity to 
the findings and shed light on the reasons behind the difference in use and 
explanations for peculiar findings. The study covered four aspects of tangible 
outcomes of Internet use, economic, cultural, social, and personal, through measuring 
achievement and satisfaction in relation to activities conducted online, and mapped a 
set of predictors combined from classical predictors of digital inequalities as well as 
predictors specific to this research advised by the literature review. Classical 
predictors included age, years of Internet use, sex, level of education, and 
employment status, while research predictors, built on the growing literature in the 
field of digital inequalities, covered individual agency to counterbalance the 
limitations, from the perception of limitations to the ability of the individuals to 
bypass limitations, and the materialisation of said ability by means of circumvention 
tools. The findings of the second study further showed the suitability of the country 
selection, demonstrated by the comparability of the results from studying tangible 
outcomes of Internet use. 
The research relied in part on the perspective of network society, where the 
whole sample was treated as one society with communities differentiated by levels of 
artificial Internet limitations levied, to build knowledge on the role of predictors 
related to Internet limitation in determining digital opportunities. The findings at the 
community level showed that the skill to bypass limitations is correlated with 
perception of those limitations, and in turn, the use of circumvention tools is 
correlated with the skill to bypass limitations, reflecting the motivation for acquiring 
skills to bypass limitations an individual gets when they perceive limitations, and 
materialising the skills into use of circumvention tools.  
The respondents who reported higher skills in bypassing limitations reported 
higher achievement and satisfaction across all of the fields, while the practice of using 
circumvention tools was found to produce higher achievement and satisfaction across 
all of the fields studied, except the field of social achievement across the sample. The 
role of use of circumvention tools had more weight than the skills to bypass 
limitations to counter the factor of general higher digital skills and focus on the actual 
operationalisation of efforts to bypass limitations. The perception of limitation and 
use of circumvention tools proved to be directly related to increased achievement in 
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topics where Internet controls in countries with high limitations is high. For instance, 
individuals that are conscious about limitations are more likely to be able to access 
information that helps them in building their identities from information on sexuality 
and ethnic groups, two categories with several websites found to be among the 
blocked in Bahrain and Singapore in Study 1. 
 The agency provided by the use of circumvention tools appear to be bridging 
the gap and levelling the field of achievement by offering people falling in the group 
of high limitations the opportunity to achieve equally or better than people in the non-
limited group. The gap here is normalised, but at the same time, people who do not 
use circumvention tools are still affected until their agency is developed to 
counterbalance the limitations. The satisfaction, however, does not seem to be 
enhanced by the use of circumvention tools in the same manner as achievement. 
Higher limitations were also found to be correlated with lower social 
achievement and satisfaction in terms of interaction with public services and political 
networks. And thus, can be seen as evidence of the democratic divide discussed in the 
literature review, putting the Internet users in communities affected by high artificial 
Internet limitations in the position of passive consumers limiting meaningful use of 
technology. At the same time, coercion, as a form of artificial Internet limitations, had 
a higher effect on the democratic divide, resulting in users in Singapore, as the country 
with the highest levels of coercion, to limit their usage to be mainly around 
entertainment and discussion of food, as concluded through the studies. 
Interviews advised that in Bahrain and Singapore the use of circumvention 
tools was primarily motivated by a will to bypass artificial Internet limitations such 
as blocking and monitoring, and are used by half of the respondents despite websites 
related to these tools being among the categories blocked, as found in Study 1. While 
in Estonia, the use of circumvention tools was driven by the will to access geo-
blocked content, with limited fear of their access being monitored or controlled, this 
important finding deserves further research on its own to study what motivates 
shifting access location to receive benefits. Another finding advised by the interviews 
was that the reported volume of use of circumvention tools is possibly under-reported, 
as it is a common practice, in particular in Bahrain, with many people using it without 
realising its technical name. 
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The discussion chapter confirmed that substantial evidence existed to support 
that artificial Internet limitations affect how people use the Internet, and how they 
make use of it, in their daily lives to access opportunities otherwise unavailable, with 
limitations affecting satisfaction more than achievement. Artificial Internet 
limitations played a role in shaping individual use of the Internet and their agency to 
utilise Internet affordances to achieve better tangible outcomes of use and thus their 
potential to spring over digital inequality divides in the countries studied. Study 2 
showed that the limitations are reported as visible by 77% of the sample who felt that 
at least one party is controlling or monitoring their Internet access.  
The findings at community and individual levels suggest the ability to use 
circumvention tools and skills to bypass limitations has the potential to 
counterbalance artificial Internet limitations and allow for better achievement, and is 
connected to higher perceptions of limitation and also lower satisfaction levels. The 
outcomes show that individuals tend to find ways to exploit Internet affordances in 
defiance of the limitations imposed on them, but with apparent dissatisfaction 
resulting from the limitations. The ability to offset limitations, whether direct or 
indirect, necessitates knowing how to bypass the controls and the act of 
operationalising this knowledge by means of circumvention tools as a possible 
application. 
The research was influenced by the transformative-emancipatory perspective 
to mixed-methods research as described by Martens (2003), a perspective that 
addresses inequalities through working with groups with different opportunities and 
powers from the perspective of communities. For this research, the adoption involved 
looking at the Internet users worldwide as one community, with the difference in 
Internet limitations imposed on sub-communities grouped in countries as a source of 
difference in power, comparing the tangible outcomes of Internet use as a divergence 
in opportunities and a rendition of inequalities. 
8.2 The Application 
In an attempt to operationalise the findings of the first part of the research as a 
model for predicting digital inequalities as a function of artificial Internet limitations, 
Study 3 applied the correlations found  in network communities with tighter access 
limitations portrayed as walled gardens offered as forms of zero-rating. The network 
chosen for the application was Facebook’s Free Basics, a platform launched to connect 
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the next billions of people that do not have affordable Internet access. Despite the 
benevolent aims of the platform, another goal is floated as being more in line with 
Facebook’s business model, using the platform to increase its market base, this goal is 
further supported by the design of the platform that gives Facebook near unlimited 
potential for surveillance and tracking of users. With the company providing the access 
and service, it installs itself in the position of holistic network provider with unmatched 
potential for control that exceeds what was detected in the cases of countries with high 
limitations studied. 
The platform in question differs from networks in countries with high limitations 
studied in that the controls on the network are driven by valorisation expectations more 
users bring to the platform, rather than controlling the media discourse and 
communication to serve a political regime. The economic drive resulted in the difference 
in the scope of limitations and controls set on the network, which in the case of Free 
Basics is not limited to a set of websites and services, but rather the user is confined to 
the few services available within its walled garden with everything else prohibited with 
near-zero potential for circumvention. The tight boundaries of the walled garden the user 
is allowed to function within limits the agency of individuals to decide what services they 
would like to use outside of the walled garden. Leaving people with no other access option 
with no hope for access to anything beyond the perimeter set by platform controllers, 
resulting in people perceiving the walled garden as the whole Internet. 
Research predictors developed in the first two studies of the research included 
perception of limitation, skills to bypass limitations, and use of circumvention tools. 
However, reflecting these predictors on individuals within the Free Basics communities 
is not straightforward, as the perception of limitation is related to the overall political 
environment in the country of concern and is a result of practices through different media 
to intimidate individuals from specific uses of the platform, thus not directly connected 
to the infrastructure or platform. Studying perception of limitation is possible through 
gathering data from individuals in a specific country, which is not possible in this case. 
The second predictor, skills to bypass limitations, was proven irrelevant in the case of 
Free Basics, while its utilisation in the form use of circumvention tools is estimated to be 
at null in the case of Free Basics as the circumvention tools cannot be used on the network 
thus the approximation can only rely on this predictor. The previous studies showed that 
the predictor of use of circumvention tools at null value is connected with less than 
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positive achievement in the economic field, and slightly towards the positive in personal 
achievement and satisfaction.  
The application of the findings in the case of Free Basics concluded that 
opportunities provided by the platform wither in front of the limitations set, leaving 
people with only access to that platform as passive consumers and part of the 
disconnected and excluded groups according to van Dijk’s categorisation, as the platform 
limits the potential for meaningful participation in the network society. No matter what 
achievements or outcomes are predicted, the fact that the offering within the walled 
garden is very limited means that the networks the individual can be part of is limited to 
the networks available through the platform, and they can only connect with people 
outside of the platform if those people were using services available within the platform. 
This study highlighted the digital inequalities as predicted in the model developed 
throughout the research to provide advice on the consequences of artificial Internet 
limitations and instigate further research on the risks and social consequences of these 
limitations. 
8.3 Contribution and Implications 
The contribution of this research to knowledge can be summarised in two 
main aspects, the first is unmasking differences in access as a predictor for digital 
inequalities, with focus on artificial Internet limitations as a source for these 
differences. The second main aspect of contribution is covering communities that are 
understudied in terms of access and tangible outcomes of Internet use. These two 
aspects provide much needed input into two main fields of media studies, digital 
divide and Internet censorship. The two fields here have been developing in two 
separate spheres, as digital divide studies look at access through one lens regardless 
of what can and cannot be accessed, while censorship studies does not treat difference 
in access as a predictor for life opportunities. The bridging offered by this research 
sheds light on the role artificial Internet limitations, including censorship, play in 
creating differences in access that transcends politics to technology and society. 
In terms of other practical contributions as of submission date, the research 
advised a series of publications that utilised concepts developed throughout to discuss 
digital inequalities and digital inclusion in different areas of the world. As well as 
studying artificial Internet limitations and access controls as a source of power to 
support colonialization, in what the researcher is calling Weaponisation of Access. 
Other contributions included presentations at conferences to present findings, 
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including conferences with non-academic Internet governance actors in an attempt to 
provide information for policymakers in relation to artificial Internet limitations. The 
latter allowed for the development of a set of key takeaways that can be used as policy 
recommendations: 
• People always find a way: direct artificial Internet limitations in the 
form of blocking of services and websites rarely works, as individuals 
tend to find their way around these controls, including with the use of 
circumvention tools, even when websites that make these tools 
available are blocked. 
• Indirect limitations are more effective in shaping behaviours: coercion 
and intimidation of certain uses of Internet affordances was found to 
be more powerful in affecting user behaviour than direct limitations 
alone. 
• Direct and indirect artificial Internet limitations cause less satisfaction 
with Internet affordances, and thus can result in disgruntled 
individuals. 
• Projects that provide access to a limited set of services in tightly 
confined walled gardens, as with Facebook’s Free Basics, do not 
necessarily contribute to the bridging of digital divides as expected. 
But rather it provides larger market access to users who treat these 
walled gardens as their whole Internet, giving the controlling provider, 
in essence the holistic network provider, unmatched powers over the 
individuals and support the potential for digital exploitation. 
In addition to policy advice and direct contribution to knowledge in the form 
of publications, the research also provided the basis for treating differentiation of 
access as predictors and variables that can be added to the set of classical variables 
used in digital inequalities research. The basis offered has the potential to provide 
better views on differences between individuals and communities, not only based on 
individuals’ traits, but on the network environment and the power balance they are 
part of as members of the network society. 
Further contribution to the knowledge offered by this research included 
practical contributions that have already left their mark, including developing the 
framework’s survey used in the research to three new languages, making versions in 
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Arabic, Estonian, and Mandarin available for sharing with the academic community. 
The Arabic version was already shared with the framework developers in LSE to be 
used in a project on Kuwait. The research also provided support in the form of 
contributing network measurement collected for the research to OONI databases, 
some measurements came from areas with no measurements previously collected, as 
with Bahrain. The research also influenced the Association for Affordable Internet 
(A4AI) to include the concept of artificial limitations as developed in this research as 
part of their definition of Meaningful Connectivity, a new standard to measure Internet 
access. 
The contributions and impact listed above demonstrate how needed this 
research was, and how timely it is, whether in the academic world, or the practice-
oriented world, thus further validating the goals and motivation behind the research 
project, and supporting designing and conducting further research. 
8.4 Limitations and Future Prospects 
The research was ambitious in covering three less-studied communities while 
having limited resources and direct access and representation in those communities, 
the implications of this limitation can be seen in the limited sample size. The research 
tried to compensate for this limitation by introducing the instrument of interviews 
with key individuals carefully selected based on position and expertise as a form of 
validation for the findings, as well as to provide details on network habits in the 
communities. Nonetheless, a more representative sample would definitely enrich the 
research further, and possibly point out more minute effects. 
The second limitation the research faced was the dynamic nature of limitations 
and networks, as it was evident that all of the artificial Internet limitations studied on 
all of the networks changed over time. With the limited data available on the networks 
at any moment of time, researching the limitations as a longitudinal process with the 
more common limitations highlighted helped in this regard. The launch of 
AccessCheck as a tool that aimed to provide real-time checking of limitations was 
promising for the matter especially that it utilised network-testing methods similar to 
what is adopted in this research. However, the tool did not provide testing for 
networks in Bahrain, and had limited testing abilities in Singapore through the use of 
virtual servers there that holds the potential to not be representative of the networks 
individuals are using, but rather to what access is available to business networks. In 
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this regard, the limited number of network measurements collected, particularly from 
Bahrain, posed another limitation for the research, which did not allow for complete 
empirical testing of all the services and networks. Nonetheless, the data collected still 
offered good insight into the status of the network there in a manner compatible with 
what was found in the secondary research conducted in analysing reports and news 
on Internet limitations in Bahrain. 
Although the data collected allows for discussions beyond those currently 
included in this dissertation, limitations related to the format played a role in setting 
the scope to be focused on researching the main elements, while providing knowledge 
that may be used for future research. Further research and publications can rely on the 
data collected by offering different perspectives in relation to tangible outcomes by 
studying the achievement and satisfaction relationships across the different fields, and 
even within the fields by studying relationships between specific activities, and the 
various independent variables collected, such as place of use and devices used. 
There is also further research potential in expanding the studies horizontally 
by covering more populations with more representative samples, where this research 
may serve as a pilot study for larger scale analysis of the role of artificial Internet 
limitations. Another potential would be to expand the research vertically and look at 
further nuances in access differentiation from one side, and other measurements for 
digital inequalities on the other side. 
Researching differentiation in access through the lens of artificial Internet 
limitations, including censorship, offer a fresh and original analysis of the predictors 
of digital inequalities. This carries the potential to extend the research to communities 
where access in terms of availability and affordability is not an issue. This include 
whether in communities with high Internet access or communities where access is 
subsidised and thus is not, by itself, a hurdle of use. This dissertation served as an 
example of such view, focusing on artificial Internet limitations and their effects on 
digital inequalities to highlight the consequences of recent normalised practices of 
limiting access as a form of control. The practices that produce differentiation in 
Internet access among members of the network society affecting individual 
opportunities in life, to conclude that not all Internet access is equal. 
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Appendix II: Interviews Summary 
Interview Code B1 
B1 was one of the key entry points to access responses to the survey in Bahrain, 
as being a self-proclaimed influencer, have shared the survey through their social 
networks, and asked other key people in Bahrain to do so. Having someone like B1 
promoting the survey provided trust in the survey to Bahrainis, and offered larger 
exposure to different groups of people, as B1 is well networked and known in the Bahraini 
online world. B1 have also provided time for an interview where they have expressed 
their views on the status of the Internet in Bahrain, and the limitations they face. This 
interview was conducted in Arabic and fulfils the sample targets of Economic Labour 
(EL), Economic Commerce (EC), Social (S), Political (P), and Institutional/Governance 
(IG) fields. 
B1 stated that although there is a high rate of Internet access in Bahrain, the 
networks suffer from severe restrictions resulting in denying people freedom of use of the 
Internet. B1 had strong views when it comes to policies related to freedom of expression 
in general in Bahrain, including online, after gaining their trust, they have freely 
expressed these opinions through the interview, to reflect the position of a regular 
Bahraini citizen who is interested in politics, but not necessarily involved in it formally. 
B1 sees that there are no guarantees for open access to the Internet, and that controls 
implemented by companies and the government focus on limiting access to political 
content rather than aiming at protecting end-users from online attacks, resulting in an 
Internet environment with complete lack of confidentiality and privacy. 
Bahrain government practices, according to B1, include blocking and filtering of 
political content that is considered critical to the current regime, controlling media outlets, 
and surveillance and infiltration targeted at political dissents and human rights defenders, 
which would ultimately result in incarceration for activity on the Internet. B1 concluded 
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their position on Internet limitations by saying that Bahrain does not respect the freedom 
of citizens and individuals in the exchange of information and knowledge through the 
Internet. 
B1 sees that the high use of circumvention tools is a direct result of the restrictions 
set on Internet use, and people are using VPNs and Proxies to maintain their privacy and 
access blocked content. However, many people would express their satisfaction in the 
survey because either they did not have the chance to know any better, and even when 
they do, the fear built through government controlling policies would push people to 
overestimate their satisfaction and not to express any frustration they may have, according 
to B1. They have also made it clear that many people do use circumvention tools without 
realising. 
In terms of tangible outcomes of Internet use, B1 feels that the direct and indirect 
Internet limitations have produced a chilling effect on online expression, but people have 
coped with that and moved on to utilise the Internet to the fullest in their daily lives, from 
economic benefits to social, and cultural ones. However, the mistrust with the government 
forced people to keep a distance and deal with suspicion with government services 
provided online, which some see as an attempt by the government to identify individual 
online personas. For the way forward, B1 expressed that there is a dire need to develop 
people’s awareness on the Internet as a gateway for change-making, and an increased 
reliance on technology to build the society offers the potential for individuals to enhance 
their life opportunities and the society to move to a more participatory and open 
environment. Currently, there is a clear increase in the reliance of the Internet as a tool 





Interview Code B2 
The second interview for Bahrain was with B2, a serial entrepreneur interested in 
digital and online businesses endeavours. B2 is based in Bahrain, and have interests and 
market knowledge particularly with the Business to Customers online commerce, which 
is a valuable input to the research, as it offers direct experience with user habits of online 
services in Bahrain. Especially when taking into consideration the size of some of B2’s 
business, which serves 12,000 active users on a daily basis. The language used in the 
interview was mainly English with some Arabic at the end. This interview fulfils the 
sample targets of Economic Commerce (EC), Social (S), Political (P), and 
Institutional/Governmental (IG) fields. 
B2 began the interview with noting how proud they are with the very high Internet 
penetration rate and use in Bahrain, as well as what they have felt of the very good digital 
skills Internet users in Bahrain have based on realisation supported by their knowledge 
on digital services offered in Bahrain. B2 gave examples on the level of complexity of 
user interfaces that people are capable of using and interacting with at ease, considering 
80% of the population in Bahrain as “well-versed” in technology, while the other 20% 
have a lower level of digital skills, but still capable of basic usage of online services. B2 
sees that language is not a barrier for Internet use in Bahrain, especially that English is 
widely spoken, and there are several resources and services available online in Arabic 
that serves most of the needs of people from the Internet. 
B2 did shed the light on a trend, they are noticing in the online business market in 
Bahrain, of quickly moving from a desktop environment to becoming mobile-technology 
oriented. This move is supported by the increased affordability and availability of 
connectivity options including third and fourth generations of broadband cellular network 
technology, as well as the widespread of mobile devices and its dominance as the main 
device people are using. 
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However, the tangible outcomes of Internet use time are not high, as B2 estimates 
90% of time spent on the Internet to be spent as “junk time”, time spent on social media 
with no proper content that can benefit oneself accessed, but rather used as a method of 
entertainment to pass time. The main useful usage of the Internet in Bahrain according to 
B2 is on e-commerce, which allows economic opportunities for Bahrainis by allowing 
access to better offers and deals, as well as opportunities for people to open their own 
online businesses.  
Nonetheless, B2 still sees that people did not yet exploit the full economic 
potential of the Internet in Bahrain, especially given that the supporting environment for 
online business, particularly online payments, is still yet lacking. The problems with 
online payment were summarised by B2 as two-fold, the availability and popularity of 
credit cards is not yet at a level that would allow for active e-commerce markets, with 
around 20% penetration. The second problem is the attitude towards paying over the 
Internet is still unfavourable, with people fearing for their privacy. This attitude prompted 
for alternative payment business models, from pay on delivery, to dedicated prepaid 
payment cards, and payment at points of presence to be a common option for e-commerce 
in Bahrain, for services from buying groceries to ordering home car wash and laundry 
services online. 
The fear of online privacy in Bahrain is also connected to active monitoring and 
surveillance as B2 puts it, which is justified according to them especially after the 2011 
“political mess”, but still left its toll on other aspects of Internet use as well. Nonetheless, 
B2 sees that there is no website blocking other than blocking of pornography website and 
torrent-based websites that offer pirated software, in a way similar to B3, with no effect 
whatsoever on the Internet use in Bahrain. B2 also connected the increase in the use of 
VPNs and proxy services to youngsters trying to access websites with “immoral” content 
or to access services blocked by other countries when visiting them, giving an example 
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of using a VPN to do WhatsApp calls from the United Arab Emirates. However, later on, 
with more trust established during the interview, B2 added that part of the surge came 
after events of 2011 when people wanted to access blocked blogs and news sites, negating 
their previous ascertain on type of websites blocked. 
When asked to give their opinion on the main results of the research survey, B2 
stated that they feel that the numbers of around half of the population using VPNs and 
proxies to be slightly over what they feel it to be between 30-40%. B2 ended the interview 
by saying that the main measure that would affect people’s use of the Internet is perceived 
monitoring and controls, with people fearing the use of some services online, and are 
afraid of fully expressing their views over the Internet, which is in line with the findings. 
Interview Code B3: 
The third interview from Bahrain was with B3, a postgraduate researcher in the 
UK, who has lived in Bahrain all of their life, except for when they travelled for studies, 
which provided them with knowledge and overview of Internet use in Bahrain and in 
other countries. As per the preference of the interview, the language of the interview was 
mainly Arabic. B3 was selected for the experience they have on Internet uses as a 
common user of Internet in both, Bahrain and the UK, as well as their local knowledge 
of the Bahraini society and laws and regulations there. The interview followed the 
structure described early, with room for comments, and flexibility to focus on specific 
issues raised during the interview that may further inform the research. This interview 
fulfils the sample targets of Economic/Labour (EL), Economic Commerce (EC), Social 
(S), Political (P), Institutional/Governmental (IG) fields, Institutional Health (IH), and 
Educational (E) fields. 
B3 expressed their satisfaction in the Internet availability and penetration in 
Bahrain, stating that people use it in all aspects of their lives. One of the main aspects the 
Internet is affecting is the local culture, where B3 attributes access to the Internet to 
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multiple phenomena, from effect on clothing choices to eating habits and choices to 
understanding of accents and dialects of other Arabic-speaking states. This allowed for 
an increase in exposure to the world, and contributed to satisfaction of Internet use, as 
people felt its influence relatively quickly, which B3 does not fail to mention that it is a 
double-edged sword, that can contribute to loss of community and social values. 
A success story on how Internet use has affected society according to B3 is its use 
as a tool for social change, citing Omar Farouq, a social media influencer who regularly 
publishes advice and positive messages to an audience of over 130,000 followers on 
Twitter17 and 2.2 million subscribers on their YouTube channel18. This influencer also 
uses their wide audience reach to receive complaints and requests from people, and 
publicize it and help in delivering it to the government to take actions. One case they 
mentioned was a road pothole that has gone unfixed for a long time, but when local 
residents sent to that account and their case was published, the next day the pothole was 
fixed19. 
People in Bahrain use the Internet to access information, communicate, and 
conducting ecommerce and ebusiness, based on what the interviewee listed as main 
motivations for use. B3 feels that almost everyone in Bahrain nowadays orders something 
online, with several local e-commerce outlets that offer all types of goods and services, 
despite possible problems in payment methods traditionally used online, credit cards, 
were many services offer to pay on delivery as an option. 
B3 also provided valuable input to the aspects of education and health. On health, 
B3 pointed out that although locally produced content on health issues is not abundant 
 
17 Twitter profile: https://twitter.com/omr94_ 
18 YouTube Channel https://www.youtube.com/user/omarfaroo8 
19 The researcher could not verify this specific case, 
nonetheless, it is consistent with other cases on that influencer’s 
account. 
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people are still able to access regional content available in Arabic, and wider global 
content available in English. This access potential provided people in Bahrain with rich 
resources that they could use to learn more about their health, allowing them to make 
better decisions on health and medical care. Nonetheless, the benefits on the Internet on 
health relies on personal effort, as there are no institutional and public efforts that aim at 
enhancing people’s life choices and medical care through the Internet according to B3. 
While in education, B3 clarifies that there are indeed public efforts towards 
developing digital skills of Bahrainis at one end and utilising the Internet as an assistive 
medium for education at the other, from school levels to higher education. The result was 
the establishment of eLearning units at universities and ministerial level, and the offering 
of technological tools to assist the educational process, particularly over the Internet. On 
a personal level, B3 is not convinced that enough people are utilising the full potential of 
the Internet to access online courses and enhance their opportunities in education. 
In terms of job finding and economic benefits of the Internet used in relation to 
labour, B3 indicated that this aspect is rapidly growing in Bahrain, with more and more 
jobs posted mainly online for locals and expats, nonetheless, given the social structures 
and size of Bahrain, traditional methods and direct recommendations are still largely used. 
At the beginning of the interview, B3 said that they do not feel any limitations on 
Internet use and that the blocking, if exists, only helps in limiting access to pornography 
websites and other indecent content which helps in maintaining the conservative feel of 
the society, as they put it. In addition, when asked about Internet shutdowns in specific 
areas of Bahrain, B3 attributed this to probably technical difficulties, and then mentioned 
that it is possible that these areas would have unrests and demonstrations, and within these 
demonstrations, people would burn cables and boxes that are part of the 
telecommunication infrastructure. However, as the interview went on, B3 was more 
inclined to admit the existence of limitations on a political basis, which is justified in their 
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opinion, but covers “very limited number of blogs and news sites”, and that they 
personally did not feel any limitations. 
In response to questions aimed at understanding the patterns of use of 
circumvention tools in Bahrain, B3 mentioned that if it used, it is only to access blocked 
content, then clarified that they mean pornography websites, as this is the only type of 
websites that are blocked. Later on, they added that they know some people that use 
circumvention tools when they are outside of Bahrain in countries that are more restricted, 
to be able to access the Internet and to call home and friends using Internet telephony 
services that are blocked in neighbouring countries like the United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia. Another use according to B3 was to access games and content that may not 
be available in Bahrain because of geo-blocking. Nonetheless, they still feel that the 
percentage of people using circumvention as found in this research, around 50%, is still 
higher than they think it is. 
Interview Code B4 
The fourth interview from Bahrain was with a prominent activist who was directly 
affected by the Internet control practices of Bahrain and had to leave the country after 
being persecuted as a result of their online activities. Access and trust for this interview 
were secured following the introduction by an entity aware of the researcher and trusted 
by B4. The interview provided deep insight into practices and who it affects not only 
political activists but also common individuals in Bahrain. The interview was conducted 
mainly in Arabic and fulfils the sample targets of      ____??????____. 
B4 provided a historical account that matched what was found in the review of 
reports section of Study 1, including the development of governmental Internet control 
policies and tactics, from early days of simple blocking based on Domain Name Systems 
(DNS) for website addresses affiliated with dissidents to more advanced monitoring and 
surveillance systems and practices. B4 accounts for the common practice of individuals 
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to use scripts distributed by political and digital activists that would change default DNS 
settings to bypass blocking by requesting website address through open systems that are 
not controlled by the government or ISPs. B4 added that people usually did not know 
about the scripts more than they needed to click on it before accessing the Internet. This 
shows another method of circumvention and supports the claim that many people are 
using circumventions tools unknowing the terminology and technical details of it. 
One of the practices B4 included was the requirements for registration and 
licensing introduced circa 2005 by the __information ministry ??? IMDA?___, which 
provided the legal cover for the prosecution of activists and blocking of blogs and 
websites deemed critical to the government. However, the government, according to B4, 
moved from blocking the message to targeting the sender by using surveillance 
technology to identify individuals and activists based on online activity, as well as 
attempts to monitor communication tools like Blackberry Messenger, Telegram, and 
WhatsApp. More recently, the government also limited ability to buying mobile SIM 
cards to registration and furnishing of government-issued identity card.  
The change in policy also included the establishment of an environment of fear 
around online activity, with public announcements on state television channels to make 
people aware that the government is capable of reading all the messages and 
communication in the country, necessarily establishing the illusion of a digital panopticon 
to control expression and use. Evidence of a similar practice of public intimidation is 
included in Chapter 4 with the Ministry of interior publishing a tweet threatening people 
who follow inciting accounts and circulate their posts will be held legally accountable. 
According to B4, people prefer to use VPNs to circumvent Internet controls in 
Bahrain over proxies, with famous ones shared among individuals until a point when the 
government catches up with it and block it when new ones are circulated again. This 
practice is encouraged and possible because people in Bahrain are aware of the 
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government surveillance and monitoring and put an effort to protect their digital privacy, 
as a result, Internet use and tangible outcomes, according to B4, may not be affected much 
aside from political participation and expression using real names. However, the one 
practice that B4 sees had the most effect on Internet use, and left people with very limited 
agency to circumvent it, is Internet shutdowns, similar to what happened in Duraz area. 
The Internet in the Duraz area was shut down in the night for over a year, with the ISPs 
claiming that it is due to technical problems. 
A valuable contribution of B4 to the research was input on the collection of 
network measurement, as they are also working on a similar aim, but have faced problems 
related to safety and security concerns of people conducting the tests, especially when 
using dedicated OONI probes. The concerns were partially addressed with the 
introduction of the mobile OONI probe application, as it made it possible to conduct the 
tests with plausible deniability on any intent other than testing network speed. The 
concerns of B4 were reflected in the design of the survey messages and the call for testing 
included asking people to conduct the tests only when they feel it is safe to. 
The personal experience of B4 included their website and blog being repeatedly 
targeted by blocking, which they addressed by providing scripts to bypass circumvention 
and providing alternative addresses to access their website. Later on, the targeting was 
directed at them personally, where they were arrested and interrogated on several 
occasions, as a result, B4 fled Bahrain, but still lives in the fear of being targeted as part 
of digital espionage practices they are following of the Bahraini government. The 
experience of B4 culminates the fears people of Bahrain connect to activisms, including 
online activism. 
Interview Code B5 
The fifth interview concerning Bahrain was done with B5, a graduate student who 
has lived most of their life in Bahrain, and belong to the local culture, allowing them to 
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contribute to this research with their knowledge on the status of the Internet in Bahrain 
and compare it to Internet use experience in other countries with fewer limitations set on 
access. The interview was conducted in English and fulfils the sample targets of 
Economic Labour (EL), Economic Commerce (EC), Social (S), Political (P), 
Institutional/Governance (IG), Institutional/Health (IH), and Educational (E) fields. 
B5 sees uses of the Internet in Bahrain to be driven by social aspects, with high 
use and reliance on social media platforms to interact and communicate, while 
educational is not as prevalent. In terms of electronic services available, the Bahraini 
government is moving towards digitisation with more services available online, however, 
not many people interact with these services by themselves, but rather rely on others to 
help them in it, this is particular with the older generation relying on younger relatives to 
access e-government services.  
The educational aspect is also important, but from B5 experience in teaching, 
although most schools and universities utilise online systems for administration, the 
actual learning process is still highly reliant on face-to-face, while student use the Internet 
to access educational material but with no formal enrolment in online learning, including 
online diplomas and courses. 
In terms of business, there is a huge wave of moving towards online business, 
including setting up simple stores over Instagram, which the government is stepping to 
regulate and now people can start a business that is totally based online without requiring 
any physical presence. However, the limitations inherently involved with online 
shopping, like the ability to touch items and try clothes play a big role in the preference 
of some people to head to the offline shopping experience, as per B5. Payment methods 
are also an issue, but there are services that are now available to address that, like 
BenefitPay, the National Electronic Wallet System, which enables people to pay to 
services and other individuals in Bahrain without the need for credit cards, using debit 
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cards and agreements with local banks20. The service has also facilitated money transfers 
among individuals through phone number. 
For the labour market and employment, the case differs a lot between a field and 
another, although for some jobs and companies they rely heavily on recruiting people 
online, in others, design, for example, handing CVs manually is the norm, as most do not 
even advertise online, and one needs to go and ask for open vacancies.  
A lot of people use VPN, B5 asserts, to access online content as with Netflix, and 
when Pokémon Go was first released to appear as if they are in other areas bypassing geo-
blocking as the main motivation. B5 added that the content blocking exist in Bahrain, 
particularly form with the government blocking explicit content, while B5 does not feel 
that work or schools would have additional restrictions, which is something new to some 
extent, as B5 remembers that when they were in school the early 2000s, the Internet did 
not have many restrictions. However, they think that the government monitoring of 
Internet use is a reality in Bahrain, although cannot be sure. The perception of Internet 
monitoring, as per B5, overshadows any facts on whether monitoring is persistent or not, 
which in itself plays an important role in affecting people’s use of the Internet, like 
thinking twice before posting anything online. B5 laughed while saying that self-
censorship a very touchy subject, and hesitantly adds that it is mainly fear of sharing and 
expressing political aspects and views, more than any other aspect. This fear is consistent 
with how people are offline. 
One of the main issues Internet use did affect in the daily lives of Bahrainis is 
social and news consumption, with more and more people, rely on the news they receive 
online, more in the social and health-related aspects than in political aspect, but this is 
also related to the difference between generations, reflecting a possible digital divide 
 
20 Details on the service verified and expanded based on: 
https://www.benefit.bh/Services/BenefitPay/ 
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among generations. B5, nonetheless, did not hear of any formal digital skills development 
initiatives, but nonetheless, more and more people are using the Internet with adequate 
digital skills. The digital skills and increased use of the Internet did affect cultural aspects 
of the digital generation in Bahrain, where it opened the door to learn about different 
cultures and learn different ideas, but cultural dynamics are still bound to traditional 
dynamics, where people pick what to adopt from other cultures and appropriate it in their 
own practice. 
Interview Code E1: 
The first interview from Estonia was with E1, an entrepreneur focused on the field 
of technology, working on projects at the intersection of computing and society, and 
active in multiple non-governmental organisations dedicated to spreading and governance 
of technology. The 44 years old was chosen for interview based on their relevance to the 
subject of this research in terms of work and interests, with access gained through the 
LinkedIn platform. The interview was conducted in the English language. The interview 
followed the structure of questions as described in the methodology chapter, with enough 
room for comments to allow E1 to express their opinion on the subject. This interview 
fulfils the sample targets of Political (P), Economic/Commerce (EC), Social (S), 
Institutional/Governmental (IG) fields.  
E1 considers the Internet in Estonia to be free, with no restriction on access or 
content and considers Estonia a success story when it comes to digitisation and Internet 
use, especially in the economic field, referring this success to leadership. Business and 
political leaders, according to E1, steered the country towards successful use of 
technology after the independence and state-building following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Much of the focus was on developing the infrastructure and skills 
of Estonians, including providing schools with Internet connectivity and computers 
across the country, as part of the Tiger Leap project. 
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Although E1 cites no much social limitations on Internet use in Estonia, and the 
high level of freedom of expression online available, they later mention constant pressure 
to control expression online coming from political groups, especially with the spread of 
fake news and weaponisation of social media for political gains. E1 makes it clear that 
fake news is well spread over Estonian networks, sometimes through external influence, 
to the point that people in Estonia got used to it, and it became normalised, with little 
influence and ability to convince people, who learned how to check the facts by time and 
experience and allowed for further involvement in politics online. 
E1 clarified the high availability of online commerce platforms and services in 
Estonia, which people are relying on more and more, highlighting the ease of creating 
new business, where you can do that entirely online, and later manage that business online 
as well, including submitting taxes and managing bank accounts and activities. 
There are nowadays more projects that can be considered as sister projects to 
Tiger Leap, as per E1 expression, that target specific groups of citizens, particularly 
elderly people and young females, with focus on digital skills and job creation. This will 
extend the outcomes of Internet availability and further include these groups as active 
users of the Internet, and provides countrywide use of eGovernment facilities as per the 
governmental plans. In response to a specific question on whether moving to digital-only 
governmental activities, as in tax submission and voting, will result in the exclusion of 
some people, E1 clarified that this is possible mainly with elderly people who may ask 
someone else to help them in it, but will not result in total exclusion. 
One of the barriers that have slightly affected Internet use in Estonia according to 
E1 is language, but only for little kids, as it is not an issue for grownups. E1 discussed 
that although there is no enough online content available in the Estonian language, people 
rely on content available in English or other languages, as English is not a barrier for most 
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Estonians, except for little kids who may still need to learn English to be able to fully 
make use on English online content. 
When asked about the use of circumvention tools in Estonia, namely Virtual 
Private Networks (VPN) and proxies, E1 confirmed that it is high indeed, and is mainly 
due to limited content available to access through Estonian networks, saying that there is 
“very bad access to films, especially on Netflix”. E1 also confirmed that the high use is 
not related to fear of Internet monitoring, or to be able to comment anonymously. This 
forces people to fake their location and use circumvention tools to access the content they 
like. Nonetheless, E1 was aware of the downsides of using VPNs and proxies, mentioning 
that it may leave traces and compromise online privacy. 
Towards the end of the interview, E1 reiterated the current position of Estonia as 
a leader in eGovernment and online freedoms, and mentioned that they are working on 
rewriting the country codes, which are the rules that the eGovernment follows, to service 
design rather than IT design, allowing it to accommodate changes in a better manner. 
From the previous, we can see that E1 does confirm the finding related to Internet 
artificial limitations in Estonia, including the high level of Internet openness, and the high 
level of use of circumvention tools. E1 also confirmed findings of various aspects and 
pattern of tangible outcomes of Internet use in Estonia, including Social, Political, 
Economic, and Personal. 
Interview Code E2 
E2, the second interviewee from Estonia, works in a company that specialises in 
information technology, but their job is not technical in itself. E2 have been living in 
Estonia for ten years by the date of the interview and consider themself Internet power 
user. This interview fulfils the sample targets of Economic Labour (EL), Economic 
Commerce (EC), Social (S), Institutional/Health (IH), and Educational (E) fields. 
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The wide spread of the Internet and Internet services was the main issue E2 
focused on during the interview, showing pride in the speed available and services of 
Internet Service Providers. For affordability, they believe that the Internet cost is 
generally acceptable at prices approachable for most people, with a high level of 
competition between providers resulting in many offers available over different 
technologies available depending on location, including Internet over wireless and fibre. 
They also praised the high level of customer service available. 
In terms of tangible outcomes, economic benefits are clear, with a variety of 
online stores available that includes several local ones, in addition to the main 
international players, like Amazon and eBay. Electronic commerce is highly relied on in 
Estonia as per E2, with a good delivery network. On the other side of electronic 
commerce, the widespread technology culture that emerged after the state-building efforts 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped in developing high use of the Internet 
in different aspects, including starting online businesses. 
For freedom of expression, E2 notices that people in Estonia use online media to 
express their different views, including political, openly and with no worry for 
consequences, unlike other places that E2 lived in, where it is possible to be summoned 
by authorities based on your online activity as what E2 noted. This created a healthy 
online environment for discussion and debate. 
However, E2 shared their concern about the social aspect of the Internet, stating 
that it is causing a decline in direct relationships and communication, with people 
focusing on their phone all the times, even when they are with family or friends. Even if 
people would feel more affiliated with people they meet and communicate with online, it 
is still reducing direct interaction and does not make sense when one is out with their 
friends for example. 
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E2 also described how the eGovernment services are prevalent in Estonia, 
covering most facets of interaction with the government, providing ease of use and speed 
for services. One example they mentioned was tax filing, which allowed citizens to 
submit their taxes easily with few simple clicks, as the information is already available to 
the government. Access to health services is also included in the electronic services as 
per E2, in addition to the wide use of the Internet by people to benefit themselves and 
learn more about their health and health conditions. 
When asked about the use of VPNs and proxies, E2 did not feel that many people 
do use it, because there is no need to it, as everything is open and there no sense of 
surveillance or monitoring. This does not comply with the survey results of percentage of 
people in Estonian using these methods to bypass local networks, however, E2 was clear 
that there many uses for it other than to hide traffic, including accessing geo-restricted 
content. 
In summary, the interview with E2 confirmed findings from reports on the 
openness and spread of Internet access in Estonia, as well as the findings of tangible 
outcomes of Internet users in terms of economic use, as well as political use and freedom 
of expression. However, they had contradicting expectations of use of circumvention 
tools. The interview, in general, provided a deeper understanding of the scape of Internet 
service provisioning in Estonia, and the acceptance of eGovernment services. 
Interview Code E3 
The third interview focused on Estonia was with a local health practitioner, E3, 
who is not a technical person, and consider themself a general Internet user, and offers 
health advise and service online, making them able to provide a specialised perspective 
on the Internet use from a general user perspective in addition to professional service 
provider. This interview fulfils the sample targets of Economic Commerce (EC), Social 
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(S), Political (P), Institutional/Governance (IG), Institutional/Health (IH), and 
Educational (E) fields. 
As common with interviews in Estonia, E3 showed that they are proud of the 
widespread of Internet services provided in the country, as being similar in other 
European countries, with very good coverage around the country, except in the rural 
areas, where it is slightly different. Internet availability in rural areas in Estonia is a bit 
problematic, as they described it, especially with problems recently arising with the 
landline telephone network, however, the ministry of telecommunication is promising a 
100% coverage, which is almost done. About affordability, E3 confirmed that Internet 
access is very affordable for the common household, as well as having affordable prices 
for mobile Internet. 
In terms of services available for the public in Estonia to use over the Internet, E3 
expressed that they feel that eGovernment services are first-class services that allow one 
to do anything online, as the saying in Estonia, you can do it all online except getting 
divorced, and the joke that they are working on it. The state has come really close to the 
citizens by providing very good services that can be done online, like paying taxes, 
renewing a driving license, and even registering new companies. 
Electronic commerce was another aspect the interview dwelt into, with E3 
outlining how popular it is in Estonia as a service offered by most local retailers, as well 
as through dedicated online retailers. However, E3 prefers to do most of their shopping 
in person at traditional shops, but definitely, e-commerce is very much used among many 
people, and there are very good services in place. A similar perspective was given on 
doing business online, especially with the experience of E3 in providing service to the 
citizens through an online speech therapy platform. This experience proved to them that 
setting up an online store and starting your business is relatively easy, and requires only 
a few hours if one had enough ambition and motivation. 
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 The experience with one of the online health services allowed E3 to evaluate 
other online health services, portraying that, when compared to other electronic services, 
eHealth services in Estonia are not where they should be. The functionality offered 
through patient portals is limited, with people having access to view their information 
now with no much interaction, except for digital registration system, which was added 
recently did not have that much use so far. Another aspect is that elderly people and 
people with more severe illness rely on institutions and not the services provided online, 
while the younger generation that is more familiar with information-seeking online help 
themselves through eHealth services knowledge available and services provided. E3 
stated that the work they are involved in, which is connected to the government, has a 
vision towards a patient-centric health system with eHealth services as the tool. 
Internet is Estonia is also important in forming individual identities, enabling 
people to affiliate themselves with people feeling more connected to their online 
acquaintances, including what groups and networks you are using, and what news you 
read, with people using the affordances of the Internet to identify themselves based on 
their interests rather than their geographical location. This is facilitated with the current 
situation of the Internet in Estonia as being free with no limitations other than cost to 
some extent and general literacy on knowing how to use connected and smart devices. E3 
compared the limitations to other countries in terms of blocking and controls especially 
that no political party is thinking of extending any control or power over the Internet, 
unlike other places like Russia. 
Nonetheless, E3 sees that many people do have agency in using VPN and proxies 
to have access to different services, including for business to access corporate networks, 
and education, to access institutional database access. Another major reason for using 
VPN, which E3 did theirself, is to access online content that is geo-blocked, from outside 
Estonia to access content only accessible from inside Estonia, as with some of the national 
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television channel content, while they realise that other people use it from inside Estonia 
to access international content, as with Netflix. 
E3 ended the interview with reiterating that tangible outcomes of Internet use in 
Estonia is more related to digital literacy, and that people in the older age groups are not 
able to use the Internet and benefit from it as with other age groups, in a manner that is 
similar to other countries, but is getting better with time. 
Interview Code S1 
The first interview for Singapore was with S1, a Singaporean student doing their 
undergraduate studies in Europe, with interests in educational, social, and commercial 
aspects of the Internet. S1’s contribution to the research included assisting in spreading 
the survey through their networks in Singapore, in addition to the insight provided 
through the interview on the Internet limitations and uses in Singapore. The language 
used in this interview was English. This interview fulfils the sample targets of Economic 
Commerce (EC), Social (S), and Educational (E) fields. 
The interview began with S1 discussing how they belong to a generation that 
knows the world through and with the Internet, with online tools and websites as well as 
applications being their main gateway to communication, social interaction, knowledge 
and information gathering, and business. S1 noted that everyone they know in Singapore 
uses the Internet, and that among the general population, most people do have access to 
the Internet, and use it in a way or another, even if at least to communicate with family 
and friends over social media platforms. 
For many in Singapore, according to S1, the Internet is their main shopping 
destination, if not for actual purchases, to browse what is available at stores and go in 
person to purchase, especially for clothes and equipment. Food was another area that 
people rely on the Internet for, from ordering food to looking for the best places to eat, 
either using directories or following some of the food-related blogs common and trusted 
A-295 
in Singapore. S1 sees these affordances of communication and ability to conduct 
eCommerce as the main drivers behind Internet adoption in Singapore, especially that it 
provided a promise for a more free atmosphere for expression, nonetheless, S1 points out 
to an increase in practices by the government to address hate speech and what is being 
labelled as fake news outlets online. The practices have also affected many regular people 
that were trying to speak their mind, which resulted in increased mistrust in the platform, 
and transcending of the general fear culture from the street to the online world. 
Despite the limitations, S1 states that most people would ignore the perception of 
limitation and use the Internet for business, communication, and entertainment with no 
worries as long as they avoid political content, even the official discourse. This attitude 
increasingly limiting the functionality of the Internet in relation to electronic political 
participation and activism, except for very few people that are openly opposing the 
political regime, and are being labelled as dissidents, and potentially persecuted, 
especially if they were based in Singapore, or do visit Singapore, under the pretext of 
protecting national harmony and morals. S1 also indicated that they feel that more and 
more of their friends are using circumvention tools even when they are trying to access 
websites and services that are not blocked, for the mere feeling of being relieved from 
governmental monitoring and surveillance. 
In terms of educational affordances of the Internet, S1 pointed out that the Internet 
allows exposure to online courses and content, as well as face-to-face courses offered 
around the world, which some Singaporeans do join. On the local level, S1 could not 
comment much except that they have heard of more schools introducing online 
curriculum to assist in their traditional training and teaching. Giving educational tangible 
outcomes of Internet use a good room to grow and develop.  
The general attitude of people towards the Internet according to S1 differs 
between generations, with the younger generations relying almost entirely on online 
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websites and services to access information and entertainment, and to communicate. The 
older generation, on the other hand, is using the Internet as an auxiliary tool for their daily 
lives, to provide easier to access services, particularly with access to some news websites 
and social media platforms. The difference between generations, according to S1, is 
nearing with more older people are introduced to Internet world and are able to obtain 
more digital skills. 
S1 did not comment on some of the issues brought up in the survey because they 
thought it would be wise for them to refrain from discussing and aspects they deemed 
political, including details on Internet limitations, and the connection between changes in 
the political environment of Singapore and changes in models of control and balance of 
network powers. But still, S1’s input matched to a large extend the finding of Study 1 and 
the survey in Study 2, particularly with perception to limitations, use of circumvention 
tools, and levels of outcomes in the Internet use fields. 
Interview Code S2 
The second interview from Singapore was with S2, an expert in eLearning based 
in Singapore, with interests in social and commercial aspects of the Internet. S2 has also 
provided good insight into the business environment and the Internet in Singapore from 
their experience as an educator and development coach, which contributed to the 
understanding of digital skills from S2’s point of view. The language used in this 
interview was English. This interview fulfils the sample targets of Economic Commerce 
(EC), Social (S), Political (P), Institutional/Governmental (IG), and Educational (E) 
fields. 
In setting the ground for the interview, S2 expressed how highly they regard the 
Internet for playing an important and crucial role in the development of Singapore as an 
economy and community, including providing data they use in research that is both local 
and global. S2 also looked at the Internet as a global platform that is moving towards 
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using as a central location for all of our information, including files we share and store 
online, and data on our Internet use of different platforms.  
However, they believe that despite all the resources the Internet make available, 
people in Singapore are not exploiting it to the fullest, especially when it comes to self-
development and learning from online resources and utilising the communication 
facilities to augment traditional education towards a full eLearning experience. The move 
can be seen in the adoption of several educational institutes of the Internet as a method 
for delivering learning, and offering skills development that included courses related to 
using the Internet to finding the right resources for studies. 
S2 noted here that for some topics, you will need a physical and direct contact to 
learn, as in laboratory experiments, but for the vast majority of education, the Internet can 
be used to provide better education experience with full courses offered online. In 
Singapore, there is some hesitation in adopting a fully online learning experience, but this 
is changing because of awareness development on the benefits of eLearning, which would 
contribute to self-development of individuals. 
Language is not a barrier for Singaporeans to access and use the Internet according 
to S2, these days, more online content is now available in different language after a wave 
of internationalisation. S2 credits this wave to globalisations, which helped in making the 
Internet more accessible, and in turn, increased how people make use of Internet use, 
rendering language as no longer a limiting factor. 
In terms of skills, S2 pointed out that they noted from experience that digital skills 
are generally acceptable in Singapore, but most people learn specialised digital skills 
because of work requirements or learning it on the job, more than on their own, but efforts 
towards general digital skills development are needed. S2 believes that age plays an 
important role in determining digital skills and usage of the Internet, where they feel that 
the vast majority of youngsters conduct their shopping online, for everything from food 
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to apparel, while older people prefer to go to a physical store to purchase items. There is 
a shift in buying habits to rely more on electronic commerce, but it is connected again to 
age, in a similar fashion to digital skills, and S2 states that there is still a long way to go 
to exploit fully the Internet in the economic field for individuals. 
Social relation in the small island nation has been active and based on areas where 
people live, whether in compounds or neighbourhoods according to S2, nowadays, the 
context of these social relations is expanding with the use of the Internet, and now it 
covers more or less the whole country. S2 believes that this is happening largely because 
people are aware that they need to put efforts towards community development, and now 
they know what is happening where across Singapore, with a wider pool of people getting 
together and forming online communities. Some of the specialised online communities 
S2 praised were the health domain, which they think is doing a good job in reaching out 
to people over the Internet. 
The interview with S2 showed that they are wary of speaking of official 
limitations and restrictions on the Internet, moving the questions to Internet limitations in 
workplace or school. For example, when asked about the reports on website blocking in 
Singapore, they justify it by saying that blocking is important especially in the banking 
industry because you have a lot of information that you do not want employees to leak 
out, so companies limit access to work-related content and sites only. Nonetheless, as the 
interview went on, they were more open and mentioned that people use VPNs and proxy 
services to access the content they do not to declare, but insisted that blocking is good to 
stop sites that are not “valid” or service inappropriate content. S2 connected blocking and 
Internet limitations to rules of digital citizenship, which they see that everybody should 
have knowledge of and work within it and should not affect your Internet use or 
opportunities of being active online as long as you are using the Internet judicially. 
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Adding that freedom comes with responsibility and people should be aware of both, the 
harms and benefits of the Internet.  
Interview Code S3 
To fulfil the requirements of interview sample selection from Singapore, the third 
interview was conducted with a student specialising in network security, who is also 
involved in online commerce. The language used in this interview was English. This 
interview fulfils the sample targets of Political (P), Institutional/Governmental (IG), 
Institutional/Health (IH), and Educational (E) fields. 
After introducing the research and collecting consent, the interview began with 
general questions on the status of the Internet in Singapore to establish rapport. S3 sees 
that Internet is used positively by almost everyone in Singapore, with a distinction 
between the uses across generations. The older generation, according to S3, tend to rely 
more on the Internet to communicate with family and friends, and for entertainment in 
the form of following television shows and dramas online. While the generations of 
people who are younger than 40 years old, rely on the Internet as a news source to stay 
informed and up to date with what is happening in Singapore and the wider world, in 
addition to communication and entertainment. However, uses of the Internet beyond 
communication, entertainment, and accessing news, is still not as wide as expected 
because people feel an alienation between their daily lives and the Internet, looking at it 
as a media that serves as a window on themselves to the government, making it hard for 
the Internet to become a normalised part of daily activities.  
The opaqueness of the Internet as a technology was notable throughout the 
interview with S3, especially when compared with how other interviewees who looked at 
the Internet as an integral part of their everyday activities. This position was not expected 
from a person who was born with the beginning of this millennium, when over a third of 
individuals in Singapore were using the Internet, prompting asking S3 to explain further 
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this position. The reason for the disconnection according to S3 is that people in Singapore 
have developed tactics to deal with government policies by altering their activities that 
can be seen by the government, including those over the Internet, as a form of self-
censorship and methods to stay off the government radar. At the same time, people in 
Singapore developed methods to express themselves freely while avoiding that 
monitoring, effectively constructed multiple groups of activities people deal with in 
separation, activities that are passable to be monitored, and activities that people prefer 
to keep off the eyes of the government. 
The interaction with public services available online and the government 
nonetheless, fell under the first group of activities, that are passable to be monitored, with 
people providing a positive attitude and outlook to these activities, while at the same time 
trying to make the most of it to safe themselves time and effort, as S3 put it. The online 
activities included applying to licenses and other electronic government-related 
processes, but fell short in terms of political expression, except when it is in line with the 
government and the main party official discourse. 
Education was another activity that was well spread in Singapore, with many 
universities and educational institutes offering online affordances to augment face-to-face 
education. At the same time, people in Singapore are open and comfortable to accessing 
educational material and courses available over the Internet, even if it did not originate 
from Singapore, as Singaporeans, according to S3, consider themselves active members 
of the global online community, or network society. 
The interview with S3 ended with them offering an insight into tendency among 
fellows to study network security and new technologies as they believe that these topics 
will be more relevant in the foreseeable future with more reliance on communication 
technologies to fulfil everyday needs. S3 however, reiterated that the split in how people 
interact with the Internet, between what they want to be seen, versus what they do not 
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what to be seen, is an extension to general culture in Singapore that was developed as a 
form of resilience to increased monitoring and surveillance in the country. 
Interview Code S4 
The fifth interview from Singapore was with a Singaporean who is currently 
outside Singapore, and thus has what they described as a different view developed over 
time of being outside. S4 is a designer who has special interests in national identity and 
has been in and out of Singapore for the past eight years. The language used in this 
interview was English. This interview fulfils the sample targets of Economic Labour 
(EL), Economic Commerce (EC), Social (S), Political (P), and Educational (E) fields. 
One of the first comments of S4 was about the change in their views happening 
after starting to go outside of Singapore for extended periods, as they found that they 
could speak more freely, and think less of the consequences of expressing an opinion, 
especially online. S4 described how in Singapore Internet is used mainly for leisure, and 
one of the trending aspects is blogs and discussion on food, saying that this is because “in 
Singapore, people have a tendency to talk more openly about food rather than for example 
politics”. People feel that they are discouraged from discussing more serious issues, 
whether online or offline and turn to other discussions thus engaging the Internet in 
different aspects of their lives. Food arises again here, as because of the limited space at 
houses, people meet outside, usually over food, and it became part of the social habit to 
search for food recommendations online before meeting. 
The political expression online is affected through the clear change in Internet 
openness and even quality after the narrow win of the incumbent ruling party People’s 
Action Party in 2011, where the government extended its control over the Internet21. S4 
 
21 The year 2011 was the first year where changes to the 
Constitution and election laws permitted campaigning in cyberspace, as 
a result the New York Times reported that grip on the Internet in 
Singapore was loosen as in 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/world/asia/08singapore.html.  
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sees this as a turning point in the voices of the opposition over the Internet, but there came 
many rules that controlled online expression, including a rule requiring blogs and 
websites talking about politics to register with the authorities. S4 says that being able to 
see the Internet from inside and outside they could see a change in openness, for their 
friends in Singapore, they would not know that a website was stopped, because they just 
would not see it. Another aspect was a sudden surge of trolls on discussion fora that would 
repeatedly publish “rubbish” that would undermine the reliability and respect of the 
platform. 
S4 was confident that rumours of what is allowed and what is not supposed to be 
discussed online affect how people use the Internet for political expression, creating an 
environment of self-censorship. This environment is carried on from the days before the 
Internet, through the early days of the Internet reaching current time. In the early days of 
the Internet, before Social media Sites, pornography and websites related to drugs were 
the only websites that people could not access, but after some time, the government 
realised that existing measures and laws cannot handle the Internet as expected, 
encouragement creation of new rules, which people did not protest as S4 said.  
Use of VPN and proxies were not as common in Singapore in the old days of the 
Internet, but with an increase of blocking, and the influence of Chinese use of 
circumvention tools, which was facilitated through the strong social ties between 
Singaporeans and Chinese. S4 said that if they were in Singapore right now, they would 
use circumvention tools to bypass blocking, and protect themselves from monitoring and 
surveillance. This assertion comes from the feeling that someone is always monitoring, 
fortified by observing a sudden drop in speed that coincided with elections, despite 
thinking that technology to manage increased demand is there, S4 believes that change in 
quality is related to the introduction of surveillance facilities. 
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In terms of economy, S4 sees that e-commerce is very common in Singapore with 
buying and selling over platforms, including Social Networking Sites, is widespread with 
no restrictions, making the Internet the main market place for many people, in particular, 
the younger generation. Another aspect is the labour and job market, which is becoming 
highly reliant on the Internet, with no restrictions observed. 
The Internet facilitated cultural and identity development in Singapore according 
to S4, with the Internet allowing for more access to culture-related content, and allowing 
for art to reach a wider audience beyond the creative sector. In term of identity and 
affiliation, S4 said that new forms are being developed based on the affordances of the 
Internet, connecting people with similar interests, even decreasing the importance of the 
Singaporean aspect of people’s self-identification. The availability of educational 
material online helped in this aspect, with a clear increase in the use of technology and 
the Internet to support education. 
The interview with S4 demonstrated the self-censorship as being the main factor 
affecting how people use the Internet, especially in relation to political expression, while 
feeling that there are no restrictions on economic, education, and cultural aspects. S4 has 
clearly identified the change in perception people have when they see the difference in 
Internet openness between inside and outside of Singapore, highlighting an aspect that 
may have affected the survey results by pushing people towards more positive answers. 
S4 have also provided testimony on the observed change in rules and quality of the 





Appendix III: Statistics and Calculations 
(A) Skewness and Kurtosis Analysis for Fields and Sub-fields 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
EAA_Property 379 1.00 5.00 3.5950 1.01520 -0.649 -0.029 
EAA_Income 360 1.00 5.00 3.2472 1.09887 -0.330 -0.441 
EAA_EduEmployment 415 1.00 5.00 3.9612 0.83536 -0.942 0.970 
ESA_Property 380 1.00 5.00 4.2868 0.79781 -1.533 3.332 
ESA_Income 381 1.00 5.00 4.3465 0.79599 -1.455 2.632 
ESA_EduEmployment 404 1.00 5.00 4.1238 0.68385 -0.905 1.721 
CAA_Identity 334 1.00 5.00 3.6108 0.97322 -0.688 0.157 
CAA_Belonging 330 1.00 5.00 3.5470 1.00685 -0.639 0.058 
CSA_Identity 296 1.00 5.00 3.5270 0.91092 -0.487 0.465 
CSA_Belonging 310 1.00 5.00 3.6790 0.89734 -0.514 0.570 
SAA_Personal 358 1.00 5.00 3.5098 0.94486 -0.256 -0.310 
SAA_Formal 260 1.00 5.00 3.4385 1.20170 -0.639 -0.410 
SAA_Political 281 1.00 5.00 3.5107 1.09458 -0.591 -0.116 
SSA_Personal 357 1.00 5.00 4.1709 0.79866 -0.987 1.060 
SSA_Formal 209 1.00 5.00 3.8541 0.78538 -0.371 0.394 
SSA_Political 335 1.00 5.00 4.0881 0.93766 -1.137 1.320 
PAA_Health 345 1.00 5.00 4.0449 0.83362 -1.063 1.547 
PAA_SelfActualisation 357 1.00 5.00 4.3992 0.64121 -1.201 2.029 
PAA_Leisure 346 1.00 5.00 4.1243 0.82384 -1.130 1.999 
PSA_Health 298 1.00 5.00 3.9060 0.77496 -0.814 1.647 
PSA_SelfActualisation 355 1.00 5.00 4.1972 0.66849 -1.085 2.503 
PSA_Leisure 357 1.00 5.00 4.0350 0.79290 -0.940 1.244 
Economic Achievement 418 1.00 5.00 3.71 0.74 -0.54 0.46 
Economic Satisfaction 415 1.00 5.00 4.21 0.63 -1.25 3.15 
Cultural Achievement 355 1.00 5.00 3.58 0.86 -0.65 0.46 
Cultural Satisfaction 340 1.00 5.00 3.63 0.80 -0.40 0.83 
Social Achievement 361 1.00 5.00 3.49 0.84 -0.37 0.03 
Social Satisfaction 364 1.00 5.00 4.09 0.66 -0.65 0.79 
Personal Achievement 362 1.00 5.00 4.19 0.61 -1.03 2.05 
Personal Satisfaction 359 1.00 5.00 4.06 0.57 -0.85 2.53 
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(B) Factor Analysis for Perception of Limitations 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Feel_WorkControl 1.000 .358 
Feel_ISPControl 1.000 .442 
Feel_GovControl 1.000 .542 
Feel_WorkMonitor 1.000 .486 
Feel_ISPMonitor 1.000 .412 
Feel_GovMonitor 1.000 .613 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.853 47.546 47.546 2.853 47.546 47.546 
2 .948 15.805 63.351    
3 .779 12.988 76.339    
4 .699 11.652 87.991    
5 .397 6.614 94.605    
6 .324 5.395 100.000    












Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 









 Initial Extraction 
[I know how to access a 
blocked site] 
1.000 .842 
[I know how to access a 
restricted website without 
being caught] 
1.000 .842 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 




Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
1 1.684 84.218 84.218 1.684 84.218 84.218 
2 .316 15.782 100.000    






[I know how to access a 
blocked site] 
.918 
[I know how to access a 
restricted website without 
being caught] 
.918 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 





(D) Correlations between predictors and subfields 













How old are you? -0.005 -0.059 -.159** 0.093 0.073 -0.040 
Year_Internet 0.088 0.071 -0.067 .194** .187** .110* 
Are you? .136** .150** 0.027 -0.065 -0.098 -0.049 
Education Level Group 0.005 -0.006 0.010 0.084 0.064 .104* 
Employment Group -.133* -0.021 0.070 -.125* -.124* -0.047 
Perception of Limitation 0.047 0.095 0.083 -.102* -.133** -0.060 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .248** .182** .168** -0.061 -0.053 0.044 
Circumvention_useSum .174** .156** .137** 0.066 0.088 .142** 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      
 
Cultural Achievement and Satisfaction Sub-fields, Whole Sample 
Whole Sample CAA_Identity CAA_Belonging CSA_Identity CSA_Belonging 
How old are you? -.252** -.152** -0.066 -0.078 
Year_Internet -.163** -.163** -0.007 -0.056 
Are you? -0.019 -0.048 -0.008 -.115* 
Education Level Group -.181** -.115* -0.070 -0.071 
Employment Group .152** .116* 0.001 0.047 
Perception of Limitation .194** .291** 0.055 -0.044 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .190** .113* 0.097 0.024 
Circumvention_useSum .107* 0.072 0.085 0.100 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Social Achievement and Satisfaction Sub-fields, Whole Sample 












How old are you? -.132* -.215** -.220** -0.054 -0.024 0.082 
Year_Internet -.167** -.169** -0.090 -0.016 0.045 .139* 
Are you? 0.070 0.019 -0.061 -0.086 -0.124 -.119* 
Education Level Group -.197** -.191** -0.105 -0.079 -0.003 0.012 
Employment Group .188** .158* 0.082 0.072 -0.067 -0.048 
Perception of Limitation .182** 0.070 -0.035 0.083 -0.064 -.224** 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .155** .138* 0.012 0.054 0.038 -.124* 
Circumvention_useSum -0.002 0.107 0.057 0.076 0.120 0.042 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 




Personal Achievement and Satisfaction Sub-fields, Whole Sample 












How old are you? -.121* -.205** -.223** 0.031 -.108* -0.047 
Year_Internet -0.022 -0.052 -0.096 0.113 -0.016 -0.048 
Are you? -.107* 0.033 -0.087 -0.020 -0.020 0.033 
Education Level Group -0.083 -.127* -.178** -0.067 -.114* -.165** 
Employment Group 0.064 0.076 .200** -0.044 .116* 0.102 
Perception of Limitation -0.015 -0.028 0.045 -0.067 -0.022 0.084 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .135* .186** .152** 0.003 0.084 0.051 
Circumvention_useSum .116* .201** .158** 0.097 .119* .126* 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 














How old are you? 0.030 -0.006 -.131* .151* .131* -0.076 
Year_Internet 0.083 0.098 -0.090 .228** .194** 0.045 
Are you? .135* .236** 0.057 0.030 -0.026 0.009 
Education Level Group -0.021 -0.039 -0.059 0.098 0.089 0.071 
Employment Group -.142* 0.019 .167** -.194** -.187** 0.029 
Perception of Limitation .181** .142* .174** 0.094 0.076 .128* 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .260** .170* .132* 0.014 0.019 0.121 
Circumvention_useSum .211** 0.119 0.074 0.033 0.049 .146* 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), Underline denotes significance 
specific to high limitations, Italic is specific to whole sample but not high limitations 
Cultural Achievement and Satisfaction Sub-fields, Countries with High 
Limitations 
High Limitations CAA_Identity CAA_Belonging CSA_Identity CSA_Belonging 
How old are you? -.243** -.212** 0.005 -0.015 
Year_Internet -.158* -.144* 0.022 -0.053 
Are you? -0.040 -0.094 0.041 -0.024 
Education Level Group -.195** -0.130 -0.023 -0.085 
Employment Group .142* .144* -0.077 -0.032 
Perception of Limitation .217** .181** .142* 0.055 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .184** 0.091 0.097 0.040 
Circumvention_useSum 0.073 0.037 0.057 0.016 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), Underline denotes significance 
specific to high limitations, Italic is specific to whole sample but not high limitations 
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Social Achievement and Satisfaction Sub-fields, Countries with High Limitations 












How old are you? -0.096 -.227** -.208** -0.080 -0.038 .166* 
Year_Internet -0.098 -.179* -.173* -0.002 0.007 .151* 
Are you? 0.021 0.037 0.060 -0.046 -0.015 0.038 
Education Level Group -.214** -.253** -0.140 -.155* -0.055 0.067 
Employment Group .138* .205* 0.086 0.116 -0.028 -0.111 
Perception of Limitation 0.098 -0.022 0.061 .155* 0.027 -0.062 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .175** .196* 0.094 0.120 0.114 -0.056 
Circumvention_useSum 0.056 0.101 0.080 0.073 0.103 -0.015 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), Underline denotes significance 
specific to high limitations, Italic is specific to whole sample but not high limitations 
 
 
Personal Achievement and Satisfaction Sub-fields, Countries with High 
Limitations 












How old are you? -0.071 -.148* -.159* 0.097 -0.033 -0.060 
Year_Internet -0.004 -0.041 0.000 0.121 0.024 -0.011 
Are you? -0.086 0.102 -0.078 0.048 0.010 0.075 
Education Level Group -0.127 -0.120 -.170* -0.107 -.157* -.151* 
Employment Group 0.104 0.052 .149* -0.036 0.084 0.100 
Perception of Limitation 0.036 0.092 0.120 0.037 0.062 .137* 
Skill, Bypass Limitations .143* .252** .140* 0.041 0.119 .147* 
Circumvention_useSum 0.080 .176** 0.083 0.099 0.066 .202** 
Notes: ** Denotes Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Denotes 
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), Underline denotes significance 
specific to high limitations, Italic is specific to whole sample but not high limitations 
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Appendix IV: Example of the Free Basics Service 
The following is a set of screenshots for Facebook’s Free Basics service as 
available on the Jordanian Zain Mobile Network through the web browser, the Android 
App experience is identical. The screenshots were last updated on 15th of October 2019 
and portray the welcome page, list of main services, list of services available to add, and 
the search functionality. 
 




Main page and list of default services 




List services that can be added 
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